Category: FAQ

Connecticut’s post-election audit law exempts referendums and questions from audit. Often we hear that nobody would steal a referendum, that local control of elections in Connecticut would preclude that. We object:

Two motivations and opportunities:

The Town has the budget referendum turned down frequently at $20,000+ per referendum for a turnout of a small % of registered voters.

• All the insiders of all parties are for it
• Many town hall jobs are dependent on it
• The insiders convince themselves that “if the right voters showed up then it would pass”
• They think they are helping out the town out by passing the budget and saving multiple election costs
• All look the other way

One insider is convinced the budget is too big.

• Convinced that “If the people really knew then they would vote it down”
• When nobody is looking, the insider takes advantage of sole access to voting machines and ballots, to hack the machine with the Hursti Hack before the election.

In 2005 the Legislature passed the Voter Verified Paper Trail Bill. They also passed post-election audits along with a minimum one hundred and eighty day seal on the paper. Unfortunately, they had not anticipated optical scan, limiting the audit to DRE (Touch Screen) equipment. We actually have tougher post-election audits and custody laws on the books that would have applied to DRE than apply to the optical scanners we do have. We are not advocating DRE machines, Connecticut voters have a much safer, auditable, economical voting system with optical scan.

We have pointed out many weaknesses in the optical scan audit law passed in 2007 which applies to optical scan. Among the inadequacies of the law are that we don’t audit enough of the votes, we don’t do it soon enough after the election, and we have a questionable chain-of-custody provision which many believe only lasts fourteen days – with the audits starting on day fifteen. But on the books is a much tougher audit law for DRE’s which does not apply to optical scanners. This law has a much bigger audit, started sooner, audits all races and questions, and with a much longer and clearer chain-of-custody This would be an expensive audit as DRE paper tapes are much more time consuming to audit than paper ballots: Sec. 9-242b. Procedures for use of direct recording electronic voting machines

(5) Not later than five business days after each election in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least (A) two direct recording electronic voting machines used in each assembly district, or (B) a number of direct recording electronic voting machines equal to fifty per cent of the number of voting districts in the municipality, whichever is less. Not later than five business days after a primary in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrar of voters of the party holding the primary shall conduct such a manual audit by designating two or more individuals, one of whom may be the registrar, representing at least two candidates in the primary. The machines audited under this subdivision shall be selected in a random drawing that is announced in advance to the public and is open to the public. All direct recording electronic voting machines used within an assembly district shall have an equal chance of being selected for the audit. The Secretary of the State shall determine and publicly announce the method of conducting the random drawing, before the election. The manual audit shall consist of a manual tabulation of the contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records produced by each voting machine subject to the audit and a comparison of such count, with respect to all candidates and any questions or proposals appearing on the ballot, with the electronic vote tabulation reported for such voting machine on the day of the election or primary…

(6) The individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records contemporaneously produced by any direct recording electronic voting machine in use at an election or primary held on or after July 1, 2005, shall be carefully preserved and returned in their designated receptacle in accordance with the requirements of section 9-266, 9-302 or 9-310, whichever is applicable, and may not be opened or destroyed, except during recanvass or manual audit as set forth in this section, for one hundred eighty days following an election or primary that does not include a federal office, pursuant to section 9-310, or for twenty-two months following an election or primary involving a federal office, pursuant to 42 USC 1974, as amended from time to time.

What we need in Connecticut is a stronger, independent, more comprehensive, more timely post-election audit of all types of ballots cast with a stronger chain-of-custody.

The Connecticut post-election audit exempts, among other things, all referendums and questions. This is a mistake.

Referendums and questions may be the most vulnerable election items open to human attack via programming – often all the elected officials of both parties want the referendums passed – they may go through multiple, failed, low turn-out, budget referendums and say to themselves “if the majority of the voters turned out it would pass” and be tempted to make sure it passes. Or one tax-averse ballot programmer, a high asset individual, or even a single election official may want to make sure a new or higher tax does not pass.

Now we have an example from Puma County, AZ of a potentially corrupt election, possibly changed by the actions of a single individual ordered by an election official. Via BradBlog since the underlying link to the original article seems broken <read>

According to Osmolski’s affidavit :

During that conversation Bryan Crane told me he “fixed” the RTA, or Regional Transportation Authority election on the instructions of his bosses and he did what he was told to do. Mr. Crane expressed his concern about being indicted and said he would like to talk but couldn’t trust anyone.

The affidavit is the latest in a series of red flags concerning the RTA election. Other red flags include: (1) This was a sales tax increase, the type of vote that usually fails, and it looked like it was going down in the days prior to the election; (2) The database on the vote counting computer was erased and replaced a day into the early ballot scanning; (3) Unauthorized vote total summary reports were printed during the counting; (4) A tape of the original ballot layout stored with the Secretary of State — which could have indicated if the vote was flipped — was sent back to the County, which lost it; (5) An investigation into the election completed by the Attorney General’s office was cursory and inconclusive.

I’ll hold judgement on the merits of this particular case at least until the votes are counted, the chain-of-custody broken, or the ballots destroyed, whichever comes first.

Nor will they ever be hand-counted. Nor will contested races.

Connecticut’s “strongest in the country” post-election audit law exempts races that are recounted or races that are contested from post-election audits. The law does not require that recounts be manual hand-to-eye counts and the Secretary of the State after some hesitation has lifted her requirement that recounts be manual.

Worse. If one race in a district is contested or subject to recount, the district is entirely exempt from the post-election audit.

• Example #1: (Actual) When Representative Caruso contested the mayoral primary in Bridgeport, it exempted his race and all the races and districts in Bridgeport from the post-election audit entirely.
• Example #2: (Theoretical) A state-wide race, such as Governor, Senator, or Attorney General could be close and cause a recount resulting in no post-election audit in the entire state.
• Example #3: (Theoretical) Candidate A is the apparent winner of a fraudulently stolen race for the Connecticut House that would likely be detected by a post-election audit. But candidate B who lost the Connecticut Senate race in a senate district including the House district can conspire to block the audit of A’s race by contesting the Senate election.

Further Irony: We randomly select races to audit with no exceptions. We will audit/count races where candidates are unopposed, leaving other races unaudited.