CT | CTVotersCount.org

How Could CT Spend New Federal Election Security Money?

Connecticut will have available somewhere around $5 million to spend on election security in the new “omnibus” appropriations bill. Woefully inadequate for states that should be replacing touch-screen voting with all paper ballots. etc., for a state that already has paper ballots, a lot can be accomplished.

Denise Merrill is already thinking about how to spend it: CTMirror: Omnibus has millions to strengthen CT voting system against cyber attacks.

Secretary Merrill asked me for suggestions in a brief conversation a couple of weeks ago. At the time, off the top of my head, I suggested and we briefly discussed three things. After consideration I would suggest some more things. Security is not just cyber security and training officials. It also requires physical protection of ballots, physical protection of voting machines, and understanding the situation before determining the training needed.

Connecticut will have available somewhere around $5 million to spend on election security in the new “omnibus” appropriations bill. Woefully inadequate for states that should be replacing touch-screen voting with all paper ballots. Yet, for a state that already has paper ballots, a lot can be accomplished.

Explanatory Statement on Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018
House Appropriations Committee; Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen, R-N.J., 3/21/2018

ELECTION REFORM PROGRAM

The bill provides $380,000,000 to the Election Assistance Commission to make payments to states for activities to improve the administration of elections for Federal office, including to enhance election technology and make election security improvements, as authorized under HAVA sections 101 [Payments to States for activities to improve administration of elections], 103 [Guaranteed minimum payment amount], and 104 [Authorization of appropriations] of the Help America Vote Act 2002 (P.L. 107-252). Consistent with the requirements of HAVA, states may use this funding to:

replace voting equipment that only records a voter’s intent electronically with equipment that utilizes a voter-verified paper record;

implement a post-election audit system that provides a high-level of confidence in the accuracy of the final vote tally;

>upgrade election-related computer systems to address cyber vulnerabilities identified through DHS or similar scans or assessments of existing election systems;

facilitate cybersecurity training for the state chief election official’s office and local election officials;

implement established cybersecurity best practices for election systems;

and fund other activities that will improve the security of elections for federal office.

Denise Merrill is already thinking about how to spend it: CTMIrror:Omnibus has millions to strengthen CT voting system against cyber attacks <read>

Connecticut Secretary of State Denise Merrill has asked the state to fund two IT positions at her agency to help strengthen protections of the state’s electoral system. Currently the state’s election system relies on an IT team that works for all state agencies.

Merrill says she wants an IT staff “with substantial knowledge of elections” to help fend off cyber threats.

The election chief’s request is pending.

The federal funds in the omnibus, which Merrill says will amount to between $3 million and $5 million for her agency, will be released within 45 days.

Merrill said she plans to use that money to buy equipment, and especially to train election personnel in the state’s 169 towns.

Secretary Merrill asked me for suggestions in a brief conversation a couple of weeks ago. At the time, off the top of my head, I suggested and we briefly discussed three things:

Strengthening Connecticut’s woefully inadequate ballot security. At a minimum setting basic standards for ballot access and minimum sealing duration in law as I suggested in legislation: <S.B.540 2017> That was indeed a minimal proposal at an estimated cost of $30,000.
Improving the Electronic Audit to satisfy reasonable integrity requirements as we have proposed in that same bill and in more detailed form to the Secreary’s Office and the UConn Voter Center. Once again this is very few thousands in enhancing some of the prototype code UConn has developed to meet those specifications along with a few thousands in developing documentation while piloting the enhanced system as the current system has been piloted over the last two November elections.
Developing the training and support system necessary to use the UConn audit system for all post-election audits – with a trained staff to support the audits deployed across state in the nine regional governments, reducing the need for UConn computer scientist support. I.e. The state has already purchased nine complete systems, that is one for each region of the state. I have suggested training election day scanner experts for the job in a system similar to the way the State now pays part-time registrars additional part-time income providing Moderator Certification classes. I would deploy teams of two trained individuals with three complete audit systems (two to use, one a spare) to each visit three regions for three days each, allowing registrars from towns selected for audit to signup for times to present the ballots for audit. At most $50,000 to setup the system and train the individuals (they could easily be trained, hands-on in one day, and perhaps assisted by a UConn expert the 1st day of actual auditing.) The cost to pay for each year, renting a van for each team, refresher training, etc. Might be $30,000 – that’s about half what the hand-count audit costs today. Certainly for cutting costs in half, towns could be expected to pay for the service after a couple years of Omnibus funding!.

After consideration I would suggest some more things. Security is not just cyber security and training officials. It also requires physical protection of ballots, physical protection of voting machines, and understanding the situation before determining the training needed. I would suggest:

An independent security audit of every one of the 169 municipalities, performed by a reputable third-party. I would assess the security of paper ballots – how sure can we be that they have not been tampered with for audits and recounts?; the security of voting machines and memory cards; the security of registrars’ office records and municipal clerk election records; the security practices surrounding receipt and processing of absentee ballots; the security practices and security of the elections network associated with the voter registration system and the municipal network in general. At a minimum assess a random sample of very small, small, medium, and large municipalities.
Based on that assessment make recommendations for the training of officials and further enhancements of all areas assessed (I suspect needs will be identified that go well beyond the $5 million.

In the long run, beyond the $5 million, the optional solution for ballot storage may be some configuration regional storage with better monitoring and safeguards that can be accomplished by 169 individual municipalities. Such rationalization would facilitate the audits and would also provide a basis for, so called. risk limiting audits.

NPV Compact – for the 7th or 8th time: It sounds good but has Unintended Consequences

On Monday we testified against the National Popular Vote Compact. We have been testifying against it since it was first proposed in Connecticut in 2007. There are two companion bills, you can link to them from our testimony. We have been saying pretty much the same things for the last several years. Each year we hone our testimony a bit and listen to new and predominant arguments from the proponents and make small adjustments.

As I have said many times, most of the democrats (and my friends) who support the Compact are wrong. And most of the Republicans opposed, are opposed for the wrong reason. Unlike the National “Experts” that fly in each year to testify, I provide complete testimony with facts that they have not successfully disputed since 2007.

On Monday we testified against the National Popular Vote Compact. We have been testifying against it since it was first proposed in Connecticut in 2007. There are two companion bills, you can link to them from our testimony <here> We have been saying pretty much the same things for the last several years. Each year we hone our testimony a bit and listen to new and predominant arguments from the proponents and make small adjustments. Here is the excerpt I spoke on Monday, with the changes for this year highlighted:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount. I am a computer scientist and a certified election moderator.

I understand the theoretical advantages of the national popular vote, yet there are extreme risks in its mismatch with our existing state-by-state voting system.

Many concepts such as Nuclear Power, GMOs, DDT, and Fracking have benefits, but also have unintended, unrecognized, and unappreciated consequences. This Compact is another.

What often appears simple is not. The Compact would cobble the national popular vote onto a flawed system designed for the Electoral College. It does not change that system. It magnifies the risks.

Developments since the 2016 election make the real dangers more apparent than ever. Most recently the risks of cyber vulnerability from foreign, domestic, and other actors. After the 2016 election, citizens and a candidate attempted to obtain recounts in three closely contested states, (Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania). Apparent, is a flawed system with errors and uncertainty, ultimately unable to prove accuracy and integrity, with strong official resistance to audits and recounts.

Six major concerns with the Compact include:

The 12^th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act govern declaring the President. They have been called a “Ticking Time Bomb” because of strict, yet, ambiguous rules, causing problems seen in 1876 and 2000. The Compact would exacerbate that risky system. (see page 6)

There is no official national popular vote number compiled in time, such that it could be used to officially and accurately determine the winner in any close election. (see page 3)

Even if there were such a number, it would aggravate the flaws in the system. The Electoral College limits the risks and damage to a few swing states. With the National Popular Vote Compact, errors, voter suppression, and fraud in all states would count against the national totals. (see page 5)

There is no national audit or recount available for close elections, to establish an accurate popular vote number. (see page 4)

With the Compact there is every reason to believe that any close election would be decided by partisian action of the Congress or the Supreme Court, as in Gore v. Bush. (see page 6)

This Compact will not make every voter equal.

Recently proponents of the Compact have highlighted the fact that the “U.S. Presidential election is the only U.S. election not decided by popular vote.”

Note that it is also the only U.S. election decided by a voting system that is not uniform in voting methods and franchise, and with votes not subject to uniform adjudication and totaling.” With the Compact, it would be the only such election in the World.

I urge you to consider the risks and chaos made possible if Connecticut were to endorse the National Popular Vote Compact, including reading the attached editorials and detailed arguments.

Thank You

As I have said many times, most of the democrats (and my friends) who support the Compact are wrong. And most of the Republicans opposed, are opposed for the wrong reason:

I would support a national popular vote amendment to the U.S. Constitution, if and only if, it provided for a uniform franchise, required sufficient voting systems, sufficient audits and recounts nationwide. And sufficient laws that were enforceable and enforced to provide a trustworthy and trusted national popular vote number. Those ifs are a large leap for our democracy, yet are reasonable, economical, realistic requirements to achieve trustworthy democracy,

Unlike the National “Experts” that fly in each year to testify, I provide complete testimony with facts that they have not successfully disputed since 2007. The experts got about 30min, 90min, and 105min of testimony and questions. I got 3min. I would put my credentials up against any of them. Here is all the testimony <here>

Let me add that there were at least three fact free arguments and statements today:

Chair Sen McLachlan early on incorrectly stated that I was not present – I was signed up as con, as number 7 on the public list. As Mark Twain would have said, “The report of my demise was premature”. Some of the media picked up on and reported his statement.
Rep Matt Lesser incorrectly stated that there was no election fraud. This is a usual proponent tactic. There is negligible votER fraud, but plenty of votING fraud, including in Connecticut. <see this recent summary>
After I testified, Chris Pearson, one of those national “experts”, testified that my contention that “There is no official national popular vote number compiled in time, such that it could be used to officially and accurately determine the winner in any close election.”, was incorrect. He made claims that continue to be refuted by the law, precedent, and practices as articulate for several years on page 3 of my testimony. Consider that there is a reason that none of the leaders from NPV have ever dared join me at any of the three well-publicized debates on the issue.

Five pieces of testimony on six bills

On Thursday the GAE Committee held testimony on most election bills this year. (There was one last week and a couple more will be on Monday). For once, I was able to support more bills than I opposed!

Opposition and support by the Secretary of the State and Registrars was mixed. In addition to supporting and opposing various bills, I offered several suggestions for improvement. And one suggestion for radical improvement.

It would be a very instructive exercise for you to read my testimony, that from individual registrars, ROVAC (Registrars Of Voters Association, Connecticut), the Secretary of the State, and others.

The bills were:
H.B.5422 Election Day Registration for Primaries
[Supported]

H.B.5459 Wording Change to Closing Polls
[Provided extensive comments and changes, pointing out that polling-
place ballots are insufficiently protected and how to change that.]

H.J.28 and S.J.31 Constitutional Amendment Authorizing Early Voting
[Supported. This is a much safer alternative than proposed and
rejected by the voters in 2014. I suggested modifications that
would save municipalities a lot, and provide even more
hours for voters.]

S.B.410 Post-Election Audit Drawing Date and SOTS Posting of Rulings
[Supported the bill with changes.]

S.B.411 Curing a Civil Rights Violation with EDR
[Supported. For several years I have been warning of the
potential violation]

You can see all the testimony <here>

Links to the bills are at the top of my testimony on each bill.

Do you have any examples of incorrectly decided elections, errors, and fraud etc.?

Last month as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists, which I addressed earlier, and then there was this one about actual evidence of incorrectly decided elections, error, and fraud.

Do you have any examples of incorrectly decided elections, errors, and fraud etc.?

In Connecticut there was a question incorrectly decided in New London. Because advocates closely reviewed election data it was obvious that officials counted 50 more voters than voters in one district’s absentee ballots(*). They demanded a recount and the result was reversed.

The last I heard, the recently replaced municipal clerk in Stamford was under Federal investigation for Absentee Ballot errors. She was reported by the two Registrars…

Last month as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists, which I addressed earlier <here>, and then there was this one about actual evidence of incorrectly decided elections, error, and fraud.

Do you have any examples of incorrectly decided elections, errors, and fraud etc.?

In Connecticut there was a question incorrectly decided in New London. Because advocates closely reviewed election data it was obvious that officials counted 50 more voters than voters in one district’s absentee ballots(*). They demanded a recount and the result was reversed.

The last I heard, the recently replaced municipal clerk in Stamford was under Federal investigation for Absentee Ballot errors. She was reported by the two Registrars.

Also a Party Chair in Bridgeport is under SEEC investigation for Absentee Ballot errors.

In fact, absentee skullduggery is pretty common. A couple of years ago an article said that of 17 allegations of Absentee ballot fraud in recent years in Bridgeport, 13 were investigated, validated, and resulted in fines.

In East Longmeadow, MA, a few years ago, in a primary 400 voters were registered in a party without their knowledge by insiders and voted without their knowledge. It swung the primary and the inside perpetrators were punished, with the election reversed.

In that same year a similar thing happened with 3000 votes in Miami/Dade. Officials withheld IP data vital to an investigation, nobody was caught of punished.

In 2002, Don Siegelman, a very popular person in Alabama, ran for re-election, one county obviously manipulated several thousand votes to cause his loss. The county refused to perform a recount or to show the ballots. As Siegleman prepared to run again in 2006 he was subject to a very questionable prosecution, convicted, and spent four years in Federal Prison. He is still under probation, limited in speaking and traveling. Many of the good guys were punished, while many of the bad guys were promoted. See the recent documentary Atticus v. The Architect is available from the producer or Amazon videos.

* This would never have been discovered in a post-election audit, as central count absentee scanners are exempt from audit by some flawed theory (held by legislators and election officials) along the lines of “if one machine works correctly someplace at some time, all machines work perfectly all the time.” That is apparently why we don’t continue to inspect cars for emissions, vaccines, or baby food.

Testimony on Well-Intended Bill That Would End Publicly Verifiable Elections

On Monday we testified against H.B.5173 An Act Protecting the Privacy of Voters

Note that this version of partially protecting some voters includes preventing open, transparent, and publicly verifiable elections by any and all voters, candidates, and parties.

Here is my testimony <read>. This is the summary:

The heart and soul of democracy is justified trust in elections. [This Bill]would be a death blow to the heart of public verifiability. [It] would preclude independent verification of the lists and electors recorded as voting; it would preclude officials from demonstrating to the public that our elections are on the up and up.

Like paper ballots, voter registration records need to be open, transparent, and publicly verifiable. (And recorded on paper.)

On Monday we testified against H.B.5173 An Act Protecting the Privacy of Voters

Note that this version of partially protecting some voters includes preventing open, transparent, and publicly verifiable elections by any and all voters, candidates, and parties.

Here is my testimony <read>. This is the summary:

The heart and soul of democracy is justified trust in elections. [This Bill]would be a death blow to the heart of public verifiability. [It] would preclude independent verification of the lists and electors recorded as voting; it would preclude officials from demonstrating to the public that our elections are on the up and up.

Like paper ballots, voter registration records need to be open, transparent, and publicly verifiable. (And recorded on paper.)

In my verbal testimony, I added to my written concerns that procedures, regulations, and most importantly laws need to change to be consistent with this proposed law, so that election officials and clerks can know how to implement the law, given its many conflicts with current law.

I also noted that it was “Address Suppression Light”, given that it did not suppress all the other addresses which are suppressed under the existing address suppression program, like land records. The regular address suppression program also includes an ID card issued to those that have their addressed suppressed, so they can be positively identified in the polls. (There are books written, mostly for felons, on how to find addresses for police, judges, and prosecutors etc. Many of those avenues remain unprotected by this bill).

Here is all the testimony submitted <read>

On one side in favor, was Secretary of the State Denise Merrill and the Connecticut League of Women Voters.

On the other side against, included CTVotersCount, the FOI Commission, State Elections Enforcement Commission, and the Freedom of Information Council.

The ACLU seemed to be in favor of expanding some provisions and against others.

American Progress Report: State Election Security Readiness

American Progress Report: Election Security in All 50 States

The report gives every state grades based on some detailed criteria. Connecticut was graded ‘B’, which it shared with several other states as the highest grade awarded. Yet there are problems and limitations with such reports. We would give Connecticut lower grades in some areas, higher in others, and are uncomfortable with other grades.

The report is useful and provides directions for improvement in many areas in every state. Election officials, legislators, and voters should act to improve our voting systems and laws in the near term. We would give the authors A+ for effort and the report a grade of B.

American Progress Report: Election Security in All 50 States <read>

The report gives every state grades based on some detailed criteria. Connecticut was graded ‘B’, which it shared with several other states as the highest grade awarded – it sets pretty stiff criteria for an ‘A’, yet we doubt that any state deserves an ‘A’. Yet there are problems and limitations with such reports. We would give Connecticut lower grades in some areas, higher in others, and are uncomfortable with other grades.

The criteria at a high level:

1.Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems

2.Voter-verified paper audit trail

3.Post-election audits that test election results

4.Ballot accounting and reconciliation

5.Return of voted paper absentee ballots

6.Voting machine certification requirements

7.Pre-election logic and accuracy testing

The criteria are good at first glance, yet I question why only “minimum” standards for voter registration systems, criteria should include “recounts” and standards for security of voted paper ballots.

A big weakness in such reports is that much of the information is based on self-reporting by election officials,who can be biased, limit their views to their state’s practices, and may not have the technical expertise to evaluate many of the criteria. Also state statutes may be misread or not represent the actual implementation in practice:

The information included in this report is derived primarily from state statutes and regulations, as well as interviews with state and local election officials.

The ratings in each category ranged from Unsatisfactory, Mixed, and Fair, to Good. Connecticut received a ‘B’ from category ratings of:

Fair 1.Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems

Good 2.Voter-verified paper audit trail

Mixed 3.Post-election audits that test election results

Fair 4.Ballot accounting and reconciliation

Fair 5.Return of voted paper absentee ballots

Fair 6.Voting machine certification requirements

Fair 7.Pre-election logic and accuracy testing

The factors and category ratings were somewhat complex, with some categories providing a score of 0 or 1 and others scoring 0 to 3 based on the number of criteria matched. resulting in totals leading to the final letter grade. So, where do we question Connecticut’s scores? The details for Connecticut can be found starting on page 50 of the report. Our comments and concerns:

Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems. This criteria is difficult to judge. The criteria is likely only based on interviews with officials. I suspect there is a tendency to say ‘Yes’ as often as possible. And even with accurate answers it is difficult to judge how well those criteria are met in practice. Yet, for Connecticut it is clear that officials are concerned and working on cybersecurity for of all our systems, not just election systems. As a central mainframe system managed by the State, the voter registration system is subject to every protection applied to that environment.

We would give Connecticut higher grades. Connecticut was downgraded because the voter registration system was judged over 10 years old. We disagree with that broad-brush criteria and the definition of Connecticut’s system as over 10 years old. As an IBM Mainframe, CICS, DB2 system our voter registration system is presumably regularly upgraded with new versions of the operating system, CICS, and DB2. The hardware may also be less than 10 years old. In addition, the registration system itself has been enhanced.

Post-election audits that test election results. Here we would downgrade the “mixed” results. As has been repeatedly reported by the Citizen Audit, the conduct of the audit falls short of what would be reasonably expected of any effective audit. While it is true the statutes require that the audit be completed before certification, in practice that is impossible in some elections since certification must be complete before the date the audits can commence. It also depends on the definition of “complete”. In practice, the overall audits are not complete until the Secretary of the State receives the final report from UConn and files that with the SEEC. The reports for all elections since November 2011 are yet to be filed and only one report for a primary (2014) has been filed in that period.

Ballot accounting and reconciliation. Once again we would downgrade Connecticut’s score. In practice, ballot accounting and reconciliation do not always occur. In recent years in almost every election, the Citizen Audit, has documented instances where write-in ballots (up to 151) have been read into the scanner at the end of election day in error. That results in counts that exceed the number of checked-off voters. In most instances those discrepancies have been discovered only by the audit, showing that they had not been discovered or addressed in the closing of the polls, nor in the review of results by both registrars and municipal clerks.

Voting machine certification requirements. Here we would upgrade Connecticut’s score. Connecticut was downgraded because our optical scanners are just over 10 years old – their design and circuits are even older in technology. Yet, they are working fine and from random survey’s of the Citizen Audit are not showing signs of age. There are incrementally better systems available today, yet voter marked paper ballots will continue to protect our votes. We expect they will need to be replaced in the next 5 to 10 years, but not yet. The longer we wait the better options will become available, at lower cost, and will also last that many years longer.

Missing Criteria Recounts: About half the states have close-vote recounts. Connecticut has close-vote recanvasses, which fall short of the best adversarial manual recounts in some other states. Connecticut should have more open, adversarial recounts, with more time to call for and perform recounts, with stronger criteria than the upper limit of 2000 vote differences which is too low a threshold ( as low as 0.12% in statewide elections). We should also allow for candidates, parties, or citizens to call for a limited number of directed recounts of specified districts, perhaps at a reasonable fee. We would rate Connecticut mixed in this criteria, as our recanvasses are actually conduced, usually fairly, yet not conduced uniformly and in accordance with the law. Sadly, that mixed rating would put us in the top 50% of all States in the recount category.

Protection of Paper Ballots. Here, once again, we would rate Connecticut mixed. Connecticut has an inadequate law for the protection of paper ballots and the actual practices in the vast majority of towns do not provide credible evidence that ballots were not tampered with. Once again, see the Citizen Audit reports. Despite inadequate law and practice, the distributed nature of Connecticut’s election system mean that for statewide elections it is doubtful that enough ballots could be manipulated in the same direction to change anything but the closest of outcomes. Unfortunately, that leaves local and regional elections vulnerable, protected only by trust in every election official and other local staff that frequently have access to voted ballots.

Finally, despite flaws, the report is useful and provides directions for improvement in many areas in every state. Election officials, legislators, and voters should act to improve our voting systems and laws in the near term. We would give the authors A+ for effort and the report a grade of B.

Citizen Audit Report: After 10 Years, Serious Flaws Continue

Citizens Audit Report:
After 10 years, 18 post-election audits, and 800 local audit counting sessions, serious flaws continue

From the Press Release:

Post-election vote audits of the November 2017 elections continue to fail to meet basic audit standards. They again undermine confidence in the accuracy of our elections, concludes the non-partisan Connecticut Citizen Election Audit.

Among the group’s concerns:

41% of reports required to be submitted to the Secretary of the State by registrars were incomplete or were not submitted. The Secretary’s Office failed to follow up on those reports.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.
Continued use of flawed electronic audit procedures that are not publicly verifiable.

On the bright side, developments related to the electronic audit point the way to improvement:

The Secretary of the State’s Office and UConn Voter Center solicited feedback on improving the electronic audits.
Write-in counting issues and failure to separate ballots as required were clearly identified by the electronic audit and observed by the Secretary of the State’s Office.

Luther Weeks, Executive Director of the Citizen Audit said, “We are frustrated with so little improvement after 18 statewide audits over 10 years. Citizens deserve better. Yet, if the Secretary of the State’s Office follows up on these problems and pursues publicly verifiable electronic audits, progress can be achieved in the near term.”

Citizens Audit Report:
After 10 years, 18 post-election audits, and 800 local audit counting sessions, serious flaws continue

From the Press Release:

Among the group’s concerns:

41% of reports required to be submitted to the Secretary of the State by registrars were incomplete or were not submitted. The Secretary’s Office failed to follow up on those reports.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.
Continued use of flawed electronic audit procedures that are not publicly verifiable.

On the bright side, developments related to the electronic audit point the way to improvement:

The Secretary of the State’s Office and UConn Voter Center solicited feedback on improving the electronic audits.
Write-in counting issues and failure to separate ballots as required were clearly identified by the electronic audit and observed by the Secretary of the State’s Office.

Are you a Conspiracy Theorist?

Last week as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists.

Are you a Conspiracy Theorist?

I think we all are. We just don’t recognize that many of the things we believe are conspiracies. Many were unproven allegations before we believed them…

Reading the Hartford Courant and the New York Times its amazing how many articles involve actual or alleged conspiracies. I counted at least a score in those two publications, just today. Take this as an exercise. Pick up your newspaper, online news site, or look at Facebook for a while and see how many you see that you believe are actual conspiracies, are possible, or are doubtful. Here are some ideas to ponder…

Last week as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists.

Are you a Conspiracy Theorist?

I think we all are. We just don’t recognize that many of the things we believe are conspiracies. Many were unproven allegations before we believed them. For example:

Russian hacking the 2016 election and news propaganda leading up to that election.

Hollywood and Congressional sex abuse coverups.

Tobacco and Energy companies hiding the effects of tabacco and fossil fuels for decades.

For a wide election coverup see the documentary Atticus v. The Architect about Don Siegleman’s election loss in Alabama. The conspiracy by now is widely known, yet the good have been punished, and the perpetrators have been promoted.

I guarantee you everyone in this room believes in some conspiracies, some of which are widely accepted, yet not proven. We call them Conspiracy Theories only when we aren’t convinced or suspicious.

What articles allege Russians hacked the election?
A conspiracy to execute illegal contracts with the CT Education Department?
Some unknown legislators or staff add items to bills?
What evidence is presented?
Do you believe it or disbelieve it based on your political or other predispositions?
Is it overblown in the article or did you have to read behind the lines to see it was a conspiracy?

My bet is that you are a Conspiracy Theorist. Yet get upset when someone calls you one. That is because its pejorative, no longer connected to the actual meanings of Conspiracy and Theory.

“Does your vote count?” Glastonbury MLK Conversation

Last Wednesday evening, I was one of five speakers and a moderator at a Community Conversation held by the Glastonbury Martin Luther King Community Initiative. There were about 60 to 75 in attendance. We addressed “Does your vote count? An examination of the Issues” I addressed issues in two areas: How could you know if your vote was counted? And what I would recommend to expand democracy in Connecticut, without risking election integrity. Here are my prepared remarks:

Last Wednesday evening, I was one of five speakers and a moderator at a Community Conversation held by the Glastonbury Martin Luther King Community Initiative. There were about 60 to 75 in attendance. We addressed “Does your vote count? An examination of the issues.” I addressed issues in two areas: How could you know if your vote was counted? And what I would recommend to expand democracy in Connecticut, without risking election integrity. Here are my prepared remarks <read>

Some excerpts:

I tend not to agree with anyone 100% of the time. I view voting through a lens of balancing three priorities

Voting Integrity, that is Justified Confidence

Engaging more people in Democracy

The costs of Elections

To me, Justified Confidence is the highest priority, followed by a balance between increasing voter engagement and cost.

Let’s talk voting integrity. Said another way “Does your vote count?” The problem is that you and I cannot answer that question. The systems we have, by intention or not, prevent us from answering that question…

For Democracy to function, citizens must have JUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE in elections — elections providing strong evidence that the correct winner was declared.

The 2016 elections surfaced two election integrity questions in the minds of many citizens:

First, Did the Russians hack our election systems? That is distinct from did they influence our elections?

Second, Were the winners of the Primaries and Election accurately determined?

There is a lack of confidence in the system. There are legitimate, yet often exaggerated questions of integrity.

It is especially important that losers believe they lost fair and square.

There is excessive emphasis on Russian hacking, ignoring other risks. And a myriad of other cyber-attacks are just a part of the risks…

There is too much emphasis on cyber-attack by outsiders. The greater risk is INSIDER ATTACK. Insider attack is easier and likely more frequent – air-gaps cannot prevent insider attack – there is motive, opportunity, and the ability to cover-up…

Fortunately. there are remedies to these risks and lack of credibility. They come down to TRANSPARENT, PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE ELECTIONS. That is elections where every critical aspect CAN be verified by citizens, candidates, and parties.

“Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence.”…

We need to open-up the system to candidates.

I would enhance our Citizen’s Election Program.

We should reduce prohibitive signature and finance requirements for third-party and petitioning candidates.

We have a crazy law that prevents the posting of the list of Write-In Candidates in polling places. Posting the list should be mandatory…

The evidence is not that Millennials avoid voting because it’s inconvenient. They avoid it because they don’t have enough information about voting and candidates.

We need to change our archaic lever-look ballot layout. I am tired of consoling voters who missed the question on the ballot.

We need better voting web sites in Connecticut’s towns, many lack critical information, some have incorrect information.

We have Election Day Registration, yet it is the most difficult, and restrictive in the Nation. That would remedy many of the errors that cause voters to be unintentionally not registered or removed from the roles…

I am an election official, a Certified Moderator. I ran our Glastonbury Academy polling place in the 2016 presidential primary. That day changed me.

Let’s at least allow unaffiliated voters to vote in the primary. I saw many voters who did not understand the system and could not vote. They were not party regulars, they were first time voters or those that had not voted in years. I was moved that very few were upset that they could not vote. That bothers me. We may never see them attempting to participate in democracy again.

Finally, Two things you can do to help – two days for each election.

First, volunteer one weekday observing a post-election audit with the Citizen Audit.

Second, Invest a day as an election official at your local polling place.

I guarantee you will learn a lot. Let us work together, to create a flourishing democracy we can trust.

************Update 2/29/2018

Courant coverage: Does Your Vote Count <read>

Note one small misquote:

“First, did the Russians hack our election systems? Second, were the winners of the primary elections actually determined?” [Weeks] said.

That ‘actually’ should be ‘accurately’ !

Supreme Court to Bridgeport: Those sort of things just aren’t done in CT

In a 3am decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a third primary in Bridgeport. CTPost: Supreme Court orders 3rd primary for Bridgeport

“Citizens can expect and are entitled to integrity in the process and a fundamentally fair and honest election, and this, I regret to say, they did not get,” the judge stated in overturning the results of the primary and ordering a new one.

In a 3am decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a third primary in Bridgeport. CTPost: Supreme Court orders 3rd primary for Bridgeport <read>

The state’s highest court agreed that Superior Court Judge Barbara Bellis was within her right to throw out the results of two previous primaries after she ruled they were skewed by political corruption.

“Citizens can expect and are entitled to integrity in the process and a fundamentally fair and honest election, and this, I regret to say, they did not get,” the judge stated in overturning the results of the primary and ordering a new one…

During a hearing Dec. 21, lawyers for the city of Bridgeport had asked the justices to answer four questions regarding the legality of Judge Bellis’ decision: if state law prohibits any person other than the elector from arranging for a designee to return an absentee ballot to the town clerk; did the judge err in rejecting the unpostmarked ballots; did the judge err in her Northbridge ruling and did the judge wrongfully apply the law in ruling there were substantial violations of law that left the reliability of the election in doubt.

In its one-page decision released shortly after 3 a.m. on Friday, the Supreme Court simply ruled “Yes,” to the first question, “No,” to the second, “Yes,” to the third and “No,” to the fourth question.

Once again, we oppose no-excuse or all mail-in voting for two reasons. 1) Its where the fraud actually occurs, ongoingly. 2) Despite common sense, increased mail-in voting does not increase turnout. (See: Grand Theft Absentee)