Category: Electronic Vulnerability

“Paperless electronic voting is in retreat” – Because It Cannot Be Verified

Electronic Verification for E-voting: A Dead End for Voter Confidence, by By Sean Flaherty, Verified Voting Foundation <read>

There is a small possibility that sometime in the future some smart people will come up with a way that we can vote and verify our votes all electronically, without paper. Yet, it may be impossible. For now at least, voter verified paper and manual counting or manual audits are required.

Paperless electronic voting is in retreat, its popularity done in by disturbing security reviews of current e-voting systems and significant voter concern about the integrity of elections. Optically scanned paper ballots, which also use software to count votes but allow software-independent hand audits and recounts, are the most common voting system in the United States. A number of states that have purchased paperless electronic voting machines are moving to adopt optical scan systems, with accessible ballot-marking devices for voters with disabilities. Approximately 60% of America’s voters live in jurisdictions in which voter-marked paper ballots will be the primary voting system in the November elections.

But we live in a technological age, and to some it seems logical that in crafting laws governing voting systems we not “stifle innovation” by closing the door on paperless voting. The present generation of systems was a bust – but could a new generation of paperless voting systems contain enough redundancies that paper ballots or voter-verifiable paper records could become unnecessary?

…First, it is necessary to compare electronic voting to electronic commerce. There is a fundamental problem in comparing e-voting to e-commerce: the secret ballot. Secure electronic commerce depends in part on connecting the individual investor with the online stock trade, the taxpayer with the 1040 form, the traveler with the flight itinerary. The secret ballot, an essential element of our democratic tradition, requires that the voter not be connected with the votes she has cast. If taxpayers had no way of confirming to their satisfaction that their tax returns were received by the IRS as they submitted them, most would never consider filing their taxes electronically…

In Connecticut we are more than half way there. We have voter initiated verifiable paper ballots, yet lack sufficient post-election audits and lack a sufficient chain of custody.

Readers’ Digest: Quick Study: Voting Machines

I’m no fan of the Readers’ Digest*, but even they have finally recognized there is some concern about electronic voting: Quick Study: Voting Machines

I’m no fan of the Readers’ Digest*, but even they have finally recognized there is some concern about electronic voting: Quick Study: Voting Machines <read>

Some of the definitions and references seem to be a good start. One item that I would disagree with is:

Computer Scientists
From MIT to Caltech, computer science professors have lined up on both sides of the DRE debate. Stars include Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins (anti-DRE) and Michael Shamos of Carnegie Mellon (favors e-voting but critical of DRE manufacturers).

This is like comparing a dusty teaspoon to the sand in the universe. The line of Computer Scientists behind Avi Rubin is almost infinite. The line behind Michael Shamos has perhaps two or three others. In fact, its not just a DRE debate.

* I gave up my subscription to Readers’ Digest several years ago. They keep sending it and I keep trashing it. Every year they ask me to renew and I refuse. I’d change my address to send the free subscription to another, but I just would not want to feel responsible if they actually read it.

Why We Need Manual Recounts And Audits

They used optical scan! They had the paper! How could the wrong candidate be elected? (See Myth #9 )

Governor’s race decided by margin of 0.2% with highly questionable results. But not recounted or audited. Democratic Underground has the story <read>. Here are the pertinent details:

A close look at the 2002 Alabama Governor’s race suggests that the fraud perpetrated in that election was more obvious than even the 2000 or 2004 U.S. Presidential elections. The final official results were Riley 672,225, Siegelman 669,105 – a difference of 3,120 votes, representing a margin of 0.2% of the total.

The initial vote count for Governor for Baldwin County, reported from the Bay Minette tabulator at 10:45 p.m., was quite surprising to say the least. It reported: Riley (R) 30,142, Siegelman (D) 11,820, and the Libertarian candidate, John Sophocleus, 13,190. Although it was expected that Siegelman would lose Baldwin County, the margin of the loss not believable, as he had lost Baldwin County in the Governor’s race in 1998 by only a little over four thousand votes. Furthermore, the idea of his losing to the Libertarian candidate was not plausible.

Result: Free lodging for the ‘sore loser’, but not in the Governor’s Mansion:

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Voting Machines vs. Slots – Which Do We Protect More?

How we actually treat Voting Machines vs. Las Vegas Slot Machines – Does it indicate our priorities and how important we consider Democracy? From the Washington Post <read and compare>

Of course this may or may not apply to Connecticut Slots, but as we covered here, we seem to hold electric meters to a higher standard <read>. Maybe its energy, since we seem to hold energy companies to a high standard, beyond that of voting machine companies <read>.

The Company That Can’t Or Won’t Count

Forbes Magazine, Diebold a Reluctant Takeover Target <read>

I am not encouraged by the prospect of a military contractor taking over our voting machines. On the other hand UTC could certainly provide a higher quality product if they chose to keep and fund the voting machine division.

“The New York Stock Exchange has notified Diebold that it is at risk of delisting due to management’s failure to file timely financial statements,” Geisler said…

Diebold shareholders are somewhat in the dark, and not just by lack of SEC revenue and earnings filings. The company’s annual meeting of shareholders, which usually is held each April at a college campus near its Canton headquarters, has been postponed indefinitely.

Update: Its not just their accountants that can’t count: <read>

A failure in Diebold touch-screen voting systems in Butler County, OH resulted in votes not being included properly in Election Night results, even though the system had reported that all votes were uploaded and recorded correctly. Once the error was discovered, a subsequent upload of all of the county’s 1599 touch-screen memory cards to the Diebold central election tabulator after the election, also resulted in the failure to record the results of one of the memory cards, despite the system having reported that all results were “uploaded properly.”

Quality and Voting Machines

Imagine the discipline of Quality applied to voting machines. Business Wire story, ASQ Quality Report Offers Solutions to Error-Proof Voting Machines <read> .  Basic modern engineering but we are not applying Quality techniques to voting.

Perhaps much more is needed than outlined in this article to produce a voting system with integrity, confidence, and efficiency. However, using standard quality techniques could go a long way to protect our votes. Consider the level of testing of medical equipment and medical staff. Compare that to voting system equipment and election official training. Simpler, more foolproof equipment and procedures are even more important when the people using the equipment don’t run elections or vote every day.

“It’s very important for citizens to have as much trust in their voting systems as they have in their medical care systems or air travel,” says ASQ quality expert Liz Keim, a past president of ASQ. “So why not leverage some of the same basic tools that bring reliability to critical functions like medical care and air transport to solve quality problems that continue to plague our elections?” she asks.

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Courant Editorial: Don’t Overlook The Assumptions

We agree with the overall thrust and purpose of the editorial, to support the encoding in statute of privacy measures in the polling place to protect secret ballot and voters’ confidence in privacy.

Where we disagree is with some of the assumptions of the ediorial which subtely reaffirm the Courant’s blind faith in the integrity of our optical scan systems

In an editorial today, Protecting Poll Privacy, the Hartford Courant supports SB 444, “An Act Concerning Certain Revisions and Technical Changes to the Election Laws” <read editorial>

We support provisions of the latest versions of H.B. 444 and H.B 5888, “An Act Concerning Revisons To The Optical Scan Voting System”. Revised versions of both bills (not yet available online) passed the Government Administration and Elections Committee last week,

We agree with the overall thrust and purpose of the editorial, to support the encoding in statute of privacy measures in the polling place to protect secret ballot and voters’ confidence in privacy.

Where we disagree is with some of the assumptions of the ediorial which subtely reaffirm the Courant’s blind faith in the integrity of our optical scan systems. Recall a myth based editorial in September that said “So far, no one appears to have figured out how to tamper with the machines” completely ignoring research from around the country including our own University of Connecticut and a full court press to dismiss polls after the New Hampshire primary.

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E-Voting Is Very Different From E-Banking

One more time, in detail from techdirt <read>

the security model of an ATM is totally different from the security model of a voting machine. The most important line of defense against ATM fraud is not the machines themselves, but the fact that they produce a lengthy paper trail. If a hacker breaks into a bank’s network and transfers funds from someone else’s account to his own, two important things will happen.

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Susan Bysiewicz: LHS Invented Our Voting Machines

Surprising information on Colin McEnroe. This is not what I have understood, yet I am always open to new information. <listen>

“We have a type of machine that was invented by LHS Associates in Massachusetts, twenty years ago” – Susan Bysiewicz, Secretary of the State, Connecticut

This is worth a bit of research. How can I doubt the word of a Constitutional Officer who evaluated and signed a $15 million dollar contract for our optical scanners? Perhaps UTC should check into the patent issue.

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Denise Weeks’ Testimony – West Hartford

Denise Weeks, Co-Founder CTVotersCount.org testified at the West Harford hearing <testimony>

Excerpts:

What is most alarming to me is the prevailing belief among registrars of voters and poll workers that machine counts are more reliable than hand counts, that the recent audits demonstrate that machines are more reliable and the conclusion by many that hand counted audits and recounts should be abandoned or replaced by machine audits and recounts.

My experience compels me to argue against these conclusions.

Computers are programmed by people and are every bit as prone to human error as hand counts.

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