Random Audit Drawing – While Everybody Was Watching East Haven

I was at the Random Audit drawing yesterday. A Press Conference at the Secretary of the State’s office at 1:00pm.

We drew 70 districts to be audited along with 15 extras in case there are additional contested races which prevent audits in any of the 70 selected districts.

If my preliminary count is correct there are 44 towns required to audit at least one district. Several towns have mutiple districts with Waterbury and New Haven having quite a few to audit. Also several towns with only two districts will audit both of them! <read the press release>

East Haven Recount#2 Lessons – Will We Learn?

Update: More lessons from the Wallingford Recount <read>

This was a town council race with 17 candidates and 9 elected. 11,000 votes 59 poll workers counted in 6 hours.

If we assume a $0.05 per vote (9) that would $0.45 per ballot. If so it works out to paying an average of $14.00 per poll worker per hour. I don’t know what they were paid, but its in range of best practice claims.

Also we see that there is need for public education about what to expect for accuracy. Counting each vote per voter’s intent vs by the machine’s reading ability should yield slightly different results — the very reason why close races should be recounted manually. The machine will never be able to judge voter’s intent perfectly.

We have repeatadly warned that claiming the the machines performed “flawlessly” or “perfectly” sets up false expectations.

_____________________________________

The East Haven re-recount ended yesterday on a reassuring note. The problem apparently being a human error in the recount process itself. East Haven Politics has the story and videos <read>

What we might learn from this:

  • It would be a good idea to publish detailed recount procedures and develop best practices. We do not have to reinvent the wheel.
    • One of the advantages of selecting Dieblod/LHS optical scanners, often cited by the Secretary of the State, is that they have been in use in other New England states…so we can learn from how they perform recounts and audits efficiently.
    • PEW is funding research into best practices for manual counting of ballots, hopefully, that study will be complete and available in time for consideration in creating procedures in Connecticut for the November 2008 election.
    • The legislature can also fund research into best practices as requested in the petition on this site: “Request that you fund research into mechanisms for counting votes, looking carefully at practices employed elsewhere that indicate an average cost of $0.04 per ballot per race counted are attainable.”
  • A lot of negative publicity and drama can be avoided by semantics: When counting shows huge discrepancies, count again until at the minimum the same result is produced at least twice. You do not have to announce a huge discrepancy as the result of a recount until you verify it. What caused all the excitement here was announcing the result before verifying it.
  • Its a good idea not to jump to conclusions, especially those that blame election officials and the voters. As suggested on this site, it was highly unlikely that more than 100 voters took two ballots by mistake or that several ballot clerks in one municipality each lost track of ballots or that checkers made a significant number of errors. As we said here “We don’t know what happened. It could be human error, but more likely one or a sequence of two or three errors rather than 130 errors by multiple people in multiple places.”

Finally, East Haven Politics quotes a figure of $15,000 for the initial inaccurate recount. I don’t know where that figure came from, however, it seems wildly out of line. Best practices in New Hampshire indicate that $0.04 per ballot per race counted is obtainable. That may take some doing, however, $15,000/8,000 votes yields about $1.87 per vote.

Update: My answer to a question posed on my cross post on MyLeftNutmeg

greenpeas: I don’t see any way out of saying there’s a discrepancy
The press is waiting for a result and the registrar could not announce one the day of the first recount, nor did she want to announce a recount without making sure she had to do one. I think we should encourage, not discourage, coming forward to provide open and transparent access to information about what is going on so people have confidence in the process. finding mistakes and correcting them will be part of getting the process right, and se should both try to vastly improve our overall processes as well as inform the public what it will look like to witness this process and what is normal/not normal about sorting out a manual count.

I think the problem was not the discrepancy announcement; it was the lack of SoTS office involvement that would have allowed the registrar to either to confirm the vote achieved or to confirm the next step to be taken.

It would also be helpful for the SOTS to explain what voters should expect on recounts — perfect recounts? discrepancies? What margin of discrepancy is acceptable to the SOTS office?

We may have to look to other states and cumulative studies to figure this out, since as we know, in CT everything is coming up roses.

Luther Weeks (aka BlastFromGlast) I still think that the announcement could be different
Such as “We have all had a long day, the initial count we have is way off. What we need to do is secure everything, get a good night’s sleep and comeback again and carefully count again, until we get the same results twice. Perhaps we counted some votes more than once or added incorrectly of transposed some digits, or perhaps it is more serious. Right now we need to relax and get some sleep and continue deliberately”. As I have said there is a need for more detailed procedures. That should be done by the SOTS and/or ROVAC (Registrars Of Voters Assn Connecticut). Yet, counting again and simply counting the number of ballots to balance with the result, should only require common sense.

We have heard over and over from registrars in the last few months that going all paper would be bad, for one reason because of the difficulty of counting the paper and getting it right. Here we have an example of that but suddenly normally rational people find it surprising that we don’t count the paper correctly the 1st time.

Recount Does Not Match – Mystery? Discrepancy? Error?

Update: Middlefield, a sensible recount discrepancy report, a few votes off in the count, some sensible advice to count again, and a reasonable possible explanation <read>

Update, Colin McEnron interviews Rep Mike Lawlor <listen>

We learn that the counts of votes were higher in several districts, not just one. Lawlor likes a similar explination to that of Head Moderator Jaffe. Lawlor speculates that the checkers did not do their job and did not check off all voters. I am skeptical, election officials can make mistakes, but it just is hard to believe that multiple checkers in one town all made similar mistakes or that 130 voters made the same mistakes without being noticed.

I doubt either of these explanations. Just like the airlines and the aircraft manufacturers like to blame pilot error rather than the aircraft design or manufacture.

Blaming the Secretary of The State’s office is a bit of a smokescreen. Perhaps they should be available on Sunday, or maybe there should be no recounts on Sunday’s and holidays, but that takes attention away from the real issues here.

We don’t know what happened. It could be human error, but more likely one or a sequence of two or three errors rather than 130 errors by multiple people in multiple places.

Update, possibly the most rediculous attempt at an excuse ever <read>

[Head Moderator Lori] Jaffe told the New Haven Register that the new voting system may have confused some voters. “They might get a ballot, make a mistake on it, then go to the clerk and get a second one,” she said.

No – the ballot clerk is responsible to give one ballot to each voter. And to give another one the clerk must give one back and mark it spoiled and is responsible for it. (I don’t believe any Head Moderator would confuse that)
————————-

The East Haven recount shows more votes than on election day and more votes than voters checked off <read>

the recount has completed. Now they are trying to figure out why they have more votes for mayor in the recount than they had voters voting.
… the results of the recount will not be certified by the recount moderator, Lori Jaffe due to significant discrepencies(sic) noted in the previous update. There are 114 more votes cast than people that are thought to have voted. The moderator and the Registrar of Voters will contact the Secretary of State on Tuesday to get instructions.

We also have unconfirmed reports of discrepancies and procedural questions with the recount performed Friday in East Hampton — and that the recount will be redone today.

TalkNationRadio – Raindrops Keep Falling

This week’s TalkNationRadio by Dori Smith, Raindrops Keep falling on Connecticut’s Diebold Voting Machines: <read and listen>

Interviews with Connecticut Registrars, Deputy Secretary of State Lesley Mara, and True Vote Connecticut member George Barnett.  Coverage of the November 6th election and the problems with wet ballots.

Former corporate auditor George Barnett:

‘In 2006 twenty eight of the 550 recounts from seventeen districts there were differences of ten votes or more between the machine counts and the hand counts. In 19 of those of those 28 recounts the machines recorded a higher votes than the hand counts. Now, after these audits the Secretary of State put out a press release saying the optical scan machines performed very well on election day without any problems and that any changes in vote totals found in these audits were due to ballots being marked incorrectly by the voter–not to any problems with the optical scan machine.

So if 19 recounts the machine count was higher than the hand recount during the audit, that contradicts that statement. And I personally reviewed an audit in Monroe where the machine had a higher count than the hand recount and I talked to the Registrars there and they never spoke to the Secretary of State. So it seems like the Secretary of the State made this statement without basing it on fact. She did not look into any of these differences.

Barnett has also written about these issues at CTVotersCount <here> and <here>.

14 Towns Exempt From Post-Election Audits, So Far

Press Release from Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz <read>

So far, 14 Connecticut towns have reported races close enough for an automatic manual recount.  That is the good news, unfortunately, due to Public Act 07-194 those towns are also exempt from the random post-election audits.  More to come as results come in and races are contested which can also result in exemption or avoiding the recount.

One slight mis-statement in the release: all paper ballots for selected races will not be counted – central count absentee ballots are also exempt by Public Act 07-194 audited.

Once again there is news – 300 memory cards were tested so far, and another 300 expected to be done soon.  At 600 that is a large portion of the districts in the election.

Bysiewicz Trashes Levers – Minimizes Vulnerabilities

Susan Bysiewicz held a press conference to symbolically trash a lever voting machine and raise voter confidence in the implementation of our new voting machines. We applaud her formal announcement of the testing of memory cards by UConn, however, we beg to disagree with the lack of concern for the programming of the memory cards <read>:

LHS has nothing to do with our elections except that they program the memory cards,” Bysiewicz said.

While basically accurate that is far from reassuring – the memory cards have EVERYTHING to do with our elections. If the memory cards are corrupted, democracy is lost, all our efforts to vote, the time and expense of running elections, the time and expense candidates and their supporters put in is in vein. Sort of like saying the Fox has nothing to do with the chickens except that we send the chickens to Massachusetts to the Fox house for a little vacation.

Update: Continue reading “Bysiewicz Trashes Levers – Minimizes Vulnerabilities”

Talk Radio Investigation Into New Voting Technology Reveals Vulnerabilities

Secretary Bysiewicz is taking steps to improve security and procedures with our voting machines. More seals and testing of spare memory cards for most districts by UConn. Yet, the procedures must be clear to election staff and followed unfailingly — a huge challenge when changing so many locations at once, with 169 municipalities with dedicated but predominately very part time election staff. CTVotersCount readers know that the audits remain insufficient to detect errors and deter fraud.
Dori Smith of TalkNationRadio.org covers her investigation of procedures not being followed in 2006, the risks of outsourcing election programming and management, along with potential problems posed by new and conflicting procedures <read>.

Are Connecticut’s new electronic voting machines safe from fraud? A year-long Talk Nation Radio investigation found serious security problems when the machines were first used in some Connecticut towns during the 2006 election. There was chaos at the polls during the 2nd District recount and LHS staff members were refusing to follow the voting machine security protocols drafted by Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz under Chapter 9 of Connecticut law. The 2006 protocols were rushed through, and a year later the state’s new protocols were hastily constructed and are still being updated for the public with the Nov. 6 election right around the corner.

Memory Card Failures 1%? 4%? 9%? – Diebold Won’t Disclose Data

Memory cards have been failing in Florida on AccuVote-OS scanners. Diebold won’t release the actual data claiming it is proprietary. Also attempts to blame the customer for the problem. BradBlog has the story. <read>

The resulting reports, from 17 of the 27 counties, show two counties with over 9 percent memory card failure rate and some counties with zero. The average failure rate is 2.8 percent; nearly three times what Diebold/Premier is admitting publicly.

Datona Beach News-Journal:

Diebold officials said the 4.4 percent error rate in Volusia was unusual, that the average was about 1 percent. The company conducted a survey of 27 Florida counties that use its machines but refused to release the results, calling them “proprietary business information.

The company offered several explanations for the damage, including improper cleaning, foreign objects and improper memory card removal or insertion,

Update: More from Brad Blog <read>

Nonetheless, some very good stuff here. Of particular note, are the points from Diebold’s recommendations which “appear to border on the absurd,” that should voting machine memory cards be lost, “elections must be re-scheduled.” Or if they fail, as our recent story concerning Diebold’s admissions about memory card failures in Florida pointed towards, the company says “all voters will have to be called in to re-vote.”

Update 11/12: Some responses from Diebold/Premier <read>

Unintended Consequences – Bridgeport Lockup

Update:Â Supreme Court to intervene <read>

Bridgeport, Conn., Voting Machines “Held Hostage” Says Secretary of State <read>

Judge Blawie has ruled that the primary election results are valid,” said Bysiewicz. “Rep. Caruso is entitled to appeal but he should not hold the city’s voting machines hostage in the process. The actual paper ballots would be available for review if necessary but the voting machines used in the primary should be released now so election officials can prepare them for next week’s general election. Rep. Caruso has the opportunity to help, and ensure that taxpayers are not forced to shell out thousands of dollars to have substitute machines shipped in from out of state.”

Here are some solutions:

  • Borrow the machines from towns not holding elections this year (Federal HAVA funds paid for them)
  • Have a team of representatives of both candidates observe as the memory cards are removed from the scaners and locked up, then reuse the machines.
  • Use paper ballots and hand count the election
  • Use the backup machines for the election, and use paper where the backup machines fail on election day

What has not been mentioned in any reporting, as far as I know, is that Bridgeport was supposed to conduct random post-election audits of the primary by October 1st, and has not because of the machine lockup.

New Britain – Shortage of Election Officials. Questionable Procedures? Short Fuses?

Update 11/3, more arguments <read>, no wonder they are having problems recruiting.

Between pay increases for poll workers and a candidate’s company moving voting machines, New Britain voting officials have had their share of the news lately. Now Rick Guinness reports on a shortage of poll workers, a shortage of cooperation between registrars, and frustration directed at the Secretary of The State <read>

As of Wednesday afternoon, Democrats need one to fill their quota and Republicans needed 27, according to Democratic Registrar of Voters Edward “Butch” Dzwonkowski…

Tensions have risen among voting officials. Staff members in the registrars’ office said [Republican Registrar of Voters Dorothy] Turnrose stormed out of the City Hall basement vault where she, Dzwonkowski and their staffs had been working to secure and store voting machines for Election Day. Turnrose did not show up for work Wednesday after Tuesday’s argument, and she did not return phone calls….

[Mayor Timothy] Stewart said the state thrust new voting machines and laws on cities and towns on the pretext they were more efficient and secure.