Category: Post-Election Audits

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 2 – Counting Not Extremely Accurate

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified. Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>.  Yesterday, in Part 1, we covered the Memory Card Report.   Today, in Part 2 we highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn.   We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s commitment to solve the problems identified.  Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Summary Three Reports On The November Post-Election Audits

From the Secretary of the State’s Press Release, December 12th, 2008, headlined:  BYSIEWICZ: RESULTS OF POST ELECTION AUDIT SHOW ACCURATE ELECTION DAY MACHINE COUNTS:

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz announced today that post election audits conducted in 10% of all voting precincts in Connecticut have shown extremely accurate machine counts on Election Day November 4, 2008. An initial review of the audit results has been completed by the Office of the Secretary of State, and the results will now undergo a complete, independent analysis by the University of Connecticut’s Voting Technology Research Center under the direction of Dr. Alexander Shvartsman.

“We set a record in Connecticut on November 4th with 1.64 million people casting ballots and Election Day went remarkably smoothly,” said Secretary Bysiewicz. “The results of this audit indicate, once again, that the optical scan voting system is secure and extremely accurate. Connecticut voters can be confident in the integrity of our elections and that their votes were counted correctly. Still, I’m not asking anyone to simply take my word for it: that’s why these post-election procedures are so important. We want to shine the light on the electoral process, before and after all votes are cast…

While the audits did uncover accurate machine counts on Election Day, there were discrepancies in isolated cases involving the hand-count audits for some ballots marked with votes for major party candidates who were cross endorsed by minor parties.

From the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition Report, January 28, 2009 (I was the lead author of this report):

In this report, we conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of

* standards,
* detailed guidance for counting procedures, and
* consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

We also note continuing failures to follow audit and chain-of-custody procedures.

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

  • The Coaltion report highlighted many discrepancies in votes and ballot counts that exceded questionable ballot counts and  that did not involve cross-endorsed candidates <read>

From the UConn Post-Election Audit Report, May 12 2009:

The VoTeR Center]s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unacceptably high unexplained differences between hand and machine counts…As a result the [Secretary of the State’s] Office performed additional information-gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand counting of ballots…

The main conclusion in this report is that for all cases where non-trivial discrepancies were originally reported, it was determined that hand counting errors or vote misallocation were the causes.  No discrepancies in these cases were reported to be attributable to machine tabulation.  For the original data where no follow up investigation was performed, the discrepancies were small, in particular the average reported discrepancy is lower than the number of votes that were determined to be questionable…

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the hand counting remains an error prone activity. In order to enable a more precise analysis it is recommended that the hand counting precision is substantially improved in future audits. The completeness of the audit reports also need to be addressed…

This analysis does not include 42 records (3.2% of 1311 [candidate race counts]) that were found to be incomplete, unusable or obviously incorrect.  This an improvement relative to the November 2007 elections.

The Secretary of the State and her Office,  are rightfully proud of proposing the audit to the Legislature in 2007.  Based on the municipal reports from November, we asked for public follow-up investigations of the initial audit results, at least starting with the largest and most blatant discrepancies and incomplete forms.  We appreciate that follow-up of the largest discrepancies was initiated.  Yet, we are disappointed that the investigations were not open to public observation and that all incomplete forms were not investigated.

Our comments and concerns:

  • The investigations prove that Election Officials in many Connecticut municipalities are not  yet able to count votes accurately. As we have noted, we appreciate that the largest discrepancies were investigated. We asked for that as a minimum.  Yet without reliable counting, initially, or via follow-up we find no reason to agree that the audits prove the machines in Connecticut were “extremely accurate”.  Reports in  several other states show that officials and machines can count quite accurately.   Some audits and recounts by hand show occasionally that initial reported election results created on election night by people and machines are inaccurate because of human and machine errors — that is what  is supposed to happen, exactly what audits are designed to do.  (We plan on developing a detailed post discussing counting accuracy and reasonable expectations in the near term)
  • The audit and the audit report are incomplete. The report “does not include 43 records (3.2% of 1311) that were found to be incomplete, unusable, or obviously incorrect”.   When we overlook obvious errors, then in future elections creating obvious errors is another route to avoiding detection of errors or fraud — If the counts don’t match, just don’t report the result.
  • Even with all the investigations and adjustments we have many unexplained discrepancies. The largest discrepancies were investigated, leaving 98 cases of discrepancies greater than 4 and 34 cases greater than 9. Or 68 with discrepancies over 2% including 31 with discrepancies over 5% of the vote. (Table 1 and Table 2 of the UConn report) We are reminded of Ohio in the same November 2008 election, where a discrepancy of 5 ballots was a matter of serious national concern.  With effective initial counting, there should be a small number of counts requiring investigation.
  • The Chain-of-Custody is critical to credibility. Even the some of the originally reported data which closely matched machine totals lacks credibility — based on lapses in the chain-of-custody of ballots prior to the initial municipal counting. In several cases the ballots were not resealed after the initial audit counts, and are thus less than fully credible. Once again, we do not have any reason to suspect errors or fraud, we just point out the lack of following procedures, the holes in credibility, and the openings for covering errors and fraud in elections.
  • The entire audit process should be open to observation. We do not doubt the hard work and integrity of the Secretary of the State’s election staff of seven, several of whom recounted ballots and performed research in a number of towns. If the recounting and field research had been open to the public, we might be in a position to vouch for the integrity of the process.  We, not the public, were informed of the initial “site visits” but our request that they be open to the public, or at least open to us, was to no avail.  If any critical part of the audit is performed out of public view, it leaves questions for the public and opens up another avenue for fraud or for errors to be covered up.
  • Either “questionable ballot” classification is inaccurate in many towns or we have a “system problem”.  Based on our analysis of the audit results and our observations during 18 post election audits, we find that election officials classified way more votes as questionable than necessary. In most cases only a very small number, 1 or 2 votes per candidate, are filled out poorly enough not to counted by the machine, but several towns classify large numbers as questionable. This is a problem as it opens a hole for real problems to go undetected. When 10% of ballots are incorrectly classified as questionable it opens up the possibility of not recognizing a problem of a 10% undercount for a candidate.
    Conversely, if the officials are reasonably classifying questionable ballets, then we have a system that 5%, 10%, or 25% of voters in several towns are actually unable to use properly. That would really be a serious “system problem” that needs to be addressed – by better systems not by smarter voters. (If we actually have such a “system problem” then we have a very poor ballot layout, much worse than other states, much worse than the legendary “butterfly ballot” in Florida 2000.)
  • Accuracy and the appearance of objectivity are important. We disagree with the Secretary of the State’s initial assessment on December 12 when all the data from the municipalities was available, but no UConn report was available.   Secretary Bysiewicz said the audits “have shown extremely accurate machine counts”.  While it may actually be the case,  the accuracy of all scanners in the audit cannot be proven based on the data available now, and less so based on the data available in December.
  • Timeliness is important. We have reports and follow-up, long after the election: The election was November 4th, the audit was complete in early December, the Presidential electors were certified on December 14th, the initial “site visits” began on January 19th and were complete by January 23rd, the data from the initial “site visits” were sent to UConn on February 18th, and further follow up data on April 3, 2009.   The report is dated on May 12, 2009 — over six months after the election. The longer the delay the colder the trail of evidence, the more opportunity for cover-up, and the less value the data.
    When the Presidential electors were certified on December 14th, there were huge obvious discrepancies.  What if a race for President, a U.S. Representative, or State Legislator was close? Would there have been a swifter response even though the machines were declared “extremely accurate” at that point?

Our bottom line:

  • The problem is not that there were machine problems. We have no evidence there were any. The problem is that when there are or ever were, dismissing all errors as human counting errors, we are unlikely to find a problem. In this audit, the worst discrepancies were investigated, which proved that many discrepancies in these audits were human errors —  not surprisingly based on observation of inadequate counting.   However, a sample does not prove all discrepancies are human errors.
  • We stand by our recommendations and the recommendations of other groups for what is required to have effective, credible audits.  CTVotersCount Petition 2009, Coalition Recommendations, Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits, and The League Of Women Voters Report on Election Audits.
  • The current Audit Process in Connecticut demonstrates the need for audits to be Independent and focused on election integrity, not just machine certification reliability. Even with hard work and high integrity the appearance of integrity is questionable when the Election Officials and the State’s Chief Election Official are responsible for both the audit the election.  We know of no other area of business or Government where something labeled an “audit” is this far from independent. If the purpose of the audit were to just check if the machines can work as certified and not to uncover and rectify instances of error and fraud, then improved audit execution and tweaks of the current law might suffice.  Yet, for the audits to provide election integrity we need a credible audit that is completed in time to adjust election results, that includes an audit of the entire process, and one that subjects all ballots and machines to selection for audit.  The current law has too many exemptions which all represent opportunities for error or fraud to go undetected.

Secretary Bysiewicz supported independent audits in 2008 when they failed to pass the Connecticut Legislature.  She reiterated her commitment to independent audits and having a completely open process in a letter to CTVotersCount petition signers earlier this year, sent on January 23rd:

We supported the creation of an Independent Audit Board last legislative session as the next step in improving the administration of audits in our state.  We also supported a bill that would require one hundred percent (100%) testing of memory cards prior to thier use. Of course, we will continue to support that type of refinement to our current process.

Our audit law requires that audits be conducted in public.  I have long been a strong advocate of openness and transparency in government.  We will advocate for the types of improvments suggested in the petition (e.g. that all audit activiteis should occur in public)...

We will work very hard to maintain the gains we have made against any effort to pull away from these basic security measures, like audits, on the ground that we face financial challenges in the state and local level.  Like you, I strongly believe that such measures are critical to maintaining public confidence in our electoral process and constitute a small price to pay for ensuring that our elections function properly.

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 1 – Bad Cards, Procedural Lapses Continue

This week the University of Connecticut VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report.  In Part 2 we will highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Summary

From the press release:

My office entered into this historic partnership with the University of
Connecticut VoTeR Center so that we could receive an independent, unbiased accounting of Connecticut’s optical scan voting machines,” said Bysiewicz.  “The results of these two studies confirm that numbers tallied by the optical scanners were remarkably accurate on Election Day November 4, 2008.  Voters should feel confident that their votes were secure and accurately counted.

From the Post-Election Memory Card Audit Report:

In summary. (1) all cards used in the election were properly programmed, (2) cards with junk data continues to be a problem, and additional analysis is in progress to determine the cause, (3) a number of cards show that the pre-election procedures are not followed uniformly and that cards continue to be duplicated; we recommend a stronger policy statement is needed on handling the cards before and during the election an disallowing memory card duplication.

The Secretary of the State, her Office, and UConn are rightfully proud of initiating the audit in 2008 and instituting the unique memory card testing program. We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn.   We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified:

From the Press Release:

“Overall, I’m pleased that our first pre- and post-testing procedures with UConn demonstrate the security of our office’s chain of custody practices with election officials,” said Bysiewicz. “However, the percentage of unreadable cards is still too high and we await UConn’s forthcoming investigation into possible causes and recommended solutions for guidance on this issue. In the interim we will provide additional training to local election officials to make sure regulations concerning the handling and security of memory cards used by the optical scanners are uniformly followed throughout the State of Connecticut.”

From the Secretary of the State’s May 14th Newsletter:

Moving forward, my office will continue to improve the training we give to Registrars of Voters and local election officials to reduce any further errors in counting. We will also start new training within weeks to improve the security of memory cards used by the optical scanners to record votes on Election Day.

Our comments and concerns:

  • This is not a random audit of memory cards. We continue to applaud this unique memory card testing program, yet it is a registrar selected set of memory cards, not exhaustive, not a random sample. 297 cards used in the election were tested out of 833 districts. This opens a huge hole for covering up errors and fraud – just don’t send in your card. It also biases any statistics one way or another based on which cards tend to be sent to UConn.
  • 9% error memory card failure rate is bad enough, but is it the actual rate? 9% of all cards sent to UConn had memory problems. These are all classified as cards not used in the election, if so, the rate would be 41/142 or 29%. We wonder if many bad cards are found in the process of testing and not used in the election thus not counted in the audit. Or could some of these cards have worked in the election and failed subsequently? Bottom line we don’t know the actual failure rate % since we don’t have a random sample. The 9% is within the range of previous UConn pre and post election tests <all UConn Reports> <Our Past Commentary>
  • There is a serious failure of officials to follow procedures. A rate of 34% or 144 failures to follow procedures on 421 non-junk-data cards is a serious pervasive problem. (52-Not Set for Election, 20 Results Print Aborted, 2-Set for Election, Zero Counters, 41-Duplication Events, 29-Zero Totals Printed Before Date of Election)  In some cases multiple problems may have occurred on the same card so the number of districts detected as failing to follow procedures is likely a bit less that the 34%. (This  paragraph has corrected numbers, in an earlier version we had double counted some of the errors)Once again, this is not a random sample yet it’s a totally unacceptable level of not following procedures. The report correctly suggests these should be changed through better training and instruction to municipalities. If procedures are necessary, then when they are not followed it means there is an opportunity for problems to occur. This should cause everyone to wonder to what extent other unaudited election procedures are regularly not followed. Most procedures are in place because they are intended to prevent election day problems, errors, and fraud.  In fact, this memory card finding is very consistent with the Audit Coaltion Reports which have consistently shown a significant level of failures to follow procedures, for instance the chain-of-custody failures described in the most recent Coalition report <read>

Our bottom line:

  • A non-random partial post-election audit of memory cards is useful, but it is insufficient. A more rigorous sampling process would yield more accurate information and, just as importantly, it would eliminate the existing opportunity for errors or fraud to be covered up by not sending the cards for testing.  Last year we proposed and the GAE Committee passed 100% pre-election independent testing of memory cards.  We stand by that recommendation to protect the cards from front-end insider fraud and to make it less likely that election officials have to deal with junk data cards.  Post-election random testing or 100% testing of memory cards is also advisable.
  • How many more tests, reports, and elections will it take before the junk data problem is significantly reduced? Ridiculous, Unacceptable, Unconscionable come to mind to describe the junk data problem.  5%, 9%, 20% or even 1% is way out of line for electronic equipment.  Why do we stand for it?  What about all the other states that use this exact same technology, why are they putting up with it?
  • Almost every failure to follow procedures is an opportunity to cause problems, cover up errors, or cover up fraud. Perhaps it is easier to understand human failure to follow procedures exactly, every time.  Once again no mater if failure to follow procedures is 5%, 10%, 20% or 40% in handling memory cards it points to a likely much higher rate of failure to follow all procedures.  How can we have confidence in elections with such a lack of ability or attention to following procedures, many of which are performed outside of public view, outside of audits purview to discover.    We can only hope that the Registrars of Voters will join in the commitment to meet a much  higher standard.

************

Related story 5/28:  Diebold memory card problems in Florida — a different model, this time it is high speed wireless cards <read>

May Elections: Random District Selection for Post Election Audit

Connecticut towns must hold municipal elections in May or November of odd years. On May 4th, elections were held and as required by law 10% of districts holding municipal elections are subject to the Post-Election Audit. CTVotersCount attended the drawing this morning, representing the public.

Analysis and Opinion: Some might question the value of such a small audit. Considering the value of elections and statistics, we disagree.

Connecticut towns must hold municipal elections in May or November of odd years.

The Secretary of the State’s pre-election Press Release:  Bysiewicz:  Polls Will Be Open Monday May 4th, 15 Connecticut Communities Holding Municipal Elections In May <read>

As required by law 10% of districts holding municipal elections  are subject  to the Post-Election Audit.  CTVotersCount attended the drawing this morning, representing the public.  Some might question the value of such a small audit.  Considering the value of elections and statistics, we disagree.  (see our analysis and opinion below)

The law:

Not earlier than the fifteenth day after any election or primary and not later than two business days before the canvass of votes by the Secretary of the State, Treasurer and Comptroller, for any federal or state election or primary, or by the town clerk for any municipal election or primary, the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded in not less than ten per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable.

However, not all these elections were “municipal elections”, several were “borough elections”.  As such, the “borough elections” do not fall under the post-election audit laws, adding another item to our list of  “loopholes” or exemptions in the law.

By the numbers:

  • 6 Municipalities had municipal elections  on May 4th
  • 13 Election districts* in the election
  • 2 10% of districts in the election that must be audited
  • 3 Municipalities had recanvasses** in at least one race, exempting districts in those municipalities from audit

The law:

If a selected voting district has an office that is subject to recanvass or an election or primary contest pursuant to the general statutes, the Secretary shall select an alternative district

The process:

The 10 districts in the three towns without districts are printed and separated.

The public has the opportunity to review the list of districts:

The eligeable districts
The eligible 13 districts

The slips of paper are folded uniformly.  The public is invited to randomly draw districts:

CTVotersCount Co-Founder, Denise Weeks selects districts
CTVotersCount Co-Founder, Denise Weeks, selects districts

The chosen districts and alternates*** are announced as they are drawn:

 

Deputy Secretary of the State, Lesley Mara, announces district
Deputy Secretary of the State, Lesley Mara, announces district

The eligible districts include eight from Naugatuck along with one each from Andover, and Woodbridge.  That would give about a 62% chance that Naugatuck would be selected for both districts to be audited:

 

Two selected districts and alternate, all from Naugatuck
Two selected districts and alternate, all from Naugatuck

What is next:

The individual municipalities (in this case just one) will be notified of their selection.

The municipal clerks in each town will randomly select three races to audit for the districts selected.  (We’d like to report on these to provide confidence that they are truly random and fair, however, they are not required to be public or noticed to the public)

The municipal registrars will determine and publicly notice a date of the local counting session which must occur between May 19th to, we understand, May 29th.  The Election Audit Coalition will observe the audit counting sessions.

Election Audit Coaltion will analyze and report the results.  Independently, The University of Connecticut is required by law to analyze and report audit results.

Analysis and Opinion:
Some might question the value of such a small audit.  Considering value of elections and the statistics, we disagree.

We question the wisdom of not subjecting all elections, all contests, and all ballots to the possibility of being selected for audit.  In addition to the recanvassed races in this election several contests and ballots are entirely exempt from audit.  Exemptions include other races in recanvassed districts, all questions, all referendums, all ballots initially counted by hand, and all centrally scanned absentee ballots.  Exemptions open up opportunities for error and fraud to go undetected, and openings for fraudsters to know in advance what will never be audited.   Every type of election, contest and ballot should be subject to being selected for audit.  No election contest is unimportant, no ballot is exempt from changing election  results.

We also point out that the statistical implications of auditing municipal elections are different than the implications for Congressional or statewide contests.  Statistically each municipal election is independent, selection 10% of districts produces the same level of confidence in a race if the municipality is one of six in May or one of 163 in November.

Other coverage: Orient Lodge Secretary of the State’s Press Release

—————
* Districts are similar to precincts in other states

** Recanvasses are similar to recounts in other states, with perhaps less rigor.  They are done with a combination of machine and manual counting.  According to the Recount Proceedures Manual, revised last July, there is no public notice requirement.

*** Alternates are chosen in case a district is subsequently subject to an election contest prior to the audit counting session.

Diebold: Revenue way down. $25,000,000 settlement proposed

Results included a $25 million charge for a deal Diebold reached with the Securities and Exchange Commission to settle civil charges related to a pending enforcement inquiry. The proposed settlement still needs final SEC approval.

The New York Times reports the story <read>

Results included a $25 million charge for a deal Diebold reached with the Securities and Exchange Commission to settle civil charges related to a pending enforcement inquiry. The proposed settlement still needs final SEC approval.

Diebold spun off its election system business after a failed attempt to sell it.  The settlement is related to accounting tricks presumably intended to puff up voting system results to produce a sale.

What Did The November 2008 Post-Election Audit Cost?

How much did our November audit cost? Election officials and towns complain about the cost of the audits and that they threaten town budgets.

No matter what your politics, you can find many many votes in Hartford, Washington, or your town that you disagree with, costing one way or another more than the cost of an audit. What is the value of confidence that all those officials were elected without error or fraud?

After the November 2008 election, Secretary Bysiewicz ordered the post-election audit of all five races in the election which added about 40% to the votes required to be counted by law.  We appreciate this as the law only called for the audit of a randomly selected three races and does not exempt uncontested races.  As we pointed out at the time, using statistical methods we could have done much better auditing all races and the two questions counting the original number of votes <read>

But how much did our November audit cost?  Election officials and towns complain about the cost of the audits and that they threaten town budgets.

We have two sets of information provided very responsively  from the Secretary of the State’s office.  The reimbursement requests from towns from the November 2008 election as of February 12 <read> and for the November 2007 election as of yesterday. <read>

We analyzed the November 2008 data, comparing the costs for the towns with the number of ballots and votes counted <read>

Preliminary conclusions.

Some towns don’t actually seem all that concerned with the costs:

  • In November 2008 47 towns requested reimbursement from the State 9 selected for the audit did not (we use 46 for our calculations as we were not able to classify one town)
  • In November 2007 13 towns requested reimbursement  27 did not.

The costs of auditing vary widely between in November 2008  towns:

  • Cost per ballot counted range from $0.09 to $1.88
  • Cost per vote counted range from $0.02 to $0.38|We have a hard time believing the lower costs reported and the higher costs.

Costs on average and in total for Municipalities:

  • The most reasonable number to use for November is the median cost of $0.48 per ballot
  • If all towns had requested reimbursement at the median cost per ballot, the total cost of the audit in November 2008 would have been: $72,103
  • Since we audit 10% of the districts we audit approximat3ely 10% of the ballots cast so the cost per voter is 1/10th of the cost per ballot actually counted, or about $0.05 per voter.

Total costs of the Audit:

The estimate of $72,103 does not include all the costs to the State for the audit, just the Municipalities.  Some of the additional costs, primarily for the Secretary of the State’s Office are:

What would we do for an audit? And how much would that cost?

CTVotersCount proposed a revision to the audit law in this session of the General Assembly, it was died in committee. <read>.  It would audit ALL statewide and congressional races and ALL questions on the ballot based on statistical principles and eliminate several loopholes in the law.

  • It would audit only three races per district except under exceptional circumstances, consistent with the current law, or 40% less than the November 2008 audit, or $72,103 * .6 = $43,262
  • Eliminating the loopholes would add less than 10%, or $43,262 * 1.1 = $47, 588 or about $0.03 per vote.

But, based on our observations the current methods of counting provide insufficient transparency, accuracy, and confidence.  So we would adjust these costs:

  • Most towns use two person counting teams, we would use three or four person teams so the cost of a single count might as much as double.
  • Counting more accurately would reduce the need for counting multiple times and the costs for unnecessary investigations.
  • Costs might go up anywhere from 25% to 90%
  • As an estimate we would increase costs to the municipalities by 50%,  or about:

So it might be about $72,000 or $0.045 per vote for a sufficient audit. To put that in context:

  • Cost of paper ballot $0.35 per voter
  • Stamp for letter to your representative requesting single payer heath care, $0.42
  • One teabag and a postage stamp $0.60
  • Cost of a standalone race to replace a Senate vacancy $6,000,000 not including audit costs or campaign costs.
  • Cost of clean elections for a single State Senate candidate in on district, $85,000.
  • Cost of just one highly contested Senate race, tens of millions,
  • Cost of a wrong vote in congress, billions of dollars, and thousands of lives.

No matter what your politics, y0u can find many many votes in Hartford, Washington, or your town that you disagree with, costing one way or another more than the cost of an audit.  What is the value of confidence that all those officials were elected without error or fraud?  We say priceless, certainly worth  much much more than $72,000 for last November’s election.

Is it worth $0.05 per voter or $0.03 per voter for integrity and confidence?  We think so.

CTVotersCount Testimony To The GAE Committee

Update: We provide Testimony Response & Clarification

The primary issues needing your attention are the post-election audits, ballot chain-of-custody, and the reporting of election results…As you consider the current audit laws and other bills before the committee effecting voting integrity and security, we encourage you to seek the best advice of legal experts, computer experts, security experts, and the experience of other states…What often is an attractive idea, also often has risky unintended consequences as well…

We want every citizen’s vote to be counted!
To be counted accurately!
And to be counted only once!

Update: 3/09/2009, comments on Secretary of The State’s Testimony <read>

Update: 2/24/2009, we provide Testimony Response & Clarification <read>

************************

The Government Administration and Elections Committee (GAE) held a public hearing on several elections bills on February 18, 2009.  CTVotersCount testified in favor of HB-6441 to improve the integrity of elections, while cautioning the committee about the voting integrity risks of several other bills.  The full testimony contains 17 pages of the most pertinent exhibits and references to additional supporting details <full testimony>

Update: Most of the testimony from yesterday is online <here>. Several citizens supported HR-6441 and the problems it addresses.  Others addressed concerns with the costs, effort, and details of the bill.  I am preparing a detailed response to some of the concerns raised including some suggested revised text for the bill.

Summary of my Testimony:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am the Executive Director of Connecticut Voters Count and the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition. Today I am representing Connecticut Voters Count. My testimony does not necessarily represent the views of the Coalition or its other members.

I am a Certified Moderator and have personally observed eighteen (18) post-election audits in municipalities across the state. I am also a retired computer scientist and software engineer involved in voting integrity since 2004.

I am here again to ask that you improve the election laws to provide real confidence to the voters of Connecticut. The primary issues needing your attention are the post-election audits, ballot chain-of-custody, and the reporting of election results.

Currently we have a weak chain-of-custody for ballots, dependent on unenforceable procedures that are often violated. We need stronger, enforceable protection for the ultimate record of our votes.

The election results posted on the Secretary of the State’s web site are inaccurate, difficult to check, and provide no confidence that critical results are correctly certified. These results are accumulated by an error prone three step process of transcription and addition, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office. Advocates from across the state have found obvious errors almost everywhere they have looked.

Based on five public hearings last year and on the Coalition reports of four post-election audits, we continue to conclude that the audits as performed are inaccurate, unreliable, and ineffective. Fortunately, we can make the audits much more effective, without counting more ballots.

We remain committed to an Independent Audit Board, relieving the Secretary of the State, towns, and registrars of the audit work. However, in these fiscally challenging times we have also proposed text for HB-6441 which would make significant improvements without significant fiscal impact.

Even though most members of the GAE are lawyers, when the committee drafted campaign finance law, you sought the advice of The Brennan Center for Justice. As you consider the current audit laws and other bills before the committee effecting voting integrity and security, we encourage you to seek the best advice of legal experts, computer experts, security experts, and the experience of other states.

We don’t claim that our proposed text is perfect. One contributor is a lawyer. I am a computer expert. Yet, we turn to the collective work and experience of many others. Attached to my testimony are references endorsed by nationally recognized groups and individuals, used for drafting HB-6441. The Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits created by a variety of experts, endorsed by the Brennan Center for Justice, Common Cause, Verified Voting, the American Statistical Association, CTVotersCount, TrueVoteCT and others; and a similar document from the League of Women Voters, U.S.

We urge you to seek and follow the advice of recognized subject matter experts and the experience of other states as you consider improving our voting systems. What often is an attractive idea, also often has risky unintended consequences as well.

Summary
We want every citizen’s vote to be counted!
To be counted accurately!
And to be counted only once!

Thank you.

League Of Women Voters: Report On Election Auditing

Includes many of the same recommendations in the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits and expands the scope to include auditing of the whole election process.

Includes many of the same recommendations in the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits and expands the scope to include auditing of the whole election process: <web intro> <Report .pdf>

This report consists of four key parts: Recommended Guidelines for Election Audits, Criteria for an Election Auditing Law, Glossary of Election Audits Terminology, and Election Audits Resources. These sections are intended to be used together in their entirety.

Report: CT Nov 08 Election – Large Differences From Optical Scanner Totals

We conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence…Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently

In some cases as many as twenty-four (24) fewer ballots were counted by hand than recorded by optical scanners. For individual candidate races, vote counts between hand counts and scanner tapes varied by as much as three-hundred-sixty-six (366) votes in one race or as much as 46% in another.

We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.

Read the press release, full report and excerpts at CTElectionAudit.org

Summary, from the Press Release and Report:

Connecticut’s November 2008 Post-Election Audits Report
Large Differences From Optical Scanner Totals

Coalition Calls On Legislature To Act

The Coalition noted large differences between reported results by electronic voting equipment and the hand count of ballots by election officials across Connecticut. In some cases as many as twenty-four (24) fewer ballots were counted by hand than recorded by optical scanners. For individual candidate races, vote counts between hand counts and scanner tapes varied by as much as three-hundred-sixty-six (366) votes in one race or as much as 46% in another. Most officials attributed the widespread differences to the inability to count votes accurately by hand.

In this report, we conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of
• standards,
• detailed guidance for counting procedures, and
• consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

We also note continuing failures to follow audit and chain-of-custody procedures.

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

Several audit supervisors attributed discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts to human limitations; other supervisors attributed these to inaccurate scanners. We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “Given the variation in the counting procedures used, there is no way to distinguish when officials or machines counted accurately or inaccurately. When differences are dismissed as human counting errors, it is unlikely that an audit would identify an election error or fraud should that occur.”

Cheryl Dunson, League of Women Voters of Connecticut’s Vice President of Public Issues, stated, “We have reorganized our recommendations to the Secretary of the State and the Legislature. Along with improvements to laws, and audit procedures, we recommend that an Independent Audit Board be established.”

Cheri Quickmire, Executive Director, Connecticut Common Cause said, “Gaps in ballot chain-of-custody, election accounting, and the post-election audits must be addressed to assure integrity and provide confidence to the voters of Connecticut”

Tom Swan, Executive Director, Connecticut Citizen Action Group, said “This is our fourth report showing similar weaknesses in the post-election audits. After these reports and five public hearings around the state, it is time for the Legislature to act.”

Read the press release, full report and excerpts at CTElectionAudit.org

Optical Scanners “Extremely Accurate” – In MN

the “gross” error rate is about 1 in 1000, or a gross accuracy of 99.91%.

Andrew Appel has analysed the official results of the Minnesota recount and pronounced them “Extremely Accurate”, <read>

There were 2,423,851 votes counted.

The recount added a total of 1,528 votes to the candidates, and subtracted a total of 642 votes, for a gross change of 2170 (again, not including absentee ballot qualification). Thus, the “gross” error rate is about 1 in 1000, or a gross accuracy of 99.91%.

Petition Delivered: 994 Connecticut Voters Call For Action

We call for action to enhance integrity and confidence in Connecticut elections, during the 2009 legislative session.

We believe the incremental costs of post-election audits that meet the requirements of the petition are appropriate considering the key role voting plays in democracy. Yet, we recognize that less costly alternatives may need to be considered.

Today, we delivered our petition to the Governor, Secretary of the State, Government Administration and Elections Committee, and the Connecticut General Assembly <read petition>

We call for action to enhance integrity and confidence in Connecticut elections, during the 2009 legislative session.

We believe the incremental costs of post-election audits that meet the requirements of the petition are appropriate considering the key role voting plays in democracy.  Yet, we recognize that less costly alternatives may need to be considered.

Here is the complete  text of our cover letter:

The Honorable M. Jodi Rell, Governor
The Honorable Susan M. Bysiewicz, Secretary of the State
Government Administration and Elections Committee
Connecticut General Assembly                                                              January 9, 2009

Re:       Petition To Enhance Confidence In Connecticut Elections (2009)

Nine-hundred-ninety-four (994) voters of Connecticut request that laws be enacted to enhance integrity and confidence in elections as outlined in the attached petition.

Over the last year and since the petition was initiated, several relevant developments have transpired:

  • Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits has been released and endorsed by The Brennan Center for Justice, Common Cause, The American Statistical Association, and others.  These principles closely parallel the details in the petition.
  • Connecticut has completed four post-election audits.  The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition has issued three reports indicating that the current post-election audits are inaccurate, unreliable, and ineffective.  These reports also uncovered extensive gaps in ballot chain-of-custody and frequent failures to follow procedures.
  • A series of five public hearings were conducted in 2008 by the Government Elections and Administration Committee demonstrating significant gaps in election integrity.
  • Nationally, the November 2008 election went smoothly, however, in that election and others over the year, several problems have demonstrated the risks of error and fraud in our voting systems.  Several of these errors highlight the critical need for effective post-election audits and manual recounts to assure the voters’ intent is realized.
  • In Connecticut the November 2008 election and post-election audits has once again demonstrated the need for significant improvements in our chain-of-custody and post-election audits.  In addition discrepancies between results posted online by the Secretary of the State’s Office and the actual results have highlighted the need for a more effective and transparent system for reporting and totaling votes.
  • Finally, the fiscal situation in Connecticut and the Nation has become critical.  We believe the incremental costs of post-election audits that meet the requirements of the petition are appropriate considering the key role voting plays in democracy.  Yet, we recognize that less costly alternatives may need to be considered.

CTVotersCount has prepared, with suggested text, an act that will fully meet the requirements outlined in the Principles and the petition.  We also have available alternative text with minimal fiscal impact that would significantly increase the effectiveness of post-election audits and the integrity of elections in Connecticut. We ask that you give full consideration to our concerns in the petition in the 2009 legislative session.

Also attached are the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits, copies of original signatures on paper, and a list of all signers both paper and online.