By Luther Weeks on May 30, 2017
Article in The Atlantic: The Case for Standardized and Secure Voting Technology
It’s time to fix the voting process.
American voting systems have improved in recent years, but they collectively remain a giant mess. Voting is controlled by states, and typically administered by counties and local governments. Voting laws differ depending on where you are. Voting machines vary, too; there’s no standard system for the nation.
Accountability is a crapshoot. In some jurisdictions, voters use machines that create electronic tallies with no “paper trail”—that is, no tangible evidence whatsoever that the voter’s choices were honored. A “recount” in such places means asking the machine whether it was right the first time.
We need to fix all of this.
Posted in Internet Voting, National, Post-Election Audits, Recounts/Recanvasses
By Luther Weeks on May 24, 2017
A few municipalities conduct elections in May rather than November. We joined Deputy Secretary of the State Scott Bates, Assistant Secretary Peggy Reeves, and SOTS Office Interns for the drawing. Sadly, due to last year’s reduction in the audit, only one district will be audited.
We strongly object to the official press release’s characterization of Connecticut’s Post-Election Audit as “Comprehensive”. A comprehensive audit would not exempt ballots from selection for audit, it would audit the totaling of votes, and include compliance audits of all aspects of the election such as checkin lists, voter roles, and ballot security.
Posted in CT, Post-Election Audits
By Luther Weeks on May 19, 2017
It is rare that a bill is debated that has insufficient majority caucus support to pass.
[Speaker] Aresimowicz said he’s heard from his constituents that they want the issue debated.“I’m saying let’s at least hear it out and have the discussion,” Aresimowicz said Thursday morning during a press conference in his office before the House debated the bill.
House Majority Leader Matt Ritter, D-Hartford, said he expects the vote to be close and it’s unclear what will happen.
Here, we disagree with both sides. We do not buy the Republican arguments against nor the Democratic arguments for the bill. We would support a sufficient Constitutional Amendment. The Compact approach is dangerous making, a flawed system worse. It will lead to increased voter suppression and skulduggery.v
Posted in CT, National Popular Vote
By Luther Weeks on May 13, 2017
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill , said,“The rationale for this commission was articulated in a baseless tweet from the president that claimed millions of illegal votes were cast. The facts don’t lie. Voter fraud is extremely rare. Yet time and again, the specter of voter fraud has served as an excuse to disenfranchise tens of thousands of eligible voters. I hope that this investigation is not a fig leaf for voter suppression and intimidation. In Connecticut, we will protect every eligible person’s right to vote. I stand by our process and our elections officials.”
This reminds us of the Bush era witch hunt in the Justice Department for voter fraud. Several attorneys were let go because they could not find or refused to continue hunting for all but non-existent fraud.
We do question Secretary Merrill’s statement that “In Connecticut, we will protect every eligible person’s right to vote. I stand by our process and our elections officials.”
Posted in CT, National, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on May 8, 2017
Connecticut is known as the “Nutmeg State” based on the legend of Yankee Peddlers selling wooden nutmegs to unsuspecting New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians. True or not, there is little reason to trust anyone here when it comes to random drawings. Recent history leaves us with little trust in officials and random drawings.
The Secretary of the State’s Office has improved the integrity of the post-election audit drawing, yet two problems remain.
Posted in CT, Post-Election Audits
By Luther Weeks on May 2, 2017
Article at Think Progress: How easy would it be to rig the next election?
In the popular imagination, this is what election hacking looks like?—?dramatic, national-scale interference that manually rewrites tallies and hands the victory to the outlier. Certainly these attacks may occur. However, they’re only one of a variety of electoral hacks possible against the United States, at a time when hacking attacks are becoming more accessible to threat-actors and nation-state-sponsored attackers are growing more brazen. Yes, hackers may attempt to change the vote totals for American elections?—?but they can also de-register voters, delete critical data, trip up voting systems to cause long lines at polling stations, and otherwise cultivate deep distrust in the legitimacy of election results. If hackers wish to rig a national election, they can do it by changing only small numbers on a state level.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National