By Luther Weeks on September 19, 2019
States and the Federal Government are pumping millions into cybersecurity and new voting systems. That is all good, especially when the new systems are for Voter Marked Paper Ballots and Ballot Marking Devices for those with disabilities. Yet ultimately, it can provide a false sense of security. No matter how strong the cybersecurity and the quality of software, based on Turing’s Halting Problem, it is impossible to secure a computer system from errors and hacking. it is also impossible to secure systems from insiders and others with physical access.
Posted in Chain of Custody, Electronic Vulnerability, National, Our Editorials, Post-Election Audits
By Luther Weeks on September 12, 2019
Op-Ed in Politico by two former secretaries of state, one D and one R: Election Security Isn’t That Hard
First, we need to dispel one misconception. Many people (including many election officials) believe that if a voting system or scanner is never connected to the internet, it will always be safe. Alas, that’s not the case…
What this means is that while we must make our election infrastructure as secure as possible, we need to accept that it is essentially impossible to make those systems completely secure.
Overall, we agree as far as this op-ed goes. Yet, Risk Limiting Tabulation Audits alone are not sufficient. We need additional audits to check the rest of the process, “process audits” e.g. chain-of-custody/ballot security audits, check-in process audits (appropriate voters allowed or excluded from voting?), accuracy of the voter registration database and lists etc. Like many officials the authors focus on cyber attack, yet we must also protect our systems from insider attack. Connecticut has a way to go to meet these standards. We do have voter marked paper ballots and air-gaped systems. Yet we have insufficient protection of those paper ballots and insufficient election audits.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National, Post-Election Audits
By Luther Weeks on August 25, 2019
This week Verified Voting released a Policy on DREs and BMDs. It is consistent with our views.
But it’s not enough for a voting system to “check the box” on paper – to print paper records that voters may not even notice or examine. To be trustworthy, elections need to be based on voter-marked paper ballots. Whether these ballots are marked by hand or by device, for them to be considered voter-marked, voters should know what they say!
As they say: “We have had some long and sometimes difficult conversations about these topics, and we look forward to more.”
Posted in National, Other Editorials, Reports
By Luther Weeks on August 21, 2019
Costs to mail ballots may skyrocket for civilians, military living overseas
Election officials are growing increasingly concerned that the Trump administration’s trade war with China could make it more difficult and expensive for overseas voters — including those in the military — to cast ballots in the 2019 and 2020 local, state and federal elections…
The deadline for his state and most others to send out absentee ballots for the fall elections, Dearing said, falls a few days before a Sept. 24-25…That makes it difficult to provide voters with guidance about how to return their ballots.
The bottom lines:
- Election officials are approaching a deadline and have no idea what to tell Military and Overseas voters.
- Maybe, there will be relatively easy options for Military voters, yet the Military has done a poor job of serving Military voters, especially in training Voting Assistance Officers in the current stable laws.
- Overseas voters like expats, state department employees, military contractors, and corporate employees overseas, will be hit hardest, with the highest costs, highest hurdles, and likely the least information.
Posted in Mail/Absentee Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on July 27, 2019
A highly redacted 67 page report: Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 Election. Volume I Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure With Additional Views
The threat is real. Lack of investigation and exaggeration does not help make the case. The science is clear. Senator Wyden is correct. We need voter marked paper ballots, strong security for those ballots, with sufficient audits and recounts.
Posted in CT, National, Our Editorials, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on July 9, 2019
After a very close race in NYC there was a recount. As this NYTimes editorial points out most people would think the people’s choice lost because of overly strict laws and incompetent poll workers: One Lesson From the Katz-Cabán Recount
Posted in National
By Luther Weeks on July 1, 2019
Former President Jimmy Carter questioned the legitimacy of Donald Trump’s presidency on Thursday, saying he would likely not be in the White House if the Russians did not interfere in the 2016 presidential election.
“I think a full investigation would show that Trump didn’t actually win the election in 2016. He lost the election, and he was put into office because the Russians interfered on his behalf,”
I have the greatest respect for President Carter, especially after his presidency, including his work for election integrity across the Globe. Yet we need actual actions not speculation.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Security Issues, National, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on June 18, 2019
NYTimes, David Sanger: U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid
To me, the basic story is a ho hum. Russia and China are lurking in our power grid and its been known for sometime we are in Russia’s. I would be concerned if we weren’t attempting to match them. All of that is covered in Sanger’s book, The Perfect Weapon, which I am reading right now.
There are two things that are scary in all this:
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Security Issues, National
By Luther Weeks on May 17, 2019
LA Times article features the entrepreneur behind Internet voting pilots vs. Science: The vote-by-phone tech trend is scaring the life out of security experts <read>
With their playbook for pushing government boundaries as a guide, some Silicon Valley investors are nudging election officials toward an innovation that prominent coders and cryptographers warn is downright dangerous for democracy…
As seasoned disruptors of the status quo, tech pioneers have proven persuasive in selling the idea, even as the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine specifically warn against any such experiment…
Tusk is certain participation in elections would surge if the technology were widely permitted, even though studies in some of the few places around the world that have tried the method revealed no big turnout boost
Crusade, Gospel, Genie seem appropriate to describe entrepreneur Tusk. Its a blind disregard for evidence, science, and the scientists, including yours truly, warning of the risks of Internet voting
Posted in Blockchain, Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on May 4, 2019
Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) are under consideration by several states for use for all in-person voting. They have paper ballots, “What could possibly go wrong?”. A recent paper makes the case that they cannot be audited or trusted to provide accurate results. The paper recommends that they should be limited to use by voters that need accessibility: Ballot-marking devices (BMDs) cannot assure the will of the voters
not only is it inappropriate to rely on voters to check whether BMDs alter expressed votes, it doesn’t work.
Yet, this paper has been very controversial in election integrity circles. Advocates for those with disabilities argue that everyone should vote the same way on the same equipment, because that is what is needed to provide equality, to incentivize and cause better BMDs that meet everyone’s needs including those for evidence based elections.
Posted in Costs, Electronic Vulnerability, National, Our Editorials, Post-Election Audits
