Other Editorials | CTVotersCount.org

Columnist Calls for Elimination of the Secretary of the State

Coming two weeks after April 1st, we assume the author is serious. We point out that transferring the functions of the Secretary of the State to the Attorney General or the State Elections Enforcement Commission would hardly eliminate much of the Secretary’s $8.4 million budget, especially if we still want to register businesses in the state, keep records, comply with election laws, train election officials, total results, assist election officials, and maintain an independent enforcement function. We also note that Hawaii has not been doing so well in elections without a Secretary of the State and is a case study in how not to outsource elections.

But to tear down a factory or to revolt against a government or to avoid repair of a motorcycle because it is a system is to attack effects rather than causes; and as long as the attack is upon effects only, no change is possible – Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

CTPost: ‘A Modest Proposal’ for the Secretary of the State’s Office, by MariAn Gail Brown <read>

And, if we’re really serious about finding savings in this tough economic climate, why not get rid of her entire office with its $8.4 million budget?

Three states — Hawaii, Alaska and Utah — get along just fine without any secretary of state. And Arizona is poised to eliminate its secretary of state, and have its responsibilities assumed by a newly created lieutenant governor…

Sure, it’s one of four constitutional offices, but just because it’s been that way for more than two-and-half centuries doesn’t mean it has to be this way. We can and we should get rid of it. Of course, in the Land of Steady Habits, the secretary of the state’s job is an elective office authorized under our state Constitution.

That means it will take a constitutional convention to change. And the last time the Nutmeg State did some constitutional soul searching was 1965. Forty-five years is a long time to go without this kind of checkup. Let’s demand that our General Assembly vote to convene a Constitutional Convention for the express purpose of nixing the secretary of the state position.

Where might government transfer the functions this elective office is responsible for — items like election law, campaign oversight, voter registration, corporate filings and licensing? Connecticut already has a State Elections Enforcement Commission and an attorney general’s office. Most, if not all, of the secretary of the state’s workload can be delegated between those two agencies.

We also note that Hawaii has not been doing so well in elections without a Secretary of the State and is a case study in how not to outsource elections <read report, page 19>.

In a similar vein we could suggest eliminating columnists from newspapers along with the budget for editing, printing, and delivering their columns. After all the advertising department can type and the billing department prints and delivers invoices already.

Update: An advocate with experience in Utah points out:

Just because in Utah the Secretary of State’s office instead has the title “Lt. Governor” does not mean Utah does without all the functions of a Secretary of State. The Utah Lt. Governor is a member of the National Association of Secretaries of State. I would imagine that the other two states mentioned by the author likewise have officials who are members of NASS because they perform the equivalent functions despite not having the label of SoS. It is true that not all Secretaries of State handle elections. In Utah, the Lt. Governor hires a state Election Director but gets the final say re. elections but in some states there is a separate office having legal responsibility for elections.

just because in Utah the Secretary of
State's office instead has the title "Lt. Governor" does not mean Utah
does without all the functions of a Secretary of State.  The Utah Lt.
Governor is a member of the National Association of Secretaries of
State. I would imagine that the other two states mentioned by the
author likewise have officials who are members of NASS because they
perform the equivalent functions despite not having the label of SoS.
It is true that not all Secretaries of State handle elections.  In
Utah, the Lt. Governor hires a state Election Director but gets the
final say re. elections but in some states there is a separate office
having legal responsibility for elections.

The Risks of Mail-In and No-Excuse Absentee Voting

Voting at your precinct on a paper ballot has been the gold standard in elections around the world and in Boulder County for a long time. When comparing the security of precinct polling place voting to the security of the mailed ballot, there is little doubt about which is gold and which is tin. [Or in Connecticut which is more befitting our nickname, ‘The Constitution State’ and which ‘The Nutmeg State’]

Daily Camera: Guest opinion: Keep Colorado’s voting integrity <read>

The opinion covers most of the reasons we are concerned when the Legislature moves toward no-excuse absentee voting. Mail-in voting seems so good to the voter, just like high-fat, high-sugar fast food, but it is not good for democracy:

it is worth reviewing the vulnerabilities of this method of voting and how voting by mail weakens the integrity of our elections.

Voting at your precinct on a paper ballot has been the gold standard in elections around the world and in Boulder County for a long time. When comparing the security of precinct polling place voting to the security of the mailed ballot, there is little doubt about which is gold and which is tin. [Or in Connecticut which is more befitting our nickname, ‘The Constitution State’ and which ‘The Nutmeg State’]
Neither the chain of custody of a ballot mailed from the clerk`s office nor the chain of custody of the ballot mailed back by the voter is as secure as the chain for votes cast at a polling place or hand-delivered to the clerk`s office. While the U.S. Postal Service is among the best in the world, its margin of error is greater than our elections can afford. Low-income urban dwellers do not receive their ballots as reliably as property owners with stable addresses. Of course, transient and marginalized peoples lose ballot access. There are instances in Boulder County and elsewhere when ballots turned up in Dumpsters rather than ballot boxes on Election Day.

Elected officials will state authoritatively that absentee ballot fraud doesn`t happen when, if the truth be told, they don`t know. Researchers at Project Vote have found that absentee voter fraud is more common in local, county, and municipal elections than in general elections. There are four known forms of absentee ballot fraud: forging signatures or signing fictitious names, coercing or influencing a vote, vote buying, and misappropriating absentee ballots. It`s happened in a mayoral race in Miami and a Dodge County (Georgia) sheriff race.

Many Coloradans fear union hall voting brunches as much as church congregations` voting breakfasts during the two-week run-up to Election Day. The potential for voter intimidation is much greater with mailed ballots than at the polls. And while voting at the kitchen table is convenient, the secrecy of the ballot can be compromised in ways that do not exist at the polls.

To this we would add that in addition to ballots lost in the mail or “lost in the mail”: Significant numbers of voters are disenfranchised when their ballot is disqualified because of an innocent mistake in completing the envelopes properly, or when they overvote and are not given the opportunity they have in a polling place to correct that problem.

Guest opinion: Keep Colorado’s voting integrity

The Times: They are a Antitrust’n, but it is not enough

“The Justice Department’s work should not end with blocking this one sale. It also needs to keep a close eye on widespread reports of anticompetitive behavior by Election Systems and Software and other vendors.”

NY Times Editorial: Antitrust and Your Vote <read>

The good news:

When the nation’s largest voting machine manufacturer, Election Systems and Software, acquired the voting machine business of Diebold, the nation’s second-largest manufacturer, it set off alarms for anyone who cares about election integrity. The combination meant that 70 percent of the nation’s voting machines would be provided by just one company.

The Justice Department has now announced that it intends to block certain parts of the deal on antitrust grounds. That is a very welcome step, but the department and Congress need to do more to protect the vote.

The Justice Department is right to try to block the deal between the voting machine makers. It was a clear violation of antitrust law and a clear threat to the public interest. Less competition would mean less choice for states and localities looking to buy and service voting machines — and even less incentive for industry to produce first-rate products. We hope a federal court approves the Justice Department’s decision and that Election Systems and Software quickly finds a buyer.

But it is not enough:

The Justice Department’s work should not end with blocking this one sale. It also needs to keep a close eye on widespread reports of anticompetitive behavior by Election Systems and Software and other vendors. It should look in particular at how Election Systems handles sales of service contracts for voting machines, which are a big revenue generator, that make it hard for other companies to compete.

Congress also should hold hearings to investigate that and other reports of anticompetitive behavior in the industry. It also should set strong standards for voting machines, including a federal requirement for paper trails and audits. The security of the vote is too important to leave those decisions up to local governments or an industry with a less-than-stellar track record.

We agree.

RoundUp: Registrar Error or Election Fraud? – Saving $$$ or Empowering Voters?

Our Editorial: One clear theme in Connecticut this year is saving money. That is certainly an important goal, but the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered. Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and buildings because it costs money? Or should we continue because it protects the value of our investment in infrastructure and saves lives? Should we save on election audits and voting? Or should we further empower voters and strengthen voting integrity because we value fair elections and a participatory democracy?

We are likely to have several busy news days over the next few weeks as the General Assembly considers changes to the election laws and the 2010 election heads towards the May party conventions.

Court Rules In Hartford Primary

One slate in Hartford recently accused a registrar of illegally certifying another slate. There is also a potential conflict of interest (probably legal) given that the registrar and two of her relatives are on the slate <earlier coverage> Now a court has ruled the slate should be removed from the ballot, yet because of an appeal the election will go forward with both slates on the ballot. <Courant Article>

“The court has made a finding that there are names on the ballot that do not belong there” [Plaintiffs’ Attorney] Sweeney said…But [Hartford Corporation Counsel] Rose argued that the case boiled down to “an error by the registrar” and said that the court did not have the authority to remove the names from the ballot. [Judge] Peck said she decided not to terminate the stay because if her ruling is eventually overturned, the election would have already been held.

Courant Proposes Cost Savings At The Expense Of Voters

Also today, the Courant has an editorial proposing centralized voting and no excuse absentee voting to save money in elections: Would ‘Vote Centers’ Work? <read> The article touts success in Indiana in saving money. The focus of the editorial is on saving money, but likely at the expense of voter convenience:

Voting centers, an alternative to precinct-based elections, are usually set up in strategic locations and save money because they require fewer workers and voting machines. Centralized electronic voting records are used to ensure security. In some places, centers open before Election Day for early voting. Ideally, vote centers will give local election officials the flexibility to anticipate election turnout and modify the number of locations and the level of staffing…

If the centers have to be open for weeks before the election with paid staff, that might eliminate the savings. If they were only open on Election Day, that might cause crowding that would discourage voting or make it difficult for workers to assist older or handicapped voters. The change in location could inconvenience voters who travel by public transportation…

Even with these caveats, the idea should receive a public airing. We are looking at a massive budget deficit. If regional election centers will save some money, they should be on the table. Perhaps the place to start is with a good idea Ms. Bysiewicz put forward last year, “no excuse” absentee ballots.

We note that these are not early voting centers that add to the convenience of voters, they are a few polling places replacing many at the expense of voter convenience, especially for those dependent on public transportation: From an article reporting the results in Indiana – the savings based on dramatically consolidating polling places: <read>

Vote centers allow ballots to be cast at any county voting location instead of at home precincts. The Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute reported recently the centers would save every county money. Tippecanoe, Cass and Wayne counties have been piloting the idea.

House Democrats aren’t buying the plan. House Elections Chairman Rep. Kreg Battles of Vincennes wants more study because of questions over electronic poll books, security and other matters.

A Porter County Commissioners task force study in 2009 found the cost savings to taxpayers could climb as high as $200,000 per year. The study showed the county’s poll worker numbers would drop from 640 to about 120.

Vote centers also would mean fewer voting machines would be needed. They cost about $4,000 each and need to be replaced every 10 years.

Vote centers would be an added convenience for citizens who would have the choice of voting near work, home or their child’s school. The bill should pass.

Depending on where they work, live, and their children go to school. Its hard to imagine that dramatically less polling places would leave many voters closer to the polls.

As we have stated many times we are opposed to the expansion of absentee voting for any purpose. It disenfranchises voters without their knowledge and risks voting integrity.

Our Testimony On A Flawed Bill

Yesterday we testified to the General Administration and Elections Committee on a bill for Election Day Registration in Connecticut. We support Election Day Registration and testified in favor of the original bill submitted last year. Over the course of the year that bill was changed to a form of absentee voting with little safeguards. This year that bill has been resurrected. I testified in favor of the concept and against the details in the bill. Once again the motivation is to provide an image of voter empowerment with a focus on saving money and the convenience of election officials: <H.B.5321> <Testimony>

I support the good intentions and concepts behind H.B.5321, yet I have serious concerns with the specific approaches in the current bill.

I am generally opposed to the expansion of absentee balloting for any purpose. Absentee ballots have security and integrity risks not associated with regular voting. Election day registration may represent over 10% of the votes in an election. Beyond risks to integrity, in every election absentee voters are disenfranchised without their knowledge in two ways:

First, they may make a simple mistake in following procedures and have their ballot rejected.

Second, voters do not have the opportunity to revote their ballot if by mistake they overvote.

It would serve the voters of Connecticut much better if Election Day Registration (or EDR) were available at each polling place as is the case in five (5) of the six (6) states with EDR as of 2006. Connecticut could follow the examples of Maine, New Hampshire, or Minnesota. We are piloting a less than adequate system, I presume because of concerns with cost and integrity. I recall testimony before the GAE demonstrating the integrity and effectiveness of polling place EDR in Maine.

I would also recommend that any pilot program include a requirement for independent objective analysis with reporting back to the Legislature, rather than relying only on feedback from election officials. When Secretary Bysiewicz chose new election equipment in 2006, she included an independent professional analysis involving citizen evaluation, along with focus groups of citizens and election officials. Without that study we might well have doubled our costs and be voting today on inadequate touch screen voting equipment.

There are several ways in which polling place EDR could be accomplished. Any EDR method will increase some election day costs, yet there would also be savings in other election day and pre-election day costs.

Major improvements to the bill would include:

Requiring voting booths, a ballot box tender, and ballot clerks in central EDR locations to provide the opportunity for a smooth, secure voting process, along with a clear opportunity for voters to correct errors on their ballot.

Allowing single polling place towns to provide EDR in the same building as the polling place, with voters voting by optical scanner as usual.

Requiring towns with central count absentee ballot locations to use an optical scanner for EDR ballots, rather than the using the “absentee ballot” like process.

In summary, the focus should be on enfranchising voters and encouraging participation, while maintaining voting integrity.

We note no testimony in public in favor of the bill’s absentee-like mechanisms for voting. Perhaps some was submitted on paper.

Our Editorial:

One clear theme in Connecticut this year is saving money. That is certainly an important goal, but the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered. Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and buildings because it costs money? Or should we continue because it protects the value of our investment in infrastructure and saves lives? Should we save on election audits and voting? Or should we further empower voters and strengthen voting integrity because we value fair elections and a participatory democracy?

In Washburn’s World: Election Records Would Be Public

“I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any of the election records are a secret.’

Blog post: The GAB: The Johnny Yoo of Election Administration <read>

I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any of the election records are a secret.

We agree.

GAB provides legal cover to clerks so that the clerks may destroy election records which the clerks deem too inconvenient to preserve and retain.

In order to set the context for the last two years on this matter I will show my fundamentalist, Christian roots and begin with a creedal statement:

I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any election records are secret.

I believe ballots are not secret, but anonymous.

I believe the content of a removable memory card used by a voting machine during an election is an election record as that term is used in state and federal law.

I believe that ALL of the content of a removable memory card is an election record.

I believe the contents of a removable memory card contain an admixture of some or all of the following:

programming,

ballot “images”¹,

audit logs,

event logs,

vote totals at various levels of aggregation,

“ballot definition files”²,

audio files,

screen text,

page/screen layout,

whole, mountable file systems.

I believe the above list is likely incomplete because the exact contents of a removable memory card are secret and vigorously protected as trade secrets.

I believe election records should not be secret.

I believe election records are records that should have an “absolute right of access“. Under current law some election records in whole or in part are not even open records, much less records with an “absolute right of access“.

I believe the contents of a removable memory card used to aid in the administration of an election should be preserved and retained by jurisdictions for the same length of time as the jurisdiction is required to preserve and retain the poll registration lists used to administer the same election.

I believe state law, WI Stats. 7.23(1)(g), requires the contents of a removable memory card used by a voting machine in the administration of an election be preserved and retained for 22 months

I believe federal law, Title 42, Chapter 20, Subchapter II, § 1974, for federal elections, requires the same; preservation and retention for 22 months

I believe state law, WI Stats. 7.24, requires the backups made of the contents of a removable memory card pursuant to WI Stats. 7.23(1)(g) remain in the custody and control of the election official for the entire retention period.

I believe the contents of a removable memory card used in a voting machine is MORE important than the voter poll lists used in the same election. This is because the contents of the memory card actively and directly determine how the election is administered, where the poll books do not. If nothing else (and there is more), the contents of the removable memory card control how or if marks on the paper ballot or touches on the touch screen will be recognized and to whom votes will accrue based on those marks or touches. These are the election officials’ duties under WI Stats. 7.50 even if those duties have been delegated to an inscrutable black box.

The Government Accountability Board (GAB), its staff, and the clerks who head the Wisconsin Towns Association, Wisconsin County Clerks Association, and the Wisconsin Municipal Clerks Association do not agree with most, if any, of the above credos.

I object to the notion that there can be such things as secret election records.

NY Times: States put Military votes at risk

“Internet voting is in its infancy, and still far too unreliable, but states are starting to allow it and the trend is accelerating because of a new federal law that requires greater efforts to help military and other overseas voters cast ballots. Men and women in uniform must have a fair opportunity to vote, but allowing online voting in its current state could open elections up to vote theft and other mischief.”

New York Times Editorial: Internet Voting, Still in Beta <read>

Internet voting is in its infancy, and still far too unreliable, but states are starting to allow it and the trend is accelerating because of a new federal law that requires greater efforts to help military and other overseas voters cast ballots. Men and women in uniform must have a fair opportunity to vote, but allowing online voting in its current state could open elections up to vote theft and other mischief…

But the value of removing roadblocks is undermined when votes are put at risk, which can happen when ballots are returned by e-mail or are actually cast on a Web site. Massachusetts recently enacted a law allowing service members to vote by e-mail overseas. According to Verified Voting, a group that works to ensure reliable elections, 16 states allow some form of Internet voting, and more than a dozen — including Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois and Washington — are considering it.

E-mail can be intercepted, and voting Web sites can be hacked or taken down by malicious attacks. There are not even agreed-upon standards for what safety measures are necessary.

In many cases, it is not possible to ensure a secret ballot when votes are cast online or by e-mail. That is a particular concern for military voting, where soldiers could come under pressure from commanding officers about their choice of a candidate.

As is often the case, the Times gets it right when it comes to voting Integrity. We would add that if some votes are at risk, our entire democracy of and by the people is a risk.

Many ask “Why not let the Military and even all citizens vote over the Internet like American Idol?”. The question is not the problem, but the public and election officials should direct the question to computer scientists and security experts and listen carefully to their answers.

Courant: Ballot Access Should Require Two People Of Opposing Parties

“The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

We believe that ballots cannot be trusted unless there is a strong chain of custody, one critical part of that is that all access should be by at least two people and of opposing parties, and opposing interests in primaries. The Courant is right on in their editorial covering the Haddam situation <read>

when town offices were closed for Veterans Day, head election moderator Marge DeBold, a Democrat, found a clerical error in the absentee vote count that added an additional vote to Ms. Houlton’s total. That extra vote would throw the results into a tie, which would require a runoff election. The following day, Democratic Registrar Pat Hess authorized Ms. DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and amend the recount.

But there were no Republicans present. That was wrong…

Mr. Harris, the initial winner of the recount, summed it up well: “The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

The Courant’s earlier coverage and our comments <read> Coaliton reports documenting breaches in the chain of custody <read> The issue goes beyond a documented instance of two people from the same party accessing the ballots. The issue includes the risks of single individuals having access to a single key needed to access the ballots – leaving them vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Courant: Iranians Sure Could Speed Up U.S. Voting System

CTVotersCount readers know we have often criticized Courant Editorials. In this case we are pleased to agree…

What we need to do in this country, I’m thinking, is to hire some Iranian election officials as consultants and see what they can do to speed up our own system.

Think about it:

We spend billions on high-tech voting machines.

CTVotersCount readers know we have often criticized Courant Editorials <e.g> <e.g> <e.g>. In this case we are pleased to agree – that this appeared in an acknowledges humor column. <Jim Shea’s Full Article>

We we need is less hanging chads, more paper ballots, more counting as accurately as the do in Minnesota, and less frivolous challenges in the aftermath of accurate counting.

Barbara Simons: The Internet and Voting: Worth Doing Right

Recently we were dissapointed when the Huffington Post ran a PR piece from Everyone Counts touting their risky election technology used in a Honolulu election. Now, Huffington Post has provided a platform for an expert technologist’s view.

Recently we were dissapointed when the Huffington Post ran a PR piece from Everyone Counts touting their risky election technology used in a Honolulu election: Did Hawaii and Honolulu Defy Own Laws, Science, and Common Sense?. Now, Huffington Post has provided a platform for an expert technologist’s view.

Barbara Simons is the only technologist on the Board of Advisors of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. She is a recognized expert on voting integrity and security. She was also President of the Association for Computing Machinery.

She refutes the contention that technologists are intimidated by technology:

In response to multiple efforts to allow voting over the Internet in major elections, many of our nation’s prominent technology experts have signed a statement cautioning against adopting Internet-based voting systems without first understanding and guarding against the numerous and well-documented dangers. This is not because, as Mr. Contorer suggests, those opposing Internet voting find “[t]he introduction of technology to any process … scary”. The signatories to this statement are not at all intimidated by technology; in fact many are established experts in voting systems who are most certainly aware of the major risks associated with Internet voting.

Simons then explains that ATM Banking and voting are different:

The article asserts that since we are able to conduct banking and commerce over the Internet, we should also be able to vote over the Internet. This is a common misconception (or misrepresentation) that is often made when attempting to support Internet-based voting. Banks spend considerable time and money to ensure the security of our assets, yet there are still risks. Identity theft and fraud affect millions of Americans and cost billions of dollars each year. When we can detect such fraud it is because we are able to track our money through each transaction from start to finish, including the people associated with those transactions.

However, elections by their very definition disallow this type of explicit end-to-end auditing. Voters must cast their ballot in secret and not be able to prove to others how they voted. Election officials must not be able to tie votes to citizens except in very narrow circumstances as carved out by law. The lack of these basic protections make Internet-based voting a dangerous idea and place it so far from the realm of Internet banking or commerce as to make the author’s point moot.

There are significant security issues that any vendor must address before declaring such a system fit for public elections. Yet the author glosses over these security issues raised by Internet voting, referring several times to “military-grade encryption.” It is a well-known marketing technique of voting system vendors to tout the strength of their encryption because it sounds impressive. But the fact is that encryption is only a secondary part of any electronic security.

Technology can help in elections:

Americans deserve the best electoral system available. There are many options for making elections more accessible, secure, and efficient, and the Internet will have a role to play. Current possibilities that show promise include the easier maintenance of voter registration records and the distribution of blank absentee ballots. But we should not subject our democracy to the costs or risks of current Internet-based voting schemes.

We recommend reading the entire post <read>

McCain, Obama Counsels Agree: Start With The Facts

It may be news to many readers that reforms are still needed. The media widely reported a smooth election, and in some places, those reports were accurate.

An article in RollCall by Obama and McCain campaign general counsels: Next Phase of Election Reform: Start With Facts <read>

we share a deep commitment to fair and well-run elections in which all qualified voters have the opportunity to vote, and all the votes that they cast are accurately counted.

Looking back on the 2008 elections, we have no doubt that reforms in the administration of elections in this country are needed if we are to meet these standards. We also believe such reforms can be achieved, with potentially transformative success for the American voter.

It may be news to many readers that reforms are still needed. The media widely reported a smooth election, and in some places, those reports were accurate. The problems — and there were many, scattered across the country — received comparatively little attention because the outcome of the voting was clear…

Understandably, Americans seem to care about these problems most when, and sometimes only when, elections are close. Even when these problems receive the attention that they deserve, there remains a major obstacle to rational dialogue and effective reform: the absence of reliable, comparative data on how our election system is performing.

If these debates are to move forward in the face of much partisan mistrust and reflexive disagreement, we need some factually grounded agreement on where we are now. Only then will we have some sense of what kind of solutions are likely to succeed.

We agree with the thrust of the article. Facts are required. Just because we had an election that produced a clear winner is no reason to be complacent. We would add that post-election audits are an important piece of the facts that are needed. All states need paper ballots followed by sufficient and reliable post-election audits, producing facts, that lead to actions, that result in confidence in our election process, including a system where any problems will be surfaced and addressed.