Insider Fraud In Kentucky

The scheme involved duping people to walk away from the voting computer before they had finished their elections, then changing their choices…White said she also went into the booth with people who had sold their vote to make sure they cast ballots for the candidates who had paid.

We have blogged  in the past about the fuzzy line between retail and wholesale vote fraud.  A story from Kentucky describes alleged, long-standing, fraud by officials.  In this case the fraud may have been limited in scope, but so were the elections which might well have been decided by skulduggery.  <read>

Wanda White testified that Clerk Freddy Thompson — the county’s chief election officer — helped show her how to manipulate voting machines along with Charles Wayne Jones, the Democratic election commissioner.

The scheme involved duping people to walk away from the voting computer before they had finished their elections, then changing their choices, said White, the Democratic judge in a precinct in Manchester.

White said she stole more than 100 votes that election.

“It was easy done,” she said.

White said she also went into the booth with people who had sold their vote to make sure they cast ballots for the candidates who had paid.

White testified Friday in the continuing trial of eight Clay County residents who allegedly took part in a scheme to rig elections over several years…

The machines had a “Vote” button that people could push to review their choices, then a second button they had to push to record the choices and finish voting.

At Maricle’s direction, she went to Stivers, who taught her about distracting voters so they would leave the machine after pushing the review button, but before they’d recorded their choices, White said.

Thompson and Jones used a voting machine to show her and Charles “Dobber” Weaver how to change votes, White said.

White said they did that at the clerk’s office after legitimate training for all election workers. She and Weaver stayed late to learn how to manipulate the machines, White said.

Weaver, then the Manchester fire chief, was the Republican judge in the precinct where White was the Democratic judge in May 2006.

Let us point out that it is questionable to call this electronic voting fraud.  It is two schemes, one made possible by confusing touch screen machines.  That scheme would work even if the touch screen had a “voter verified” paper record.  However, the other scheme, watching people vote to verify they did what they were paid to do, would work just as well with voter verified paper ballots, no matter how they are counted.

ES&S Diebold Purchase: Groups Endorse Remedies for Unlawful Concentration of Market Power

We are deeply concerned about the public impact of ES&S’s purchase of Diebold’s Premier Election Solutions, Inc… Fortunately, the Federal Government has expedited its research into purchaser ES&S’s accelerated absorption of PESI assets into ES&S and the business goliath’s concerted attempt to achieve a de facto dissolution of PESI before the DOJ can act.

Groups endorse and recommend remedies to the merger of ES&S and Dieblod/Premier <read>

RE: ES&S Purchase of Diebold/Premier: Remedies for Unlawful Concentration of Market Power and Other Public Injuries Within DOJ Jurisdiction

Dear Attorney General Holder, Assistant Attorney General Varney, and Assistant Attorney General Perez:

The undersigned organizations and individuals possess nationally recognized expertise in voting systems technologies, local and State election administration, and in removal of barriers to voting participation. We have cooperated in the preparation of this letter thatseeks to address appropriate remedies for ES&S’s anticompetitive disruption of the relevantmarkets and the threats thereby posed to American election integrity.

We are deeply concerned about the public impact of ES&S’s purchase of Diebold’s Premier Election Solutions, Inc. (“PESI”), referenced here as the “merger.” Fortunately, the Federal Government has expedited its research into purchaser ES&S’s accelerated absorption of PESI assets into ES&S and the business goliath’s concerted attempt to achieve a de facto dissolution of PESI before the DOJ can act.

This purchase represents a dangerous concentration of election equipment, maintenance, and management in one company.  To understand the extent to which companies can control elections and hold election officials and government hostage, we recommend the VotersUnite report and our comments on the risks to Connecticut.

We are very much impacted by this purchase.  It seems that it is now highly unlikely that there will ever be significant software upgrades to our Diebold AccVote-OS optical scanners, and even less chance that there will be a hardware upgrade to fix their(our?) ancient failure prone memory cards.

We have only one other company supplying ballots in Connecticut in addition to Diebold.  Only one company programming all the memory cards in five New England states, including Connecticut.

ES&S has a track record that adds to our concerns. From the letter:

C. History of ES&S Anticompetitive Market Conduct:

Buyer ES&S’s record of anticompetitive market conduct includes:

1. Legally proscribed tying arrangements to achieve vertical integration and marketdominance;

2. Predatory pricing of goods and services; and

3. Threatened breaches of contracts on the eve of elections, unless the election jurisdiction agreed to ES&S’s unilaterally determined price increases for essential goods (e.g. ballots) and services (e.g., technical maintenance and testing of voting equipment) that had been previously negotiated and approved for local or State fiscal planning.

D. ES&S Conduct Post-Merger Designed to Obstruct DOJ Remedial Options

ES&S engaged in conduct which appears to have been deliberately designed to vitiate the Antitrust Division’s (AD) scope of available remedies, and specifically the Government’s ability to unwind the sale as by a divestiture of PESI. Given the market share of theresulting corporate entity and other factors that justify DOJ review, buyer ES&S should reasonably have known that DOJ-AD would examine the merger. ES&S conduct that soughtto obstruct DOJ’s vindication of the antitrust laws and larger public interest includes:

1. Taking physical possession and control of all PESI intellectual property and business records within a few days of the sale/merger;

2. Rapidly renegotiating contracts with local election jurisdictions, to transfer them to ES&S products and services at steep discounts if the contracts were executed quickly, thus eviscerating the PESI business relationships;

3. Discharging PESI employees, so that virtually no qualified workforce would remain to manage and execute PESI’s business if DOJ required ES&S to divest PESI; and,

4. Undertaking an arguably deceptive sales effort to excise some low-value PESI assets in order to unilaterally and superficially restructure the voting products and services markets, with the objective of superficially restoring competitive market conditions while also not actually reducing or endangering the ES&S dominant market share.

In sum, ES&S’s restrictive contractual provisions intensify the dependence of local and State governments on one privately held firm for their mission-critical election operations. ES&S’s vertically integrated business model and standard terms greatly reduce the opportunities for smaller vendors to offer goods and services to governmental units. The terms also augment the opportunities for ES&S vendor intimidation of governmental customers in ways that threaten the integrity of elections. ES&S’s oligopolistic control over the market (an estimated 70% share) and the injuries inflicted by this degree of market power will likely escalate unless DOJ-AD redresses ES&S’s problematic contractual provisions as part of the remedies ordered.

With the discharge of employees etc. the purchase cannot be undone to leave Diebold/Premier viable. Yet there are remedies that can mitigate and reverse the damage. From the letter (read the full letter for the details):

A. Prohibit ES&S From Conducting Business Under Contractual Provisions that Undermine Competitive Market Conditions and Unfairly Perpetuate Oligopolistic Market Share

B. Require Continuation of PESI’s Efforts to Achieve Increased Electoral Transparency

C. Require ES&S to Continue PESI’s Effort to Serve Voters With Disabilities By Identifying Alternatives to the AutoMark Voting Machine

D. Require Buyers of PESI Assets to be Qualified to Compete in Jurisdictions that Mandate Paper Ballots

F. To mitigate the increased threat to national security generated by this merger, require ES&S to divest sufficient assets, reduce its contractual control over election jurisdictions, and take other appropriate actions.

We are pleased to join the other signatories in urging strong action.

Update: 2/18/2010:  From Bo Lipari’s blog: Dominion [Voting Systems] Sues to Stop New York City Contract with ES&S <read>

A current example of the hardball we may face with possible questionable/illegal tactics by a single company driving further to monopolize election equipment and maintenance:

In court papers, Dominion argues that the New York City Board of Elections failed to comply with New York State and New York City Procurement Laws, Rules and Regulations, and awarded the contract on the basis of illegal criteria. Further, the lawsuit argues that the New York City Board of Elections:

1) Did not conduct a lawful bidding and procurement process;

2) Did not disclose the method and criteria used in evaluating bidders;

3) Did not award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.

The city used a point system to evaluate the two companies. In the final evaluation, ES&S received 3,417 points, while Dominion received 3,395, a difference of only 22 points. Dominion claims that the slightly higher overall score for ES&S in the city’s evaluation is due to extra points given to the ES&S DS200 scanners for an option called “Easy Startup”. This option is said to include electronic machines pre-programmed in the warehouse prior to delivery to poll sites, and the ability for poll workers to open the machines without a password (such a configuration is not only an obvious security risk, but disallowed under New York election law). The lawsuit claims that the State Board of Elections explicitly ruled that the DS200 Easy Startup option does not comply with state law, and informed the New York City Board that it would reject any contracts that included it.

Bo also points to an article on a lobbiest for ES&S <read>

While a Republican lawyer was under federal investigation in a Yonkers corruption case, he was paid nearly $50,000 last year to help a Nebraska company win a contract to provide New York City with new voting machines.

Anthony Mangone was indicted this month with Yonkers Councilwoman Sandy Annabi and former city GOP Chairman Zehy Jereis on extortion, bribery and other federal charges related to payments made to Annabi for her to change votes on city projects.

Coincidentally that same day, the New York City Board of Elections voted to buy thousands of new electronic voting machines — a contract expected to be worth more than $40 million — from Mangone’s client, Election Systems & Software

Is this what Connecticut look forward to, totally dependent with most other jurisdictions on one company?

Integrity and Credibility in Massachusetts

Perhaps the election will be close, less than 0.5% with a very careful recount or a runaway for one side or the other. But otherwise the 1st casualty will be credibility. No matter who wins there are likely to be unsatisfactorily answered questions.

Stories from the Detroit< FreePress and BradBlog about the possibility of the election in Massachusetts being stolen by Democrats or Republicans <BradBlog> <FreePress>

From BradBlog:

The near-entirety of the state will vote next Tuesday on paper ballots to be counted by Diebold op-scan systems. The same ones used dubiously in the New Hampshire Primary in 2008, and the same ones notoriously hacked — resulting in a flipped mock election — in HBO’s Emmy-nominated Hacking Democracy.

And to make matters even worse, the notorious LHS Associates — the private company with the criminal background that has admitted to illegally tampering with memory cards during elections, and which has a Director of Sales and Marketing who embarrassed himself with obscene comments here at The BRAD BLOG some years ago, resulting in his being barred from CT by their Sec. of State — sells and services almost all of MA’s voting machines along with those in the rest of New England.

From the FreePress:

In Massachusetts, a recount only occurs if the final results are less than half of one percent, and as election reform activist John Bonifaz points out, Massachusetts does not require random audits of the computerized vote counting machines to compare the computer results to the optical scan ballots marked by the voters. Bonifaz notes that in the Al Franken-Norm Coleman Minnesota Senate race in 2008, “everything was ultimately hand-counted.” The problem in Massachusetts hinges on whether the race is close enough to trigger a recount, which candidates can peition for within thirty days…

Given the Democratic party’s astonishing lack of leadership on so many issues, it is entirely possible that Scott Brown could legitimately beat Martha Coakley in this election.

But it is also possible that the outcome could be manipulated by the companies in control of the registration rolls and vote counts. It will be up to citizen election protection activists to make sure that doesn’t happen yet again.

Perhaps the election will be close, less than 0.5% with a very careful recount or a runaway for one side or the other.  But otherwise the 1st casualty will be credibility.  No matter who wins there are likely to be unsatisfactorily answered questions.  Massachusetts, like all states, needs effective, credible post-election audits along with a  strong, transparent chain-of-custody.  Ironically Massachusetts has paper ballots and was used as proof of the reliability of Diebold equipment and LHS service, because no problems had been discovered after years of use – but without post-election audits how would problems be recognized?

CT IRONY #4: Machine Errors Result In Recounting By Machine

What happens when an post-election audit discovers a large discrepancy in a race that could reverse the election result? A recanvass, defined as a modified optical scanner recount. Possibly some machine problems might be mitigated by such a recanvass, yet if there were an error in memory card programming or an error in the software it is quite likely the same discrepancy would be repeated.

In reviewing Connecticut’s post-election audit law, we discovered another irony, perhaps one of those unintended consequences.  What happens when an audit discovers a large discrepancy in a race that could reverse the election result if that same error were present in other optical scanners?

(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9-311, the Secretary of the State shall order a discrepancy recanvass of the returns of an election or primary for any office if a discrepancy, as defined in subsection (o) of this section, exists where the margin of victory in the race for such office is less than the amount of the discrepancy multiplied by the total number of voting districts where such race appeared on the ballot, provided in a year in which the Secretary of the State is a candidate for an office on the ballot and that office is subject to an audit as provided by this section, the State Elections Enforcement Commission shall order a discrepancy recanvass if a discrepancy, as defined by subsection (o) of this section, has occurred that could affect the outcome of the election or primary for such office.

For those not familiar with Connecticut law, a recanvass is our substitute for an automatic recount when election contests are close.  It make sense to recount an entire race if an audit discovers errors in some districts and if those errors were common across the districts might change the election results.  How does our recanvass work?

It is a modified machine recount:

(e) The new memory card shall be installed in the tabulator, the tabulator shall be installed on an empty ballot box, the pre-election testing procedures should be followed to prepare the new tabulator for use and a record shall be made. The test ballots shall be removed and packaged.

(f) After the tabulator is properly tested and those present agree that the tabulator is properly set, the tabulator shall be set in election mode. When the machine prints the election zero report, check that it identifies the town or voting district and the office and candidates being recanvassed. The report shall be signed by the moderator and registrars and left attached to the tape in the machine…

(l) The recanvass officials of opposing political parties shall remove all other ballots in the ballot transfer case (except any ballots marked “spoiled ballots” from a polling place in which the marksense machine was used for polling place voting). They shall examine all these ballots which were machine counted on election day to determine whether the markings for the office being recanvassed are sufficiently clear to be read by the machine. (See examples of properly and improperly marked ballots in this handbook as a guide) Also, if a stickered race is being recanvassed, make sure that early absentee ballots issued without the corrected name are not machine counted. If any such error or defect is found, the ballot should be set aside for hand counting of the races involved in the recanvass. If two recanvass officials of opposing political parties agree that such ballots are sufficiently clear to be read by the machine, such ballots shall be processed through the machine

Possibly some machine problems might be mitigated by such a recanvass, yet if there were an error in memory card programming or an error in the software it is quite likely the same discrepancy would be repeated.

It was not always this way.  The recanvass procedures written in the fall of 2007 just after Connecticut purchased optical scanners statewide called for complete manual count for racanvasses.  <Oct 2007 Recanvass Manual>

§ (e) The new memory card shall be installed in the tabulator, the tabulator shall be installed on an empty ballot box, the pre-election testing procedures should be followed to prepare the new tabulator for use and a record shall be made. The test ballots shall be removed and packaged.

§ (f) After the tabulator is properly tested and those present agree that the tabulator is properly set, the tabulator shall be set in election mode. When the machine prints the election zero report, check that it identifies the town or voting district and the office and candidates being recanvassed. The report shall be signed by the moderator and registrars and left attached to the tape in the machine.

TIME: Galbraith: How the Afghan Election Was Rigged

“Once fraud occurs on the scale of what took place in Afghanistan, it is impossible to untangle.”

We are lucky to hear from Mr. Gailbrath. Had he not been fired, he might have continued to keep quiet

Time article, How the Afghan Election Was Rigged <read> by Peter W. Galbraith, formerly deputy special representative of the Secretary-General of the U.N. in Afghanistan

No one will ever know how Afghans voted in their country’s presidential elections on Aug. 20, 2009. Seven weeks after the polling, the U.N.-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is still trying to separate fraudulent tallies from ballots. In some provinces, many more votes were counted than were cast. E.U. election monitors characterize 1.5 million votes as suspect, which would include up to one-third of the votes cast for incumbent President Hamid Karzai. Once fraud occurs on the scale of what took place in Afghanistan, it is impossible to untangle.

Afghanistan’s fraudulent elections complicate President Obama’s job as he weighs a recommendation from General Stanley McChrystal, his top commander there, to send as many as 40,000 additional troops to support a beefed-up counterinsurgency strategy. But for that strategy to work, the U.S. needs a credible Afghan partner, which Afghanistan’s elections now seem unlikely to produce…

We are lucky to hear from Mr. Gailbrath.  Had he not been fired, he might have continued to keep quiet:

Unfortunately, I am unable to provide reassuring answers. Over the past four months, I served as the deputy head of the U.N. mission in Kabul and had a firsthand view of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan’s presidential vote. Each time I proposed actions to deal with it, Kai Eide, the head of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan, overruled me. Like any good subordinate, I respected my boss’s decision, but in private, I told him I thought he was making a mistake in downplaying the fraud. When the press learned of our disagreement (through no fault of ours), U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon removed me from my post.

I recommend reading the entire article, it is not that long.  This so called  ‘election’ shows an unbelievable disregard for integrity, a very thinly disguised fraud, and a superficial image of democracy.

We can have high degree of certainty that the Afghan elections were not credible.  How much worse is this than the uncertainty we often have in our own elections?  We need effective monitoring and reporting of all elections. Without effective monitoring and auditing we cannot have confidence in the leaders of our own democracy.

Verified Voting Statement on the Acquisition of Premier Election Solutions

“it raises greater concerns about the security, transparency and cost of elections and creates a profound anti-competitive effect in the shrinking marketplace for voting systems…We can also expect to see substantial increase in vendor control over key contract provisions.”

Update: 12/27/2009 Gainesville editorial: Bad Business <read> For once Florida is leading toward voting integrity:

Corporate mergers can be good for business. But if mergers lead to less competition and innovation, they are not necessarily good for consumers.

This is especially true when the “consumers” are voters and the product voting machines.

Case in point is the recent purchase of Diebold Inc. by Election Systems & Software. The result is that a single company will now make the voting machines used by 92 percent of Florida voters … and by two-thirds of the nation’s voters.

“Each of Florida’s 67 counties must negotiate its own contract with the vendor,” says Dan McCrea, president of Florida Voters Foundation. “With no competition, Florida counties and taxpayers are over a barrel.”

The good news is that state Attorney General Bill McCollum announced ths week that he will conduct an anti-trust investigation of the merger. Given Florida’s embarrassing showing in the 2000 presidential election, the last thing this state needs is to become a captive market for a single voting machine vendor.

Update: 12/19/2009 New York Post:  U.S. opens probe of Diebold unit sale -report <read>

he U.S. Department of Justice and 14 states have opened investigations into the sale of Diebold Inc’s (DBD.N) voting machines business to Election Systems & Software that could lead to the unwinding of the September sale, the New York Post said on Saturday.

Update: 11/2/2009:  Secretary Bysiewicz letter to Senator Schumer <read>

Update: 10/29/2009 New York Times Editorial: Trust, Antitrust and Your Vote <read>

The interests of voters should be part of this lawsuit. The Justice Department and state attorneys general should consider formally joining the suit, so they can argue that the combination of Election Systems & Software and Diebold would make the voting experience worse and reduce the reliability of election results. The Justice Department’s antitrust division could also make its own attempt to block the sale. The enormous market share that the newly combined company would control should by itself set off anticompetitive alarms.

Since the 2000 presidential election, the public has rightfully been skeptical about how elections are run. We fear that if any one voting machine maker is allowed to dominate the market, there will be even greater reasons to worry about the nation’s flawed voting system.

*********

Our friends at VerifiedVoting have released a statement articulating concerns with the acquistion of Premier Election Solutions by ES&S <read>

The recently announced acquisition of Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold) by its largest competitor, Election Services & Software (ES&S), requires close scrutiny, as it raises greater concerns about the security, transparency and cost of elections and creates a profound anti-competitive effect in the shrinking marketplace for voting systems…

Without competitive alternatives, a post-merger ES&S has jurisdictions over a barrel when it comes to renewing or negotiating new contracts. We can expect higher costs for ongoing services as well as future procurement of voting equipment and support services including ballot programming, printing, equipment maintenance and supplies.

We can also expect to see substantial increase in vendor control over key contract provisions. Contracts between election jurisdictions and voting system vendors have been demonstrated in some instances to present significant barriers to election transparency. Contracts may limit jurisdictions’ access to source code, or restrict their ability to conduct independent evaluations of voting systems performance and security. There are even two known cases of a contract between a county and ES&S containing a provision that stipulated that the terms of the contract itself were confidential. Lacking the negotiating leverage that robust competition provides, counties could face pressures to accept contracts that do not provide sufficient transparency.

The merger will make a risky, expensive situation worse.  Connecticut, like most jurisdictions, uses a single vendor for equipment and maintenance.  We are also dependent on a single source, our distributor LHS Associates, for memory card programming.  A single more dominant vendor portends additional problems.  Its quite possible that the optical scanners we own, the AccuVote-OS will be discontinued.  Its less likely that there will be a soluntion to our memory card problems.  For more on the dangers of outsourcing our elections see the Voters Unite Report and our associated coverage.

Diebold/ES&S: AntiTrust Investigation and Suit

Senator Schumer requests investigation. Hart files suit.

Wired story, Antitrust Concerns Swirl Around Sale of Diebold Voting Machines, by Kim Zetter <read>

Sen. Charles Schumer asked the Justice Department’s antitrust division on Monday to investigate the recent sale of Diebold’s voting machines division to a competitor, saying the deal raises anti-competitiveness concerns and has “adverse implications on how our country votes.”…

The sale gives ES&S, already the largest voting machine maker in the country, a near monopoly on the voting machine industry. According to the company’s website, its systems, used in 43 states, counted “approximately 50 percent of the votes in the last four major U.S. elections.”

Hart InterCivic, a voting machine firm based in Texas, filed an antitrust suit (.pdf) on Friday, seeking a temporary and permanent injunction against the sale. According to the suit, the sale “poses a significant and imminent threat of irreparable antitrust injury to plaintiffs.”…

The suit alleges that Diebold and ES&S have long engaged in anti-competitive practices to win bids “through both legitimate and illegitimate acts and conduct.”

This behavior includes submitting low-ball bids to get contracts, after which the companies allegedly gouge customers with additional expenses for after-market service and upgrades. The suit alleges the companies also exaggerate the capabilities of their systems, misrepresent the status of their certification and exert improper and undue influence on government officials to win contracts.

This sale would make a bad situation.  Once a company selles its equipment to a state or county, it has a virtual monopoly.  This is not just theoretical.  Read the VotersUnite report from last year and Connecticut implications.

Largest Democracy Risks It All On Electronic Voting

” In the absence of such certainty, the entire democratic process would be rendered a mockery. It is to ensure that democracy in its true sense is brought back that AIADMK decided to boycott the by-polls.’’

Party to boycott election based on reports of hacking of electronic voting machines. <read>

CHENNAI: AIADMK general secretary Jayalalithaa on Wednesday observed that her party’s boycott of the coming by-elections was“to ensure that democracy in its true sense is brought back to the State.”
In a statement, the former chief minister, reiterated that the electronic voting machines could be tampered with. “In a democracy, every voter should know whether the vote cast has gone to the candidate or party it was meant for. In the absence of such certainty, the entire democratic process would be rendered a mockery. It is to ensure that democracy in its true sense is brought back that AIADMK decided to boycott the by-polls.’’
She noted the media reports that on August 2, Hari Prasad, a software engineer from a Hyderabad firm demonstrated on behalf of the NGO, Jan Chaitanya Vedika,  that EVMs could be tampered with.

Without paper ballots, no voting system is safe from errors and tampering, especially insider attack.

Video: The Costs of Op-scan vs. DRE’s

In Tennessee they are fighting for optical scan in the Legislature.  Election officials claim that the costs of  paper ballots, audits, and optical scanners is too much.  We hear similar complaints about the costs of paper ballots and audits in Connecticut as well.

We recommend watching the video of a legislator as he explains reality vs. the estimates of election officials:  <watch>