CT | CTVotersCount.org

The Risky Way to Make an Important, Costly Decision

On March 11th, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, released an RFP along with a Press Release: Secretary of the State Aims to Revolutionize Voting Devices for Persons with Disabilities in Connecticut.

From what I can determine, this is a rushed, unsound plan. It is likely to be wasteful, risks chaos in November, and unlikely to satisfy the needs of those with disabilities, taxpayers, or polling place officials.

On March 11, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, released an RFP along with a Press Release: Secretary of the State Aims to Revolutionize Voting Devices for Persons with Disabilities in Connecticut<read> Invitation to bid <read>

We note that:

The whole time from RFP to response gives vendors just 20 days to respond. That suggests that there is some vendor already selected and the process will be superficial.
All vendor questions are due only 6 days after the RFP was issued.
There is a very short two month period between RFP submission and the start of the project, June 1. Leaving little time for things like demonstrations of the system, selection, and then vendor preparation.
The roll-out of this significant system to polling place officials and voters with disabilities is apparently scheduled for the November Presidential Election, with no pilot use.
We question the accuracy of the number of systems to be acquired, since it is significantly less than the number of polling places in the 2014 Federal Election.
Persons with disabilities should also be concerned that their is no system provided today, and none contemplated here, for Election Day Registration (EDR) locations. One of the many shortcomings allowed by not defining EDR locations as “Polling Places”.

A significant portion of my career was spend evaluating and implementing off-the-shelf and custom commercial software products for a large insurance company, with another portion spent developing and marketing software to large commercial and government organizations. From what I can determine, this is a rushed, unsound plan. It is likely to be wasteful, risks chaos in November, and unlikely to satisfy the needs of those with disabilities, taxpayers, or polling place officials.

Clearly, the current system for those with disabilities, the IVS, is unsatisfactory and needs replacement. At most it serves only those with sight impairment, and hardly serves them. It can take a long time to vote, sometimes hours to complete the process, and fails to provide a secret vote as required by the Connecticut Constitution. Most of those who have tried the system have chosen not to use it again. The system is difficult to set-up, is a challenge for officials, and is dependent on dedicated phone lines being installed in every polling place. It is subject to failure in a power or communications emergency. Yet, we are not aware of any people with disabilities pushing for change.

We long for the previous administration of Susan Bysiewicz, and their creative and effective evaluation of HAVA compliant voting systems in 2006. Had they not done such an open careful plan we may have ended up with a monstrosity of a voting system. We came close but the careful process provided advocates the time to make the case that the decision should be reversed and the process restarted. Connecticut cut costs in half and implemented optical scanning voting rather than expensive, unauditable touch screens. Some attributes of that process should be emulated in procuring a system to replace the IVS (which itself was not subject to a thorough public process):

There was much more time for vendors to respond in 2006. There were open public vendor conferences.
Three systems were subject to a large public test in several locations around the state where citizens could try the systems and provide feedback.
The UConn Voter Center tested all the machines and provided reports on their technical suitability.
Focus groups were created to provide more feedback. As I recall, focus groups of Election Officials, Persons with Disabilities, and Independent Technical Experts.
UConn political scientists independently analyzed public input and conducted the focus groups.

Replacing the IVS is a somewhat smaller decision than was made in 2006, yet it deserves time for vendors, input from at least the disability community and election officials, along with a careful thoughtful implementation process. There is no evidence of that in what is apparent in the process as described in the RFP and the press release. Perhaps a sound process would recommend waiting a year of two to possibly obtain a system better than that available today.

What is wrong with CT’s Election Day Registration

Late last month, we testified on a bill, S.B. 250 that would modify Connecticut’s Election Day Registration (EDR) law. We did not testify for or against the proposed change, clearly aimed at making life easier for registrars and election day workers* at the expense of convenience to the public. It would curtail EDR at 7:00pm rather than 8:00pm currently in place. This change would be a disservice to voters by not only curtailing hours, but for the many that are likely to assume that EDR is open until 8:00pm like polling places. Yet there are larger problems with Connecticut’s EDR law and procedures implemented by the Secretary of the State. Here are several of those problems:

As I testified, it is a Civil Rights/Voting Rights violation waiting to happen. The problem is that the Secretary of the State’s procedures require that those in line at 8:00pm cannot have the opportunity to register and vote. Actually it has already happened as we had long predicted, yet was not acted upon on behalf of those denied a fair opportunity to register and vote. From the comments by the Committee during the hearing, it seems they get the problem, if not the complete understanding of a risk of an embarrassing Federal suit.
An EDR location is not a polling place. So, anyone can walk in and talk to or solicit voters in the EDR location; signs required to be posted at polling places such as ballots, voters bill of rights etc. are not required to be posted; votes are not submitted to scanners, increasing the odds that the new voters will overvote unintentionally; the leader is not required to be a Certified Moderator; and who knows what else?
It only applies to Election Day. That is right, it does not apply to this coming Presidential Preference Primary or any of the highly charged primaries we have from time to time for Governor, Senator, or Representative. I addition to preventing citizens from voting in those primaries, it could be a vehicle to bring more voters into the process, initiating a lifetime of participation.
It risks chaos in a not so sunny November or for a local power/internet outage. One of the Secretary of the State’s proudest accomplishments if a requirement for emergency plans and an associated Model Plan. Unfortunately, the Model Plan has no contingency for EDR. We point out that EDR is very special – it requires access to a functioning Central Voter Registration System (CVRS) to register voters – it requires access to a phone system to connect with registrars’ offices throughout the state. Without that system there is no guidance on a contingency. Do all registrations stop? Do registrations continue, but votes held for checking with other towns and the CVRS when the situation is corrected?Should there be a contingency including a complete printed CVRS list for each town? That way if the CVRS goes down that list could be used. (The CVRS regularly goes down or officials get locked out based on high volume or other problems. e.g. It went down in the fall of 2015 on the very last day when officials were required to print voter lists for the Nov election).
It is not the system so successful in other states. Most states with EDR allow registration in any polling place, trusting the voter and large penalties for voting in more than one place. We are doing something different than other states, inconveniencing voters, making more work for officials and expecting the same increase in turn-out.

Let me end on a positive note. Twice I have lead the EDR function in my town. It is a very positive experience seeing citizens register to vote. Citizens willing to accept the hassles of EDR to participate in Democracy. Also to see voters who, through no error of their own, thrown off the registration system give us the opportunity to successfully fix the problem.

* Individuals working at EDR sites are not “pollworkers” since the law is very clear that EDR is not conducted at a polling place.

Reminder: Still time for almost any eligible citizen to vote in the Presidential Primary

Reminder: The only way to be sure your vote won’t count: Don’t Vote. If you choose not to vote, don’t complain that we could have done better.

You may or may not be pleased with the choices in the primary, yet I would hope you would agree that it would make a difference to you between a Trump, Cruz, Rubio, or Kasich presidency and a difference to you between a Clinton or Sanders presidency.

The best day to register is today. The easiest way to register is with online registration <online registration>

Reminder: The only way to be sure your vote won’t count: Don’t Vote. If you choose not to vote, don’t complain that we could have done better.

If you are registered as a Democrat or Republican at this point you can vote in your party primary. If you are registered as unaffiliated, you can still register as a Democrat or a Republican and vote in that party primary. Only those registered in some other party are ineligible to vote in a primary.

The best day to register is today. The easiest way to register is with online registration <online registration>

Here is a link to the details about eligibility, deadliness, and checking your current registration <registration details>

Testimony on Four Bills

This year we testified on four bills before the legislature. We supported two bills, and for a change opposed none. For the two we neither supported nor opposed,, we proposed changes to the same sections of the law addressed by the bills.

This year we testified on four bills before the legislature. We supported two bills, and for a change opposed none. For the two we neither supported nor opposed, we proposed changes to the same sections of the law addressed by the bills.

A bill we proposed, S.B. 252 would strengthen the current post-election audits, while adopting changes long sought by the Registrars of Voters Association Connecticut (ROVAC). It would also require that the electronic audits approved last year be publicly verifiable – without public verification we would simply be adding unverifiable “Black Box” auditing, to unverifiable “Black Box” voting (CT’s current manual hand counted audits are publicly verifiable . <Prepared Remarks> <Testimony>

We supported H.B. 5390 would require the Secretary of the State to archive directives and instructions on the web. We supported the bill which would do what we asked last year, when the Secretary’s properly identified directives and instructions were made enforceable. <Testimony>

We took no stand in favor or against S.B. 250 which would entail cutting off Election Day Registration (EDR) at 7:00pm rather than 8:00pm. We warned in our testimony that the Secretary of the State’s EDR procedures risked a serious election rights violation, due to the cut-off of incomplete registrations at 8:00pm, rather than letting anyone in line at 8:00pm have the opportunity to register and vote. From the questions asked during testimony of officials, it was clear that the Committee understood the issue we raised. <Testimony>

We took no stand on S.B. 251. It would allow officials to interrupt counting and paperwork completion on election night in municipal elections. It was similar to a change last year that would allow those same interruptions for State and Federal elections. We pointed out, as we did last year, that both parts of the law should provide an effective means for the public, candidates, and party officials to determine the date, time, and location of the continuation of counting. <Testimony>

Citizen Audit Cites Flaws in Official Election Audits

Again accuracy declined and write-in votes handled incorrectly
November 2015 Post-Election Audit Report

From the Press Release:

The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit has released its report on its observation of the November 2015 official post-election audits. The audits, required by state law, are intended to verify the accuracy of elections at the municipal level.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “After 9 years of official audits, voters should expect accuracy. Yet the audits have gone from poor to worse.”

The group’s observers found that official audit results do not inspire confidence because of continued:

Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts of votes reported to the Secretary of the State by municipal registrars of voters.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering investigations.
Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.

The group’s report noted:

28% of official audits cited “Human Error” in counting ballots and votes. Registrars of voters should be expected to take the necessary effort to count accurately.
Significant decreases in audit integrity, and accuracy.
In three towns audits detected districts where officials fed write-in ballots through scanners a second time on election night.
If the group’s recommendations from last year had been mandated and followed, all write-in ballots would have been counted accurately.

“Problems discovered counting write-ins two years in a row shows the value of the official audits. But the report also reveals the decline in official attention to the audits, demonstrating that independent citizen observation and reporting are essential to election integrity.” Weeks emphasized.

Again accuracy declined and write-in votes handled incorrectly
November 2015 Post-Election Audit Report

From the Press Release:

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “After 9 years of official audits, voters should expect accuracy. Yet the audits have gone from poor to worse.”

The group’s observers found that official audit results do not inspire confidence because of continued:

Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts of votes reported to the Secretary of the State by municipal registrars of voters.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering investigations.
Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.

The group’s report noted:

28% of official audits cited “Human Error” in counting ballots and votes. Registrars of voters should be expected to take the necessary effort to count accurately.
Significant decreases in audit integrity, and accuracy.
In three towns audits detected districts where officials fed write-in ballots through scanners a second time on election night.
If the group’s recommendations from last year had been mandated and followed, all write-in ballots would have been counted accurately.

“Problems discovered counting write-ins two years in a row shows the value of the official audits. But the report also reveals the decline in official attention to the audits, demonstrating that independent citizen observation and reporting are essential to election integrity.” Weeks emphasized.

Help Wanted: Low pay, long hours, impossible demands, no benefits

A Courant article reminds us of an idea out of left-field enacted last year by the General Assembly as a “rat*”: Deadline Looms For Regional Election Monitors

When the Connecticut General Assembly passed the budget implementer bill in June 2015, buried in its 702 pages was the stipulation that regional election monitors be in place by March 1.

Those regional monitors were to be hired by each of the nine planning regions in the state. They would be certified by the Secretary of State’s office, but not paid by them.

Gentle reader, before you rush out and apply we note several items which might not be apparent.

A Courant article reminds us of an idea out of left-field enacted last year by the General Assembly as a “rat*”: Deadline Looms For Regional Election Monitors <read>

When the Connecticut General Assembly passed the budget implementer bill in June 2015, buried in its 702 pages was the stipulation that regional election monitors be in place by March 1.

Those regional monitors were to be hired by each of the nine planning regions in the state. They would be certified by the Secretary of State’s office, but not paid by them. They would represent, consult with, and act on the SOS’s behalf, but would not be state employees. Instead, each council of government would be expected to contract an individual to serve as a monitor and enter into a memorandum of understanding with the SOS about them.

But plenty of questions have yet to be answered with a March 1 deadline and April 26 primary on the horizon.

“There are a lot of details still to be worked out,” Filchak said. “We have a lot of questions about the ‘what ifs’ and those take time to work out.”

One question concerns liability issues. The REM would be an employee of the COG, but his or her duties would include working with registrars in the towns of each COG. NECCOG has 16 towns in its region. The REM for NECCOG would have to do several things for each of those municipalities.

They’d have to hold regional instructional sessions for moderators and alternate moderators. They might be called on to assist registrars in preparing for and conducting elections, primaries, a recanvass, or audit. And they would be expected to transmit any order issued by the SOS…

Legislation calls for $100,000 to be allocated for REMs. How that money will be divided up between nine COGs and what the hours and benefits will be is still unknown.

SOS Communications Director Patrick Gallahue said details are still being worked out between the COGs and the SOS office. He said the REMs would provide supplemental assistance to local election officials such as trainings, audits, and help with the implementation of new laws or elections hardware and software.

Gentle reader, before you rush out and apply we note several items which might not be apparent:

You will be a contractor, so there will be no benefits. The annual pay will be about $11,111.
At minimum in 2016 expect to work at least three 18-24 hour days supervising one election and two primary elections.
You will receive training, leading to a required certification. Training will attending instruction for 2-4 hours on 9 occasions (moderator and registrar certification), several hours of online training, and passing several tests at home (be sure not to have someone else take the test for you). (For now lets ingnore the law for certification that says you cannot be so certified, unless you are simultaneously serving as a registrar or deputy registrar, which also requires performing a very demanding job for those same three 18-24 hour days.)
You will be directly supervising about 16-24 individuals in about 8 to 12 towns, while they are working those 18-24 hour days.
You may be singly or jointly responsible for any errors and legal violations of those individuals or the several hundred temporary individuals they employ for those three days a year. You will also be responsible for assisting in the training of all those individuals. Not to worry, some of those individuals have been performing their duties for many years. Others will be very new to their jobs. None of the registrars are currently certified, but most will be by November 2017. (So you might want to check very carefully before elections, after elections, and all year, that they faithfully perform all their many legally mandated responsibilities).
It may, in some cases, be a bit challenging: The two registrars in each town are from opposing parties, most get along well, yet many bicker constantly and in rare cases assaulted their “partner” from the other party. Even though many have performed well for years, some frequently make mistakes, failing to follow the law. Your supervisor has little or no experience in the actual job you will be supervising, yet is confident that your registrars will all perform well once they are certified, with your guidance.
You will not have to worry about firing anyone. Registrars are elected officials – no matter what, they will stay on the job, except in very rare circumstances, as yet, never tested in court.

* Def: Rat – In Connecticut slang, a section of a long bill, a.k.a. Public Act**, inserted near the end of the session, usually near the end of a long bill, without hearings, by legislators unknown to the public. Legend has it that most pass without the knowledge of most legislators.
** Def: Public Act – A fictional drama performed in public.

Are Feds off-target in disabled ballot probe?

From the CT Post: Feds probing how Connecticut handles disabled voters ballots

Both the IVS and the referendum systems, for different reasons, are a disservice to voters with disabilities. Yet the gist of the probe, if the article is correct, is incorrectly aimed at referendums and would be more appropriately aimed at State and Federal elections. Perhaps both should be probed for different reasons.

From the CT Post: Feds probing how Connecticut handles disabled voters ballots <read>

Federal authorities are investigating possible privacy and disability act violations in the way Connecticut’s towns and cities require handicapped Americans to vote in referendum elections…

It advises them [registrars] a complaint was filed contending violations of federal civil rights laws and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Specifically, the allegation charge that voting by paper ballots, which are then segregated and hand-counted, violates privacy and secrecy requirements that are afforded non-disabled voters.

If the article is correct, the Feds do not really understand the IVS machine we use in State and Federal Elections. The IVS creates a unique paper ballot that cannot be scanned. It is an arduous process that would mainly serve voters that are blind and does not serve them well. It is theoretically possible that the paper would not be seen between printing and deposit in the ballot box. Yet, it must be segregated and hand counted at the end of the night. It is not normally secret, since very few voters use the system. My guess is that in an average State or Federal election, in less than 5% of polling places does even a single voter use the system – so every polling place official knows who voted on the machine and how they voted – and if there is a recanvass, so could anyone in the polling palace at the time the IVS was uses. In our opinion, the IVS is a disservice to those with disabilities.

Most voters who try the system once, never try again. Officials hate setting it up and are nervous that someone will want to use it, which will require their assistance to set-up for the voter. Last November my co-worker noticed a label on the IVS in our polling. The dialing instructions had a different code than our polling place. It took her several phone calls to customer service and maybe 45 minutes work to get it functioning.

BUT this suit is about Referendums where the IVS system generally is not used. The voter uses a regular ballot. It is known by whomever assists them, yet not counted separately. They can have almost anyone of their choice assist them, including polling place officials. It is actually more confidential than the IVS in practice, since only one or two people know how a particular voter voted.

Time to Hold ’em – Connecticut’s voting machines

San Francisco provides another reason for Connecticut to wait before considering new voting machines: San Francisco Examiner: San Francisco sets sights on open source voting by November 2019 <read>

“San Francisco could help write some U.S. democracy history with its leadership role,” said a Nov. 18 letter to the Elections Commission from Gregory Miller, co-founder of the Open Source Election Technology (OSET) Foundation, a collection of executives from top technology companies like Apple and Facebook. “And the total estimated cost to do so [$8 million] is a fraction of status-quo alternatives.”

San Francisco could have an open-source voting system in place by the November 2019 election, under a plan approved earlier this month by the Elections Commission.

The timeline could result in the emergence of San Francisco as the leader of the open-source voting movement in the United States.

For supporters of open-source voting, the importance of that point can’t be underscored enough.

“San Francisco could help write some U.S. democracy history with its leadership role,” said a Nov. 18 letter to the Elections Commission from Gregory Miller, co-founder of the Open Source Election Technology (OSET) Foundation, a collection of executives from top technology companies like Apple and Facebook. “And the total estimated cost to do so [$8 million] is a fraction of status-quo alternatives.”

Open-source voting systems bring a greater level of transparency and accountability by allowing the public to have access to the source codes of the system, which is used to tabulate the votes. A system owned by The City could also save taxpayers money…

We have said it before, No Crisis in CT unless we make one, there are few voting system options available today, expensive and, at best, incrementally better than the AccuVoteOS scanners we use in Connecticut. It is time to wait and see the results of efforts underway in Los Angeles County, CA, Travis County, TX, and now San Francisco. There will be dramatically better and more economical systems available in the next five to ten years for Connecticut to benefit from these pioneering efforts.

Essex students assist Secretary in random drawing

Yesterday we observed the random drawing of 68 districts and alternate districts for the post-election audit. Just as last time, it was an effective and educational event for all those present and participating. After each district was drawn they were marked on an map of the State. See the <press release> for more details and a list of the districts chosen.

CT Lottery Hacked. Claimed to be easy “unsophisticated” hack

Once again, we wonder which is safer Gambling or Voting?

Courant story: Suspended Lottery Game Had Too Many Winners <read>

Just how some lottery agents were able to manipulate their machines is not clear, but
investigators believe there was a vulnerability between the time a ticket was ordered at a terminal when it was printed…

[Consumer Protection Commissioner Jonathan] Harris said he does not think those who manipulated the system were sophisticated hackers, but rather people who were able to figure out how the lottery terminals work.

We are not reassured.

Once again, we wonder which is safer Gambling or Voting?

Courant story: Suspended Lottery Game Had Too Many Winners <read>

The Connecticut Lottery and state Department of Consumer Protection shut down the 5 Card Cash game after noticing there were more winners than the game’s parameters should have allowed, and determining that some lottery agents were manipulating machines to print more winning tickets and fewer losers…

Just how some lottery agents were able to manipulate their machines is not clear, but
investigators believe there was a vulnerability between the time a ticket was ordered at a terminal when it was printed…

As for how many agents and terminals were involved, “That’s the part we still don’t know,” Harris said. It’s also not clear how much money was lost, Harris said...

Lora Rae Anderson, a spokeswoman for the Department of Consumer Protection, said the fact there were more winners than there should have been raised a flag…

The Connecticut Lottery and the state Department of Consumer Protection were alerted to the possibility of problems involving 5 Card Cash a year ago. A lottery retailer in Weston was accused of holding back winning tickets and selling losing tickets to unsuspecting customers. State authorities were alerted and suspended the retailer’s license to sell lottery tickets.

We are not reassured.

Is it really an unsophisticated hack? If that is true we are concerned because,
- The vulnerability was not corrected in a year
- They have no idea who did it, how often it was done, how exactly it is accomplished, and how much was stolen
- Apparently ignored red flags that too much money was being awarded
Yet, it could be sophisticated, which would be even more concerning, since they apparently have gotten away with the money

We ask:

Why do they assume it was unsophisticated hackers?
Was it really a hack? Or the did the system simply pay out too much?
What kind of security expertise does the vendor have, if a system could be broken by unsophisticated hackers?
What kind of security review and testing does the Lottery employ, if any?
Is anyone sure the random algorithms that choose winners are operating correctly?
Are they sure it is not an inside job?
Is there an audit trail of tickets cancelled? Can’t they tell which terminals cancelled numbers of losing tickets?

We also wonder if the Lottery is up to the standards of Los Vegas gambling machines or closer to the weaker standards of voting machines <compare>