Luther Weeks | CTVotersCount.org

No Susan, “top two” primary is a flawed centerist dream, not a panacea

Susan Bigelow’s Op-Ed at CTNewsJunkie: Lesson from Levy’s Win: Open Up the Primaries. Argues for opening up primary voting to all voters, easier ballot access, and for “top two” primaries…

Our Editorial

First, we agree its all two difficult to get on the primary or election ballots for all but party endorsed candidates, or those like Levy and Lumaj.

The other two suggestions remind one of the Great Centerist dream, that there is a large number of voters not aligned with each party, they are all for business taxes being low and corporate welfare being being high, against the polls that show overwhelming support for climate action, medicare for all etc. They are alleged to align with the corporate lobbyists and interests that control legislative bodies and party leaders. Yet somehow that always fail as Andrew Wang’s latest new party is…However, the top-two has not worked out so well as we detailed in a previous post, reviewing its application in California: NY: don’t follow CA in making “Top Two” error , as we summarized back then…

Susan Bigelow’s Op-Ed at CTNewsJunkie: Lesson from Levy’s Win: Open Up the Primaries <read> Argues for opening up primary voting to all voters, easier ballot access, and for “top two” primaries.

Closed primaries get criticized for enabling extremism, a criticism that seems absolutely valid in the aftermath of Levy’s win. Who reliably turns out for primaries in the dead of August? The most activist, the most partisan, and often the most extremist voters, that’s who. And if turnout is low enough, this small minority of voters can swing an election.

The parties need to open up their primaries to everyone, though that alone won’t really fix the situation. There may be some moderating influence from unaffiliated voters, but the problem of primaries being inherently partisan remains. It’s also notoriously difficult to get on the primary ballot at all for anyone who doesn’t have enough support at a party convention.

What I’d like to see is a system employed in other states and countries: a two-round election. The first round is open to all candidates, with the top two vote-getters moving on to the final round. This takes the party out of the primary process altogether, which is healthier for democracy. It also guarantees that the eventual winner is elected by an actual majority of voters.

Editorial

First, we agree its all two difficult to get on the primary or election ballots for all but party endorsed candidates, or those like Levy and Lumaj.

We are fine with trying open primaries, we have not heard of any problems there. Not so sure they actually support the centerist dream in reality.

However, the top-two has not worked out so well as we detailed in a previous post, reviewing its application in California: NY: don’t follow CA in making “Top Two” error <read>, as we summarized back then:

This all goes to show why it is called a Jungle Primary. We prefer to call it a Crap Shoot, because, like many reforms, its intention is to correct a perceived past problem, but just replaces one imperfect system with another – fighting the last war.

(And who said that centrism is a worthy goal – its usually defined only in the vision of a particular pundit or politician, completely in agreement with that pundit’s own views)

Reminder: Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) beyond redemption

A new article by Andrew Appel reminds us: Magical thinking about Ballot-Marking-Device contingency plans .

The Center for Democracy and Technology recently published a report, “No Simple Answers: A Primer on Ballot Marking Device Security”, by William T. Adler. Overall, it’s well-informed, clearly presents the problems as of 2022, and it’s definitely worth reading. After explaining the issues and controversies, the report presents recommendations, most of which make a lot of sense, and indeed the states should act upon them. But there’s one key recommendation in which Dr. Adler tries to provide a simple answer, and unfortunately his answer invokes a bit of magical thinking…

This the magical thinking: “election officials should have a contingency plan.” The problem is, when you try to write down such a plan, there’s nothing that actually works! .

Fortunately Connecticut uses Hand Marked Paper Ballots except that it allows the IVS BMD to serve those with disabilities.

A new article by Andrew Appel reminds us: Magical thinking about Ballot-Marking-Device contingency plans <read>

The Center for Democracy and Technology recently published a report, “No Simple Answers: A Primer on Ballot Marking Device Security”, by William T. Adler. Overall, it’s well-informed, clearly presents the problems as of 2022, and it’s definitely worth reading. After explaining the issues and controversies, the report presents recommendations, most of which make a lot of sense, and indeed the states should act upon them. But there’s one key recommendation in which Dr. Adler tries to provide a simple answer, and unfortunately his answer invokes a bit of magical thinking. This seriously compromises the conclusions of his report. By asking but not answering the question of “what should an election official do if there are reports of BMDs printing wrong votes?”, Dr. Adler avoids having to make the inevitable conclusion that BMDs-for-all-voters is a hopelessly flawed, insecurable method of voting. Because the answer to that question is, unfortunately, there’s nothing that election officials could usefully do in that case…

This the magical thinking: “election officials should have a contingency plan.” The problem is, when you try to write down such a plan, there’s nothing that actually works! Suppose the election officials rely on voter reports (or on the rate of spoiled ballots); suppose the “contingency plan” says (for example) says “if x percent of the voters report malfunctioning BMDs, or y percent of voters spoil their ballots, then we will . . .” Then we will what? Remove those BMDs from service in the middle of the day? But then all the votes already cast on those BMDs will have been affected by the hack; that could be thousands of votes. Or what else? Discard all the paper ballots that were cast on those BMDs? Clearly you can’t do that without holding an entirely new election. And what if those x% or y% of voters were fraudulently reporting BMD malfunction or fraudulently spoiling their ballots to trigger the contingency plan? There’s no plan that actually works.

Fortunately Connecticut uses Hand Marked Paper Ballots except that it allows the IVS BMD to serve those with disabilities.

Poll Workers/Registrars challenges in CT and Nationally

A recent article in WhoWhatWhy outlines challenges across the country: Big Lie Fallout: Experts Fear Threats Will Cause Poll Workers to Quit

Election integrity experts are sounding the alarm that many election workers will leave their positions on the front lines of democracy unless they are protected from the types of threats and harassment that hundreds of them experienced after the 2020 election.

According to a 2022 survey from the Brennan Center for Justice, 1 in 5 local election officials are “very” or “somewhat unlikely” to continue serving through 2024. The survey stated that “politicians’ attacks on the system, stress, and retirement plans are the primary reasons they plan to leave their jobs.”

“There’s an air of menace that causes people to say, ‘Oh, the heck with this, I don’t want to do this anymore,’” said Elaine Kamarck, founding director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institute.

It may be different in Connecticut with perhaps worse results in too many towns:

We have not heard much about about open harassment, yet the job is getting ever tougher with massive amounts of FOI requests to some registrars and with town government, in many cases, ignoring calls for more funding, hours and staffing for overworked officials. No wonder they are quitting. In those situations it is a wonder anyone knowledgeable would step up or step in to help.

We hear that between Nov 2021 and a couple of months ago over 40% of Connecticut Registrars of Voters have resigned! That’s a lot more than the 1 in 5 thinking about it in the Brennan Survey; that does not include those already not running again in Nov 2022; and experienced registrars are even more important to our elections that experienced poll workers. At least poll workers, by law, must be paid for every hour they serve.

A recent article in WhoWhatWhy outlines challenges across the country: Big Lie Fallout: Experts Fear Threats Will Cause Poll Workers to Quit <read>

Election integrity experts are sounding the alarm that many election workers will leave their positions on the front lines of democracy unless they are protected from the types of threats and harassment that hundreds of them experienced after the 2020 election.

According to a 2022 survey from the Brennan Center for Justice, 1 in 5 local election officials are “very” or “somewhat unlikely” to continue serving through 2024. The survey stated that “politicians’ attacks on the system, stress, and retirement plans are the primary reasons they plan to leave their jobs.”

“There’s an air of menace that causes people to say, ‘Oh, the heck with this, I don’t want to do this anymore,’” said Elaine Kamarck, founding director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institute.

Kamarck added that there seems to be a concerted effort to terrify election workers. Many people who believe that former President Donald Trump won the 2020 election, she said, feel that election workers participated in “funny business” and counted the votes incorrectly, even though repeated investigations have found no evidence of that.

“It is intimidation. It’s the sort of intimidation that happens in banana republics,” she said. “It’s a disaster. I mean, it’s just an awful, awful problem.”

Kamarck said that the purpose of the individuals sending these threats is to “strike fear and try and scare you away from doing your job.”

And that’s exactly what they have done.

“What’s going on is terrifying,” said Jan BenDor, who worked for 18 years as an election administrator in Michigan.

The Department of Justice identified more than 850 incidents of threats and harassment targeting election workers, according to a recent report from the Congressional Research Service.

This atmosphere of intimidation caused the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) to call on all leaders to denounce threats of violence against election workers and officials. A report it adopted in February of last year showed the 2020 election cycle to be the “most challenging in recent memory,” where “unrelenting misinformation” led extremists to threaten and endanger election workers.

Kamarck described this as a significant assault on democracy.

“What they’re trying to do is undo the will of the people, and it is one of the most serious threats we’ve ever faced,” she said.

It may be different in Connecticut with perhaps worse results in too many towns:

Next Up: Supreme Court may let legislatures decide the 2024 Presidential Election

The Supreme Court has taken a redistricting case for next year that could take the 2024 Presidential Election out of the hands of the voters and the the Governors and put them exclusively in the domain of the state legislatures. Tom Hartman has the best explanation I have seen: Beware: The Supreme Court Is Laying Groundwork to Pre-Rig the 2024 Election

This scenario isn’t just plausible: it’s probable. GOP-controlled states are already changing their state laws to allow for it, regardless of how their people vote…

This scenario isn’t just plausible: it’s probable. GOP-controlled states are already changing their state laws to allow for it, regardless of how their people vote…

It’s not particularly ambiguous, even as clarified by the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act of 1887.

Neither mentions the will of the people, although the Electoral Count Act requires each state’s governor to certify the vote before passing it along to Washington, DC. And half of those states have Democratic governors.

Which brings us to the Supreme Court’s probable 2023 decision. As Robert Barnes wrote yesterday for The Washington Post:

‘The Supreme Court on Thursday said it will consider what would be a radical change in the way federal elections are conducted, giving state legislatures sole authority to set the rules for contests even if their actions violated state constitutions and resulted in extreme partisan gerrymandering for congressional seats.’
While the main issue being debated in Moore v Harper, scheduled for a hearing this October, is a gerrymander that conflicts with North Carolina’s constitution, the issue at the core of the debate is what’s called the ‘Independent State Legislature Doctrine.’

It literally gives state legislatures the power to pre-rig or simply hand elections to the candidate of their choice.

Daughters (Sons and Elders) head Jonathan Simon’s advice to his Daughter.

Jonathan Simon, via WhoWhatWhy.org Letter to My Nonvoting Daughter:

“My daughter, 28, recently wrote in an email to me, “I’m so disappointed in how the world is right now, I don’t vote because of it.”

Here is my response to her.

Dear L_____,

A lecture is coming that you’ll probably feel you could live without. Nevertheless, I persist.

Reminiscent of our past post:

THE ONLY WAY TO BE SURE YOUR VOTE WON’T COUNT – IS TO NOT VOTE.

Jonathan Simon, via WhoWhatWhy.org Letter to My Nonvoting Daughter:

“My daughter, 28, recently wrote in an email to me, “I’m so disappointed in how the world is right now, I don’t vote because of it.”

Here is my response to her.

Dear L_____,

A lecture is coming that you’ll probably feel you could live without. Nevertheless, I persist.

I don’t blame you for being disappointed, or worse. But when you’re disappointed and frustrated and angry with how the world is, that’s just the time to vote!

Now that may sound strange coming from someone who you know has challenged the honesty of our electoral process for 20 years.

If you wanted to organize a mass boycott of elections (or a mass consumer boycott or general strike, for that matter), perhaps I could support that. But that takes a lot of work. Simply not voting yourself takes no work — in fact, it saves time and energy. Great!

Just recognize, though, that what you’re doing, others like you are also doing — others who are, like you, “disappointed in how the world is.” (By the way, the world has always found ways to be disappointing.) So then who is left to change it?

And yes, one vote (or two or three) seems very tiny, not at all powerful or consequential. If you don’t vote, it won’t be missed — after all, how many elections are ever won by a single vote? Virtually none. And add to that your doubts about the count to boot! You can certainly make a logical case that it’s not worth your time.

But then, do you see, it’s not worth anybody’s time! And that’s the end of democracy…”

Reminiscent of our past post:

THE ONLY WAY TO BE SURE YOUR VOTE WON’T COUNT – IS TO NOT VOTE.

A flawed new version of Risk Limiting Audit bill moves forward in the General Assembly

Last month I wrote about S.B.472 for Risk Limiting Audits, despite all but unanimous testimony that the bill was highly flawed, a flawed substitute was passed shortly thereafter by the General Administration and Elections Committee. Last week that revised bill became available on the web, allowing public scrutiny. There is a Word version and a .pdf version, the .pdf version has a fiscal note and an Office of Legislative (OLR) analysis.

It is revised from the original with some improvements, yet remains ambiguous and confusing, although now it may be closer to an actual Risk Limiting Audit. I question if the person(s) who wrote this updated bill had or took advantage of review by anyone familiar with the science of Risk Limiting Audits. Considering the fiscal note and the OLR Analysis, it seems to me that the description in some cases reads things into the bill that do not seem to be reflected in the bill. In particular, it assumes costs and roles for UConn that are not clear in the bill. Costs and roles that would be consistent with the prototype last year, but not obvious in the bill that would become law.

There are some welcome changes:

This version delays a full RLA until 2024 rather than 2022. This will allow time for planning, especially important since we will have a new Secretary of the State (SOTS) in January 2023. This also provides time for future revisions to the law prior to Nov 2024.
This version makes a complete new section for RLAs from the existing and continuing 5% audit which still applies to all primaries and odd-year elections. This makes the bill easier to read and perhaps contributes to its improvements, clarity and perhaps facilitating clarity in future improvements. Yet it copies text that is appropriate to the existing audits but not for RLAs.
It seems to have better, if imperfect, definitions of RLAs, closer torecognized standard definitions.
It arguably requires that manifest creation be open to the public.

Yet, in my reading, there remain new and old problems:

It continues the lack of specific notice requirements. In every very case where something is open to the public, there should a clear notice requirement specifying how far in advance each event should be notices (e.g. 48 hours) and where the notice will appear (e.g. a specific place on the SOTS Web.)
Like the original it has no requirements for close public observation, software independence, and public access to information critical to verifying the audit. It should clearly require standard, recognized statistical evidence, the review of samples of actual paper ballots, and public access to algorithms and data necessary to independently verify the results of the audit.
It continues the ambiguous requirements that UConn report on the audit, send the report to the SOTS and the SOTS file it with the State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC). The weakness is that the current law and this bill provide no deadline for such filing. Many reports of audits since 2008 have yet to be published by UConn, published by the SOTS, or filed with the SEEC. Also in practice these are not independent reports. The UConn Voter Center is dependent on the SOTS for its budget and in practice draft reports are reviewed by the SOTS Office and revised by UConn before they are accepted.
It continues the ambiguous language that candidates can use evidence from the audit to challenge an election in court until seven days after the audit is complete, yet provides no definition of completion of the audit. It would seem that an audit is not complete until a report is filled and published by the SEEC. If so, given history, candidates could challenge an election for years after. See Sec. 4 Section 9-323 (page 11) and Sec. 5. Section 9-324 (page 13) and Sec. 6. Section 9-328 (page 15) or Sec. 7. Subsection (a) of section 9-29a (page 16).
It requires that presidential electors, all statewide offices including one U.S. Senator, a randomly chosen Congressional race, and 5% of General Assembly offices be audited in even years. Precluding audits of any other offices in even years, such as Judge of Probate and Registrar of voters from any audit.
It continues the current flaw in the law that exempts questions from audit. I wonder if anyone would have any concerns if the Early Voting or No-Excuse Absentee Voting questions were to pass or fail by small margins? Would those be concerns be magnified realizing they were exempt from the audit?
Recanvassed races (CT’s hand and machine recounts) are included in the RLAs. General Assembly races that have been recanvassed are automatically included in the 5% that are subject to RLA. I wonder if they realize that such races, since they are close, will often end in a complete hand recount? If the intent is to hand-recount all such races, why not do the hand recount instead of the recanvass?
The timing of ballot manifest creation seems to be part of the process of the initial close of the polls on election night and is specified as open to the public – an improvement over the original bill. However, other laws allow counting to be interrupted and completed within 48 hours, without any public notice requirements for the date, time and location of where counting will resume.
While the non-binding Fiscal Note and OLR Analysis added below the bill seems to indicate that UConn will be part of conducting the audit, the bill mirrors the requirements of the existing 5% audit, where the SOTS creates the procedures for the RLA, the Registrars conduct the RLA submitting results to UConn, who submits a report to the SOTS.
- It is hard to imagine the Registrars (two independent D and R election officials in each of 169 towns) coordinating a state wide RLA, including escalation, and results without some body coordinating the state wide calculations, decision making, and declaring the final result.
- It seems the Registrars determine if the audit meets the risk limit or not and then based on that the SOTS shall order a manual recount. See Section 1 (e).

Perhaps some of these concerns can be cured/overridden by procedures issued by the SOTS. See Section 1 (d). However one should question if the SOTS can write binding procedures, opinions, or declarations which contradict the text of state law.

Testimony on two election bills. One poorly written, the other needing more.

Yesterday I submitted testimony on two bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee. Unfortunately I was unable to testify in person. It was not for a lack of trying. I had submitted testimony and signed up for the hearing two days in advance, yet only one of my two testimonies was posted in time for the hearing and neither I nor the committee staff could get me the link to testify. Its happened before this year and last, yet only for this committee – in the past the staff was able to correct the problems. In one case not much was lost except to my reputation as the committee still called may name when I was supposed to testify.

S.B.472 Would change our existing 5% audit, adding risk-limiting audits. Unfortunately it is a highly flawed bill. I submitted the most detailed testimony, articulating its many flaws new and existing. Fortunately the testimony, so far, us unanimously against the current bill, with more on the way. Overall no harm done that I could not speak. It would seem that its is very unlikely to move forward this year.

H.J.114 The Constitutional Amendment to provide for no-excuse absentee voting. In this case, not being able to testify in person and my testimony not being up hurt. I am likely the only person speaking and submitting testimony asking that the bill remove another unfortunate restriction in the Constitution that will bite us along the way with absentee voting and/or ranked choice voting. Of course we can wait and learn our lesson the hard way.

Yesterday I submitted testimony on two bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee.) Unfortunately I was unable to testify in person. It was not for a lack of trying. I had submitted testimony and signed up for the hearing two days in advance, yet only one of my two testimonies was posted in time for the hearing and neither I nor the committee staff could get me the link to testify. Its happened before this year and last, yet only for this committee – in the past the staff was able to correct the problems. In one case not much was lost except to my reputation as the committee still called may name when I was supposed to testify.

S.B.472 Would change our existing 5% audit, adding risk-limiting audits. Unfortunately it is a highly flawed bill. I submitted the most detailed testimony, articulating its many flaws new and existing. Fortunately the testimony, so far, us unanimously against the current bill, with more on the way. Here is the testimony so far: <read>. Overall no harm done that I could not speak. It would seem that its is very unlikely to move forward this year.

I thank all the nationally recognized experts in Risk Limiting Audits and advocates from around the country who testified in person and submitted testimony.

Also a shout out to Chris Prue and ROVAC for catching a civil rights issue that we opposed last year and was a section of another bill being heard this yesterday, the testimony by Chris Prue: <Video 4:04 in>

Testimony: Suggest Correcting Two Serious Flaws in the Law.

Yesterday I testified on a technical elections bill that the General Assembly should go farther in two regards:

Transparency, Ballot Security, and Public Verifiability are the basis for justified confidence in our elections. So much more important now that many question the integrity of our elections.

As I testified in 2016 and 2015, existing law and a new law providing for interrupted counting lasting up to 48 hours have serious flaws:

First, the new law for interrupted counting did not provide any method for the public, candidates, or parties to be notified when counting was to resume.

Second, since the inception of optical scanners in 2007 the law has never recognized that ballots are cast in polling places. That portion of the law assumes, apparently, that we are still using lever machines.

It is long past time for Connecticut to begin a path toward full transparency, public verifiability, and protecting our paper ballots, upon which justified confidence in elections is based. <testimony>

Yesterday I testified on a technical elections bill that the General Assembly should go farther in two regards:

Transparency, Ballot Security, and Public Verifiability are the basis for justified confidence in our elections. So much more important now that many question the integrity of our elections.

As I testified in 2016 and 2015, existing law and a new law providing for interrupted counting lasting up to 48 hours have serious flaws:

First, the new law for interrupted counting did not provide any method for the public, candidates, or parties to be notified when counting was to resume.

Second, since the inception of optical scanners in 2007 the law has never recognized that ballots are cast in polling places. That portion of the law assumes, apparently, that we are still using lever machines.

It is long past time for Connecticut to begin a path toward full transparency, public verifiability, and protecting our paper ballots, upon which justified confidence in elections is based. <testimony>

Insiders are a great threat to elections

It is refreshing to see that main stream media is beginning to recognize the threat of insiders to elections. I agree that election officials are by and large of high integrity, however just like other officials a few are not. Insiders can have access to a wide range of election equipment, ballots, and other data that create and verify election results. A recent Associated Press article by Christia A. Cassidy points that out:

In a handful of states, authorities are investigating whether local officials directed or aided in suspected security breaches at their own election offices. At least some have expressed doubt about the 2020 presidential election, and information gleaned from the breaches has surfaced in conspiracy theories pushed by allies of former President Donald Trump.

Insiders are not just election officials, other insiders include town hall employees in the mail room and network/computer staff, janitors with access to storage areas and election offices; They include post office workers and various vendor personal with access to networks or to repair election equipment. Here are some examples from Connecticut and elsewhere:

In a handful of states, authorities are investigating whether local officials directed or aided in suspected security breaches at their own election offices. At least some have expressed doubt about the 2020 presidential election, and information gleaned from the breaches has surfaced in conspiracy theories pushed by allies of former President Donald Trump.

Adding to the concern is a wave of candidates for state and local election offices this year who parrot Trump’s false claims about his loss to Democrat Joe Biden.

“Putting them in positions of authority over elections is akin to putting arsonists in charge of a fire department,” said Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, a Democrat and former law school dean who serves as Michigan’s top elections official.

Here are some examples from Connecticut and elsewhere:

CO: Colorado clerk is indicted for election tampering and misconduct

CT: VotING fraud via Absentee, this time in Stamford

CT: Chain-Of-Custody Education In Haddam

CT: Sometimes it is just incompetence, insufficient laws and procedures:
Judge orders primary after Bloomfield Democrats sue their own party registrar over petition rejection

Dead Men Don’t Vote (New Podcast)

My friends at OSET (Open Source Election Technology just officially launched a new podcast yesterday: Dead Men Don’t vote. Its goal it to explain all that officials do under the covers to run our elections. The 1st episode, Do Dead People Actually Vote?, lived up to that goal. They packed a lot into 33 minutes. <link>