Testimony on two more election bills: RLAs and Internet Voting

H.B.6325 was a second bill similar to an earlier on that proposed a task force for Risk limiting Audits (RLAs). My detailed testimony only changed a little bit. For the previous bill, I only testified on paper. For this bill I spoke, especially giving my answer to a legislators question of another on another bill. I’m glad I had a few days contemplate an answer: “How would you explain RLAs to forth graders?”

That is a good question: Risk Limiting Audits are intended to confirm that elections are correctly counted and totaled or to correct incorrect results…

That is a good question: Risk Limiting Audits are intended to confirm that elections are correctly counted and totaled or to correct incorrect results. Over a 10-year period, Connecticut has about 20,000 election contests. For instance, if 20 of those contests were incorrectly decided due to error or fraud, rigorous Risk Limiting Audits which examine all 20,000 contests would correct at least 19 of the 20.

After several hiatus an Internet voting bill is being proposed, one of 28 sections. It also included a flawed proposal for curing absentee ballots rejected for signature issues etc. S.B.5 was patterned after systems that have failed independent security studies, spectacularly.

Testimony on two Elections Bills

Earlier this week we testified on two elections bills.

First a bill for a Task Force to provide a prototype and recommend state laws for Risk Limiting post-election Audits (RLAs). See our testimony and that of the inventor of RLAs, Philip Stark, and John Marion of RI. Phil and I disagree just a bit on our recommendations. I find November is just not the best time to do a prototype and then providing less that two months to make recommendations to the General Assembly is not enough time. Here is all thee testimony <read>

Then on a long bill with several election changes recommended by the Secretary of the State. We had comments on two sections: We asked that two officials empty drop boxes and sign logs listing their content. Also a reform we have been requesting for a long time – including central count absentee ballots and Election Day Registration ballots in post-election audits <testimony>

Earlier this week we testified on two elections bills.

State Audit Working Group comments on H.R.1

This week the State Audit Working Group published a letter sent to Rep Sarbanes regarding the collective concerns with the bill.

Here are the details from the cover letter to Rep Sarbanes:

We write to request critical changes to H.R.1, along with suggested improvements. Without a few key changes, we believe the bill might degrade election integrity and miss opportunities for improvement, rather than meet its well-intended, laudable goals. Our comments are restricted to election administration and integrity issues pp78-407 of the bill.

Attached to this letter is a list of detailed comments. Here we summarize the most critical items:

Requirements for grants should be stronger, to help ensure effective Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs)…

This week the State Audit Working Group published a letter sent to Rep Sarbanes regarding the collective concerns with the bill <read>

Here are the details from the cover letter to Rep Sarbanes:

We write to request critical changes to H.R.1, along with suggested improvements. Without a few key changes, we believe the bill might degrade election integrity and miss opportunities for improvement, rather than meet its well-intended, laudable goals. Our comments are restricted to election administration and integrity issues pp78-407 of the bill.

Attached to this letter is a list of detailed comments. Here we summarize the most critical items:

>Requirements for grants should be stronger, to help ensure effective Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs). We suggest specific improvements to the HR1 grant requirements. Grants should be available to audit compliance and eligibility which are crucial for valid RLAs.

Poll books should be part of the Federal certification program, as proposed. So should other systems used to determine the eligibility of voters or ballot packets. They however, should be tested and certified separately from the voting system. Competition will be stifled if pollbooks are only tested as part of an entire voting system. Election officials will end up with fewer and less innovative purchase choices.

Ballots cast by an in-person voter by hand marked paper ballots may be rejected later under the current text. When a voter appears in person they must be offered an opportunity to be authenticated and, upon authentication, vote on a hand marked paper ballot without further eligibility checks.

Voter Privacy / Ballot Secrecy. Ballots should never be associated with voters, thus compromising ballot secrecy There should be no unique identification numbers on some ballots for voters with disabilities. Voters should not be able to waive their ballot secrecy, a collective right.

Voting over the internet is not secure and does not protect the secrecy of the ballot. For security and integrity, votes should not be transmitted over the internet or by other electronic means such as email or fax.

Last week we posted a three-part series on our concerns with H.R.1. There concerns were largely based on the effects for states like Connecticut.

PS: I am the Moderator of the State Audit Working Group. Members spent hours over a couple of weeks under tight deadlines to publish our concerns.

Testimony on Early Voting/Absentee Voting Constitutional Amendments

On Monday, the Government Administration and Elections Committee will hear testimony on bills to modify Connecticut’s Constitution for Early Voting and No-Excuse Voting. Meanwhile another Constitutional Amendment or change is advisable to pave the way for related and unrelated voting changes which Connecticut may desire or may be forced upon Connecticut by H.R.1. My testimony is below and <here in .pdf>

H.J.58, H.J.59 – Needed – A Further Critical Change to the CT Constitution

Chairs, members of the Committee, and Connecticut voters, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount, a computer scientist, and a Certified Moderator since 2008. I also lead one national group and participate in another that discuss, evaluate, and regularly propose changes to state and Federal election laws.

As you are contemplating amendments to the Connecticut Constitution for elections, we need to go just a bit farther than the changes now in H.J.59. Just a few more words would make a great difference going forward. The additional changes would remove deadlines for reporting state contest results that are now baked into our Constitution. These same deadlines would remain in effect, in law, yet easier to change in short order should that become necessary.

Why are these changes critical?

There are at least four reasons why these deadlines may need to change quickly in the near future. Not removing them as soon as possible in our Constitution would cause significant problems and limitations, while waiting for another years-long amendment process to change them…<more>

Portions in bold are those that I intend for my oral testimony:

H.J.58, H.J.59 – Needed – A Further Critical Change to the CT Constitution

Why are these changes critical?

Reason #1: The U.S. Congress is contemplating H.R.1[1] which if passed in its current form, would mandate no-excuse absentee voting for Federal contests, including allowing ballots post-marked by election day to be counted, if received, within a minimum of 10 days after election day. And subject to “curing”[2] for a minimum of 10 ten days after that.

If H.R.1 or a similar Federal law were to pass, it would only apply and override our Constitution for Federal races, then in even-year elections Connecticut would be faced with two election deadlines, one for Federal elections, and another for state elections, likely requiring two ballot designs per district. Ballots would have to be segregated, with some counted and declared within the currently mandated 10 days and others accepted, cured, and added in 20 days later, with the possibility of two sets of recanvass deadlines etc. To do what we do now within 10 days after an election, under H.R.1 would take at least 30 days! Not something that could be completed before early December.

Reason #2: If our Constitution is amended to provide for no-excuse absentee voting, presumably there will be calls for the same things in H.R.1, i.e. accepting ballots post-marked by election day, followed by curing.That would be impossible for state offices until and unless the Connecticut Constitution were to be amended as recommended here.

Reasons #3 and #4 are Ranked Choice Voting and Risk Limiting Audits. If either were to be implemented in Connecticut, they would require days and sometimes weeks longer than the current limit of 10 days – even longer if they were combined with H.R.1:

Reason #3: If Connecticut were to institute Ranked Choice Voting, in some cases it could take days to a few weeks to determine initial results, followed by days or weeks of recanvassing. Those time requirements would be impossible for State offices without this change to the Constitution.

Reason #4: If Connecticut were to institute Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs), by definition RLAs, must be coordinated statewide, completed before certification, may take several rounds, and can sometimes take several days for the last round, as they did in Georgia this past November. That would be impossible without these changes.

The changes I suggest are based on those already in H.J.59, plus the ones in bold and larger type below:

Section 9 of article third of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 9. At all elections for members of the general assembly the presiding officers in the several towns shall [receive the votes of the electors, and] count and declare [them] the votes of the electors in open meeting. The presiding officers shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each. One list shall be delivered [within three days to the town clerk,] and [within ten days after such meeting,] the other shall be delivered [under seal] to the secretary of the state.

Section 4 of article fourth of the Constitution is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. [At the meetings of the electors in the respective towns held quadrennially as herein provided for the election of state officers, the presiding officers shall receive the votes and shall count and declare the same in the presence of the electors] The votes at the election of state officers shall be counted and declared in open meeting by the presiding officers in the several towns. The presiding officers shall make and certify duplicate lists of the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each. One list shall be delivered [within three days] to the town clerk, and [within ten days after such meeting,] the other shall be delivered [under seal] to the secretary of the state. The votes so delivered shall be counted, canvassed and declared by the treasurer, secretary, and comptroller[, within the month of November]… that currently even without being limited by our Constitution, all contests in Connecticut are similarly limited by law. The clauses in the Constitution above only apply to State Contests.

At this time, H.J.59 cannot be changed. There are two courses going forward 1) Place the additional changes in H.J.58 or 2) Create an additional amendment with only these changes. I recommend placing the additional changes in H.J.58, rather than as a separate amendment which would likely confuse voters.

Please consider the urgency of making these critical changes in Connecticut’s Constitution.

Thank you

[1] U.S. House Resolution 1 https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1/text

A bill that would mandate many changes for Federal elections nationwide by 11/2022 with some by 1/2020, including accepting absentee ballots for 10 days after election day if post-marked by election day followed by 10 subsequent days for “curing” them. It would also mandate at least 15 contiguous days of in-person early voting including on election day.
For more analysis of H.R.1, see: https://ctvoterscount.org/whats-the-matter-with-h-r-1-part-1/

[2] Curing – Processes by which voters are notified of errors in mail-in ballots in signatures, envelope protocols etc. and provided a period for correcting such errors.

What’s the matter with H.R.1, Part 3

Last week in<Part 1> we covered our three greatest concerns with the election administration portions of H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021” <read H.R.1> and then in <Part 2> we covered our minor concerns which alone would argue against the bill as currently written. In this final installment we will cover what is good about the election administration areas of the bill. (We have refrained from commenting on the rest of the bill which concerns campaign finance reform, gerrymandering, and other issues which we generally do not cover and lack expertise to comment on in detail, other that we are sure that they, like the entire bill, are well-intended).

What is good about election administration in H.R.1?…

What can be done to make election administration portions of H.R.1, more acceptable, short of eliminating all the areas of our concern?..

What is good about election administration in H.R.1?

It prohibits excessive requirements for authenticating absentee ballots such as the requirements that they be witnessed by one or two people.
It provides grants for the development of voting equipment for those with disabilities.
It provides grants for Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs), although the definition of RLAs and requirement for grants should be improved to require more transparency, public verifiability, and require that races to audit not be chosen by partisan bias or based on expediency after results are known. It could also offer grants for ballot security and other, so called, process audits.
It provides funds for replacing equipment that is over ten years old. We wish that those grants were limited to systems which require hand-marked paper ballots and one ballot marking device per polling place, and cover only VVSG/EAC certified equipment.
It adds ePollbooks to the definition of voting systems, thus subjecting them to the Election Assistance Commission’s Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines, subject to certification testing as well.

What can be done to make election administration portions of H.R.1, more acceptable, short of eliminating all the areas of our concern?

Overall the requirements should be spread over several years, perhaps 2022 through 2026 or 2028.
Absentee ballots should not be required to be accepted after Election Day, that one requirement adds 10 days to the election cycle, delaying results. Voters knowing the deadline can be expected to mail them earlier or get them to drop boxes in time.
Curing should be required only for ballots received 12 days before election day and processed such that letters go out no less than 10 days before election day and cured by election day. Mandatory curing requirements should be delayed until 2026.
Officials should not be responsible for voters receiving absentee ballots. Voters should be able to request absentee ballots in-person and receive them on the spot until 5 days or less before the election. Requests received by mail should be mailed back within 24 business hours.
Election Day Registration should only be required for election day. Voters should be able to register in-person five days or less before election day, and any mailed-in or on-line requests received by that date processed.
Considering that states like CA and CO have shown that only a small number of voters use early voting when no-excuse absentee voting is available, there should be no requirement for early in-person voting. At worst it should only be required for a minimum of 5 days in the two weeks before election day.
Chief election officials should only be required to step aside, when they are on the ballot and not running for reelection.
Drop box ballots should be counted like absentee ballots. Drop boxes should, at most, be required to be wheelchair accessible and to have instructions in braille.
Unrealistic requirements for all voters with disabilities to be able to vote independently and privately should be dropped or made realistic, based on the capabilities of commonly available VVSG/EAC certified equipment.
Enforcement provisions should also be made more realistic to protect pollworkers and election officials from excessive risk and harrassment.
The unrealistic requirement for voters never having to wait over 30 minutes in line should be removed or drastically changed.
Having IDs on ballots which can link them to voters should be prohibited, never required in any circumstance. IDs on envelops are acceptable.

That is all for now, unless there are further developments.

What’s the matter with H.R.1, Part 2

Yesterday in <Part 1> we covered our three greatest concerns with the election administration in H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021”. Here we will cover the rest of our major concerns, these alone argue that the bill should not be passed without a number of major and minor changes…

In <Part 3> we address what is clearly good in the election administration portions of the bill and what might be changed to meet the well-intended goals without the, likely unintended, unnecessary detailed requirements and consequences.

Yesterday in <Part 1> we covered our three greatest concerns with the election administration portions of H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021” <read H.R.1> Here we will cover the rest of our major concerns, these alone argue that the bill should not be passed without a number of major and minor changes:

In states, like Connecticut, with an elected Chief Election Official (in CT Secretary of the State), when they are on the ballot, they are required to step aside and appoint someone else to perform their role for the election – appoint someone who does not report to them. For instance, if Denise Merrill were to run for reelection in 2022, under H.R.1, she would need to do that. Its a complex job to learn and in Connecticut there are few sufficiently knowledgeable or experienced individuals who could quickly step in – even less individuals willing to stop what they are doing and take over a more than full time job. Worse that would apply to all future Secretaries of the State. Perhaps many future Secretaries would choose for the benefit of election management, limit themselves to a single term. The voters of the State might well suffer from missing the benefits of an experienced Secretary of the State.
H.B.1 requires that drop box ballots be counted like early voting ballots. Instead, they are normally counted like absentee ballots, yet this law seems to preclude that. Early voting ballots are normally provided to voters in person, voters who fill them out in the early voting place, have an opportunity to replace them to re-vote, and then the voter feeds them into a scanner. Perhaps this is just an oversight, yet it needs to be corrected or clarified.
H.B.1 also requires that drop boxes be accessible to all those with disabilities. It would be straight-forward to make them accessible to those who use wheelchairs, yet presumably there other disabilities where that would be all but impossible and prohibitively expensive, e.g. to provide independent access to a severely limited paraplegic.
In a similar vein, H.B.1 requires that all those with disabilities be a able to vote independently and privately. While that is a laudable goal it is all but impossible to serve everyone, with every actual disability, or combination of disabilities. While this is required the bill recognizes the limitations of actually available products when it, laudably, offers grants for researching such solutions.
H.B.1 requires Election Day Registration at every early voting site. That is certainly a convenience for voters, yet we point out it is another significant additional amount of work both for early voting place officials and for registrars in Connecticut.
The bill requires that voting arrangements should be such that for election day and for early voting that voters must not ever have to wait more than 30 minutes in line. Anyone familiar with queuing theory would know that to achieve that is all but impossible. Election officials have no way of predicting when and how many voters will arrive at a polling place or early voting center, especially when polling places open on election day and the 1st day of early voting. I have served at polling places in Connecticut where the only line over five minutes was at 6:00am. The 1st time I served in Nov 2008 the media hyped up that voting would be difficult with long lines, we had a 6:00am backup that was about 20 min – it could have been much longer, most of the rest of the day. we were mostly idle. In Nov 2020 and the Jan 2021 run-off in Georgia there were many stories of long lines in Georgia and other states on the 1st day of early voting, the stories seemed to go away after that initial crush. I agree that voters should not have to wait in lines for long times and generally less than 30 minutes, yet that is absolutely impossible to guarantee. Worse, there are unpredictable problems that take time to cure that could interrupt or slowdown voting e.g. ePollbook and voting machine breakdowns, sick pollworkers, power and internet failures, broken water pipes etc.
Another provision requires IDs on some ballots to identify the voter with their ballot. This is violates the, so called, Secret Ballot, or as the Connecticut Constitution calls the right of secret voting. Any method of linking a voter to a ballot should be illegal, rather than mandatory. Note that a ballot package with such an ID on an outer or inner envelope is fine, as long as the process does not result in an opportunity for the ballot to be read while still linked to such an envelope.
Finally, the bill has very strong enforcement provisions that go well beyond what we have in Connecticut. We have Secretary of the State’s Office’s hot lines, Election Enforcement hot lines, Elections Enforcement processes, and the opportunity for redress in the courts. A small error by an official should normally be referred to the processes we have now, yet this law would provide extensive legal recourse for a voter who had to wait in line more than 30 minutes, a single voter with disabilities who could not be served independently and privately, a single voter with disabilities unable to use a drop box unaided, a single voter not receiving an absentee ballot when they applied as late as five days before election day, etc. Who would want to be a pollworker, registrar or clerk under such potential risk?

What’s the matter with H.R.1, Part 1

H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021”. It is a 790 page omnibus election reform bill supported largely by Democrats. There is a companion bill in the U.S. Senate.

It is endorsed by a huge number of good government groups. I wonder how many have read it in detail and understand its ramifications? Like many such bills it has some good provisions and some not so good provisions. I have read only those portions having to do with voting and election administration, about half the bill, pp78-407 – areas where I can claim a level of expertise. I have also spent hours with a team of experts reviewing those provisions in further detail.

Be careful what you endorse! All of this bill is well-intended, yet not all workable.

In this 1st post I will concentrate on just three concerns that make it especially tough for states like Connecticut. Overall in its voting and election administration sections one could say it seems to be intended to make all states voting more like California and Colorado which encourage voters to vote by mail, while offering extensive early (in-person) voting, along with polling place voting.

First, overall its too much too quickly. Overall we estimate doubling to quadrupling election costs in our cities and towns...

H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021” <read H.R.1> It is a 790 page omnibus election reform bill supported largely by Democrats. There is a companion bill in the U.S. Senate.

Be careful what you endorse! All of this bill is well-intended, yet not all workable.

First, overall its too much too quickly. Most of its provisions apply to all Federal elections (Federal races*) starting with November 2022, others apply by January 2022. Most previsions apply to Federal elections, primaries, run-offs, and special elections. For a state like Connecticut, you will see that it will be ongoingly expensive and in the near term challenging to implement so much. Overall we estimate doubling to quadrupling election costs in our cities and towns.

Second, significant changes in absentee voting. H.R.1 would allow all citizens the opportunity to vote by mail, yet with significant additions that will be especially challenging for Connecticut. It will mandate that mail-in packets must be processed if they are postmarked by election day** and received within 10 days after the election. Then if such ballot packages are rejected (for instance without a signature), voters must be notified and given at least 10 days to ‘cure’ (correct) the problem. That might sound good and fair, however:

Currently Connecticut law requires all ballots to be counted, recounted, and finalized within 10 days of the election. For state races, that 10 day deadline is in the Connecticut Constitution. So, in November 2022 and thereafter for every even year, the deadlines for Federal races would have to change to about 30 days after the election. State laws and election procedures should be changed to account for all requirements and to correct all subsequent deadlines (i.e. swearing into office) to conform to those Federal requirements, at least for even-year and other Federal elections. That’s all tall order to complete in, at most, a year and a half. Yet there is more. Federal law can not override our Constitution for state contests, so every two years, until our Constitution is changed we would have to effectively run two elections, with two deadlines for accepting ballots, counting ballots, calling and completing recounts (actually recanvasses in Connecticut). Realistically the earliest a Constitutional amendment could pass would be 2024, to be in effect in 2026. Connecticut could keep some or all of our current laws and deadlines for municipal races, yet that would create additional challenges and confusion for voters and for officials. Plus for the Federal races there would be no-excuse absentee voting, yet under our Constitution only absentee ballots for those with excuses could be counted for all other contests. So that would likely require two absentee ballots, one type for those with excuses, and another for those without an excuse that has only the Federal races.

The law also makes election officials responsible for the delivery of absentee ballots to individuals requesting them five days or more before the election. What about the elderly person who cannot use the Internet who requests a ballot five days before? What is an election official to do, but deliver it by hand?

Third, gargantuan early voting requirements.
Background: Connecticut does not have in-person early voting. In the past proposed Constitutional amendments have allowed the General Assembly to mandate a maximum of five or eight days of early voting in a specified period prior to an election or primary. In California there are currently 11 days of early voting, even that seems to be overkill for California, where 70% of voters mail-in their ballots, 20% vote on election day, and just 10% vote on those 11 days of early voting. Statistics are similar in Colorado.

H.R.1 would mandate a minimum of 15 days of early voting, not just any days, but each of the 15 days before election day and election day itself. It would mandate at least 10 hours a day of early voting, with all days required to be the exact same hours. And that early voting must use the same methods as election day voting, e.g. check-in lines, scanners, etc. So even the smallest, single polling-place towns in Connecticut would have to staff an early voting site for 15 days, with a minimum of six pollworkers, before election day and on election day. By my estimates likely contributing to quadrupling election costs for some towns, in an already busy period for registrars and clerks. Perhaps ‘only’ tripling costs for mid-size municipalities, and ‘only’ doubling them for large cities. Another implication is that because early voting hours must be the same every day, early voting could not be open early some days, late other days, and vary for weekend days. Finally, if you desire to use an early voting location to double as an election day polling place that would mean all early voting hours would need to be from 6:00am to 8:00pm – most small one-polling place towns would find it easier to have two venues open on election day rather than do 15 days of 6:00am to 8:00pm. Staffing 15 days of 10 hour (actually 12 hours for staff) early voting would seem to require at least three crews plus registrars and clerks available.

This is perhaps the bulk of the work, yet not the end of H.R.1 and requirements that seem to have been written without the benefit of consulting those who have to implement them. Read <Part 2> and <Part 3>.

*We try to use ‘race’ when we mean a race for office and ‘contest’ when we mean both a race or a question on the ballot. When it comes to Federal elections, there are only races.

** For the most part when we use ‘election’ in this post we mean election, primary, run-off, or special election.

To trust our elections we need evidence, enough evidence

A recent article in Barons by respected scientists: Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.
Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered…

A recent article in Barons by respected scientists: Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.

Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered. This requires stringent physical security protocols and ballot accounting, among other things.

Election officials count the votes, using technology if they choose. If the technology altered the outcome, that will (with high confidence) be corrected by the steps below.

Election officials reconcile and verify the number of ballots and the number of voters, with a complete canvass to ensure that every validly cast ballot is included in the count.

Election officials check whether the paper trail is trustworthy using a transparent “compliance audit,” reviewing chain-of-custody logs and security video, verifying voter eligibility, reconciling numbers of ballots of each style against poll book signatures and other records, and accounting for every ballot that was issued.

Election officials check the results with an audit that has a known, large probability of catching and correcting wrong reported outcomes—and no chance of altering correct outcomes. The inventory of paper ballots used in the audit must be complete and the audit must inspect the original hand-marked ballots, not images or copies.

None of these steps stands alone. An unexamined set of paper ballots, no matter how trustworthy, provides no evidence. Conversely, no matter how rigorous, audits and recounts of an untrustworthy paper trail provide no evidence that the reported winners won. Auditing or recounting machine-marked ballots or hand-marked ballots that have not been kept secure can check whether the reported outcome reflects that paper trail, but cannot provide evidence that the reported winners won.

We completely and enthusiastically agree.

One more time: Hand Marked Paper Ballots, protected and exploited

Our Longtime Editorial Opinion

We hear a lot about protecting voting equipment and paper ballots. We talk a lot about both as well. They are not equal!…

Today an article in Freedom to Tinker echoing our opinion: ESS voting machine company sends threats

Our Longtime Editorial Opinion

We hear a lot about protecting voting equipment and paper ballots. We talk a lot about both as well. They are not equal!

It is good to protect machines from tampering; good to test machines; and good to preserve them for post-election forensic analysis; yet, ultimately they cannot be fully protected and error free. They cannot be preserved for extended periods, they are needed for the next election.

Paper ballots are also ‘hackable’ by good old fashioned replacement, destruction, or alteration; yet they can be well protected by strong security measures and audits of security compliance. They must be exploited by sufficient, transparent, publicly verifiable audits and recounts.

Today an article in Freedom to Tinker echoing our opinion: ESS voting machine company sends threats <read>

The ExpressVote XL, if hacked, can add, delete, or change votes on individual ballots — and no voting machine is immune from hacking. That’s why optical-scan voting machines are the way to go, because they can’t change what’s printed on the ballot. And let me explain some more: The ExpressVote XL, if adopted, will deteriorate our security and our ability to have confidence in our elections, and indeed it is a bad voting machine. And expensive, too!

The main point of the article is that ES&S is using false claims made against Dominion to intimidate others, making accurate, indisputable, scientific claims:

Apparently, ES&S must think that amongst all that confusion, the time is right to send threatening Cease & Desist letters to the legitimate critics of their ExpressVote XL voting machine. Their lawyers sent this letter to the leaders of SMART Elections, a journalism+advocacy organization in New York State who have been communicating to the New York State Board of Elections, explaining to the Board why it’s a bad idea to use the ExpressVote XL in New York (or in any state).

ES&S machines, as far as we know, are no more or less vulnerable than other brands, however, the company exposes its lack of integrity by its unfounded intimidation.

Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust

Commentary in Barron’s this week Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>

Even though there is no compelling evidence the 2020 vote was rigged, U.S. elections are insufficiently equipped to counter such claims because of a flaw in American voting. The way we conduct elections does not routinely produce public evidence that outcomes are correct.

Commentary in Barron’s this week Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>

Even though there is no compelling evidence the 2020 vote was rigged, U.S. elections are insufficiently equipped to counter such claims because of a flaw in American voting. The way we conduct elections does not routinely produce public evidence that outcomes are correct.

Furthermore, despite large investments since 2016, voting technology remains vulnerable to hacking, bugs, and human error. A report by the National Academies into the 2016 election process concluded that “there is no realistic mechanism to fully secure vote casting and tabulation computer systems from cyber threats.” The existence of vulnerabilities is not evidence that any particular election outcome is wrong, but the big-picture lesson from 2020 is that ensuring an accurate result is not enough. Elections also have to be able to prove to a skeptical public that the result really was accurate.

We need evidence-based elections: processes that create strong public evidence that the reported winners really won and the reported losers really lost, despite any problems that might have occurred. Every step in election administration—from technology choices to voter eligibility checks, physical security, the canvass, and audits—should flow from that requirement…

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.

Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered. This requires stringent physical security protocols and ballot accounting, among other things.

Election officials count the votes, using technology if they choose. If the technology altered the outcome, that will (with high confidence) be corrected by the steps below.

Election officials reconcile and verify the number of ballots and the number of voters, with a complete canvass to ensure that every validly cast ballot is included in the count.

Election officials check whether the paper trail is trustworthy using a transparent “compliance audit,” reviewing chain-of-custody logs and security video, verifying voter eligibility, reconciling numbers of ballots of each style against poll book signatures and other records, and accounting for every ballot that was issued.

Election officials check the results with an audit that has a known, large probability of catching and correcting wrong reported outcomes—and no chance of altering correct outcomes. The inventory of paper ballots used in the audit must be complete and the audit must inspect the original hand-marked ballots, not images or copies.

None of these steps stands alone. An unexamined set of paper ballots, no matter how trustworthy, provides no evidence. Conversely, no matter how rigorous, audits and recounts of an untrustworthy paper trail provide no evidence that the reported winners won. Auditing or recounting machine-marked ballots or hand-marked ballots that have not been kept secure can check whether the reported outcome reflects that paper trail, but cannot provide evidence that the reported winners won…

outsourcing audits, as Georgia did after the November vote, may prevent such process improvements. It is the responsibility of election officials (and not a third party) to ensure and demonstrate that the paper trail includes no more and no less than every validly cast ballot, and that the reported result is what those ballots show.

We note that, to us, ‘Outsourcing’ audits is a distinct concept from ‘Independent’ audits. Outsourcing implies turning all responsibly over to a hired vendor or entity dependent on election officials for funding. Independent auditing means assigning responsibility for the audit, or at least assessment and oversight of the audit to an entity independent of election officials.