Category: CT Law

Columnist Calls for Elimination of the Secretary of the State

Coming two weeks after April 1st, we assume the author is serious. We point out that transferring the functions of the Secretary of the State to the Attorney General or the State Elections Enforcement Commission would hardly eliminate much of the Secretary’s $8.4 million budget, especially if we still want to register businesses in the state, keep records, comply with election laws, train election officials, total results, assist election officials, and maintain an independent enforcement function. We also note that Hawaii has not been doing so well in elections without a Secretary of the State and is a case study in how not to outsource elections.

But to tear down a factory or to revolt against a government or to avoid repair of a motorcycle because it is a system is to attack effects rather than causes; and as long as the attack is upon effects only, no change is possible – Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

CTPost: ‘A Modest Proposal’ for the Secretary of the State’s Office, by MariAn Gail Brown <read>

And, if we’re really serious about finding savings in this tough economic climate, why not get rid of her entire office with its $8.4 million budget?

Three states — Hawaii, Alaska and Utah — get along just fine without any secretary of state. And Arizona is poised to eliminate its secretary of state, and have its responsibilities assumed by a newly created lieutenant governor…

Sure, it’s one of four constitutional offices, but just because it’s been that way for more than two-and-half centuries doesn’t mean it has to be this way. We can and we should get rid of it. Of course, in the Land of Steady Habits, the secretary of the state’s job is an elective office authorized under our state Constitution.

That means it will take a constitutional convention to change. And the last time the Nutmeg State did some constitutional soul searching was 1965. Forty-five years is a long time to go without this kind of checkup. Let’s demand that our General Assembly vote to convene a Constitutional Convention for the express purpose of nixing the secretary of the state position.

Where might government transfer the functions this elective office is responsible for — items like election law, campaign oversight, voter registration, corporate filings and licensing? Connecticut already has a State Elections Enforcement Commission and an attorney general’s office. Most, if not all, of the secretary of the state’s workload can be delegated between those two agencies.

Coming two weeks after April 1st, we assume the author is serious.  We point out that transferring the functions of the Secretary of the State to the Attorney General or the State Elections Enforcement Commission would hardly eliminate much of the Secretary’s $8.4 million budget, especially if we still want to register businesses in the state, keep records, comply with election laws, train election officials, total results, assist election officials, and maintain an independent enforcement function.

We also note that Hawaii has not been doing so well in elections without a Secretary of the State and is a case study in how not to outsource elections <read report, page 19>.

In a similar vein we could suggest eliminating columnists from newspapers along with the budget for editing, printing, and delivering their columns.  After all the advertising department can type and the billing department prints and delivers invoices already.

Update:  An advocate with experience in Utah points out:

Just because in Utah the Secretary of State’s office instead has the title “Lt. Governor” does not mean Utah does without all the functions of a Secretary of State. The Utah Lt. Governor is a member of the National Association of Secretaries of State. I would imagine that the other two states mentioned by the author likewise have officials who are members of NASS because they perform the equivalent functions despite not having the label of SoS. It is true that not all Secretaries of State handle elections. In Utah, the Lt. Governor hires a state Election Director but gets the final say re. elections but in some states there is a separate office having legal responsibility for elections.

just because in Utah the Secretary of
State's office instead has the title "Lt. Governor" does not mean Utah
does without all the functions of a Secretary of State.  The Utah Lt.
Governor is a member of the National Association of Secretaries of
State. I would imagine that the other two states mentioned by the
author likewise have officials who are members of NASS because they
perform the equivalent functions despite not having the label of SoS.
It is true that not all Secretaries of State handle elections.  In
Utah, the Lt. Governor hires a state Election Director but gets the
final say re. elections but in some states there is a separate office
having legal responsibility for elections.

What could a Secretary of the State Do?

Much of what we hear from candidates is proposed cheerleading and leadership from the bully pulpit: the bills they would propose to the legislature, the leadership they would provide to improve the business climate, encourage voting, and voting integrity in Connecticut. However, there are items that the Secretary of the State can do on their own initiative to improve business registration, public access to information, and the election process.

Much of what we hear from candidates is proposed cheerleading and leadership from the bully pulpit: the bills they would propose to the legislature, the leadership they would provide to improve the business climate, encourage voting, and voting integrity in Connecticut.  Don’t get me wrong these are useful and legitimate roles for the Secretary of the State.  However, there are items that the Secretary of the State can do on their own initiative to improve business registration, public access to information, and the election process.

When I talk to candidates for Secretary of the State, one of my main themes is what they could do on their own authority as Secretary of the State to improve election integrity and public confidence.

Here is my initial list of items, which may be expanded:

  • Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site, while increasing the integrity of the post-election audit
  • Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested
  • Improve documentation and training for election officials,  in substance and format
  • Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

We recognize that everything costs money, however, most of these items are relatively modest items that appear to be within the authority of the Secretary of the State.

Further Details

Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site

In a PEW study the Connecticut site ranked 48th out of 50 states.  We could debate if we should be higher in the rankings, or instead work to emulate and surpass the top ranked states.

The process of accumulating voting results in Connecticut is an error-prone three step process of addition and transcription, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office, and to the web.  Citizens have identified errors large and moderate – errors of a magnitude  which could change election results, the initiation of recanvasses, or ballot access. See <here> <here>

Without reliable, publicly posted results, post-election audits cannot be accomplished which inspire confidence and provide integrity.  A trusted audit requires selecting districts for audit against previously posted results.  Since we audit against optical scanner tapes, and the tape results are not posted, then we fail to meet that requirement.

What can be done?

  • Post copies of the original documents: All district and central count absented ballot Moderator’s’ Reports and copies of scanner tapes should be faxed to the Secretary of the State’s Office and posted on the SOTS web site. (We know this is easily possible since the SOTS web site has recently included images of all local ballots, and is capable of the quick addition of press releases)
  • Post detailed and summary data: The SOTS could use temporary employees or outsourcing to input and double check the input of all that data, then post it to the web site in human and downloadable formats.
  • Side benefit: A free public audit: As a byproduct the public, candidates, and parties could check and audit the data at no cost to the state.  To do that today would involve visiting town halls across the state and performing all the calculations done today by hand – efficient auditing of selected districts is not possible because detailed data is not currently posted.
  • Consider using the Overseas Vote Foundation facility for empowering military and overseas voters, now in use by seven states.  This is an example of what could be done to empower all voters. (Added 4/4/2010)
  • Improve post-election audit integrity: Stop accepting reports showing wild discrepancies as extremely accurate and make all audit investigations public and transparent. (added 7/31/2010) <Extremely Accurate> <Audit Reports>

Another area of irritation and loss of integrity in the post-election audits is that while the Secretary of the State’s Office is able to post ballots for every municipality, they are not provided with a reliable list of polling districts in those municipalities.  By requiring the faxing of district Moderator’s Reports and posting them, this uncertainty would be eliminated.

Another problem is public notification of audit dates, times and locations.  By procedure (unfortunately not by law), registrars are required to inform the Secretary of the States’s Office three days in advance of the local audits.  If these dates were posted by the SOTS Office within 24 hours of receipt, then the public, candidates, and parties would have much better access to actually observing audits.

Beyond audits, having centralized voting district locations and assisting voters in finding their polling place would help the public and partially relieve that burden from towns.

Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested

Currently, before each election, memory cards are programmed in Massachusetts by our distributor, LHS Associates.   The cards are shipped to local election officials for pre-election testing.  There are two problems:

  • We have no effective supervision over the process.  One of the risks is insider fraud or intimidation of those who program and ship memory cards.
  • The process is not perfect, and the memory cards are physically unreliable.  Extra effort is required when bad cards are discovered by the Registrars and new cards need to be ordered and shipped.  See <UConn Report.>

What can be done?

  • Perform the programming in Connecticut: In other states (outside of New England) large counties program their own cards and often perform programming at a fee for small counties.  We have paid for two machines which we can use to program the cards. They could be used by state employees or outsource the programming within Connecticut.
  • Independently test the cards nearby the programming: UConn has developed, at taxpayer expense, a program to eliminate many causes of error in the cards and easily detect bad cards with “junk” data.  Currently this program is underutilitzed in no non-random testing of cards selected by local officials after pre-election testing and after the election.  We can exploit this program to 100% pre-test the cards, enhancing integrity and reducing wasted effort by local officials when they discover “junk” cards.
  • Side Benefit:  Jobs: It might be small, yet every job moved back to Connecticut would be a benefit to the state.  Like large counties in other states, we might provide the service to other states in New England – we could compete with LHS for business and with the added advantage of the UConn testing program.  Perhaps we could expand beyond New England to service other states.

We also note a large cadre of very part-time election officials, many of whom served as lever mechanics and later as vendor trained optical scan technicians.  We expect that several of these same individuals could quickly train to meet the seasonal demand for programming and testing, and appreciate the opportunity for work and public service.  It would not take many.

Improve documentation and training for election officials,  in substance and format

The current Secretary of the State and her staff have worked to improve documentation and training.  This work should continue and be taken to a new level.

What can be done?

  • Update and improve the value of manuals: The Moderator Manual, the Absentee Ballot Moderator, the Recanvass Manual and the Post-Election Audit Procedures were modified after the commitment to optical scanners.  They need to be updated and expanded based on experience.  They need to be rewritten and edited by professional technical writers to make them more effective as training and reference documents.  For instance,
    • The Absentee Ballot Moderator’s Manual still calls for multiple counting throughout the day, but only one count is necessary with optical scanners.
    • The Post-Election Audit procedures should provide more details in several areas:  Counting incomplete bubbles, counting write-in votes, exactly what levels of differences should call for recounting and investigation, and help with accurate and efficient counting methods.
    • The Recanvass Manual should also cover details of counting incomplete bubbles, counting for voter’s intent, voter identifiable ballots, and the role of designated observers.
    • There may be value in following the examples of other jurisdictions in creating observer manuals for post-election audits and recanvasses.
  • Improve and expand certification: The Secretary has begin efforts for Registrar Certification and Training to complement the current Moderator Certification and Training.  The Registrars job is much more involved than that of a Moderator, yet Registrars have no formal training and certification program (And currently there is no requiremen for Registrars to be certified Moderators or to attend training.  Moderators are supposed to be certified, yet that is not enforced – these are issues for the Legislature and an example of where the Secretary of the State could be an effective cheer leader)

Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

One responsibility of the Secretary of the State’s Office is to advise election officials on proper procedures according to law, regulations, procedures, and directives.  We have heard registrars complain that the advice given depends on who one talks to, and on what day.  We have no way of determining if that is true or how prevalent the problem is.  The uncertainty and over-reliance on verbal communication should be eliminated.

We hear the same from committee political treasurers. In fact it is the subject of a proposed law before the Legislature.  The law would require the State Elections Enforcement Commission to follow-up with a written version of any verbal advice within ten days. <H.B. 5470> However, it is difficult to write law that distinguishes from a simple inquiry from one that provides a critical distinction that the caller must rely on to avoid error and avoid potential fine or jail time.

What can be done?

  • All directives should be in writing and publicly available. Like any laws, regulations, and procedures there is usually some ambiguity, unanticipated situations, new regulations can take years to be approved, and problems which must be overcome.  The Secretary of the State Office from time to time must issue directives to cover these situations.  Such directives should be in writing and posted publicly.
  • All substantial advice and rulings should be recorded in writing. The current Secretary of the State’s Office keeps track of all citizen inquires.  The Office should keep track of all official inquires, and summarize any significant election advice and rulings for future reference.
  • Economies of Scale: Perhaps the state would be best served by a common system, that tracked similar advice for the Secretary of the State’s Office and Elections Enforcement.  Perhaps we should use the same or similar laws, and the same system for all agencies that have a similar requirement.  The Environmental Protection Agency comes to mind.  What do other agencies do today?  What do other states do?  We have only one Freedom Of Information law for all agencies.  Perhaps we need a uniform law for agency directives, rulings, and advice?  There will always be a need to consider economies of scale vs. excess bureaucracy – but the third option is to search for the ways that increase economy of scale, increase democracy, while also streamlining bureaucracy.  Once again, the Secretary cannot change the law alone, but could cooperate with other agencies to produce efficiency and provide leadership in going beyond requirements of the law.

This list would be a good start.  Perhaps we will update and add to it over time.

Testimony: Rescanning On Same Type Scanner Would Gut Post-Elecition Audit

The current bill is based on three assumptions, all of which are erroneous because:
1. A count by an identical scanner and memory card is NOT equivalent to a manual count.
2. The audits DO NOT cost too much.
3. People in Connecticut CAN count votes accurately

Friday was the public hearing on S.B. 364 proposed by the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC).  It would replace the manual hand count post-election audit by a rescanning by the same model of ES&S/Premier/Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scanner with a duplicate memory card.

Here is the prepared introduction to my testimony:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am Executive Director of CTVotersCount and Executive Director of the Connecticut Citizens Election Audit Coalition.  I have personally observed twenty-five (25) post-election audits. Today, I am speaking for CTVotersCount. (I am also a certified moderator and a retired computer scientist)

I am opposed to the current Senate Bill 364 which would gut the current post-election audit law by eliminating the manual count and substituting an almost useless recount by the same type of machines and duplicate memory cards.

Instead, CTVotersCount recommends our alternative bill which would clarify the ballot chain of custody, make the audit procedures enforceable, while improving the efficiency and integrity of the audit – without increasing costs.

The current bill is based on three assumptions, all of which are erroneous because:

1. A count by an identical scanner and memory card is NOT equivalent to a manual count. In the words of a League of Women Voters Report:

An audit count that simply repeated the original counting procedure, whether electronically or by hand, would add little value to the election-validation process.

2. The audits DO NOT cost too much.  Based on municipality requests for reimbursement to the State and citizen observations, the costs of the 2008 audit are estimated at $82,000 and the cost of the 2009 audit at less than $41,000.  (Under our proposal the 2008 audit would have likely have cost 20% to 30% less than it did.)

3. People in Connecticut CAN count votes accurately. Officials in other states have regularly counted paper ballots quite accurately with less than 1/8th difference rate as Connecticut officials, at a lower cost.  The keys are better methods, documentation, training, and organization.

My written testimony includes details supporting estimates for the costs of the audits, the ability of people to count votes accurately, and the advantages of our proposed alternative bill.

I have also delivered testimony to the committee from several computer scientists from Connecticut and around the country attesting to the fallacy of auditing by identical computers and the costs of manual counting in other states.

In summary: Saving money is an important goal, yet the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered.  Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and election systems because it costs money? Or should we continue because they protect the value of our investments in infrastructure, save lives, and protect Democracy?

Thank you.

My complete testimony.

Fortunately the Committee did not have to rely exclusively on my testimony and experience observing post-election audits:

  • Two Coalition Post-Election Audit Observers gave a real-world voters’ view of the current process and its limitations:  Tessa Marquis and Mary Rydingsword.
  • Christine Horrigan and the Connecticut League of Women Voters testified in opposition to the current bill.
  • Out-of-state experts who provided testimony that audits don’t cost that much and that using similar machines and memory cards is of little value: David L. Dill, Jeremy Epstein, Candice Hoke, Peter G. Neumann, and Barbara Simons, along with two Computer Scientists from Connecticut, the President and a member of TrueVoteCT who lent their names to the testimony: Michael Fischer and Ralph Morelli <testimony>

There is a sound technical basis for verifying electronic vote tallies by manually counting a sample of precincts or vote subtotals. As computer scientists and election experts, we know very well that there is no reliable way to ensure that a security-critical computer system, such as a vote scanner, is free of malicious software that can change votes — or is even bug-free, for that matter.

It has been shown time and time again that there is a clever way to defeat every defense that has been invented. Furthermore, basic errors and gross security holes have been exposed in every existing voting device examined by computer security professionals to date. Errors are routinely detected in elections – and many smaller errors are probably missed. In 2008, hand-counted tabulation audits have discovered errors that led to incorrect vote totals. Computers can greatly increase the convenience and accuracy of elections – but only if we double-check the results independently of the hardware or software by hand counting a randomly selected sample of the ballots.

  • A special thanks to Barbara Simons for her own independent testimony: <testimony>

Senate Bill 364 appears to be based on the flawed premise that simply rerunning paper ballots through vote counting scanners used for the initial count can replace the manual audits currently required by law. Unfortunately, this assumption is wrong. Because the proposed rescan is not an audit, it will not achieve the goals for which the manual audit was intended. I urge the legislature to retain the manual hand counts in the existing audit legislation.

  • Also Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, testified her opposition to the bill.

Our hope, based on the overwhelming opposition to be bill, based strongly on well established science, is that the bill will either be completely rewritten based on our recommendations or not moved forward by the Committee.

We also note that the testimony on this bill and other election bills considered, resulted in interest by the Committee and important discussions of the details of how incorrectly marked ballots are counted, the importance of careful recanvasses, and the ballot chain-of-custody.

We expect that in a few days all of the written and verbal  testimony will be available <here> and <here>

Another instructive issue:

In other testimony we agree with Registrars who testified for improvement/removal of the quirks in Connecticut law which require multiple moderators in each polling place when more than one party has a simultaneous primary.  And perhaps with even less justification, in elections, officials can be recruited from any town to serve in another, in Presidential primaries too, yet in local, state, and other Federal primaries all officials must come from the town of the polling place.

The basic problem is that our election statutes are a hodgepodge.  Some sections apply to primaries, others Federal elections, others state elections, others local elections, others local primaries, others referendums etc.

As partially covered in our proposed revisions (see our proposed bill in our testimony) there is a need for clarifying, consolidating, and rationalizing the ballot chain-of-custody.  The law has different rules for moving and preserving absentee ballots, polling place ballots cast in all paper elections, and polling place ballots cast in optical scan elections.  That last item covering the majority of ballots and elections, polling place ballots cast in optical scan elections, is a hodgepodge of unclear language partially reflecting lever machines and ballot boxes, while reverencing a hard to follow chain of law leading to sections referencing absentee ballots.  It seems to be more of a chain-of-confusion and ambiguity than a chain-of custody we can rely on or expect officials to understand!

A 74 page bill is being considered to fix some of the continuing reverences in the law that remain focused on lever machines and are inappropriate for optical scanners.  Between mixing lever machines and scanners, even DRE’s (which have not been used in Connecticut), incomplete recanvass laws, and chain-of-custody laws, there remain plenty of issues to address in the future.

Courant: Ballot Access Should Require Two People Of Opposing Parties

“The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

We believe that ballots cannot be trusted unless there is a strong chain of custody, one critical part of that is that all access should be by at least two people and of opposing parties, and opposing interests in primaries.  The Courant is right on in their editorial covering the Haddam situation <read>

when town offices were closed for Veterans Day, head election moderator Marge DeBold, a Democrat, found a clerical error in the absentee vote count that added an additional vote to Ms. Houlton’s total. That extra vote would throw the results into a tie, which would require a runoff election. The following day, Democratic Registrar Pat Hess authorized Ms. DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and amend the recount.

But there were no Republicans present. That was wrong…

Mr. Harris, the initial winner of the recount, summed it up well: “The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

The Courant’s earlier coverage and our comments <read>  Coaliton reports documenting breaches in the chain of custody <read> The issue goes beyond a documented instance of two people from the same party accessing the ballots.  The issue includes the risks of single individuals having access to a single key needed to access the ballots – leaving them vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Absentee Ballots Can Be Decisive – yet Unaudited

“Before the absentee ballots were counted last week, Valle led with 266 votes tallied on the voting machines, and Martinez was second with 248 votes. In third place was Valle’s partner Christina Ayala with 245 votes and Manuel Ayala, who was running with Martinez, trailed with 223 votes. But after the absentee ballots were counted, Martinez emerged as the victor with 356 votes and Manuel Ayala, who received 106 absentee votes, leapt to second place slot.”

Story in ConnPost, Primary loser declines to challenge absentees, <read>

Before the absentee ballots were counted last week, Valle led with 266 votes tallied on the voting machines, and Martinez was second with 248 votes. In third place was Valle’s partner Christina Ayala with 245 votes and Manuel Ayala, who was running with Martinez, trailed with 223 votes.

But after the absentee ballots were counted, Martinez emerged as the victor with 356 votes and Manuel Ayala, who received 106 absentee votes, leapt to second place slot.

Valle, the only City Council candidate endorsed by the Working Families Party, said this week that she finds it unusual that so many absentee ballots were filed, but does not plan to challenge the primary results. “I’m not going to go there. November 3rd is another election. November 3rd is around the corner,” she said.

“I won at the polls,” Valle said of the voting machine totals. “For me, it says a lot. In regard to the ABs, time will tell,” she added, cryptically.

Still, Valle admitted she was concerned that voters might be confused by the third slate of candidates on the ballot and not realize that they can vote for her — regardless of what political party they belong to.

We point out several issues that this situation brings up:

  • Absentee ballots can be decisive.
  • Ballot layout is important.  Perhaps the location of the candidate or organization by party on ballots in Connecticut was the critical item.
  • Perhaps the Democratic Party or the endorsed candidates did a lot of work getting out the absentee vote.
  • As we and others have pointed out, there are many issues and risks with any type of mail-in voting, including absentee voting.
  • Finally, also as we have pointed out before, most absentee ballots are not subject  to the Connecticut Post-Election Audit Law – an opening for errors to go undetected and an opportunity for fraud.  And as we have learned from the Minnesota recount, just recounting absentee ballots is half the  job – the other half is reviewing and perhaps correcting the rejection and acceptance of absentee ballots.

Is Early Voting A Good Idea For Connecticut?

Connecticut (like the other New England states) is not Minnesota. Most states have county election management, while New England has town election management. We are concerned that it could be a costly, risky proposition. Here are our major reservations:

Last week, we highlighted a commentary by Minnesota Secretary of State, Mark Ritchie.  We mentioned our reservations with implementing one of his suggestions for improvement in Connecticut.  From Ritchie’s commentary:

Implementing early voting can greatly eliminate the number of people casting absentee ballots and thus reduce the number of rejected absentee ballots.

Connecticut (like the other New England states) is not Minnesota.  Most states have county election management, while New England has town election management.  At CTVotersCount we are conditionally against* early voting for Connecticut.   We are concerned that it could be a costly, risky proposition.  Here are our major reservations:

  • If  early voting polling places were set-up with a full complement of election officials using optical scanners and a strong chain of custody it could be reasonably safe.  That is a big and costly “if”.   Since we have 169 towns, each independently managing their own polling places – each would have to set-up and manage at least one polling place.  One would be enough since optical scanners can be setup to handle multiple ballot types, from multiple districts, such as they are now setup in many towns absentee ballot counting.  Three days of absentee voting would add about 60% to the current election day costs in the state,  putting a highly disproportionate burden on small towns.  (Officials frequently complain about the burden of post-election audits, which represent a fraction of the costs of opening 169 polling places for just one day).  Another risk/cost of consolidated early voting is that more care and more risk is involved to make sure voters are given the correct ballot and replacements for spoiled ballots.
  • Managing multiple days of voting and chain-of-custody provides additional opportunities for error or fraud, requiring additional procedures and vigilance.   Post-election Audit Observation Audit Reports from the Coalition have shown frequent violations of procedures, including chain-of-custody violations.  UConn Memory Card Audits have also show frequent failures in following current procedures.  We will remain skeptical that early voting can be secure, until there is a convincing change in following existing procedures.
  • We have heard proposals that Early Voting  could be accomplished by having a voting machine in the “corner” of the Registrar’s or Town Clerk’s office or by having an equivalent of an absentee ballot voted at the Registrar’s or Town Clerk’s office.  We find both of these ‘low budget’ options questionable.  One of the problems Mark Ritchie  is trying to solve for Minnesota with early voting, is decreasing the volume of absentee votes, which are costly and have a high frequency of disenfranchising voters.  Voters are disenfranchised primarily because they made an innocent mistake which disqualifies, for good reasons, their ballot from being counted.  Absentee voting also disenfranchises voters because they are not offered an opportunity to correct overvotes (unlike ballots submitted by the voter to a scanner).  There are also chain-of-custody issues. A scanner in the ‘corner” etc. is insufficient – voting requires a tabulator tender, registration list checkers, and ballot clerks – especially when there are several ballot types being voted in one place.  We tend to think of a few absentee ballots, but a more correct assumption is that a large percentage of voters will choose to vote early – their votes will provide the critical margin to many contests.
  • Finally, early voting shortens current deadlines and increases complexity.  Each day of early voting is another day earlier that candidates, ballots, and memory cards must be finalized and petitions completed.  Each day of early voting impacts primary dates and the time period between primaries and elections.  It extends the window and complexity if a candidate pulls out of a race or becomes incapacitated.

Elections are primarily about democracy – citizens choosing and controlling our government.  Voter convenience is a high priority along with security and integrity.  Cost and election official convenience are also important considerations.  While skeptical, we remain open to the possibility that voters, legislators, and election officials  might be willing to pay the price, develop procedures, and manage elections in a way that early voting with integrity would require.

(*) When we say we are “Conditionally Against” a proposition, we mean that nobody has proposed a realistic safe way to accomplish the proposition.  We remain open to the possibility that a means may be found that would pass the scrutiny of the majority of computer scientists, security experts, election officials, and voting integrity advocates.

(*) When we say we are “Conditionally For” a proposition, we mean that other states have safe implementations of the proposition or computer scientists, security experts, election officials, and voting integrity advocates have recommended a safe solution.  We caution that a particular implementation or law may not meet a reasonable standard of safety.

Courant: Iranians Sure Could Speed Up U.S. Voting System

CTVotersCount readers know we have often criticized Courant Editorials. In this case we are pleased to agree…

What we need to do in this country, I’m thinking, is to hire some Iranian election officials as consultants and see what they can do to speed up our own system.

Think about it:

We spend billions on high-tech voting machines.

CTVotersCount readers know we have often criticized Courant Editorials <e.g> <e.g> <e.g>.  In this case we are pleased to agree – that this appeared in an acknowledges humor column. <Jim Shea’s Full Article>

We we need is less hanging chads, more paper ballots, more counting as accurately as the do in Minnesota, and less frivolous challenges in the aftermath of accurate counting.

CT: 2009 Regular Session Legislative Roundup/Wrapup

This year, CTVotesCount supported several bills, opposed several bills, and took no positions on other bills related to elections and voting. The regular session ended at midnight June 3rd with a special session scheduled for later in June to address the budget and possibly some other issues. In this post we will provide updates on the status of bills of interest as we are made aware of their final status.

This year, CTVotesCount supported several bills, opposed several bills, and took no positions on other bills related to elections and voting.  The regular session ended at midnight June 3rd with a special session likely to be  scheduled for later in June to address the budget and possibly some other issues.  In this post we will provide  our understanding of the status of bills of interest.  There may be updates as we learn more.

Finding the actual status of bills can be a challenge.  Bills are often rewritten and introduced with a new bill number.  Some bills are extensively changed or completely rewritten by amendments.  In a few cases an amendment completely changes the intent and the subject of a bill, while the bill’s title cannot be changed!

Perhaps more challenging is determining the major reasons/cause of a bill’s demise without action by one or both houses of the legislature:  Did the legislature just run out of time, with the Committee Chair and Leadership prioritizing other bills?  Was there mild support or substantial opposition?  Would one house pass the bill and the other trash it?  Would a veto by the Governor be likely?  How would a veto be viewed by the public?  Or did the bill simply need more work to make in politically acceptable or workable in practice?  We will take some educated guesses.

General Comments on the 2009 Session:

In our limited experience, this year is typical of the last few years.  Many bills are introduced.  A substantial number receive committee hearings, followed by a smaller, yet still substantial number passing committees.  But, a small subset are ever introduced and debated in either the House or the Senate.  The structure of the system provides many opportunities for members to express support or opposition to bills along with many “reasons” for hard work and support to end with no results.  Many blame partisanship, leveling  charges at one side or the other:  Democrats are blamed for a “do noting” session and Republicans are seen as “obstructionist”.   However, the system providing extended debate, in a relatively small window, at the end of the legislative session, with an absolute deadline,  makes this all (or so little) possible.

Naturally, we are relieved when bills with concepts we generally oppose or bills that have unintended consequences are not enacted one way or another.  But we are equally disappointed when important issues and  bills do not receive the attention we believe is appropriate.

Bills:

H.B. 5226 AN ACT CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF POLLING PLACES FOR A PRIMARY.
Would have allowed towns to determine polling places for a primary, greatly reducing costs.  Passed the GAE Committee but never introduced in either house.

H.B. 5903 -AN ACT CONCERNING ABSENTEE VOTING FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS.
This bill would provide additional time and support for military voters to receive and return absentee ballots.  CTVotersCount and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz opposed the provisions in this bill that would have allowed risky voting via internet, fax, or email.  It was passed without discussion by the GAE Commitee, but later amended by Chairman Spallone to remove that objectionable provision.  According to the legislative web site it was not introduced for a vote in either house.

H.B. 6435 – AN ACT CONCERNING ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION AND PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT PROCEDURES.
CTVotersCount, the League of Women Voters, and Common Cause suported this bill.  It was later amended to contain risky provisions for associated ballot security.  The final version had an acceptable compromise treating associated ballots in a very similar manner to absentee ballots.  It passed the House but was never taken up in the Senate.  It was more likely than not to be vetoed by the Governor.  However, it faced perhaps an even chance for a veto to be overriden.

H.B. 6437 – AN ACT CONCERNING AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE.
This bill would support the National Popular Vote Compact providing a back-door way for the popular election of the President.  While sounding attractive it has serious unintended consequences.  The bill was generally supported by Democrats and opposed by Republicans.  CTVotersCount and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz opposed the Agreement.  In early May, it squeaked by the House.   Our reading is that it has luke warm support in the Senate and might not have passed there – it then would have faced an all but guaranteed veto, with no chance of override.

H.B. 6440 – AN ACT CONCERNING CERTAIN REVISIONS TO ELECTIONS RELATED STATUTES.
This was a so called “technical bill” requested by the Secretary of the State that would have made several minor changes in the election statutes, primarily changing details of wording and substance from lever “machines” to optical scan “tabulators”.   Several groups opposed changes to loosen absentee ballot application distribution requirements – these provisions were removed.  CTVotersCount opposed changes in the audit law that would have weakened the audit coverage of races; opposed provisons that would weaken the randomness of the audit while disproportionately adding audit costs to small and medium sized towns.  We supported a provison to mandate completion of the audits within 10 business days of the election, replacing current provisions which mandate audits do not begin until 15 days after the election.  A beneficial provision was added which would have provided for enforcement of audit procedures issued by the Secretary of the State.  This bill passed the House on 5/21, but according to the legislative web site it was not introduced for a vote in the Senate.   Overall we have mixed feelings on the bill given the plusses and minuses.  We are surprised it was not passed by both houses by consent.

H.B. 6441 – AN ACT CONCERNING CONFIDENCE IN THE CONNECTICUT ELECTION SYSTEM.
Proposed and supported by CTVotersCount, this bill would have gone a long way to improve the integrity and efficiency of post-election audits, election results accounting, and the chain-of-custody in Connecticut. It would have closed many of the gaps identified by the Coaltion at negligible cost. We appreciate the support of our Senator and Representative (Handley and Kehoe) in initiating action.  We appreciate the introduction and hearings on the bill initiated by GAE Chair Spallone.  Unfortunately, the committee did not place a priority on the bill in this session.  Our intentions are to continue to draw attention to the inadequacy of the current law, to  propose an even more attractive bill next year, and to gather wider support.

H.J 113 – RESOLUTION AMENDING THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW EARLY VOTING. (And No Excuse Absentee Voting)
CTVotersCount is conditionally opposed to the expansion of absentee voting and early voting.  There are integrity, security, and franchise concerns which need to be addressed.   We do not have or see solutions to these concerns for scientific and practical reasons.   This bill passed the GAE Committee but was not taken up by either house.

S.B. 909 – AN ACT CONCERNING TECHNICAL CHANGES TO ELECTION LAWS.
Supported by CTVotersCount. Technical changes proposed by the Secretary of the State’s Office.  Passed by the GAE Commitee.  Provisions largely rolled into an amendment to H.B. 6440 (see the discussion above on that bill)

S.B. 913 – AN ACT CONCERNING UNITED STATES SENATE VACANCIES
This bill would  replace appointment of U.S. Senate vacancies by the Governor with an election.  Was passed by the Senate and House.  The Governor is expected to veto the bill.  A veto override is likely. <Courant>  < CT News Junkie>

S.J. 43 – RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION CONCERNING VOTING BY ABSENTEE BALLOT.
Passed the GAE Commitee, never taken up by either house.  Provisons seem to have been rolled into H.J. 113 (see discussion under that bill above)

Act Now! – Oppose H.B. 5903 – Protect Soldiers’ Votes

The Government Administration and Elections Committee (GAE) has passed a bill that will threaten the security and privacy of military absentee votes, H.B. 5903. And it could be expensive!

It sounds good but, in addition to CTVotersCount, it is opposed by computer scientists, TrueVoteCT members, and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz.

The Government Administration and Elections Committee (GAE) has passed a bill that will threaten the security and privacy of military absentee votes, H.B. 5903

And it could be expensive!

It sounds good but, in addition to CTVotersCount, it is opposed by computer scientists, TrueVoteCT members, and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz.

NOW is a critical time. The bill will soon be before the full CT House and Senate.

Call or email your State Senator and Representative NOW. Tell them you want to preserve the security and privacy of military votes.

Find your CT Senator and Representative: http://www.cga.ct.gov/maps/Townlist.asp

From the testimony of Susan Bysiewicz,Secretary of the State

This bill serves a noble purpose…After repeated attempts to initiate a secure online voting system, members of the original DOD peer review panel found a number of security risks. Further, I their June 2007 elections report, the United States Government Accountability Office stated that the federal government has not yet developed sufficient absentee voting guidelines for this kind of use.

Until an internet system is designed to safeguard against security risks, I have proposed extending the timeframe by which military personnel can obtain a blank ballot from 90 days before the election to the first business [sic] of the calendar year of the election. In addition, I propose that Connecticut allow the electronic transmission of absentee ballot applications and blank ballots. These simple steps would greatly extend voting opportunities for members of the Armed Forces without posing additional security risks.

Here is the bill: <read>

What are the problems with H.B. 5903?

  • It will threaten the privacy and security of soldiers’ votes.
  • Any threat to the private vote threatens everyone’s votes and Democracy.
  • It may be costly, perhaps several million $ in start-up costs and $500 per vote cast.

There has been a strong coordinated move to pass such bills in many legislatures across the country. So far few states have been taken in. However, in Connecticut this bill passed the Government Elections and Administration Committee without discussion, unanimously. We assume, because it sounds good and has the claim of helping our military.

Even though the Office of Fiscal Analysis says it will have no costs to the State or municipalities, it is hard to believe that the Secretary of the State could create regulations to accomplishes this without a great deal of expensive research and implementation costs, when computer scientists are skeptical that it is possible and believe it is risky to military voters and the rest of us as well. Vendors are proposing accomplishing this in other states at great costs such as $4,000,000 start-tup costs and $100,000 per county annually.

Connecticut has a problem with facilitating overseas military voting, however, Minnesota has already solved the same problems we have without resorting to the unnecessary risks and costs of this bill. In fact, the improvements in Minnesota have been cited by a veterans group: <read>

Here is the Technologists’ Statement On Internet Voting: <read>

Soldiers’ Votes and Democracy At Risk In CT

Despite opposition by the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, TrueVoteCT members, CTVoters Count, and the League of Women Voters, HB-5903 was as voted out of the General Administration and Elections Committee unanimously today. The bill will allow members of the military to submit absentee votes electronically.

This not a wild theoretical concern: Ironically, CNN has just reported that the Chinese or others have software they have used to infiltrate critical computers around the world

Despite opposition in testimony by the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, TrueVoteCT members, CTVoters Count, and the League of Women Voters,  HB-5903 was as voted out of the General Administration and Elections Committee unanimously today.  The bill will allow members of the military to submit absentee votes electronically. <testimony>  Our testimony was not listed under the bill but is available online at <CTVotersCount Testimony>.  As covered by the Secretary of the State, the Department of Defense and Goverment Accountability Office have concerns with the security of internet voting.  Our testimony referenced the Technologists Statement On Internet Voting.

Because of the increasing frequency of proposals to allow remote voting over the internet, we believe it is necessary to warn policymakers and the public that secure internet voting is a very hard technical problem, and that we should proceed with internet voting schemes only after thorough consideration of the technical and non-technical issues in doing so.

Here is the critical text from the bill:

28        (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,

29   the Secretary of the State shall work in conjunction with the Sta te

30    Elections Enforcement Commission and the United States Department

31    of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program to ensure that any

32    absent uniformed services voter, as defined in 42 USC 1973ff-6, may

33    utilize a secure electronic transmission system for the transmittal of: (1)

34    The federal postcard application form provided for pursuant to the

35    Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924,

36    42 USC 1973ff et seq., as amended from time to time, and (2) any

37    absentee ballot issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section or

38    section 9-140.

39      (c) The Secretary of the State, in consultation with the State Elections

40    Enforcement Commission and the Office of Military Affairs shall adopt

41    regulations,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  chapter  54,  to

42   implement  the  provisions  of  subsection  (b)  of  this  section.  Such

43    regulations, at a minimum, shall provide that an absent uniformed

44    services voter shall not be required to submit a paper absentee ballot in

45    addition to the electronic submission of such a ballot pursuant to

46    subsection (b) of this section.

Putting soldiers’ votes at risk threatens us and democracy as well.  The election results and our democracy depend on the privacy, security, and accuracy of every vote.

This not a wild theoretical concern: Ironically,  CNN has just reported that the Chinese or others have software they have used to infiltrate critical computers around the world: <read>

One report was issued by the University of Toronto’s Munk Center for International Studies in conjunction with the Ottawa, Canada-based think tank The SecDev Group; the second came from the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory.

Researchers have dubbed the cyber-espionage network GhostNet. The network can not only search a computer but see and hear the people using it, according to the Canadian report.

“GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers, including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including microphones and web cameras,” the report says.

Hardly reassuring is that it might not be the Chinese Government, but could in the future be citizen hackers, the U.S. Military itself or Israel:

“Chinese cyber espionage is a major global concern… (b)ut attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by the Chinese state is wrong and misleading,” says the Canadian report, titled, “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network.”

“The sheer number of young digital natives online can more than account for the increase in Chinese malware,” it adds.

But the report also points out that China is among a handful of countries, also including the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom, which are “assumed” to have considerable cyber-espionage capabilities