

Contacts: JODY EISEMANN AT 254-2765 OR CORALEE REISS AT 254-2765

Subject: WILL ALL OF CONNECTICUT'S VOTES
BE COUNTED IN NOVEMBER?

WILL ALL OF CONNECTICUT'S VOTES BE COUNTED IN NOVEMBER?

Will all of Connecticut's votes be counted in November? The public is invited to find out at a forum on July 7th sponsored by the Fairfield Democratic Town Committee. As the election integrity movement grows, concerns are raised about the safety and security of Connecticut's new voting machine, the Accuvote. Can its memory card be easily corrupted? Can vote totals be changed? Are there safeguards that can prevent our vote from being manipulated?

Guest speakers will be Deputy Secretary of State Lesley Mara; Founder of CT Voters Count Luther Weeks; and Dr. Alex Shvartsman, UCONN professor, who oversees the state's technical safety issues for Accuvote. **The forum will take place July 7 at 8 pm in Osborn Hill School's All Purpose Room.** It will include 10 minutes of HBO's "Hacking Democracy", statements from the three speakers, and then questions from the public.

For further information about the forum, please call Jody Eisemann at 203-254-6596 or Coralee Reiss at 203-254-2765.

Speakers:

Lesley Mara
Deputy Secretary of State since January 2006
UCONN Law School (honors), 1986
Smith College, 1983
<http://www.ct.gov/sots/site/default.asp>

Alexander A. Shvartsman, Ph.D. Professor Computer
Science and Engineering UCONN
Dr. Shvartsman is overseeing voting technology and
security for Connecticut's electronic voting equipment.
<http://www.engr.uconn.edu/~aas/>

Luther Weeks, Founder – Connecticut Voters Count
Retired Software Engineer and Computer Scientist
<http://www.ctvoterscount.org/>

Source Code Review of The Diebold Voting System

July 20, 2007 by the University of California, Berkeley

Princeton University: Joseph A. Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman,
J. Alex Halderman, Harlan Yu, and William P. Zeller

University of California, Berkeley: David Wagner

This report was prepared by the University of California, Berkeley, under contract to the California Secretary of State as part of a “Top-to-Bottom” review of electronic voting systems certified for use in the State of California. As a result, the State of California decertified the Accuvote. More information is available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm. This is the Conclusion of the report.

Conclusion

Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks. These vulnerabilities, if exploited, could jeopardize voter privacy and the integrity of elections. An attack could plausibly be accomplished by a single skilled individual with temporary access to a single voting machine.

The damage could be extensive – malicious code could spread to every voting machine in polling places and to county election servers. Even with a paper trail, malicious code might be able to subtly influence close elections, and it could disrupt elections by causing widespread equipment failure on election day. We conclude that these problems arose because of a failure to design and build the system with security as a central focus, which led to the inconsistent application of accepted security engineering practices. For this reason, the safest way to repair the Diebold system is to reengineer it so that it is secure by design.

We discussed a number of limited solutions and procedural changes that may improve the security of the system, but we warn that implementing any particular set of technical or procedural safeguards may still be insufficient. Similarly, fixing individual flaws in the system – even all of the issues identified in this report – may not yield a secure voting system, because of the possibility that unidentified problems will be exploited. We are also concerned that future updates to the system may introduce new, unknown vulnerabilities or fail to adequately correct known ones. We urge the state to conduct further studies to determine whether any new or updated voting systems are secure.