Two in Bridgeport risk huge sentences compared to State’s offer. As we have said before, we need swifter justice to deter fraud!
My Testimony Yesterday on Two Problem Bills
One on Internet Voting almost hidden in another bill. All I heard testifying on that bill agreed with me: https://cga.ct.gov/2026/gaedata/TMY/2026HB-05001-R000313-Weeks,%20Luther-CTVotersCount-Opposes-TMY.PDF
Another on Risk Limiting Audits – third time for this bill. Many testified in favor but this is a flawed, inadequate bill. I am in favor of good RLAs: https://cga.ct.gov/2026/gaedata/TMY/2026SB-00394-R010313-Weeks,%20Luther-CTVotersCount-Opposes-TMY.PDF
Ballot access dispute in CT
https://www.ctpost.com/news/article/voter-ballots-matt-ritter-colchester-sots-21038894.php
Unfortunately, its only about a subset of ballots, it should be about access to all ballots. I hope the requester has lots of money to challenge this as the State has unlimited funds and can go to court if they lose in the FOI Commission as could the requester.
It is based on a very questionable theory of ballot interpreting a law on physical security.
It has been violated over the years by the SOTS Office itself. How did they test the theory of machine recounts. They opened ballots themselves in 2010 to test Clear Ballot equipment. They had no problem unsealing ballots for such testing several towns.
Warning!
New report faults post-election audits in swing states
Although I am no longer auditing post-election audits in Connecticut, a new report finds significant faults in post election audits in all swing states after the 2024 election. From the report <Full Report>:
In Michigan the post-election audits are conducted months after the election, and
elections are certified based entirely on computerized totals before examining any
paper ballots. To date, Michigan has not published its state-wide post-election audit
report.
Georgia requires all in-person voters to use computerized ballot marking devices
(BMDs) statewide. In Pennsylvania, 30% of in-person voters must vote on these
devices. These computerized devices do not provide the trustworthy record of voter
intent necessary for an effective audit.
elections are certified based entirely on computerized totals before examining any
paper ballots. To date, Michigan has not published its state-wide post-election audit
report.
Georgia requires all in-person voters to use computerized ballot marking devices
(BMDs) statewide. In Pennsylvania, 30% of in-person voters must vote on these
devices. These computerized devices do not provide the trustworthy record of voter
intent necessary for an effective audit.
Although I am no longer auditing post-election audits in Connecticut, a new report finds significant faults in post election audits in all swing states after the 2024 election. From the report <Full Report>:
In Michigan the post-election audits are conducted months after the election, and
elections are certified based entirely on computerized totals before examining any
paper ballots. To date, Michigan has not published its state-wide post-election audit
report.
Georgia requires all in-person voters to use computerized ballot marking devices
(BMDs) statewide. In Pennsylvania, 30% of in-person voters must vote on these
devices. These computerized devices do not provide the trustworthy record of voter
intent necessary for an effective audit.
Nevada primarily uses direct record electronic voting machines (DREs) with paper
audit trails and BMDs to record votes. These computerized devices also do not
provide the trustworthy record of voter intent necessary for an effective audit.
Georgia, Pennsylvania and Nevada all claim to conduct “risk-limiting audits” (RLAs),
which are generally acknowledged as the gold standard of auditing. In fact, none
meet the requirements for a true RLA.
Pennsylvania is bound by court settlement to conduct risk-limiting audits on all
election contests. But in apparent non-compliance with the settlement, not only
does it not adhere to the requirements of a risk-limiting audit, in 2024 Pennsylvania
only conducted its “RLA” on one contest, the state treasurer’s contest.
Current Nevada statute directs the state to audit 2% of ballots for all contests, in
addition to its “RLA” but there is no evidence the 2% audit was conducted.7
Arizona audits include many effective provisions, and are more transparent than
other states, providing evidence to support the election outcome, but they could be
enhanced.
North Carolina’s audits adhere to several effective practices, but like Arizona, its
audits could be improved to provide stronger evidence that its election outcomes are
correct.
Wisconsin audited far more ballots than any other state, but its audit results were
published months after the election was certified. Moreover, officials published no
source documentation or details of
elections are certified based entirely on computerized totals before examining any
paper ballots. To date, Michigan has not published its state-wide post-election audit
report.
Georgia requires all in-person voters to use computerized ballot marking devices
(BMDs) statewide. In Pennsylvania, 30% of in-person voters must vote on these
devices. These computerized devices do not provide the trustworthy record of voter
intent necessary for an effective audit.
Nevada primarily uses direct record electronic voting machines (DREs) with paper
audit trails and BMDs to record votes. These computerized devices also do not
provide the trustworthy record of voter intent necessary for an effective audit.
Georgia, Pennsylvania and Nevada all claim to conduct “risk-limiting audits” (RLAs),
which are generally acknowledged as the gold standard of auditing. In fact, none
meet the requirements for a true RLA.
Pennsylvania is bound by court settlement to conduct risk-limiting audits on all
election contests. But in apparent non-compliance with the settlement, not only
does it not adhere to the requirements of a risk-limiting audit, in 2024 Pennsylvania
only conducted its “RLA” on one contest, the state treasurer’s contest.
Current Nevada statute directs the state to audit 2% of ballots for all contests, in
addition to its “RLA” but there is no evidence the 2% audit was conducted.7
Arizona audits include many effective provisions, and are more transparent than
other states, providing evidence to support the election outcome, but they could be
enhanced.
North Carolina’s audits adhere to several effective practices, but like Arizona, its
audits could be improved to provide stronger evidence that its election outcomes are
correct.
Wisconsin audited far more ballots than any other state, but its audit results were
published months after the election was certified. Moreover, officials published no
source documentation or details of
My testimony yesterday against the proposed Ranked Choice Voting Bill
You can read my testimony submitted here <READ>
What I added to the written testimony, got a few laughs and summarizes it best:
“Warning: You are entering the dreaded MathZone, unrelated to any other testimony today, except that from the Secretary of the State.” Hers wasn’t exactly from the MathZone, yet she talked about the effort and time required which is a direct consequences of the details I covered.
You can read the Secretary’s testimony here <READ>
The rest of the RCV testimony was from cheerleaders/advocates for and against. <READ> And the bill itself <READ>
I also related it to the Math for fractals with the frequent summary of that science “Simple rules, complex interactions.”
Sometimes its good to be a later speaker where you can contradict or complement other speakers. Speaking just before me was RCV Task-force Co-Chair Sen Osten, she claimed we might have to alter the RCV software in our ES&S machines. I pointed that although we might alter that software, it would make it illegal to use those machines in our elections!
My Testimony Friday On Risk Limiting Audit Bill
Friday I submitted testimony on AN ACT IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RISK-LIMITING AUDITS WORKING GROUP.
The bill was almost the same as last year’s bill so my testimony was easy. Copy and make a few adjustments.
As I say in the testimony, I am generally in favor of Risk Limiting Audits, yet this bill is was off the mark and cannot easily be saved.
There were other bills with 260 speakers. There were only four submitting testimony on this bill. I am glad I did not take the time to testify in person.
Testimony to the Governor’s Ranked Choice Voting Working Group
From what I have seen calling it a “Working” Group is a bit of a stretch as the work I have seen is testimony from experts and enthusiasts applauding Ranked Choice Voting and its apparent recent successes
From what I have seen calling it a “Working” Group is a bit of a stretch as the work I have seen is testimony from experts and enthusiasts applauding Ranked Choice Voting and its apparent recent successes. As I testified, I predict they will come up with a reasonable recommendations that fall short of what I would expect from a Working Group. Here is there web where you can review all of their meetings and all those of the public that testified: https://portal.ct.gov/governor/governors-working-groups/ranked-choice-voting?language=en_US
Early Voting: We told you so.
We have heard many changes suggested after the Early Voting issues from the recent election. First it was a huge job counting all those votes and then a long time before mostly accurate results were produced.
Back when the changes were being put into law by the General Assembly and the Secretary of the State we proposed three major changes to the proposed laws that were never considered. We have have heard calls for at least two of these, so far…
We have heard many changes suggested after the Early Voting issues from the recent election. First it was a huge job counting all those votes and then a long time before mostly accurate results were produced.
Back when the changes were being put into law by the General Assembly and the Secretary of the State we proposed three major changes to the proposed laws that were never considered. We have have heard calls for at least two of these, so far.
First that voters should cast the ballots into voting machines. We argued primarily that voters voted for Early “Voting” not another version of in-person absentee voting. Then they would have the assurance that their vote would be rejected if they made a mistake like overvoting and have a chance to correct their vote (I was a machine tender this election on election day and was amazed at the number of over votes, primarily by new voters. We had numerous voters voting for two, three or even four presidential and U.S. Senate candidates!!!) .
Now the reason some are calling for casting into the machine is to save time in counting on election day. Yes that will save much official time doing the tasks of opening, checking off envelopes, checking envelopes, organizing ballots and even hand counting those ballots that are rejected.
Others just want to get the results sooner.
Second making officials responsible for voters signing envelopes. I said that then because, once voters IDs are checked and their registration verified, just like election day voting they should not be subject to any more, redundant checks that they would on election. I a town where voters were told not to sign, instead of counseling officials, they made voters come back to sign them.
Third that early voting places should be polling places, except. Instead of a law that copied some polling place requirements, early voting places should simply be defined as polling places, with defined exceptions. Now we are seeing calls for individual changes to the law as time worn rules are implemented one at a time. (As far as I know, so far, nobody is calling for such changes.)
Missing the point on solving Bridgeport elections problems
All sorts of elections proposals to solve the Bridgeport elections problems from increasing penalties to a minimum of a year in jail to a 17 member committee under the Secretary of the State to take over elections in municipalities.
They are all missing the point. What we need is …
All sorts of elections proposals to solve the Bridgeport elections problems from increasing penalties to a minimum of a year in jail to a 17 member committee under the Secretary of the State to take over elections in municipalities.
They are all missing the point. What we need is enforcement!
The penalties already are high enough but there all but no enforcement. As allegations rise, not just in Bridgeport, but all over the state, including campaign finance violations by candidates and other political entities the size of the staff for State Elections Enforcement Commission has slowly been eroded over the years. There are all sorts of allegations in Bridgeport. If even each violation were merely fined $5oo (let alone penalties are much higher including jail time) then several criminals would be facing fines of several thousands of dollars. Soon they and their actual and would-be associates would be completely deterred.
The SEEC has five investigators, one pulled back from retirement, with four of them full time on Bridgeport. That is not enough for timely investigations and a deterrent. There are previous cases referred to the U.S. Justice Department awaiting results for years. The chief culprit in Bridgeport is awaiting any action on allegations from 2019.
Nobody seems to be advocating for more staff for the SEEC. In comparison the Attorney General, admittedly with much more responsibility, has 200 attorneys plus investigators. Could it be that the General Assembly is reluctant to see investigations accelerated on campaign finance violations?
Meanwhile, maybe there should be some municipalities where the registrars responsibilities should be taken over by the State. Yet that will be quite a job for a 17 person committee which as about twice the size of the Secretary of the State’s elections staff. Who will fund the take overs? And what good would it do for a Bridgeport when the responsibility for absentee ballots lies mostly with the municipal clerk’s office? And even in Bridgeport the kind of fraud alleged in recent elections is mostly beyond the registrars and clerks control.