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Final Warning: Don’t say “Who could have imagined?”

Many of our friends are on the other side of this vote. Some say the Legislature will hold hearings and do the right thing – even though they are upset at what the Legislature has done with election financing. I would support secure in-person early voting, but that is not on the ballot and unlikely to be the result of a “Yes” vote.

The Constitutional Amendment will pass with a moderate margin 10%-20%
The Legislature will hold hearings, and no matter what the testimony, they will enact no-excuse early voting, Governor Malloy will sign it into law
To great fanfare it will begin in November 2015.
Although it will slightly decrease turn-out, statics will be presented to say it actually increased turnout, maybe not in 2015, but soon
Sometime down the road, there will additional cases of alleged and proven votING fraud via absentee voting
Some will attribute it to the new law, some of those will say “Who could have imagined?”
In any case, the claim that any voting reform proposed will increase turnout will prevail

Make your choice on Tuesday.

How can we vote on Internet that is unsafe for banks, Canada, and alarms the President?

Recent articles highlight the folly and blind faith in technology leading many to trust voting on the Internet.

As Roosevelt said “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” seems to apply here.

There are real cyber risks, we need to protect or digital assets. Yet it does not help to jump to the conclusion that every breech is the work of our biggest enemy of the moment.

Like building new civic centers, baseball stadiums, and bankrolling fishing and hunting retailers there is plenty of real world evidence that Internet voting does not work well, yet we persist despite the evidence. Apparently the technology that actually works to protect Democracy, a technology actually under assault in Connecticut, is Freedom of Information.

Recent articles highlight the folly and blind faith in technology leading many to trust voting on the Internet

From the NYTimes: Obama Had Security Fears on JPMorgan Data Breach <read>

President Obama and his top national security advisers began receiving periodic briefings on the huge cyberattack at JPMorgan Chase and other financial institutions this summer, part of a new effort to keep security officials as up dated on major cyberattacks as they are on Russian incursions into Ukraine or attacks by the Islamic State.

But in the JPMorgan case, according to administration officials familiar with the briefings, who would not speak on the record about intelligence matters, no one could tell the president what he most wanted to know: What was the motive of the attack? “The question kept coming back, ‘Is this plain old theft, or is Putin retaliating?’ ” one senior official said, referring to the American led sanctions on Russia. “And the answer was: ‘We don’t know for sure.’ ”

More than three months after the first attacks were discovered, the source is still unclear and
there is no evidence any money was taken from any institution.

As Roosevelt said “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” seems to apply here. There are real cyber risks, we need to protect or digital assets. Yet it does not help to jump to the conclusion that every breech is the work of our biggest enemy of the moment (e.g. China last year, Putin here, and ISIS last week) when we apparently don’t have a clue.

Just as irrational is the fear in then Connecticut Legislature, (and perhaps in the statehouse) where many voted for Internet voting under the threat of being deemed “unpatriotic”.

Of course, Internet voting is not banking. Internet voting is more vulnerable, and more critical to our Democracy. As highlighted by this recent report:

From GMA News: Online voting not ready for worldwide roll-out, study concludes <read>

The research, produced by the Atlantic Council think tank and the online protection firm McAfee, concluded that “security will need to be vastly improved” before it becomes feasible to adopt Internet voting on a large scale.

According to the study, online voting faces more complex obstacles than electronic commerce, where a customer can be reimbursed in the case of fraud or theft.

“Online voting poses a much tougher problem” than e-commerce, the report said.

“Lost votes are unacceptable… and unlike paper ballots, electronic votes cannot be ‘rolled back’ or easily recounted.”

The report said hackers could paralyze an online voting system or, even worse, change the results without being detected.

A major problem of online voting is that any system must verify the identity of the voter, and at the same time guarantee anonymity in the process.

Some experts believe it could be decades before online voting becomes mainstream.
Joseph Hall of the Center for Democracy and Technology said that many security experts believe “the timeline will be 30 to 40 years” before the technological hurdles to online voting are overcome.

One of the problems is the “uncontrolled platform,” in which voting software or computers can be infected, Hall said at a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council.

Jordi Puiggali of the online voting technology firm Scytl said that while Internet balloting has not been perfect, “we have to consider the risks of voting channels that already exist,” citing practices such as stuffed ballot boxes.

The researchers cited a study released earlier this year by University of Michigan scientists on online voting in Estonia, the first country to hold national elections on the Internet.

That study, which is to be published in a scientific journal next month, revealed vulnerabilities in Estonia’s online voting system.

“Attackers could target the election servers or voters’ clients to alter election results or undermine the legitimacy of the system,” the study said.

Estonian officials have maintained that the system is secure.

Wednesday’s report said that online voting has enormous potential if security can be improved.

“For the digital generation, unsupervised polling via mobile devices may be the ‘killer app’ of e-voting,” the report said, adding that biometric and other security features may need to be perfected.

“Broad adoption of most new technologies generally takes longer than technology optimists hope, but it will happen,” the report added.

“Online voting’s potential benefits in terms of reach, access and participation have the potential to revolutionize the democratic process around the world.”

Count us among the skeptics that Internet voting will be safe in 30-40 years. We say it is a good bet that 20 years from now it it will still be 30-40 years off, and maybe that will be the last we will hear of it. On the other hand it might be possible with a radical redesign of the underlying Internet. (Geeks like myself will remember IP 6, which we were all supposed to be using by about 10 years ago. Great news its up to 4% now.)

From Aljazera: Latest Internet voting reports show failures across the board <read>

Internet voting, a technology often cited as a solution to the United States’ problematic voting machines, received failing security and accessibility grades in the latest in-depth audit conducted by the City of Toronto. Two of the three vendors audited by the city currently have contracts with over a dozen U.S. jurisdictions for similar technologies.

The accessibility report, prepared by researchers at the Inclusive Design Research Centre at OCAD University, and the security report, prepared by researchers at Concordia and Western universities, were obtained by Al Jazeera America through a Freedom of Information Act

request.

Proponents of Internet voting, largely disabilities groups and advocates for military voters overseas, point to the apparent ease-of-use of other Internet-based activities, such as banking, and claim the technology would lead to higher turnout rates.

The reports highlight the difficulty in creating a voting system that isn’t more susceptible to corruption than existing voting technology and that is easy enough to use for voters with a variety of personal computer setups, including those with disabilities who often use alternatives to traditional mice, keyboards and screens.

Got that? Susceptible to corruption. And does not provide expected benefits. Sounds a lot like those civic center, sports stadium, and fishy retail projects! Meanwhile the U.S. Government continues to stonewall:

A nonprofit watchdog group, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, sued FVAP last month to force them to disclose their own audits of Internet voting conducted three years ago. In 2012 the program told Congress it would release the records to the public by the middle of 2013.

Two Reminders: Transparency and the Limits of All Paper Elections

This week we have had two demonstrations of themes we have discussed in theory at CTVotersCount.
From Connecticut, the importance of transparency.
From abroad the limits of paper only elections.

This week we have had two demonstrations of themes we have discussed in theory at CTVotersCount.

First from Connecticut, amid the sad tale of our past Governor, heading once again for food and shelter at the expense of the public: Jury Finds Rowland Guilty On All 7 Counts; Attorney Vows Appeal <read>

A reminder from the prosecutor:

Prosecutors called the verdict a victory for transparency and the electoral process. The jury agreed that Rowland conspired to do work on two Republican congressional campaigns and had pitched a scheme to keep his pay hidden from federal election regulators.

“It ought to be — no it has to be — that voters know that what they see is what they get. In this case, the defendant and others didn’t want that to happen,” Michael J. Gustafson, Criminal Division Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, told reporters.

We would add that transparency is insufficient. Somebody, like the public, has to use the transparency. And occasionally the system needs to assist in assuring transparency. As we have pointed out in theory: <Vote Audit Observe> <Public Transparency and Observability>

Second a reminder from Scotland, pointing to some of the same risks and the insufficiency of paper only counting. As we have discussed in theory:
Common Sense: Paper Ballots are Insufficient for Voting Integrity <read>

Take a look at this video alleging irregularities in the Scottish Independence vote:

We cannot vouch for the accuracy and know the actual implications of the allegations in the video. Perhaps some of the footage is rigged. Perhaps the incorrectly classified ballots and stacks were double checked and corrected. Yet the video reminds us of several theoretical questions and issues with paper only counting and elections:

It would be much more credible and provide higher confidence to have a machine publicly count and print results then followed by solid ballot custody and an audit or recount. To accomplish fraud or cover error then would be much harder, since the numbers have to at least come close to matching when machines are rigged ahead of time, and ballots must be changed in a corresponding way.
Paper counting demands double checking by multiple individuals, observed by opposing interests.
In addition, central counting of paper ballots requires strong ballot security from the polling place ballot box to the counting place.

In Connecticut we are fortunate to have paper ballots, recanvasses, and post-election audits. Unfortunately, we also have very weak, vulnerable ballot security, and a post-election audit that is weal in many regards, and far from adequately executed.

Editorial: Improve Turnout By Making Voting Worthwhile

It seems that turnout is the holy grail of elections. Many election reforms are justified on a claim, true or not, that the reform will increase turnout. But, turnout is more a symptom of democracy, than an end in itself.

We have some suggestions to consider:

Make it easier for third-party candidates to get on the ballot, easier to qualify for public financing. Let us start with a level playing field for public financing, and officials that follow the law, with a “Chief Election Official” with actual responsibility for elections.
Reform the decentralized partisan election system.
Eliminate the “Spoiler” effect, provide more democracy, with a true runoff election when one candidate does not get 50_% of the vote.

Let us recall that in this generation, two third-party “spoilers” did win elections in Connecticut: Governor Lowell Weicker, and Senator Joe Lieberman.

Background <go to Editorial>

In our last post we summarized the case for and against no-excuse absentee voting. Proponents claim that it will increase turnout. Yet, what we find as the best science says it tends to decrease turnout – the reasons are not obvious, not intuitive, and far from clear. Yet, either way the difference in turnout is just a very few points. It would be unlikely to take the 21% turnout we had in the recent primary and make it more than 25%.

What increases turnout? One factor could be voter interest in the election, that the election is important, and that their vote is important. We always have lower turnout in odd year municipal elections and higher turnout in general elections. We have had more than our fair share of exciting general elections in even years lately, Lamont vs. Lieberman 2006, Malloy vs. Foley 2010, McMahon vs. Blumenthal 2010, and McMahon vs. Murphy in 2012. Even when it is a slam dunk in Connecticut it seems that an election where voters want to register their enthusiasm for a candidate can bring voters out, e.g. Obama 2008.

Looking at the 2014 election, conventional wisdom is that it will be a close election rematch between Tom Foley and Dannel Malloy. Neither candidate is all that popular, both were expected to and are underway in very negative campaigns against each other. Columnist Kevin Rennie has characterized it as “A Race Between Two Dark Vaders”. A close race between unpopular candidates, both well financed with lots of “outsider” funding as well – many voters will be turned off, yet many may still turnout.

How could it get more exciting? Enter two petitioning third party candidates, stage right and stage left. Is this exciting or more depressing? For the two major party candidates and their supporters, depressing. For supporters of the third-party candidates and those depressed by the major party candidates, exciting.

How could it get more depressing to voters and potential candidates? First, by the major party candidates and their supporters adding to the negativity by bashing the minor party candidates, and the system that allows them to petition their way onto the ballot. The case for additional candidates, best summarized by Connecticut native Ralph Nader, himself bashed for the 2000 election and for signing a petition for one of the candidates, resulting in a Courant Op-Ed <read>

Nader: Crashers Needed At The Two-Party Party

Giving voters more choices in an election year should be as American as the Fourth of July

The word “spoiler,” when applied only to small-party candidates, is an epithet of political bigotry. It says to people who want to enter the electoral arena and talk about ignored but important issues that they should not do so.

It says the two big parties own all the voters, and they should not be taken away by third-party candidates who can’t win. Nor should these candidates be given an opportunity to build voter familiarity and an eventual chance at winning over several elections.

Many Americans, despite their disgust with the behavior of the two major parties, think nothing of telling people not to run because they’ll be “spoilers.” That is equivalent to telling candidates to shut up — a nasty demand that one would not readily use in daily interactions.

Even so, I was surprised that my mere signing of former state legislator Jonathan Pelto’s petition, along with thousands of other Connecticut voters, to get him on the gubernatorial ballot made news. After all, giving voters more choices and voices in an election year should be as American as apple pie and the Fourth of July. Except that it isn’t…

How could it get more depressing to voters and potential candidates? Second, by a system that looks like insider manipulation by local party operatives, with a system headed by a Secretary of the State powerless to enforce the law and free from full actual responsibility as the State’s “Chief Election Official”.

The only good news in this: There is enough remnants of our formerly world-leading Freedom Of Information law, a smart candidate, and apparently no questions asked cooperation from the Secretary of the State’s Office in providing transparency. (At least that is what we have experienced from the Merrill and Bysiewicz administrations, and have no reason to doubt here).

On Sunday, petitioning candidate Jon Pelto, on his blog described his efforts of see what was actually happening with his petitions, it is a long sad, interesting story. W applaud his initiative to find what is so: You call this a Democracy?<read> His blog post is well worth reading. We also applaud the Courant for an article in today’s edition covering the story and summarizing the issues, based on the information developed by Pelto, hopefully they have been, or will, be joined by other media in the State: Pelto Sweating Out Signature Count, Says He May Sue If Denied Ballot Access <read>

Merrill’s office has been allowing Pelto, under supervision, to examine hundreds of petitions that it already has logged in — and he said it’s now clear that “dozens” of signatures were wrongly rejected by local officials.

Pelto said some of the unjustified reasons given for those rejections included: the lack of a full birth date in a space on the petition form that isn’t mandatory; a woman including her married name after the maiden name under which she was registered, even though all other information matched local records; and petition signers being on a local list of “inactive” voters, after not voting for a couple of years…

As Pelto riffled through stacks of petition sheets Tuesday, he said that Merrill’s staff already had agreed with him that some of the local officials’ rejections are unjustified. But, he added, Merrill’s office cannot overrule the decisions of local officials, many of whom are party insiders. Merrill can only compile the local officials’ certified totals; if they add up to 7,500 or more, she puts the candidate on the ballot.
[Deputy Secretary of the State James] Spallone said it appears Pelto is correct in at least some of what he says. For example, Spallone said, a signature shouldn’t be rejected simply because a person is on the local “inactive” voter list. People on that list must be allowed to vote if they show up on Election Day and verify their identities, he said, adding that “simply being ‘inactive,’ on its own, is not enough to reject a signature.”

Editorial

This election demonstrates the worst of money in political campaigns with two sides with large stores of cash, along with only slightly “separate” groups assisting with even more cash. Much to the discredit of our once leading public financing system, struggling survival along with our FOI laws.

It also demonstrates the worst of our decentralized, dual partisan Registrars of Voters system of elections, with an almost powerless Secretary of the State. It is time to consider reforming the system by regionalization as we have suggested, and not make it worse as the Courant has been advocating.

And for turnout, that indicator and symptom of the value the electorate places on participation in elections. We have some suggestions to consider:

Make it easier for third-party candidates to get on the ballot, easier to qualify for public financing. Let us start with a level playing field for public financing, and officials that follow the law, with a “Chief Election Official” with actual responsibility for elections.
Reform the decentralized partisan election system.
Eliminate the “Spoiler” effect, provide more democracy, with a true runoff election when one candidate does not get 50_% of the vote.

Let us recall that in this generation, two third-party “spoilers” did win elections in Connecticut: Governor Lowell Weicker, and Senator Joe Lieberman.

An afternoon at the Recount(?)

On June 24th there was a third budget referendum in Colchester, CT. There were separate questions for the town budget and the Board of Education budget, both previously twice voted down. This time the town budget passed by a margin of twelve votes and the BOE squeaked by with a margin of four votes.

This was actually the first time I have attended a recount in Connecticut. In the past I have attended about eight recanvasses. Every time, I have attended a recanvass, either as a member of the public or representing a party or slate, I have learned something. Most often a few good ideas, and new ways not to run a recanvass. This was an exception, I only learned good things. It was a thoroughly effective recount in all regards, and educational for me.

This was actually the first time I have attended a recount in Connecticut. In the past I have attended about eight recanvasses. Every time, I have attended a recanvass, either as a member of the public or representing a party or slate, I have learned something. Most often a few good ideas, and new ways not to run a recanvass. This was an exception, I only learned good things. It was a thoroughly effective recount in all regards, and educational for me.

The first thing I learned was the Connecticut law actually has a recount, yet unlike a recanvass it is essentially undefined! As far as I can tell, there is no definition, no requirements, no rules, no limits or restrictions on how it is conducted. A search of CT Statutes for recount shows it can be ordered by a judge in most elections and primaries, yet like most Connecticut statutes, leaving referendum rules all to each municipality.

In primaries and elections we have a close vote recanvass – when the margin is close there is a recanvass, a weak version of the recounts we have seen in Minnesota and Florida, with less rights to slates, parties, and opposing interests to closely observe the counting, with no rights to object. But at least in the case of Colchester, there is a provision for a close vote recount of a referendum in the town charter, if votes petition for the recount. <Colchester Charter>

Recount of Annual Budget Referendum or special referendums.
Should the vote cast at either the Annual Budget Referendum or a special referendum be decided by a
margin of less than 2.0% of those electors who cast votes, the vote shall be subject to recount upon the
petition of any of the Town voters. During the pendency of such recount, the Town may not take any
action whatsoever in reliance upon the outcome of the initial vote count.

It seems we need to be careful what we ask for, unless it is well defined! A recount could apparently be anything from that ideal we imagine, to perhaps just reading some tapes and forms again. I am not a lawyer, yet it seems one could argue for days in court what a recount should entail.

I was invited by individuals petitioning for the recount, those representing the ‘no’ position on the referendum. I am completely agnostic on this referendum – I am not a voter in Colchester, I have no knowledge of the issues and arguments for or against the budgets. I do enjoy attending and representing some faction in a recanvass (or a recount). especially if the faction needs help in understanding the process and their rights (so far, almost all do). Normally, I will represent any side that will have me, except where I have taken sides in the contest or would have the appearance of bias. Yet, my preference would be to represent apparent losers and outsiders – those not represented by the elected registrars and other election officials. That was the yesterday.

Representing a side means that I will give them my best advice, work to have a fair and observable recanvass/recount, yet at the same time not intentionally act to aid another faction. Usually, the apparent loser is still the actual loser after the recount/recanvass. To me, it is still a win if the recanvass/recount is fair, transparent, and results in the actual loser accepting the result of the recanvass/recount. That was the case today – I likely played a small part in that, but the credit goes to the ‘no’ faction, and the officials. It was an interesting, fair, and transparent process. (Not everyone has this same prospective. In my experience, it seems that many party lawyers scrutinize recanvasses jist enough to find errors, so that if they believe it would be beneficial, they could later challenge the result it court. I am all for such a challenge if it is justified, yet I would prefer an accurate, trustworthy result from the recanvass/recount as well.)

The two registrars assisting the Head Moderator, who led the recount. went will beyond the requirements of a recanvass, to provide a transparent, effective process, open to questions and objections. I wish it was always that way! Too often, some questions are not welcomed, most objections are unwelcome, objections cut-off, transparency to observe ballots limited, and the process not even meeting the inadequate recanvass procedures. Often factions are unaware of their rights, when they should be at least asking for even more. When I represent a faction, I insist on following the procedures, and at least ask for more.

Credit goes to the ‘no’ faction for thoroughly going through all the absentee ballot lists and questioning some items we did not understand – they were well explained by the registrars and town clerk, who was also present. They also closely scrutinized the absentee ballot applications – they found two that were apparently defective – I cannot say that officials officially agreed they were defective – a judge would likely have to finally rule on that.

There was considerable concern about absentee ballots. In the 1st two referendums there were 21 and 19 absentee votes. This time 90. According to the petitioners there was a strong campaign by advocates for ‘yes’ to get out the absentee vote. According to the registrars a major factor was that the third referendum was the 1st week of summer vacation, with many parents (likely ‘yes’ voters) on vacation. I noted that the absentee ballots were all half-sheet paper forms. Talking to the registrars it was motivated by saving money, since the minimum order of ballots is 100, and in the previous referendums, so few were needed. They were counted quite efficiently in four stacks, of yes-yes, no-no, no-yes, and yes-no, there were no partial votes. ‘no’ had won the polling place voting. ‘yes’ had carried the absentee votes.

So, we had an original four vote margin. With two defective absentee applications, that likely would bring the provable margin down to two. If the recount margin were two or less, one way or the other, then a judge would likely call for a re-vote, as the will of the legal voters could then not be determined.

As I suspected there were very few votes that could not be accurately read by the scanner, actually none where there was an issue of voter intent that would have been different for the scanner scanner count. Several bubbles were partially filled in and several ballots that the scanner refused to read, were hand counted. The final margin for the town budget remained at twelve. The final margin for the BOE budget was three – just one vote from a likely successful legal challenge.

Important lessons.

The recount was conducted so well, the relations between officials, ‘no’ faction, and ‘yes’ faction were so cordial that nobody for a moment, as far as I can tell, considered that the final count might be incorrect.
Opposition can work hard, yet remain cordial.
An effective, open process is worthwhile for everyone.
Every detail matters. It is important that every absentee ballot application be scrutinized by official to make sure that it is properly filled out, so that votes and whole elections are later not called into question.
It is important for concerned candidates and citizens to check such details.

Legislative Wrap-Up: One recommended bill passes – Electronic Check-in

It is often tricky to navigate the course of bills stuffed into other bills. At this point, as far as we can tell none of the bills we supported or opposed passed individually. We have scanned the 314 page ‘implementer bill’ checking each section and found only one bill that passed, one that we recommended – Electronic Check-in.

Every year many good bills passed by Committees never pass the General Assembly, the majority are never even brought up for debate. This year is an exception, only in that even less bills were debated than is normal for a ‘short session’. On the other hand we can usually celebrate several well-intended, but risky election bills that do not pass. Often risky bills are intentionally not debated, so that Senators and Representatives do not have to go on record for or against. Either way we celebrate when sanity prevails or insanity goes the way we find best for democracy.

It is often tricky to navigate the course of bills stuffed into other bills. At this point, as far as we can tell none of the bills we supported or opposed <here>, <here>, and <here> passed individually. We have scanned the 314 page ‘implementer bill‘ checking each section and found only one bill (Starting with Sec 23 on page 21) that passed, one that we recommended. As we said earlier:

Electronic Check-In

This bill allows for electronic check-in of voters. Once again this is a concept that we support, yet testified against the original which had many problems that went well beyond electronic check-in <testimony>

We are pleased to report that our objections have been addressed in a substitute bill approved by the Committee. So, we can fully support it going forward. <written testimony>

Testimony on three bills – FOI is an issue in elections too

Today I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

Yesterday I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

My prepared remarks <read>

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount and a software technologist. Most of my career focused on developing software, evaluating software products, and recommending technology strategy for the Travelers, in its Computer Science Division. I also spent nine years developing and marketing software products in small companies, for use in large organizations.

Today I have submitted testimony on three bills.

I support H.B. 5480, yet would like to see two improvements to better serve the public. First, that the Secretary of the State’s instructions etc. be required to be posted to the Secretary’s web site in a timely manner. Second, that registrars provide an email address on their web site and/or the Secretary of the State’s web for communication with voters. This would be especially useful to military and overseas voters.

I oppose S.B. 348. It would make Connecticut the 1^st state to effectively eliminate post-election audits. It is the same bill approved in committee last year. Please do not make that mistake again. I am working with the ROVAC to propose a bill that would strengthen the audits and provide almost the same savings. I believe we are close to agreement, yet, we have not reached agreement on of all the details.

I oppose H.B. 5492 as proposed, a demonstration of electronic audits. I have long been a strong proponent of machine assisted audits, in Connecticut and nationally. Unfortunately, as written, I am concerned that it might be an unsatisfactory and redundant project – theater, not integrity – possibly delaying or precluding effective use of such technology in Connecticut. Possibly leading to what some would call a “pretend audit”. My written testimony details my concerns and proposes alternatives.

Post-election audits are different than other audits for several reasons:

Unlike other audits they are not independent. They are conducted by the same officials who are responsible for conducting the elections, specify the election equipment, and select vendors to program them.

Unlike financial audits, such as bank audits or campaign finance audits, because of the secret vote, there are no independent records similar to bank statements which can be compared with other financial records of the entity being audited. Election audits must be compared against the paper ballots held by election officials.

Thus, audits and recounts must be conducted publicly and transparently, providing for public verification. Without that they cannot be trusted. Without that they cannot provide credibility for our elections, that is, credibility for our democracy.

Thank you

S.B. 5480 AN ACT CONCERNING REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE AND THE STATE ELECTIONS ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, AND THE POSTING OF REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER IDENTIFICATION. <bill> <testimony>

For this bill concerns were for the central publication of enforceable directives, rulings, and instructions. And that registrars email address be made available to the public as they are for members of the General Assembly.

H.B.5492 AN ACT CONCERNING A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FOR CONDUCTING AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

Public transparency is important for two reasons with this bill. First, it is a project that deserves public observation and comment, yet there is no requirement for public notice of the demonstration and a requirement for public input. Second, it involves an alternative to post-election audits, that themselves require transparency and public verification. This should be a criteria to be demonstrated and proven as part of the project.

S.B. 348 AN ACT CONCERNING POST-ELECTION AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

In addition to other problems which would effectively eliminate post-election audits, this bills electronic audit provision would replace black-box voting with black-box auditing transparency and public verifiability.

As we said in our testimony, it is possible to strengthen the audits and save registrars almost as much effort.

The Downside(?) Of Clear Election Laws

To paraphrase Einstein, “Laws should be as simple as possible, but no simpler”

Washington Post: The Down Side Of Clear Election Laws <read> A thoughtful piece, yet the title does not say it all:

State lawmakers have introduced at least 2,328 bills this year that would change the way elections are run at the local level. Some passed, some stalled. Some are mundane tweaks, others are controversial overhauls.

But if election reformers want to prevent their laws from being held up by lawsuits, they would be wise to pay attention to how they’re written, says Ned Foley, an Ohio State University professor and election law expert.

“Put clarity at the top of the list of things to achieve, maybe before fairness or integrity or access or whatever, because litigators can’t fight over things that are clear,” he said, speaking on an election law panel during a multi-day conference hosted by the bipartisan National Conference of State Legislatures in Washington, D.C. “It’s amazing how much ambiguity kind of seeps into laws that is unintended.”

But while clear regulations are important, too much can backfire, said Alysoun McLaughlin, deputy director of the Montgomery County Board of Elections in Maryland.

“We really kind of have a love-hate relationship with the clarity that you write into laws,” she said, speaking to a group of lawmakers, staff and others. Because election officials are working with limited resources and budgets, specific unfunded requirements can make it hard to implement new election regulations well. For example, too much specificity on ballot design—an issue a fellow election official requested McLaughlin bring up—can tie officials’ hands, she said.

“You kind of get mid-stream and then you realize, oh, there’s this statute that’s really going to make it more expensive. It really doesn’t make sense, but it’s too late to change it now,” McLaughlin said. “So specificity can kind of bite you on the back end.”

And in a lot of states, legislative schedules can make it impossible to address in time. A few legislatures meet every other year and others may pass election reform during short sessions only to realize after the session is over that the laws are problematic, she said.

Clarity matters, she said, but be wary of micromanaging.

To paraphrase Einstein, “Laws should be as simple as possible, but no simpler”

Especially when Legislators do not have the training and experience to understand all the areas that they must legislate, and lack the time to consider all sides in depth, laws can be a more complex than necessary, and ambiguous. Yet, there are cases where laws need to cover the essentials. Some issues in Connecticut:

The post-election audit law mandates that the random selection of districts and local counting sessions be open to the public. Yet, does not specify a notification period or required method of notification of the public. And there is no requirements that the random selection of races to be audited by the Secretary of the State be public. Officials have not always provided reasonable notice or public notice when not required.
A law originally saying clearly that elections that could not be handled by lever machines could use paper ballots, was rewritten to cover optical scanners. The botched rewrite was not clear. It said to run elections on paper ballots when in was impracticable to use optical scanners, yet the word impracticable has been interpreted by officials to mean not practical so many officials avoid using scanners when they clearly would work, while impracticable means “difficult or impossible to use” (did you know that?)

Speed Up Election Results – Not so fast, with another half-baked solution

UPDATED, With two additional views. And a CORRECTION.
We half agree with the Courant and the Secretary of the State. We have supported the idea, applauded the start that the Secretary took, yet there are problems with the system as proposed, and even more problems with the some of the views and ideas in the Courant’s Editorial. Yet, one half-baked manual system does not deserve a half-baked automated one to solve the problems.

We would like to see the Secretary and the Courant Editorial Board close a polling place and get the data in via smart phone, or close absentee ballots and report via laptop. We will help time them and transparently provide the video on YouTube.

We also remind readers that the Courant is one of the newspapers that led the fight to require expensive paper legal notices instead of allowing for web based notices.

The Courant published an Editorial in today’s print edition: Speed Up Election Results , the online version dated yesterday is titled Half-Baked Reporting System Keeps Election Results A Mystery <read>

We half agree with the Courant and the Secretary of the State. We have supported the idea, applauded the start that the Secretary took, yet there are problems with the system as proposed, and even more problems with the some of the views and ideas in the Courant’s Editorial.

Yet, one half-baked manual system does not deserve a half-baked automated one to solve the problems.

We also remind readers that the Courant is one of the newspapers that led the fight to require expensive paper legal notices instead of allowing for web based notices.

We see several problems with the Courant’s expectations and the system tested last year, presumably the same system tested this year, since the Secretary of the State’s web site hosts the same training as before:

The system expects every single Moderator and Head Moderator to input all the results on election night, that is about eight hundred individuals, many in their 70’s and beyond, expected to start election day at the polls at 5:00am, working the polls until 8:00pm and then work to close the polls, close the voting machines, count some ballots by hand, secure ballots, secure materials, and report results.
In a simple Municipal Election in Glastonbury, with 26 candidates, polling place Moderators have approximately 78 numbers to input, while the Absentee Ballot Moderator would have 12 times that number to input or 936.
In Bridgeport those numbers would be 19 candidates, 57 numbers for each polling place, and 2850 for the Absentee Moderator.
In Greenwich it varies by district, in District 1 it is 55 candidates and 165 numbers for the polling place, perhaps 3600 for the Absentee Moderator.
I would challenge the Courant Editorial Board to work for 15 straight hours, service the public, managing a team of individuals that work one day a year, and within one-half hour input those numbers.
To add to the challenge, the Secretary offers input via smart phone, so the entry can be performed at the polling place, if it has cell service, saving the drive to Town Hall. By the way, Moderators keep a log of incidents during the day and that has to be typed in as well.
If you are a central count Absentee Ballot Moderator you do not have that log to put in, you are at Town Hall, so you can surely use a laptop computer, you started the day a bit later, but in addition to entering a few hundred or thousand numbers, you have to print the optical scanner tape, which can easily use up more than the whole half-hour the Courant Editorial Board expects so that they can get the results on their schedule.
That is up to thirty-four individuals in a town all doing that at the same time, hopefully few would have problems with their passwords or need other help from the town or state.

Once again, we are in favor of a fully baked solution:

Allow towns to hire competent data entry help, to arrive fresh at town hall at 8:00pm, and type in the data under the guidance and supervision of the Moderators and Head Moderator. (In one medimu -sized town where I have worked, as Absentee Moderator – I read the numbers, the Head Moderator typed them into a spreadsheet, a Registrar watched him to check his input, he printed the data and the Registrar and I checked it against my hand written records and the machine tapes – we always found a couple of things to correct in the process)
Forget the smart phones, just too slow for this much data.
Test the system in real life and set reasonable expectations for timing. Most towns should be able to get the data in by Midnight, but sometimes there will be good reasons for delays.
The goal should be reasonably accurate data the first time. That means double checking entry. Double checking any transcription and manual addition required (Try as we might, it is not possible to machine count write-ins and other special situations that require hand counting of ballots)

Here is the Editorial with our annotations in []

By Wednesday afternoon, official results for all of Tuesday’s local elections were still not up on the secretary of the state’s website.

This is crazy. [Perhaps, but lets consider what we would say about this editorial after reviewing it]

By contrast, Florida voters knew by 8 p.m. Tuesday all their local election results — because Florida state law says officials have to report them to the state a half-hour after polls close and update them every 45 minutes thereafter. [Florida has improved after 2000, but Connecticut has wisely opted not to have its electronic voting machines connected to phone lines or the Internet. Pretty much impossible to get the job done this quickly without an electronic connection from each scanner to some central location]

Also, Florida has early voting, and officials are required by law to count those votes and absentee ballots ahead of time so that they’re ready for posting as soon as polls close. [Counting Absentee Ballots ahead of time is not such a great idea, since it opens the same issues as reporting Presidential elections from East to West, in this case with days of advanced notice. We are in favor of early voting, yet it would be very expensive in Connecticut with our town by town election management. This is not a simple, nor an inexpensive change. Wisely Connecticut does not allow reporting of any absentee results until 8:00pm. We do not allow counting to start before 10:00am on election day, and we get it done on election day.]
[Consider other states, like California, which counts absentee ballots for weeks after elections. Somehow their voters and media have survived]

But residents of Hartford, West Hartford, Windsor, Waterbury, Tolland and a bunch of other towns and cities that rely on the secretary of the state’s website for election results couldn’t get them the day after the election. [We agree that is too long. It is not the reporting system. The current system, with all its faults works for most of the towns, much faster than that. Something else must be delaying those results. Sometimes it is better to get the right results than pressure overwhelmed officials (see Bridgeport 2010)]

In some towns, voters won’t know Thursday, either. [Once again, they should ask their local officials for an explanation. Apparently the Courant has not considered reporting on the actual reason for such delays, instead assuming its the reporting system]

Instead, curious townsfolk who clicked on those municipalities on the secretary of the state’s website (www.ct.gov/sots) saw the message “Check back later for ‘Official Elections Results’ as submitted by the town.”

This is maddening.

What’s Up With This?

In the digital age, election results should be made public very quickly, and in many states they are. But here in the Land of Steady Habits, we’re still reporting results in some places the way we’ve done it for decades. Our breakthrough technology is the fax machine. [Actually towns can also use email, now that the law requires towns to provide email to all registrars]

Some towns make up their own reporting forms rather than use the state’s, and have state troopers, who usually have better things to do, drive their results to Hartford. [As allowed by antiquated state law. We also note that forms do have to be customized for each town, and sometimes for each district, since there are different offices and numbers of candidates on the ballot]

As a consequence, Connecticut can’t get reliable results from some towns on election night, or even the next day. This drives the media nuts, of course, but more important, it’s a disservice to the public. Voters would like to see the official tally on who won and by how much. Is that too much to ask? [Once again the current system may delay results a few hours, but not even a day. I am sure most state troopers could get to Hartford in less than a couple hours]

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill shares our pain, agrees that the present system leaves much to be desired and believes she has a solution. She said her office has been developing a software program over the past 30 months that allows instantaneous reporting of election results — “just type in the numbers and hit send.” She said 40 towns field-tested the program in Tuesday’s election. It worked well in half of them and had some bugs that need to be worked out in the others. She hopes to have it in place in all towns by the 2014 elections. [We would like to see the Secretary and the Courant Editorial Board close a polling place, get the data in via smart phone, or close absentee ballots and report via laptop. We will help time them and transparently get it up on YouTube]

Ms. Merrill’s office made more results available more quickly this year by scanning the paper forms that were faxed in and posting them on the website. Some of these were hand-written with cross-outs (see Waterford, for example), making them barely legible — more evidence that the present system is hopelessly antiquated.

Yes, Florida Does Voting Right

Ms. Merrill would do a great public service by proposing a law similar to Florida’s, requiring quick posting of at least preliminary election results. At present towns have until 6 p.m. the following day to get their results in, and many don’t make even that expansive deadline. The chance for error is magnified as numbers are transcribed once or twice, added up, faxed in and typed into the state system. The new software does the addition and requires only one input, reducing the chance for error.

Some election processes are hard to change; some local officials like things as they are. Ms. Merrill should push ahead and drag the state into at least the 20th century. [The Courant and Ms. Merrill should set reasonable expectations of the system and election officials, based on the results of tests, and then change the law, negotiating with election officials]

To understand more details, you can listen to the training and/or view a PowerPoint presentation on the Secretary of the State’s election reporting system at her web site: <view/listen>

UPDATE: 11/10/2013. A column and op-ed in the Courant today:

First, an op-ed by Karen Cortes, a conscientious(*) registrar from Simsbury, Antiquated Systems Stall Election Results <read>

She mostly echoes our concerns, yet there are several areas where we diverge:

I do not agree that automation provides a total solution and that getting results immediately is desirable. No matter how well the collection system is automated, there is an need for checking and rechecking at the origin of hand count and write-in results in particular, time should be taken to make sure the check-in list counts match the total ballots counted. Electronic data entry checked well can save a few hours and some redundant work for the Secretary of the State as well.
Electronic data transmission from our election machines is risky and not a cure for errors. Connecticut wisely does not connect our machines to the Internet or phone system, to protect against viruses and attack.
Blindly submitting electronic results, bypasses the careful checking that the scanner was used properly and did not miss votes or double count them – that has happened in Connecticut, even over turning an election.
I would not hold out NJ as a good example. NJ uses DRE (touch screen) voting which in NJ are total uninhabitable and proven to miscount.
As for Virginia, this year they are a poster-state for blindly accepting machine results. The results from one county were blindly reported, were obviously incorrect, and may, if corrected, result in the change in a result. See <BradBlog> As for me, I will opt for taking the time for accurate date entry, and checking for reasonably accurate results in initial reports.

Also a column from Jon Lender, with views closer to our own: Computerized Vote-Tally System Tested: Merrill Gives It C+, But Local Registrar Says It Flunked <read>

* CORRECTION: Good grief! An earlier version said ‘contentious’. We regret the error. At least we have proven the need for checking and rechecking.

Connecticut Deserves a Fully Transparent and Deliberative Legislature

Last week, Fresh Talk from the Courant provides a partial case for a full-time Legislature.We agree with the basic reasons presented in the argument, yet there is more that should be required of a full-time, close to adequately compensated legislature.

Last week, Fresh Talk from the Courant provides a partial case for a full-time Legislature: Connecticut Deserves A Full-Time Legislature <read>

However, we have seen too many talented people decline to run for the state legislature, instead campaigning for more prestigious federal or statewide positions.

According to the National Conference of State Legislators, 10 states have legislatures tha t operate full time or nearly full time. It is time for the Connecticut General Assembly to join its exceptional brothers and sisters in New York and Massachusetts and move to operating full time.

Of course a full – time legislature would come with a salary increase for its members. For taxpayers, this would be an investment worth making…

Additionally, the higher salary would increase the prestige of the position and attract high – caliber people who have otherwise declined to run for office. Corporate America knows that to attract high – quality workers, you must pay high – quality wages…

There is currently little incentive for a Connecticut resident making the median $65,400 a year to run against a state representative and take a $37,000 pay cut if the challenger wins…

Finally, by paying lawmakers more, the legislature could free itself from the artificial deadlines that have hamstrung its ability to tackle the state’s largest problems. A full-time legislature could go through the full procedure without leaving questions about the propriety of its process. Controversies about emergency certification and the mysterious materialization of keno in state law would become things of the past. Having extra days and months to get these right, along with giving the legislature time to face challenges that have been neglected, would be a worthwhile investment for taxpayers.

We agree with the basic reasons presented in the argument, yet there is more that should be required of a full-time, close to adequately compensated legislature. The days of the idealistic part-time citizen legislature, with farmers and shop-keepers taking a few days off for annual or biannual sessions is long gone. It takes three to five months in session, and most of the year in part-time constituent service and campaigning. There is some time for other things, like family and making an adequate living.

Currently the Legislature is over-weighted with those that can adjust their workload to fit the legislative calendar: lawyers and contractors; those with lower income requirements: singles, retired individuals, and those who are independently wealthy; and some whose employers wink at the time away from work, seemingly in anticipation of sympathetic lawmaking. I note, like the U.S. Congress, a lack of scientists and technical experts – perhaps full-time doew not turn a variety of individuals into successful politicians.

Beyond more time, we should demand more transparency, public notice, and public hearings. We are not satisfied with the ‘could’ in “A full-time legislature could go through the full procedure without leaving questions about the propriety of its process.” We are not so certain “Controversies about emergency certification and the mysterious materialization of keno in state law would become things of the past.”

Too often we have seen that extra section, known as a ‘rat’, stuck way down in a bill, voted on without public awareness and little time for most legislators to know about it. Too often bills are changed dramatically by harried legislators based on public testimony or private conversations, without a chance for public airing of those changes, before they are passed by committee, or before the final vote in the House or Senate. No system is perfect, yet there needs to be more time from text to vote for the public and legislators, more public hearings when there are significant changes. That requires and deserves the time and attention of a full-time legislature.

PS: Unlike some we are against a smaller legislature, which would place more work on fewer individuals, provide for less points of view, and leave citizens with less influence on their representatives. We also have reservations on term limits which could deprive us of the most experienced legislators, while increasing the power of staff and the influence of lobbyists.