Testimony on Well-Intended Bill That Would End Publicly Verifiable Elections

On Monday we testified against H.B.5173 An Act Protecting the Privacy of Voters

Note that this version of partially protecting some voters includes preventing open, transparent, and publicly verifiable elections by any and all voters, candidates, and parties.

Here is my testimony <read>. This is the summary:

The heart and soul of democracy is justified trust in elections. [This Bill]would be a death blow to the heart of public verifiability. [It] would preclude independent verification of the lists and electors recorded as voting; it would preclude officials from demonstrating to the public that our elections are on the up and up.

Like paper ballots, voter registration records need to be open, transparent, and publicly verifiable. (And recorded on paper.)

On Monday we testified against H.B.5173 An Act Protecting the Privacy of Voters

Note that  this version of partially protecting some voters includes preventing open, transparent, and publicly verifiable elections by any and all voters, candidates, and parties.

Here is my testimony <read>. This is the summary:

The heart and soul of democracy is justified trust in elections. [This Bill]would be a death blow to the heart of public verifiability. [It] would preclude independent verification of the lists and electors recorded as voting; it would preclude officials from demonstrating to the public that our elections are on the up and up.

Like paper ballots, voter registration records need to be open, transparent, and publicly verifiable. (And recorded on paper.)

In my verbal testimony, I added to my written concerns that procedures, regulations, and most importantly laws need to change to be consistent with this proposed law, so that election officials and clerks can know how to implement the law, given its many conflicts with current law.

I also noted that it was “Address Suppression Light”, given that it did not suppress all the other addresses which are suppressed under the existing address suppression program, like land records. The regular address suppression program also includes an ID card issued to those that have their addressed suppressed, so they can be positively identified in the polls.  (There are books written, mostly for felons, on how to find addresses for police, judges, and prosecutors etc. Many of those avenues remain unprotected by this bill).

Here is all the testimony submitted <read>

On one side in favor, was Secretary of the State Denise Merrill and the Connecticut League of Women Voters.

On the other side against, included CTVotersCount, the FOI Commission, State Elections Enforcement Commission, and the Freedom of Information Council.

The ACLU seemed to be in favor of expanding some provisions and against others.

Do you need a blockchain? (Probably not!)

Blockchains are the latest technology to enter the mainstream.  A blockchain powers and makes BitCoin possible. Many are treating blockchains as the next big breakthrough in technology. There is even a Blockchain Caucus in Congress.

Do not get your hopes up or bet your retirement savings on blockchains, they are definitely not the next Internet or Hula Hoop.  Most importantly they will not transform elections or solve the challenges of online voting.

From IEEE Do You Need a Blockchain?

“I find myself debunking a blockchain voting effort about every few weeks,” says Josh Benaloh, the senior cryptographer at Microsoft Research. “It feels like a very good fit for voting, until you dig a couple millimeters below the surface.”

Blockchains are the latest technology to enter the mainstream.  A blockchain powers and makes BitCoin possible. Many are treating blockchains as the next big breakthrough in technology. There is even a Blockchain Caucus in Congress.

Do not get your hopes up or bet your retirement savings on blockchains, they are definitely not the next Internet or Hula Hoop.  Most importantly they will not transform elections or solve the challenges of online voting.

From IEEE Do You Need a Blockchain? <read>

Blockchain technology is, in essence, a novel way to manage data. As such, it competes with the data-management systems we already have. Relational databases…suffer from one major constraint: They put the task of storing and updating entries in the hands of one or a few entities, whom you have to trust won’t mess with the data or get hacked.

Blockchains, as an alternative, improve upon this architecture in one specific way—by removing the need for a trusted authority. With public blockchains…, a group of anonymous strangers (and their computers) can work together to store, curate, and secure a perpetually growing set of data without anyone having to trust anyone else. Because blockchains are replicated across a peer-to-peer network, the information they contain is very difficult to corrupt or extinguish.

This feature alone is enough to justify using a blockchain if the intended service is the kind that attracts censors…

However, removing the need for trust comes with limitations. Public blockchains are slower and less private than traditional databases, precisely because they have to coordinate the resources of multiple unaffiliated participants. To import data onto them, users often pay transaction fees in amounts that are constantly changing and therefore difficult to predict. And the long-term status of the software is unpredictable as well. Just as no one person or company manages the data on a public blockchain, no one entity updates the software. Rather, a whole community of developers contributes to the open-source code in a process that, in Bitcoin at least, lacks formal governance…

“If you don’t mind putting someone in charge of a database…then there’s no point using a blockchain, because [the blockchain] is just a more inefficient version of what you would otherwise do,” says Gideon Greenspan, the CEO of Coin Sciences, a company that builds technologies on top of both public and permissioned blockchains.

With this one rule, you can mow down quite a few blockchain fantasies. Online voting, for example, has inspired many well-intentioned blockchain developers, but it probably does not stand to gain much from the technology.

“I find myself debunking a blockchain voting effort about every few weeks,” says Josh Benaloh, the senior cryptographer at Microsoft Research. “It feels like a very good fit for voting, until you dig a couple millimeters below the surface.”

Benaloh points out that tallying votes on a blockchain doesn’t obviate the need for a central authority. Election officials will still take the role of creating ballots and authenticating voters. And if you trust them to do that, there’s no reason why they shouldn’t also record votes.

In my early days of advocacy, my congressman at a forum claimed that there would be no problems with electronic voting because of a magic new technology, “encryption”. It has not worked out that way.  Like encryption, blockchains cannot protect against corruption of the computer itself – a laptop or smartphone used for online voting, an optical scanner or touch-screen voting machine, or the central server collecting and reporting results.

American Progress Report: State Election Security Readiness

American Progress Report: Election Security in All 50 States

The report gives every state grades based on some detailed criteria. Connecticut was graded ‘B’, which it shared with several other states as the highest grade awarded. Yet there are problems and limitations with such reports. We would give Connecticut lower grades in some areas, higher in others, and are uncomfortable with other grades.

The report is useful and provides directions for improvement in many areas in every state. Election officials, legislators, and voters should act to improve our voting systems and laws in the near term.  We would give the authors A+ for effort and the report a grade of B.

American Progress Report: Election Security in All 50 States  <read>

The report gives every state grades based on some detailed criteria. Connecticut was graded ‘B’, which it shared with several other states as the highest grade awarded – it sets pretty stiff criteria for an ‘A’, yet we doubt that any state deserves an ‘A’.  Yet there are problems and limitations with such reports. We would give Connecticut lower grades in some areas, higher in others, and are uncomfortable with other grades.

The criteria at a high level:

1.Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems
2.Voter-verified paper audit trail
3.Post-election audits that test election results
4.Ballot accounting and reconciliation
5.Return of voted paper absentee ballots
6.Voting machine certification requirements
7.Pre-election logic and accuracy testing
The criteria are good at first glance, yet I question why only “minimum” standards for voter registration systems, criteria should include “recounts” and standards for security of voted paper ballots.
A big weakness in such reports is that much of the information is based on self-reporting by election officials,who can be biased, limit their views to their state’s practices, and may not have the technical expertise to evaluate many of the criteria.  Also state statutes may be misread or not represent the actual implementation in practice:
The information included in this report is derived primarily from state statutes and regulations, as well as interviews with state and local election officials.
The ratings in each category ranged from Unsatisfactory, Mixed, and Fair, to Good.  Connecticut received a ‘B’ from category ratings of:
Fair     1.Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems
Good   2.Voter-verified paper audit trail
Mixed 3.Post-election audits that test election results
Fair    4.Ballot accounting and reconciliation
Fair    5.Return of voted paper absentee ballots
Fair    6.Voting machine certification requirements
Fair    7.Pre-election logic and accuracy testing
The factors and category ratings were somewhat complex, with some categories providing a score of 0 or 1 and others scoring 0 to 3 based on the number of criteria matched. resulting in totals leading to the final letter grade.  So, where do we question Connecticut’s scores?  The details for Connecticut can be found starting on page 50 of the report.  Our comments and concerns:
Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems. This criteria is difficult to judge. The criteria is likely only based on interviews with officials. I suspect there is a tendency to say ‘Yes’ as often as possible. And even with accurate answers it is difficult to judge how well those criteria are met in practice.  Yet, for Connecticut it is clear that officials are concerned and working on cybersecurity for of all our systems, not just election systems.  As a central mainframe system managed by the State, the voter registration system is subject to every protection applied to that environment.
We would give Connecticut higher grades.  Connecticut was downgraded because the voter registration system was judged over 10 years old. We disagree with that broad-brush criteria and the definition of Connecticut’s system as over 10 years old. As an IBM Mainframe, CICS, DB2 system our voter registration system is presumably regularly upgraded with new versions of the operating system, CICS, and DB2. The hardware may also be less than 10 years old. In addition, the registration system itself has been enhanced.
Post-election audits that test election results. Here we would downgrade the “mixed” results. As has been repeatedly reported by the Citizen Audit, the conduct of the audit falls short of what would be reasonably expected of any effective audit. While it is true the statutes require that the audit be completed before certification, in practice that is impossible in some elections since certification must be complete before the date the audits can commence. It also depends on the definition of “complete”. In practice, the overall audits are not complete until the Secretary of the State receives the final report from UConn and files that with the SEEC.  The reports for all elections since November 2011 are yet to be filed and only one report  for a primary (2014) has been filed in that period.
Ballot accounting and reconciliation. Once again we would downgrade Connecticut’s score. In practice, ballot accounting and reconciliation do not always occur.  In recent years in almost every election, the Citizen Audit, has documented instances where write-in ballots (up to 151) have been read into the scanner at the end of election day in error. That results in counts that exceed the number of checked-off voters. In most instances those discrepancies have been discovered only by the audit, showing that they had not been discovered or addressed in the closing of the polls, nor in the review of results by both registrars and municipal clerks.
Voting machine certification requirements.  Here we would upgrade Connecticut’s score. Connecticut was downgraded because our optical scanners are just over 10 years old – their design and circuits are even older in technology. Yet, they are working fine and from random survey’s of the Citizen Audit are not showing signs of age. There are incrementally better systems available today, yet voter marked paper ballots will continue to protect our votes. We expect they will need to be replaced in the next 5 to 10 years, but not yet. The longer we wait the better options will become available, at lower cost, and will also last that many years longer.
Missing Criteria Recounts:  About half the states have close-vote recounts.  Connecticut has close-vote recanvasses, which fall short of the best adversarial manual recounts in some other states.  Connecticut should have more open, adversarial recounts, with more time to call for and perform recounts, with stronger criteria than the upper limit of 2000 vote differences which is too low a threshold ( as low as 0.12% in statewide elections).  We should also allow for candidates, parties, or citizens to call for a limited number of directed recounts of specified districts, perhaps at a reasonable fee. We would rate Connecticut mixed in this criteria, as our recanvasses are actually conduced, usually fairly, yet not conduced uniformly and in accordance with the law.  Sadly, that mixed rating would put us in the top 50% of all States in the recount category.
Protection of Paper Ballots. Here, once again, we would rate Connecticut mixed. Connecticut has an inadequate law for the protection of paper ballots and the actual practices in the vast majority of towns do not provide credible evidence that ballots were not tampered with. Once again, see the Citizen Audit reports.  Despite inadequate law and practice, the distributed nature of Connecticut’s election system mean that for statewide elections it is doubtful that enough ballots could be manipulated in the same direction to change anything but the closest of outcomes.  Unfortunately, that leaves local and regional elections vulnerable, protected only by trust in every election official and other local staff that frequently have access to voted ballots.
Finally, despite flaws, the report is useful and provides directions for improvement in many areas in every state. Election officials, legislators, and voters should act to improve our voting systems and laws in the near term.  We would give the authors A+ for effort and the report a grade of B.

Citizen Audit Report: After 10 Years, Serious Flaws Continue

Citizens Audit Report:
After 10 years, 18 post-election audits, and 800 local audit counting sessions, serious flaws continue

From the Press Release:

Post-election vote audits of the November 2017 elections continue to fail to meet basic audit standards. They again undermine confidence in the accuracy of our elections, concludes the non-partisan Connecticut Citizen Election Audit.

Among the group’s concerns:

  • 41% of reports required to be submitted to the Secretary of the State by registrars were incomplete or were not submitted. The Secretary’s Office failed to follow up on those reports.
  • Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.
  • Continued use of flawed electronic audit procedures that are not publicly verifiable.

On the bright side, developments related to the electronic audit point the way to improvement:

  • The Secretary of the State’s Office and UConn Voter Center solicited feedback on improving the electronic audits.
  • Write-in counting issues and failure to separate ballots as required were clearly identified by the electronic audit and observed by the Secretary of the State’s Office.

Luther Weeks, Executive Director of the Citizen Audit said, “We are frustrated with so little improvement after 18 statewide audits over 10 years. Citizens deserve better. Yet, if the Secretary of the State’s Office follows up on these problems and pursues publicly verifiable electronic audits, progress can be achieved in the near term.”

<Press Release .pdf> <Full Report pdf> <Detail data/municipal reports>

Citizens Audit Report:
After 10 years, 18 post-election audits, and 800 local audit counting sessions, serious flaws continue

From the Press Release:

Post-election vote audits of the November 2017 elections continue to fail to meet basic audit standards. They again undermine confidence in the accuracy of our elections, concludes the non-partisan Connecticut Citizen Election Audit.

Among the group’s concerns:

  • 41% of reports required to be submitted to the Secretary of the State by registrars were incomplete or were not submitted. The Secretary’s Office failed to follow up on those reports.
  • Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.
  • Continued use of flawed electronic audit procedures that are not publicly verifiable.

On the bright side, developments related to the electronic audit point the way to improvement:

  • The Secretary of the State’s Office and UConn Voter Center solicited feedback on improving the electronic audits.
  • Write-in counting issues and failure to separate ballots as required were clearly identified by the electronic audit and observed by the Secretary of the State’s Office.

Luther Weeks, Executive Director of the Citizen Audit said, “We are frustrated with so little improvement after 18 statewide audits over 10 years. Citizens deserve better. Yet, if the Secretary of the State’s Office follows up on these problems and pursues publicly verifiable electronic audits, progress can be achieved in the near term.”

<Press Release .pdf> <Full Report pdf> <Detail data/municipal reports>

Are you a Conspiracy Theorist?

Last week as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists.

Are you a Conspiracy Theorist?

I think we all are.  We just don’t recognize that many of the things we believe are conspiracies.  Many were unproven allegations before we believed them…

Reading the Hartford Courant and the New York Times its amazing how many articles involve actual or alleged conspiracies.  I counted at least a score  in those two publications, just today. Take this as an exercise. Pick up your newspaper, online news site, or look at Facebook for a while and see how many you see that you believe are actual conspiracies, are possible, or are doubtful.  Here are some ideas to ponder…

Last week as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists.

Are you a Conspiracy Theorist?

I think we all are.  We just don’t recognize that many of the things we believe are conspiracies.  Many were unproven allegations before we believed them. For example:

  • Russian hacking the 2016 election and news propaganda leading up to that election.
  • Hollywood and Congressional sex abuse coverups.
  • Tobacco and Energy companies hiding the effects of tabacco and fossil fuels for decades.

For a wide election coverup see the documentary Atticus v. The Architect about Don Siegleman’s election loss in Alabama.  The conspiracy by now is widely known, yet the good have been punished, and the perpetrators have been promoted.

I guarantee you everyone in this room believes in some conspiracies, some of which are widely accepted, yet not proven.  We call them Conspiracy Theories only when we aren’t convinced or suspicious.

Reading the Hartford Courant and the New York Times its amazing how many articles involve actual or alleged conspiracies.  I counted at least a score in those two publications, just today. Take this as an exercise. Pick up your newspaper, online news site, or look at Facebook for a while and see how many you see that you believe are actual conspiracies, are possible, or are doubtful.  Here are some ideas to ponder:

  • What articles allege Russians hacked the election?
  • A conspiracy to execute illegal contracts with the CT Education Department?
  • Some unknown legislators or staff add items to bills?
  • What evidence is presented?
  • Do you believe it or disbelieve it based on your political or other predispositions?
  • Is it overblown in the article or did you have to read behind the lines to see it was a conspiracy?

My bet is that you are a Conspiracy Theorist.  Yet get upset when someone calls you one.  That is because its pejorative, no longer connected to the actual meanings of Conspiracy and Theory.

 

“Does your vote count?” Glastonbury MLK Conversation

Last Wednesday evening, I was one of five speakers and a moderator at a Community Conversation held by the Glastonbury Martin Luther King Community Initiative. There were about 60 to 75 in attendance. We addressed “Does your vote count? An examination of the Issues” I addressed issues in two areas: How could you know if your vote was counted? And what I would recommend to expand democracy in Connecticut, without risking election integrity. Here are my prepared remarks:

Last Wednesday evening, I was one of five speakers and a moderator at a Community Conversation held by the Glastonbury Martin Luther King Community Initiative.  There were about 60 to 75 in attendance.  We addressed “Does your vote count? An examination of the issues.”  I addressed issues in two areas:  How could you know if your vote was counted? And what I would recommend to expand democracy in Connecticut, without risking election integrity.  Here are my prepared remarks <read>

Some excerpts:

I tend not to agree with anyone 100% of the time.  I view voting through a lens of balancing three priorities

  • Voting Integrity, that is Justified Confidence
  • Engaging more people in Democracy
  • The costs of Elections

To me, Justified Confidence is the highest priority, followed by a balance between increasing voter engagement and cost.

Let’s talk voting integrity.  Said another way “Does your vote count?”  The problem is that you and I cannot answer that question.  The systems we have, by intention or not, prevent us from answering that question…

For Democracy to function, citizens must have JUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE in elections — elections providing strong evidence that the correct winner was declared.

The 2016 elections surfaced two election integrity questions in the minds of many citizens:

  • First, Did the Russians hack our election systems? That is distinct from did they influence our elections?
  • Second, Were the winners of the Primaries and Election accurately determined?

There is a lack of confidence in the system. There are legitimate, yet often exaggerated questions of integrity.

It is especially important that losers believe they lost fair and square.

There is excessive emphasis on Russian hacking,  ignoring other risks. And a myriad of other cyber-attacks are just a part of the risks…

There is too much emphasis on cyber-attack by outsiders.  The greater risk is INSIDER ATTACK.  Insider attack is easier and likely more frequent – air-gaps cannot prevent insider attack – there is motive, opportunity, and the ability to cover-up…

Fortunately. there are remedies to these risks and lack of credibility.  They come down to TRANSPARENT, PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE ELECTIONS.  That is elections where every critical aspect CAN be verified by citizens, candidates, and parties.

“Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence.”…

We need to open-up the system to candidates.

  • I would enhance our Citizen’s Election Program.
  • We should reduce prohibitive signature and finance requirements for third-party and petitioning candidates.
  • We have a crazy law that prevents the posting of the list of Write-In Candidates in polling places. Posting the list should be mandatory…

The evidence is not that Millennials avoid voting because it’s inconvenient. They avoid it because they don’t have enough information about voting and candidates.

  • We need to change our archaic lever-look ballot layout. I am tired of consoling voters who missed the question on the ballot.
  • We need better voting web sites in Connecticut’s towns, many lack critical information, some have incorrect information.
  • We have Election Day Registration, yet it is the most difficult, and restrictive in the Nation. That would remedy many of the errors that cause voters to be unintentionally not registered or removed from the roles…

I am an election official, a Certified Moderator. I ran our Glastonbury Academy polling place in the 2016 presidential primary. That day changed me.

Let’s at least allow unaffiliated voters to vote in the primary. I saw many voters who did not understand the system and could not vote. They were not party regulars, they were first time voters or those that had not voted in years. I was moved that very few were upset that they could not vote. That bothers me. We may never see them attempting to participate in democracy again.

Finally, Two things you can do to help – two days for each election.

  • First, volunteer one weekday observing a post-election audit with the Citizen Audit.
  • Second, Invest a day as an election official at your local polling place.

I guarantee you will learn a lot.  Let us work together, to create a flourishing democracy we can trust.

************Update 2/29/2018

Courant coverage: Does Your Vote Count <read>

Note one small misquote:

“First, did the Russians hack our election systems? Second, were the winners of the primary elections actually determined?” [Weeks] said.
That ‘actually’ should be ‘accurately’ !

 

 

Supreme Court to Bridgeport: Those sort of things just aren’t done in CT

In a 3am decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a third primary in Bridgeport. CTPost: Supreme Court orders 3rd primary for Bridgeport

“Citizens can expect and are entitled to integrity in the process and a fundamentally fair and honest election, and this, I regret to say, they did not get,” the judge stated in overturning the results of the primary and ordering a new one.

In a 3am decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a third primary in Bridgeport. CTPost: Supreme Court orders 3rd primary for Bridgeport <read>

The state’s highest court agreed that Superior Court Judge Barbara Bellis was within her right to throw out the results of two previous primaries after she ruled they were skewed by political corruption.

“Citizens can expect and are entitled to integrity in the process and a fundamentally fair and honest election, and this, I regret to say, they did not get,” the judge stated in overturning the results of the primary and ordering a new one…

During a hearing Dec. 21, lawyers for the city of Bridgeport had asked the justices to answer four questions regarding the legality of Judge Bellis’ decision: if state law prohibits any person other than the elector from arranging for a designee to return an absentee ballot to the town clerk; did the judge err in rejecting the unpostmarked ballots; did the judge err in her Northbridge ruling and did the judge wrongfully apply the law in ruling there were substantial violations of law that left the reliability of the election in doubt.

In its one-page decision released shortly after 3 a.m. on Friday, the Supreme Court simply ruled “Yes,” to the first question, “No,” to the second, “Yes,” to the third and “No,” to the fourth question.

Once again, we oppose no-excuse or all mail-in voting for two reasons. 1) Its where the fraud actually occurs, ongoingly. 2) Despite common sense, increased mail-in voting does not increase turnout. (See: Grand Theft Absentee)

Video: Atticus v. The Architect: The Political Assassination of Don Siegelman

I have followed this story off and on for years. As promised this film not only reviews the story but adds additional information. People ask me if any elections have been stolen. I say probably a few are and point to this as one that was. The cover-up is much much worse than the initial crime. The cover-up of the cover-up even worse. Yet, nothing happening once everything was pretty much in the open is worst of all. Like many documentaries, the first half or so is a little slow, yet you will be richly, disturbingly rewarded for watching till the end.

Beyond the preview, you will have to pay to watch. It is available on Amazon or from the Movie Site

Here is my Amazon Review:

I have followed this story off and on for years. As promised this film not only reviews the story but adds additional information. People ask me if any elections have been stolen. I say probably a few are and point to this as one that was. The cover-up is much much worse than the initial crime. The cover-up of the cover-up even worse. Yet, nothing happening once everything was pretty much in the open is worst of all. Like many documentaries, the first half or so is a little slow, yet you will be richly, disturbingly rewarded for watching till the end.

Sufficient recount laws would have corrected this error. No cyber hacking was necessary, just insider skullduggery. Do not claim there are no conspiracies – or that they all would be found out and corrected. In this case it seems it was never addressed other than punishment of the innocent and promotion of the guilty.

The constitutional case against partisan gerrymandering

The Chicago Tribune, via Verified Voting: The constitutional case against partisan gerrymandering

The case against partisan gerrymandering is not hard to make. It frustrates democracy by preventing voters from evicting those in power. It penalizes voters of one party or the other by deliberately diluting their electoral strength. It renders the consent of the governed largely moot.

The Chicago Tribune, via Verified Voting: The constitutional case against partisan gerrymandering <read>

The case against partisan gerrymandering is not hard to make. It frustrates democracy by preventing voters from evicting those in power. It penalizes voters of one party or the other by deliberately diluting their electoral strength. It renders the consent of the governed largely moot.

Virginia saga continues

Last time we editorialized that the Virginia race that came down to a single ballot and a drawing was noting to be alarmed at, nothing but a close vote.  Yet, there is a new twist,  with many voters in Virginia registered in incorrect districts.  In the district in question just a single voter incorrectly voting in the district or incorrectly excluded could have changed the result. Virginia: Thousands of Virginians may have voted in the wrong state House districts

Last time we editorialized that the Virginia race that came down to a single ballot and a drawing was noting to be alarmed at, nothing but a close vote.  Yet, there is a new twist,  with many voters in Virginia registered in incorrect districts.  In the district in question just a single voter incorrectly voting in the district or incorrectly excluded could have changed the result. Virginia: Thousands of Virginians may have voted in the wrong state House districts <read>

Thousands of Virginia voters may be registered in the wrong state House district, raising the possibility of election disputes. In a statewide analysis, The Washington Post found addresses of about 6,000 registered voters that appear to lie outside a map of the assigned House district. If their turnout tracked the state average, more than 2,800 mistaken state House votes could have been cast in November.

A revote might be a remedy, yet there is not substitute for doing it right the 1st time.