Category: CT

What I learned at the Post Election Audit Summit

Update 10/31: 1) Some grammar improvements courtesy of D. Weeks. 2) The good news: Connecticut is a Voter Intent State. 3) The not so good news: Connecticut does not require that andit or recount observers be able to viably verify that paper ballots are counted correctly. Thanks to Ted Bromley of the Secretary of the State’s Office for answering these questions.

I have just returned from the Post Election Audit Summit. A unique and powerful event which brought together stakeholders in election audits including computer scientists, statisticians, election officials, legislators, and advocates.

One of the main themes was “Better Together” taken from a book of that title. By meeting in an open, respectful atmosphere we could each be open to share concerns, ideas, successes, and failures. I found the entire event extremely stimulating and educational. We will be able to create better proposals which provide greater voter confidence at less cost, while mitigating concerns of other stakeholders and helping them meet their goals and responsibilities. I am left with much more to do, yet with the tools to provide election integrity and confidence at a higher level with more velocity than was possible three days ago.

Stay tuned for new announcements in the next two weeks about a citizen audit observation project for the November Connecticut post-election audits. The greatest value of your volunteering for the project is the opportunity and pride of actually participating in democracy.

Let me list, in no particular order, some of the things I learned and re-learned at the Summit:

Continue reading “What I learned at the Post Election Audit Summit”

Voting Machine Security Enhanced By SOTS Office

The Secretary of the State’s Office has taken action to reduce the chance of tampering with voting machines in Connecticut by requiring three additional tamper evident seals added to the Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scanners. The problem was outlined in a recent FAQ at CTVotersCount.org – the canvass bag and plastic seal are vulnerable, while the memory card seal can be bypassed by four screws on the bottom of the AccuVote-OS. In addition advocates complained that the parallel port had not been disabled as recommend by UConn.

Two seals will be placed over the ports of the AccuVote-OS, while another placed on the side to indicate that the optical-scanner was opened by the screws.

Case SealPort Seal

Hats off to the Office of the Secretary of the State for swift action to address these concerns. While we doubt these seals are a perfect solution or that there is one, they are an added layer of protection, and appear somewhat more difficult to defeat than the canvas and plastic seals.

Ballots More Costly Than A Sufficient Audit

We have been saying that a sufficient audit would cost $0.20 to $0.50 per ballot cast. Now we have an example in Connecticut demonstrating that at least for one town, ballots cost $0.40 each to print. Given that extra ballots must be printed, it is clear that counting the paper is less costly than printing it in the 1st place. Just one more reason to sign the petition and change the law: Democracy is Priceless – Audits are a bargain.

Case Dismissed in Bridgeport – Reason Missed In Hartford

Update: Glitch in the Webmaster’s work, which is unaudited!!!: An earlier versions cut off part of the quote and the editorial comment making the point.

From the Channel 30 report:

A state Superior Court judge on Wednesday dismissed state Rep. Christopher Caruso’s lawsuit challenging the results of the Bridgeport Democratic primary for mayor.Caruso lost the Sept. 11 primary to state Sen. Bill Finch by 270 votes out of 9,000 ballots cast. Caruso, who said 22 violations affected the primary, sued. He said city election officials improperly prevented some voters from casting ballots and directed others to vote for Finch…

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz said the judge’s ruling made it clear that all votes were counted accurately. “Judge (John) Blawie’s decision validating the results gives voters in Bridgeport, and across Connecticut, confidence in the election process, both in terms of the voting machines we now use and the procedures followed by local Registrars of Voters,” Bysiewicz said.

No. The votes were not counted against the paper. It does not validate the machines in Bridgeport, let alone the machines across the state. Absence of evidence of error is not evidence of absence of error. I have no reason to suspect a problem. Nobody has reasons to prove everything is ok.

Bev Harris Discusses Vulnerabilities in Bridgeport

Bev Harris of BlackBoxVoting.org has posted a stimulating discussion of the election in Bridgeport and our vulnerabilities. Not the kind of national publicity we should be proud of in the Constitution State: <read>

Bev alleges no known illegalities or incorrect vote counts, but points to the vulnerabilities of our custody procedures, the sealing of our voting machines, the inadequacy or irrelevance of the inner seal, and some questions specific to Bridgeport. Whoever won or should have won, the Bridgeport mayoral primary demonstrates several vulnerabilities which do not instill confidence.

Whoever won or should have won, the procedures in Bridgeport mayoral primary have left plenty of room for fraud…

In other words, this is a “Trust Me” elections model where you are trusting private contractors…

Despite a lot of hoopla about security procedures and special testing of memory cards and seals, we received citizen reports of at least one midday voting machine replacement. This, in a location where only 270 votes separated candidates. One or two polling places was enough to do the trick…

I have not seen the seal on the canvas tote bag, but that is actually the only seal that matters (if it even matters; I have a little experiment in mind…). The seal on the voting machine itself is a sham…

By the way, the legal term for racketeering, the charge brought against our friend the Bridgeport mayor, is “conspiracy.” Next time someone calls you a conspiracy theorist, consider saying, “Well yes, in the RICO sense, I suppose I am.”

Bev was the featured guest on Voice of The Voters last night in Pennsylvania. Two of the three callers were from Connecticut, including yours truly. I briefly discussed the recent audits. She pointed out that in her opinion that audits are not really public unless we actually see the ballots as they are being counted. Food for thought.

Post-Election Audits – the 7.2% Audit and Other Glitches

(Note: This is an abbreviated and edited version of observations and concerns with the post-election audits recently submitted to and discussed with Lesley Mara, Deputy Secretary of the State)

It is natural for things to be learned in practice that were not anticipated in creating laws and procedures. The recent random audits are a demonstration of this. Many problems not anticipated by legislation, procedures, and yours truly. Unfortunately, the number and complexity of the problems and issues indicates that there is a need for significant changes in training, procedures, and the law.

There was no easy way to determine the dates, times, and locations of the audits other than repeatedly calling the registrar’s offices. This is especially time consuming in the case of part time registrars who don’t all return messages and don’t provide office hours on their voice mail messages. There were no other members of the public as observers in Cornwall and Hartford. The only other observer was an Assistant Registrar from an opposing party in Hartford. Voter apathy or lack of publicity? There are no notice times or publication requirements for the public audits. The only notice required is to inform the Secretary of the State’s office of the date, time, and location of an audit. For instance, a pubic audit for 9:00AM could be set at 8:45AM.

The selection of races is not required to be public. The selection of races to be audited should be public and subject to notification procedures similar to those for the audits.

The time-frame of the audits, 15 to 19 days after the election, provides too much time for the ballots and machines to be manipulated and is completely counter to the opinions of the Brennan Center. This can only be fixed in the statutes; however, the procedures can be changed to mitigate some of the difficulties: a) The random selection of districts for audit could be held much closer to day 15. b) The drawing of races should be moved much closer to the date of the audit – it could be required to be the first order of business of the same public event as the audit itself.

I was able to observe two of three audits I attempted:

Continue reading “Post-Election Audits – the 7.2% Audit and Other Glitches”

CT News Roundup

TalkNationRadio.org Part 3 of 4 <read>

It’s not in LHS’s interest to have their machines viewed as failure prone and I don’t think that they should be in the pipeline between the moderator and the registrar on the one hand and the SOS on the other. So I think the whole flow of information that has been set up is wrong. — Prof. Michael Fisher, TrueVoteCT

Another “Good News” Press Release (press release)
(see other “Good News”)

“The initial recount results confirm that the optical scan machines performed well and that every vote was recorded accurately,” said Bysiewicz. “…Together, these post election procedures should send a strong and simple message to voters – your vote will be counted, we’ll make sure of it.” – Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, Press Release

When one truck from one trucking company goes down Avon Mountain and does not crash once, it is proof that Avon Mountain and can work as a truck route, but not close to proof that Avon Mountain is generally safe for every truck and driver, almost every time. At CTVotersCount we agree that the Diebold AccuVote-OS can count elections accurately. The fact is that no electronic voting machine can be proven reliable, the Diebold AccuVote-OS is far from secure, the Diebold AccuVote has been proven to be easily compromised, and Connecticut adds to that vulnerability by outsourcing the coding of each election to our vendor, LHS. What we do claim is that elections can be incorrectly decided electronically by error or fraud. The only solution we support is sufficient random audits of each race and question.

What’s the difference: Alderman or Selectman?

Shelton Weekly: Candidates question registrar’s position

A letter drafted by two candidates for city aldermen was sent to the secretary of state’s office questioning incumbent Alderman John “Jack” Finn’s dual roles as registrar of voters and his candidacy for alderman…

Continue reading “CT News Roundup”

FAQ: Have they have fixed all the problems with the voting machines?

Lately I have heard several versions of this statement. In July a registrar said something close to the following to me: The company let go of all the bad (convicted felon) programmers and they have fixed all the problems with the machines. Last week a local monthly paper had this to say in an editorial: … Continue reading “FAQ: Have they have fixed all the problems with the voting machines?”

Lately I have heard several versions of this statement. In July a registrar said something close to the following to me:

The company let go of all the bad (convicted felon) programmers and they have fixed all the problems with the machines.

Last week a local monthly paper had this to say in an editorial:

Potential glitches uncovered by the University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center in 2006 have been remedied. – Glastonbury Life

The security holes discovered by UConn have not been fixed. We are using the same version,1.96.6, of the software that UConn tested. The state requires that all software versions be certified by the Secretary of the State before they are used in our elections. Thus far 1.96.6 is the only version that has ever been certified in Connecticut. Time is running out for a coordinated update of machines before the November 6th election.

Continue reading “FAQ: Have they have fixed all the problems with the voting machines?”

CT Voting and Audit Stories – NJ Certification Problems

Doubts Cast On Voting Machines. Westport News – An excellent summary of the concerns with the AccuVote-OS in Connecticut.

Cromwell Vote To Be Audited. Middletown Press – “Town officials learned of the audit in a telephone call from a reporter Thursday night.” I wonder what the official plans are to notify registrars that their towns have been chosen and the municipal clerks who will need to randomly select offices for audits?

N.J. To Miss Voting Deadline, Cherry Hill Courier Post – Optical Scan will not be certified to meet Jan 1 deadline: “The New Jersey Institute of Technology conducted its first round of testing this past summer on three of the machines. Although the machines received a ‘good bill of health,’ Milgram said the results did not meet the criteria the office set in the spring.” More details in the NY Times and the blog from Larry Norden of the Brennan Center.