Reports

Statistics Can Help Ensure Accurate Elections

The American Statistical Association’s Science and Public Affairs Advisory Committee has recommended that post election audits have at least a 90% level of confidence. Election officials need to make sure the person elected winner is the person the most voters want..Election results are most trustworthy when the entire election process can be audited, not just […]

Brennan Center: The Machinery Of Democracy

On August 1st the Brannan Center released a report Post-Election Audits: Restoring Trust in Elections which has been covered on CTVotersCount.org. Today we will look at the security portion of an earlier report The Machinery Of Democracy: Accessibility, Usability, and Cost and its implications for Connecticut. The tone of the report is serious. The conclusions […]

EVT07 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop

Yesterday was the USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop held in Boston. Today I will give some overall impressions and highlight just one of the relevant papers. UPDATE: Avi Rubin blogs on session with Debra Bowen (inappropriate certification processes for electonic voting) For me it was a highly educational and engaging day. My experience at conferences […]

Hot Summer for Research Reports

Recent weeks and months have seen increasing activity in voting machine security and statistical analysis for auditing elections. Expect more news in the near term: A report is anticipated from the Brennan Center for Justice and several papers at the USENIX Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop in Boston on August 6th.

CA, Post-Election Audit Standards Working Group, Report

Post-Election Audit Standards Working Group, Report, Evaluation of Audit Sampling Models and Options for Strengthening California’s Manual Count This report moves the technical and political conversation to a whole new level. “ The literature does not frame the statistical problem in the best way: Most of the papers address essentially this question: ‘If the machine […]

University of California Red Team Reports to the Secretary of State

This confirms earlier reports on Diebold Optical Scan equipment, including the University of Connecticut report. The vulnerabilities identified in this report should be regarded as a minimal set of vulnerabilities. We have pursued the attack vectors that seemed most likely to be successful. Other attack vectors not described here may also be successful and worth […]

University of Connecticut, Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal

In July, 2007 a similar report was released on the Diebold TSX, which demonstrated that that the state’s choice of Diebold Optical Scan was far superior to the Diebold DRE option, however, the October 2006 report is the one that applies to our voting systems. We identify a number of new vulnerabilities of this system […]

VerifiedVoting.org, Percentage-based vs. SAFE Vote Tabulation Auditing: A Graphic Comparison

This is a complete case for variable audit percentages. Several pending electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of 2% to 10% of all precincts. However, percentage-based audits are usually inefficient… Percentage based audits can also be ineffective, since close races may require auditing a large fraction of the total –even a 100% hand recount  to provide […]