CT Law | CTVotersCount.org

“Does your vote count?” Glastonbury MLK Conversation

Last Wednesday evening, I was one of five speakers and a moderator at a Community Conversation held by the Glastonbury Martin Luther King Community Initiative. There were about 60 to 75 in attendance. We addressed “Does your vote count? An examination of the Issues” I addressed issues in two areas: How could you know if your vote was counted? And what I would recommend to expand democracy in Connecticut, without risking election integrity. Here are my prepared remarks:

Last Wednesday evening, I was one of five speakers and a moderator at a Community Conversation held by the Glastonbury Martin Luther King Community Initiative. There were about 60 to 75 in attendance. We addressed “Does your vote count? An examination of the issues.” I addressed issues in two areas: How could you know if your vote was counted? And what I would recommend to expand democracy in Connecticut, without risking election integrity. Here are my prepared remarks <read>

Some excerpts:

I tend not to agree with anyone 100% of the time. I view voting through a lens of balancing three priorities

Voting Integrity, that is Justified Confidence

Engaging more people in Democracy

The costs of Elections

To me, Justified Confidence is the highest priority, followed by a balance between increasing voter engagement and cost.

Let’s talk voting integrity. Said another way “Does your vote count?” The problem is that you and I cannot answer that question. The systems we have, by intention or not, prevent us from answering that question…

For Democracy to function, citizens must have JUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE in elections — elections providing strong evidence that the correct winner was declared.

The 2016 elections surfaced two election integrity questions in the minds of many citizens:

First, Did the Russians hack our election systems? That is distinct from did they influence our elections?

Second, Were the winners of the Primaries and Election accurately determined?

There is a lack of confidence in the system. There are legitimate, yet often exaggerated questions of integrity.

It is especially important that losers believe they lost fair and square.

There is excessive emphasis on Russian hacking, ignoring other risks. And a myriad of other cyber-attacks are just a part of the risks…

There is too much emphasis on cyber-attack by outsiders. The greater risk is INSIDER ATTACK. Insider attack is easier and likely more frequent – air-gaps cannot prevent insider attack – there is motive, opportunity, and the ability to cover-up…

Fortunately. there are remedies to these risks and lack of credibility. They come down to TRANSPARENT, PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE ELECTIONS. That is elections where every critical aspect CAN be verified by citizens, candidates, and parties.

“Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence.”…

We need to open-up the system to candidates.

I would enhance our Citizen’s Election Program.

We should reduce prohibitive signature and finance requirements for third-party and petitioning candidates.

We have a crazy law that prevents the posting of the list of Write-In Candidates in polling places. Posting the list should be mandatory…

The evidence is not that Millennials avoid voting because it’s inconvenient. They avoid it because they don’t have enough information about voting and candidates.

We need to change our archaic lever-look ballot layout. I am tired of consoling voters who missed the question on the ballot.

We need better voting web sites in Connecticut’s towns, many lack critical information, some have incorrect information.

We have Election Day Registration, yet it is the most difficult, and restrictive in the Nation. That would remedy many of the errors that cause voters to be unintentionally not registered or removed from the roles…

I am an election official, a Certified Moderator. I ran our Glastonbury Academy polling place in the 2016 presidential primary. That day changed me.

Let’s at least allow unaffiliated voters to vote in the primary. I saw many voters who did not understand the system and could not vote. They were not party regulars, they were first time voters or those that had not voted in years. I was moved that very few were upset that they could not vote. That bothers me. We may never see them attempting to participate in democracy again.

Finally, Two things you can do to help – two days for each election.

First, volunteer one weekday observing a post-election audit with the Citizen Audit.

Second, Invest a day as an election official at your local polling place.

I guarantee you will learn a lot. Let us work together, to create a flourishing democracy we can trust.

************Update 2/29/2018

Courant coverage: Does Your Vote Count <read>

Note one small misquote:

“First, did the Russians hack our election systems? Second, were the winners of the primary elections actually determined?” [Weeks] said.

That ‘actually’ should be ‘accurately’ !

Danbury Officials did not follow the law in case diseased candidate

The failure to remove Mr. Seabury’s name, either by having the ballots reprinted with the name of the replacement candidate, having stickers with the replacement candidate’s name placed on the ballots or, in the event no replacement has been nominated, “(C)caus[ing] blank stickers to be so affixed if the vacancy is not filled,” is in direct violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-460 (adding emphasis).

Our Opinion: We understand that diseased candidate Seabury was not elected, likely leaving the Democrats with no reason to go to court. Yet, the Registrars deserve an SEEC complaint and large fines for blatantly failing to follow the law.

From the Hat City Blog: Danbury Democrats threaten legal action over Seabury controversy <read>

Dear Mrs. Giegler, Mrs. Gallo and Ms. Doran: I am saddened by the recent passing of City Councilman Gregg Seabury. Gregg was a valued public servant and educator. Gregg’s passing is a loss for his family and the City of Danbury as a whole. My respect for Gregg makes me regret the need to draft this correspondence. Unfortunately, I believe it is necessary to make certain facts regarding Mr. Seabury’s presence on the Election Day ballot and the effect of his passing absolutely clear.

First, the law is well established that Conn. Gen. Stat § 9-460 governs what is to occur when a candidate passes less than twenty-four days but more than twenty-four hours before the opening of the polls on Election Day. Specifically, the statute permits the party who nominated the candidate to nominate a replacement candidate. Critically the statute does not allow, as is the law in some states, the candidate to remain on the ballot.

f passing occurred on a Saturday is of no legal moment and any claim to the contrary is simply not premised upon the law.Mr. Seabury’s passing, less than twenty-four days but more than twenty-four hours before the opening of the polls, created a vacant nomination. See, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-460 which clearly holds that in such circumstances the candidate may be replaced or his name removed from the ballot. The statute does not permit the name to remain on the ballot as I understand is intended.

The failure to remove Mr. Seabury’s name, either by having the ballots reprinted with the name of the replacement candidate, having stickers with the replacement candidate’s name placed on the ballots or, in the event no replacement has been nominated, “(C)caus[ing] blank stickers to be so affixed if the vacancy is not filled,” is in direct violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-460 (adding emphasis).

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill seems to agree:

“This is an emotional time and Secretary Merrill and the staff of her office have deep sympathy for the friends and family of Councilman Seabury.

Early yesterday afternoon, lawyers from the Secretary of the State’s office informed Danbury’s local election officials of the law regarding replacing a deceased candidate on the ballot. Connecticut law in this case is clear, and there is no basis in law to allow Gregg Seabury’s name to remain on the ballot, or to treat this situation as if there is a vacancy in office.

It is of great concern to read news reports this morning that Danbury officials have apparently decided to ignore the clear requirements of Connecticut law. It is the position of this office that all local election officials should follow the law as written.”

– Gabe Rosenberg, Communications Director for Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill

We respond to Secretary Merrill’s testimony opposing audit transparency bill

Last Monday we testified for S.B. 540, a bill that would increase audit transparency and public verifiability.

Later we noticed that Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, submitted testimony opposing one provision of the bill and therefor recommending against the entire bill. Her testimony misinterpreted our bill, recommending against it based on something we did not ask for and was not part of the bill.

In response we wrote a follow-up letter to the GAE Committee.

Last Monday we testified for S.B. 540, a bill that would increase audit transparency and public verifiability. The bill would:

Set common sense minimal standards for ballot security.
Set common sense prior public notice requirements for all aspects of the audits which should be transparent and publicly verifiable.
Based on sound science, make the recently implemented machine audits, manually verifiable, transparent, and publicly verifiable.

Our testimony <read>

Later we noticed that Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, submitted testimony opposing one provision of the bill and therefor recommending against the entire bill. Her testimony <read>

Her testimony misinterpreted our bill, recommending against it based on something we did not ask for and was not part of the bill:

My main objection is that it potentially jeopardizes the sanctity of ballot secrecy. Some people do initial or sign a ballot if a mistake is made. In smaller towns, deducing identity from these details is actually possible.

Creating images of ballots that anyone can take home and study could result in people’s ballots being posted online, something that we are already contending with vis-à-vis the voter file.

She went on to suggest a solution similar to the one actually proposed in the bill.

If there is public uncertainty about our new audit equipment or there is a desire to “audit the audit equipment”there areless intrusive ways to ensure accurate results such as a random sampling of ballots that can be compared to computerized result s while at the audit session. These types of simple solutions could be implemented at no cost and with much less intrusion to the sanctity of our voted ballots.

In response we wrote a follow-up letter to the GAE Committee. Our letter <read>

The Secretary’s testimony incorrectly stated that the S.B. 540 requires the posting of ballot images online. In fact, S.B. 540 bill does not require the release of ballot images to the public and does not require the posting of ballot images online.

S.B. 540 requires the release of Cast Vote Records (CVRs) to the public present at a machine audit, with no requirement for online posting. CVRs are not ballot images. They do not include stray marks by voters. They are data records, one record for each ballot that contains the digital interpretation of the votes on the ballot i.e. numbers indicating which bubbles on the ballot were filled in. They are totaled to determine the votes for each candidate or question in the audit

In the paper included in my testimony, CVRs are described:

“In a machine-assisted audit, the retabulation system produces an interpretation of votes on each ballot (a Cast Vote Record, or CVR) that can be matched with that ballot. The CVRs are exported from the retabulation system. Observers verify that these exported CVRs produce the same electoral outcome(winners, etc.) as the voting system. Then observers compare a random sample of actual ballots against the corresponding CVRs.”

There is no law in Connecticut exempting CVRs from the Freedom of Information Act. A quick survey of election officials and advocates indicates that CVRs for entire elections or audits are regularly provided to requesters in the states of AZ, NY, CO and SC. In SC, they are published online.

In addition to correcting the her misinterpretation, we also pointed out our stand that voted ballots are, in fact, subject to Freedom Of Information requests in Connecticut.

PS: Although it is irrelevant to S.B. 540 we disagree with the Secretary’s interpretation that voted ballots or ballot images are exempt from Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act (FOI). We are not aware of an explicit exemption in Connecticut statutes. To our knowledge, FOI of ballots has never been tested before the FOI Commission or in court. We are aware of several states where allots and ballot images are subject to FOI.

Testimony on several bills, including the National Popular Vote Compact

Yesterday, we testified on several bills, submitting three packages of written testimony. Most of the bills were proposals for the National Popular Vote Compact. We half agree with those testifying for the Compact and half disagree. We would be in favor of a National Popular Vote with a sufficient Constitutional Amendment. We oppose the Compact. Its misfit with our presidential election laws portent chaos.

We also testified against two partisan changes to the presidential election <Proportional Electors>

We testified in favor of needed changes to the Election Day Registration law. We have long argued that the 8:00pm cutoff is a civil rights violation waiting to happen . Although it happened in New Haven in 2014, it apparently happened all over the state in 2016. Secretary Merrill received much criticism in the hearing for her past opposition and proclamations keeping the cutoff in place. <EDR and Civil Rights>

Lessons from the “recount”. What would have happened here?

The Nation, hopefully, learned some lessons about our existing “recounts” after the November Election. We learned some disappointing lessons in three states. We likely would have learned similar lessons in the other states that have recounts. Remember that only about half the states have recounts at all. What might we have learned about Connecticut’s recanvasses?

We recommend three articles and comment on Connecticut’s recanvasses.

Our best guess is that Connecticut would rank close to Pennsylvania. Observed variations and poor recanvass procedures, with courts sooner or later. stopping or blocking the recanvass.

We recommend three articles and comment on Connecticut’s recanvasses.

From the Washington Post: Jill Stein has done the nation a tremendous public service <read>

To start, we must recognize that what we saw in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania were recounts in name only. Though more than 161,000 people across the nation donated to the effort — and millions more demanded it with their voices — every imaginable financial, legal and political obstacle was thrown in the way of the recounts…

n an election tarnished by unreliable, insecure and unverifiable voting machines, ordinary Americans should at least be able to make sure their votes are counted, especially in states with razor-thin margins.

Beyond the obstacles to the recounts themselves were the irregularities and anomalies we uncovered while counting. The recounts did not confirm the integrity or security of our voting system; they revealed its vulnerability…

During the course of our representation, we consulted some of the world’s leading experts in computer science and cybersecurity. They all agreed on two fundamental points: First, much of our voting machinery is antiquated, faulty and highly vulnerable to breach; second, it would be irresponsible not to verify the accuracy of the vote to the greatest extent possible…

The campaign to verify the vote should be nonpartisan. Stein has done the nation a real service in demanding these recounts. By refusing to surrender in the face of significant resistance and criticism, she has exposed problems in our voting system and shown a way forward for reforms that will protect our democracy in a new age of vulnerability.

From the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Candice Hoke compares Pennsylvania to Ohio: Pennsylvania’s voting system is one of the worst <read>

State officials don’t know if our elections have been hacked, and they don’t seem to care

…Experts in election technology have pointed out that most Pennsylvania counties — including Allegheny — use e-voting systems that have been outlawed by most states. The chief reason? The omission of voter-approved paper printouts that can be recounted and that allow for audits to check on the accuracy of the electronic machines. Even when voting systems are aged and vulnerable to hacking or tampering, durable paper ballots combined with quality-assurance audits can ensure trustworthy results.

Cuyahoga County [Ohio]election officials, like many around the nation, have learned that, even though their voting machines are certified and function perfectly one day, on another day they may fail to count accurately. Software bugs — especially from updates, malware and errors in programming — can lead to unpredictable inaccuracies. Cuyahoga County now conducts an audit after every election, using paper ballots, which most Pennsylvania counties are unable to do.

Paper ballots plus audits assure voters their choices have been accurately registered and that no partisan tampering, hacking or software glitches have affected the results of an election. Election officials can evaluate the accuracy of electronic voting systems and correct any tabulation problems. And no adversary — not even a foreign nation with sophisticated espionage capabilities — can manipulate elections results with e-invasions…

Unfortunately, Pennsylvania does not provide any of these assurances to voters, candidates, political parties or the nation. Instead, Pennsylvania law mandates little transparency or accountability when it comes to its computer-generated election tallies — something no business organization would tolerate in its information systems…

And yet, in Pennsylvania those officials close off all avenues by which forensic checks for evidence of tampering or miscounts could occur, then claim that no such evidence exists and that therefore Pennsylvania election systems are secure and accurate. This is utter nonsense. And it defies core principles of cyber risk management.

From a losing State Senate candidate in Colorado: Despite Jill Stein, Election Integrity Should Not Be A Partisan Issue <read>

The recount in Wisconsin financed by two losing candidates, Jill Stein and Hillary Clinton, was a total farce, but hopefully it will not also become a tragedy. That could happen if the partisan motivation behind that episode gives election integrity concerns and complaints a bad name…

I have seen some of those weaknesses and vulnerabilities up close and personal. In Colorado on November 8, I lost my own race for re-election to the Colorado State Senate by 1,478 votes out of 81,774 ballots cast, or less than 2%. Our Republican judges and poll watchers observed numerous irregularities, and we can prove some fraudulent votes were cast. I did not demand a recount because the errors and fraud do not appear to be on a large enough scale to affect the outcome. Nonetheless, those weaknesses leave me with less than 100% confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the final count.

If there were 270 Republican ballots with questionable signatures, and Republicans are only 34% of registered voters, that means there were probably over 800 ballots with questionable signatures in that one legislative district alone. The Colorado Voter Group, a watchdog organization promoting election security, believes our signature verification system is inadequate and wide open to abuse.

What if Connecticut was one of the close states?

In summary, we don’t know exactly what would happen.

Unlike other states, Connecticut has no law for citizens to call for a recount. They could always go to court and attempt with evidence to get a judge to order a recount. That would likely end up in appeals court and likely the Supreme Court.
Unlike other states, we do not have a recount – the word does not appear in our statutes. We have a recanvass which is something like a machine recount.
Our close-vote recanvass is at the 0.5% margin typical in other states. Yet is limited to margins of under 2000 votes. So in this past November election by our calculatinsthat would be a margin of about 0.12%.
Unlike recounts in other states, our recanvasses are not closely observable by the general public. The law is a bit ambiguous, yet there are only a very limited number of observers allowed to each candidate and party, at most two each. So, a town could easily have a recanvass with twenty-five teams of counters, with a Jill Stein, Hillary Clintion, and Donald Trump limited to two close observers each. Hardly enough to closely observe ballots marks counted at 25 tables.
Unlike recounts in other states, parties and candidates have no standing to object to the proceedings or to participate and dispute the counting of particular ballots. In practice party lawyers observe the process to find procedural errors to take to court and call for a “recount”. The last time that happened, the result was a repeat recanvass, with a party lawyer put in charge (it was a primary). The only difference was that he sat and watched while essentially the same process was repeated.
In practice, the recanvasses vary in their interpretation and adherence to the law from town to town. Recall that was one of the Supreme Court’s objection to the Florida recount in Gore v. Bush – that it was unfair, because it was not uniform across Florida Counties.

Our best guess is that Connecticut would rank close to Pennsylvania. Observed variations and poor recanvass procedures, with courts sooner or later. stopping or blocking the recanvass.

Is our election hackable or not?

We hear from Richard Clarke, President Obama, Pam Smith, and Secretary of the State Denise Merrill. We annotate Denise Merrill’s recent press conference.

Richard Clark, former White House senior cybersecurity policy adviser via ABC News: Yes, It’s Possible to Hack the Election <read>

Those experiences confirm my belief that if sophisticated hackers want to get into any computer or electronic device, even one that is not connected to the internet, they can do so. The U.S., according to media reports, hacked in to the Iranian nuclear centrifuge control system even though the entire system was air-gapped from the internet. The Russians, according to authoritative accounts, hacked into the Pentagon’s SIPRNet, a secret-level system separate from the internet. North Koreans, computer forensics experts have told me, penetrated SWIFT, the international banking exchange system. Iranians allegedly wiped clean all software on over 30,000 devices in the Aramco oil company. The White House, the State Department and your local fast food joint have all been hacked. Need I go on?…

Some systems produce a paper ballot of record, but that paper is kept only for a recount; votes are recorded by a machine such as an optical scanner and then stored as electronic digits. The counting of the paper ballots of record — when there are such things — is exceedingly rare and is almost never done for verification in the absence of a recount demand.

President Obama via NPR: President Obama: The Election Will Not Be ‘Rigged’ <read>

“Of course the election will not be rigged! What does that mean?” Obama said at a news conference at the Pentagon. “That’s ridiculous. That doesn’t make any sense.”

The president added Americans should not take Trump’s musings on this seriously. “We do take seriously, as we always do,” the president said, “our responsibilities to monitor and preserve the integrity of the voting process.”

Pam Smith, Verified Voting via NPR: Hacking An Election: Why It’s Not As Far-Fetched As You Might Think <read>

“Wherever there’s a fully electronic voting system, there’s potential for tampering of some kind,” said Pamela Smith, president of Verified Voting. She says her nonprofit group has been warning about such tampering for years.

Smith says the Democratic Party hacks are another red flag that someone might try to interfere with election results, and that there are many ways to do that.

“If you can get at an election management system, you could potentially alter results, or muddy up the results, or you could even just shed doubt on the outcome because you make it clear that there’s been tampering,” she says.

Denise Merrill, Connecticut Secretary of the State and President of the National Association of Secretaries of State, press conference as reported by CTNewsJunkie: Merrill Defends Integrity of Connecticut’s Voting System <read> With our annotations in [brackets]

I think it’s highly improbable at best that a national system of elections could be hacked. First of all there is no national system of elections,” Merrill, who is president of the National Association of Secretaries of State said Wednesday. “Our election system is extremely decentralized.” [This is a strawman. It does not take a national hack. In a close election hacking just one or two swing states could do the job. In fact, just a couple of polling places the winner of the Electoral College could have been changed either way in Florida alone. A single state could have made the difference in 2004 and 1960. ]

She said there is no credible cyber security threat. [This is just plain false in the light of all the know hacks of government, election, and corporate hacks. Perhaps it is taken out of context.]

In Connecticut there is no county government, so there are 169 towns who are all in charge of running the election and none of them are connected to the Internet. [All of them are connected to the Internet. Especially to the Central Voter Registration System, critical on election day for 5% to 10% of the vote. Also for the new end of day Election Night Reporting System. I applaud the Secretary for continuing to follow the recommendations of UConn implemented by the Bysiewicz administration to keep the voting machines from the Internet. Unfortunately that does not guarantee security. a) See the Stuxnet attack, it attacked Iran’s nuclear centrifuges which were isolated from the Internet. b) It is easy for single insider to hack the voting machines in a single town. Sadly, officials in each of 169 towns cannot approach the levels of security of Military, Government, or Corporate installations, all of which have been hacked by insiders and outsiders.]

“The idea that somehow there could be some national system hack is very unlikely,” Merrill said. [I agree, yet it is a strawman argument]

She said different states are using different kinds of election equipment, but Connecticut is using optical scan machines, which are not connected to the Internet.

Alexander Schwarzmann, head of the University of Connecticut’s Voter Technology Research Center, said there is no possible way to connect the optical scan voting machines to the Internet.

He said Connecticut’s optical scan machines also rely on a paper ballot so those can be counted independently of technology. [As we have said many times, it depends on who wants to look. Go to your town hall and ask to see and count the ballots.]

Merrill said there’s been a lot of pressure on the state to go to some type of Internet voting, but she has resisted. The state purchased the optical scan machines about 10 years ago and have developed an auditing process for the memory cards that are inserted into the machines…[As we have told the Secretary and others several times, defending against Internet voting has been her finest hour!]

Peggy Reeves, director of elections, said most of the mistakes made in elections can be attributed to “human error.” [Unfortunately, too often the SOTS Office and registrars assume that any differences in a post-election audit, without investigation, actually are human error in machine counts. Sometimes the scanners have counted incorrectly in Connecticut, sometimes local official pursue the problem and determine it was not human error in the hand count, but human error in the election process that lead to an incorrect count being certified for the election. Hacking, fraud, machine error, or errors in the process all must be investigated, resolved, and prevented in the future. ]

Merrill said she wanted to sit down with the media Wednesday to “reassure the voters” that Connecticut’s voting system is secure. [Overconfidence is a standard concern of security professionals as an indicator of security risk.]

As far as fraud is concerned, Merrill said the concern in Connecticut is whether people are appropriately filing absentee ballots. She said the law says a person must be absent from the state or unable to get to the polls from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. [We agree absentee voting fraud should be a concern. That is why we warn against all -mail voting, and no-excuse absentee voting.]

Also a Courant article covering the same press conference: <read>

…during a demonstration in Merrill’s office, Peggy Reeves, the state director of elections, showed how the machine is locked with a tamper-proof seal. The UConn Center for Voting Technology Research tests the memory cards the machines use before and after each election.

As we said in our comment on the article:

To be clear CT does not use “Tamper Proof” anything tape or seals. They are called “Tamper Evident”. What that means is that if officials follow good seal protocols and the seals are actually “tamper evident” as applied then officials should be able to detect if they have been tampered with.

Connecticut does not have, as far as I know, any such protocols. Many apply the seals in ways that could easily be compromised. NJ tried six times to create effective seal protocols and failed each time. Finally, seals are designed to prevent outsiders from tampering without detection by insiders. It would be much more difficult for seals to protect against insider access.

Also the Secretary of the State on Where We Live: <Listen>

We called in and discussed the Election Performance Index, areas it does not cover, and the cyber risks to our Election Day Registration System. The Secretary stated that we “Audit all voting machines”. That is incorrect. We audit 5% of polling place voting machines (until July 1st we audited 10%), never audit central count absentee ballot systems, and the audit, as conducted, is insufficient to provide the credibility Connecticut voters deserve. <See the observation reports at the Citizen Audit>

Report: Secret Ballot At Risk

A new report from the Electronic Privacy Information Center, articulates some of the risks of losing the the Secret Ballot: Secret Ballot At Risk: Recommendations for Protecting Democracy <Exec Summary> <Report>

We recommend reading the Executive Summary and at least the section of the report covering the history of and the need for the secret ballot, pages 4-9 and the section for your state, e.g. Connecticut pages 54-55.

Our only criticism is that the report does not cover the risks to the secret ballot and democracy posed by photos, most often seen in selfies of voters with the voted ballot taken in the voting booth. Nor does it cover the risks to the secret ballot posed by absentee voting.

From the Executive Summary:

The right to cast a secret ballot in a public election is a core value in the United States’ system of self-governance. Secrecy and privacy in elections guard against coercion and are essential to integrity in the electoral process. Secrecy of the ballot is guaranteed in state constitutions and statutes nationwide. However, as states permit the marking and transmitting of marked ballots over the Internet, the right to a secret ballot is eroded and the integrity of our elections is put at risk…

Our findings show that the vast majority of states (44) have constitutional provisions guaranteeing secrecy in voting, while the remaining states have statutory provisions referencing secrecy in voting. Despite that, 32 states allow some voters to transmit their ballots via the Internet which, given the limitations of current technology, eliminates the secrecy of the ballot. Twenty-eight of these states require the voter to sign a waiver of his or her right to a secret ballot. The remainder fail to acknowledge the issue.

From the Report:

The secret ballot reduces the threat of coercion, vote buying and selling, and tampering. For individual voters, it provides the ability to exercise their right to vote without intimidation or retaliation. The secret ballot is a cornerstone of modern democracies. Prior to the adoption of the secret ballot in the United States in the late 19th century, coercion was common place. It was particularly strong in the military…

The establishment of the secret ballot helped prevent that type of coercion in the military. It also changed coercive practices in the workplace. But has our society evolved so much that we no longer need the secret ballot?

The answer is, simply, no. The secret ballot also protects individuals from harassment as a result of their vote. In February 2009, The New York Times reported that “some donors to groups supporting [California’s “Proposition 8” re: same-sex marriage] have received death threats and envelopes containing a powdery white substance, and their businesses have been boycotted.” The Times reported that a website called “eightmaps.com” collected names and ZIP codes of people who donated to the ballot measure and overlaid the data on a map, contributing to the harassment and threats of violence.

Further, employer-employee political coercion is alive and well in the United States. A recent article in The American Prospectdocumented a number of instances of political coercion in the workplace, including:

An Ohio coal mining company required its workers to attend
a Presidential candidate’s rally – and did not pay them for their time.

Executives at Georgia-Pacific, a subsidiary of Koch Industries which employs approximately 35,000 people, distributed a flyer and a letter indicating which candidates the firm endorsed. “The letters warned that workers might ‘suffer the consequences’ if the company’s favored candidates were not elected.”

Thanks to the secret ballot, employers cannot lawfully go so far as to “check” on how an employee actually voted. But if ballots were no longer secret, many employees would risk losing their jobs if they voted against the recommendations of management. Our democracy would no longer be free and fair. Our need for privacy protections is just as strong today as it was when the secret ballot was adopted

Connecticut Constitution and statutes:

Constitutional provision re: right to secret ballot Conn. Const. Art. 6 § 5
In all elections of officers of the state, or members of the general assembly, the votes of the electors shall be by ballot, either written or printed, except that voting machines or other mechanical devices for voting may be used in all elections in the state, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. No voting machine or device used at any state or local election shall be equipped with a straight ticket device. The right of secret voting shall be preserved

”’

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-366
Any person who […]does any act which invades or interferes with the secrecy of the voting
or causes the same to be invaded or interfered with, shall be guilty of a class D felony.

…

Testimony on Four Bills

This year we testified on four bills before the legislature. We supported two bills, and for a change opposed none. For the two we neither supported nor opposed,, we proposed changes to the same sections of the law addressed by the bills.

This year we testified on four bills before the legislature. We supported two bills, and for a change opposed none. For the two we neither supported nor opposed, we proposed changes to the same sections of the law addressed by the bills.

A bill we proposed, S.B. 252 would strengthen the current post-election audits, while adopting changes long sought by the Registrars of Voters Association Connecticut (ROVAC). It would also require that the electronic audits approved last year be publicly verifiable – without public verification we would simply be adding unverifiable “Black Box” auditing, to unverifiable “Black Box” voting (CT’s current manual hand counted audits are publicly verifiable . <Prepared Remarks> <Testimony>

We supported H.B. 5390 would require the Secretary of the State to archive directives and instructions on the web. We supported the bill which would do what we asked last year, when the Secretary’s properly identified directives and instructions were made enforceable. <Testimony>

We took no stand in favor or against S.B. 250 which would entail cutting off Election Day Registration (EDR) at 7:00pm rather than 8:00pm. We warned in our testimony that the Secretary of the State’s EDR procedures risked a serious election rights violation, due to the cut-off of incomplete registrations at 8:00pm, rather than letting anyone in line at 8:00pm have the opportunity to register and vote. From the questions asked during testimony of officials, it was clear that the Committee understood the issue we raised. <Testimony>

We took no stand on S.B. 251. It would allow officials to interrupt counting and paperwork completion on election night in municipal elections. It was similar to a change last year that would allow those same interruptions for State and Federal elections. We pointed out, as we did last year, that both parts of the law should provide an effective means for the public, candidates, and party officials to determine the date, time, and location of the continuation of counting. <Testimony>

Help Wanted: Low pay, long hours, impossible demands, no benefits

A Courant article reminds us of an idea out of left-field enacted last year by the General Assembly as a “rat*”: Deadline Looms For Regional Election Monitors

When the Connecticut General Assembly passed the budget implementer bill in June 2015, buried in its 702 pages was the stipulation that regional election monitors be in place by March 1.

Those regional monitors were to be hired by each of the nine planning regions in the state. They would be certified by the Secretary of State’s office, but not paid by them.

Gentle reader, before you rush out and apply we note several items which might not be apparent.

A Courant article reminds us of an idea out of left-field enacted last year by the General Assembly as a “rat*”: Deadline Looms For Regional Election Monitors <read>

When the Connecticut General Assembly passed the budget implementer bill in June 2015, buried in its 702 pages was the stipulation that regional election monitors be in place by March 1.

Those regional monitors were to be hired by each of the nine planning regions in the state. They would be certified by the Secretary of State’s office, but not paid by them. They would represent, consult with, and act on the SOS’s behalf, but would not be state employees. Instead, each council of government would be expected to contract an individual to serve as a monitor and enter into a memorandum of understanding with the SOS about them.

But plenty of questions have yet to be answered with a March 1 deadline and April 26 primary on the horizon.

“There are a lot of details still to be worked out,” Filchak said. “We have a lot of questions about the ‘what ifs’ and those take time to work out.”

One question concerns liability issues. The REM would be an employee of the COG, but his or her duties would include working with registrars in the towns of each COG. NECCOG has 16 towns in its region. The REM for NECCOG would have to do several things for each of those municipalities.

They’d have to hold regional instructional sessions for moderators and alternate moderators. They might be called on to assist registrars in preparing for and conducting elections, primaries, a recanvass, or audit. And they would be expected to transmit any order issued by the SOS…

Legislation calls for $100,000 to be allocated for REMs. How that money will be divided up between nine COGs and what the hours and benefits will be is still unknown.

SOS Communications Director Patrick Gallahue said details are still being worked out between the COGs and the SOS office. He said the REMs would provide supplemental assistance to local election officials such as trainings, audits, and help with the implementation of new laws or elections hardware and software.

Gentle reader, before you rush out and apply we note several items which might not be apparent:

You will be a contractor, so there will be no benefits. The annual pay will be about $11,111.
At minimum in 2016 expect to work at least three 18-24 hour days supervising one election and two primary elections.
You will receive training, leading to a required certification. Training will attending instruction for 2-4 hours on 9 occasions (moderator and registrar certification), several hours of online training, and passing several tests at home (be sure not to have someone else take the test for you). (For now lets ingnore the law for certification that says you cannot be so certified, unless you are simultaneously serving as a registrar or deputy registrar, which also requires performing a very demanding job for those same three 18-24 hour days.)
You will be directly supervising about 16-24 individuals in about 8 to 12 towns, while they are working those 18-24 hour days.
You may be singly or jointly responsible for any errors and legal violations of those individuals or the several hundred temporary individuals they employ for those three days a year. You will also be responsible for assisting in the training of all those individuals. Not to worry, some of those individuals have been performing their duties for many years. Others will be very new to their jobs. None of the registrars are currently certified, but most will be by November 2017. (So you might want to check very carefully before elections, after elections, and all year, that they faithfully perform all their many legally mandated responsibilities).
It may, in some cases, be a bit challenging: The two registrars in each town are from opposing parties, most get along well, yet many bicker constantly and in rare cases assaulted their “partner” from the other party. Even though many have performed well for years, some frequently make mistakes, failing to follow the law. Your supervisor has little or no experience in the actual job you will be supervising, yet is confident that your registrars will all perform well once they are certified, with your guidance.
You will not have to worry about firing anyone. Registrars are elected officials – no matter what, they will stay on the job, except in very rare circumstances, as yet, never tested in court.

* Def: Rat – In Connecticut slang, a section of a long bill, a.k.a. Public Act**, inserted near the end of the session, usually near the end of a long bill, without hearings, by legislators unknown to the public. Legend has it that most pass without the knowledge of most legislators.
** Def: Public Act – A fictional drama performed in public.

Are Feds off-target in disabled ballot probe?

From the CT Post: Feds probing how Connecticut handles disabled voters ballots

Both the IVS and the referendum systems, for different reasons, are a disservice to voters with disabilities. Yet the gist of the probe, if the article is correct, is incorrectly aimed at referendums and would be more appropriately aimed at State and Federal elections. Perhaps both should be probed for different reasons.

From the CT Post: Feds probing how Connecticut handles disabled voters ballots <read>

Federal authorities are investigating possible privacy and disability act violations in the way Connecticut’s towns and cities require handicapped Americans to vote in referendum elections…

It advises them [registrars] a complaint was filed contending violations of federal civil rights laws and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Specifically, the allegation charge that voting by paper ballots, which are then segregated and hand-counted, violates privacy and secrecy requirements that are afforded non-disabled voters.

If the article is correct, the Feds do not really understand the IVS machine we use in State and Federal Elections. The IVS creates a unique paper ballot that cannot be scanned. It is an arduous process that would mainly serve voters that are blind and does not serve them well. It is theoretically possible that the paper would not be seen between printing and deposit in the ballot box. Yet, it must be segregated and hand counted at the end of the night. It is not normally secret, since very few voters use the system. My guess is that in an average State or Federal election, in less than 5% of polling places does even a single voter use the system – so every polling place official knows who voted on the machine and how they voted – and if there is a recanvass, so could anyone in the polling palace at the time the IVS was uses. In our opinion, the IVS is a disservice to those with disabilities.

Most voters who try the system once, never try again. Officials hate setting it up and are nervous that someone will want to use it, which will require their assistance to set-up for the voter. Last November my co-worker noticed a label on the IVS in our polling. The dialing instructions had a different code than our polling place. It took her several phone calls to customer service and maybe 45 minutes work to get it functioning.

BUT this suit is about Referendums where the IVS system generally is not used. The voter uses a regular ballot. It is known by whomever assists them, yet not counted separately. They can have almost anyone of their choice assist them, including polling place officials. It is actually more confidential than the IVS in practice, since only one or two people know how a particular voter voted.