Just a step in the right direction: Merrill meets with Homeland Security

“Yesterday, along with representatives from the state’s information technology and public safety departments, I met with regional officials from the United States Department of Homeland Security to discuss how we can work together to ensure that Connecticut elections are safe from outside interference or manipulation. We had a productive meeting and I look forward to working together in the months and years to come to protect our elections, the bedrock of our democracy.” – Denise Merrill, Connecticut Secretary of the State

We applaud this step in the right direction.  Last year as leader of the National Association of Secretaries of State, Merrill opposed the designation of elections as critical infrastructure, leading in expressing the concern for a Federal take-over of elections. We were critical of that stand then and remain so.

In our opinion this is just a step. There are several aspects to election security/integrity that should be addressed,. This  step may assist in those that are under direct control of the of the the State, yet less so those under local control.

Secretary Merrill met with Homeland Security on Thursday:

Merrill Statement on Meeting with DHS Officials Regarding Election Cybersecurity

“Rosenberg, Gabe” <Gabe.Rosenberg@ct.gov>: Oct 27 04:57PM

“Yesterday, along with representatives from the state’s information technology and public safety departments, I met with regional officials from the United States Department of Homeland Security to discuss how we can work together to ensure that Connecticut elections are safe from outside interference or manipulation. We had a productive meeting and I look forward to working together in the months and years to come to protect our elections, the bedrock of our democracy.” – Denise Merrill, Connecticut Secretary of the State

Gabe Rosenberg
Communications Director
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill

We applaud this step in the right direction.  Last year as leader of the National Association of Secretaries of State, Merrill opposed the designation of elections as critical infrastructure, leading in expressing the concern for a Federal take-over of elections. We were critical of that stand then and remain so.

In our opinion this is just a step. There are several aspects to election security/integrity that should be addressed,. This  step may assist in those that are under direct control of the of the the State, yet less so those under local control.  It’s not an issue of a State take-over of local elections, but the impossibility of every town in the State doing what even the NSA has failed at – protecting their most sensitive systems from attack. Yet, like the NSA, the State is capable of doing ever better.

  • We need to protect our Centralized Voter Registration System (CVRS) from corruption and denial of service attacks on election day.
  • We need to protect the CVRS from incremental loss or corruption of data over time.  That means independently logging of every add, change, and delete of the file, balancing, and auditing those changes against the database regularly, and especially in the days and weeks before an election.
  • Making sure that if we use electronic pollbooks that there is a usable paper pollbook in every polling place and a copy of that in the Registrars’ Offices during every election.  We want to avoid the disaster that occurred in a NC county in the last election

Cybersecurity from “outside interference or manipulation” is insufficient. We must prevent insider attacks. We must be able to recover from “interference and manipulation”, since complete prevention is not possible.. As we have said before, database and election integrity depends on Prevention, Detection, and Recovery.

  • We have paper ballots everywhere in Connecticut.  Yet, they need to be protected better.  In the majority of Connecticut municipalities they can be accessed by either Registrar for hours, undetected.  In many, they can be accessed by any official in the Registrars’ Offices, sometimes by other officials.  Without paper that we can trust there can be no detection or recovery from insider attack.
  • We need to have sufficient audits of results we can trust, from the accurate counting/adjudication of paper ballots to the totals reported by the State.  Where necessary those audits ending in full recounts to determine and certify the correct winners.
  • We also need process audits to verify various aspects of the election process:  Comparing checkoffs to ballots counted; verifying ballot security; verifying the integrity of checkoffs to actual legal voters; the integrity of the absentee ballot process, from application integrity,  mail delivery. signature verification, counting etc.

 

 

 

 

RoundUp: Spy vs Spy, while Officials and Voters lose

Almost every day lately there is news on the potential of future and past hacking, including election hacking. Today we suggest three recent articles and a report.

The N.S.A. bans its analysts from using Kaspersky antivirus at the agency, in large part because the agency has exploited antivirus software for its own foreign hacking operations and knows the same technique is used by its adversaries.

If Russia can attack our election, so can others: Iran, North Korea, ISIS, or even criminal or extremist groups.

Exactly a year after U.S. intelligence issued a stern warning about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the Trump administration has failed to fill key homeland security posts responsible for preventing another Kremlin assault on the voting system…

It sounds like science fiction, or at least “Ocean’s 11,” but cybersecurity experts are frantically waving their hands, trying to get Americans to see that in foreign capitals, the American voting system just looks like easy opportunity.

Almost every day lately there is news on the potential of future and past hacking, including election hacking. Today we suggest three recent articles and a report.

Lets start with the story of a hack involving software from Kaspersky Labs in the New York Times: How Israel Caught Russian Hackers Scouring the World for U.S. Secrets  <read>

Before we read the story, remember there is some history here.  Russia is the enemy of choice for the U.S. these days.  The media and Government are biased to attribute any attack to Russia, exaggerate any attack from Russia, and to conflate anything Russian with the Russian Government.  The infamous Stuxnet attack which disabled some of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges was allegedly carried out by Israel and the United States – Kaspersky Labs was one of the main contributors in the discovery and investigation of the attack. We remain skeptical of claims that are not highly documented, yet aware undocumented claims may be true.

The Russian operation, described by multiple people who have been briefed on the matter, is known to have stolen classified documents from a National Security Agency employee who had improperly stored them on his home computer, on which Kaspersky’s antivirus software was installed. What additional American secrets the Russian hackers may have gleaned from multiple agencies, by turning the Kaspersky software into a sort of Google search for sensitive information, is not yet publicly known.

The current and former government officials who described the episode spoke about it on condition of anonymity because of classification rules…

Kaspersky Lab denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, the Russian hacking. “Kaspersky Lab has never helped, nor will help, any government in the world with its cyberespionage efforts,” the company said in a statement Tuesday afternoon. Kaspersky Lab also said it “respectfully requests any relevant, verifiable information that would enable the company to begin an investigation at the earliest opportunity.”…

The N.S.A. bans its analysts from using Kaspersky antivirus at the agency, in large part because the agency has exploited antivirus software for its own foreign hacking operations and knows the same technique is used by its adversaries.

Nobody knows who actually exploited the Kaspersky software, yet it could have been Israel:

The report did not name Israel as the intruder but noted that the breach bore striking similarities to a previous attack, known as “Duqu,” which researchers had attributed to the same nation states responsible for the infamous Stuxnet cyberweapon. Stuxnet was a joint American-Israeli operation that successfully infiltrated Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, and used malicious code to destroy a fifth of Iran’s uranium centrifuges in 2010.

Kaspersky reported that its attackers had used the same algorithm and some of the same code as Duqu, but noted that in many ways it was even more sophisticated. So the company researchers named the new attack Duqu 2.0, noting that other victims of the attack were prime Israeli targets.

This week the DEFCON report on its Election Hacking Village was published:  Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities in
U.S. Election Equipment, Databases, and Infrastructure  <read>

It is a significant event with a short 18 page report.  Well worth reading.  The Forward summarizes it well:

last year’s attack on America’s voting process is as serious a threat to our democracy as any I have ever seen in the last 40+ years–potentially more serious than any physical attack on our Nation. Loss of life and damage to property are tragic, but we are resilient and can recover. Losing confidence in the
security of our voting process–the fundamental link between the American people and our government–could be much more damaging. Inshort, this is a serious national security issue that strikes at the core of our democracy…

If Russia can attack our election, so can others: Iran, North Korea, ISIS, or even criminal or extremist groups. Time is short: our 2018 and 2020 elections are just around the corner and they are lucrative targets for any cyber opponent. We need a sense of urgency now. Finally, this is a national security issue because other democracies–our key allies and partners–are also vulnerable…

For over 40 years I voted by mailing an absentee ballot from wherever I was stationed around the world. I assumed voting security was someone else’s job; I didn’t worry about it. After reading this report, I don’t feel that way anymore. Now I am convinced that I must get involved. I hope you will read this report and come to the same conclusion.

Douglas E. Lute
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired

From Newsweek: Russians Still Have An Open Path to U.S. Election Subversion  <read>

Although some of the references to Russian interference in the following story have been withdrawn and questioned, the basic theme that Congress and the Administration are basically not in action is cause for concern that noting of substance will be accomplished.

Exactly a year after U.S. intelligence issued a stern warning about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the Trump administration has failed to fill key homeland security posts responsible for preventing another Kremlin assault on the voting system…

“The second thing is, the administration doesn’t seem to want to have anybody head up to the Hill and testify on issues that would be hot-button issues, namely anything to do with election security, cyber security, or the Russian acts from last year.”

Unless the administration puts its own political appointees in place at DHS, analysts say, the department will struggle to get protective systems up and running in time for the 2017 primaries and state and local races, let alone the 2018 elections.

And from Politico:  Hacker study: Russia could get into U.S. voting machines  <read>  Not just Russia, however:

American voting machines are full of foreign-made hardware and software, including from China, and a top group of hackers and national security officials says that means they could have been infiltrated last year and into the future. American voting machines are full of foreign-made hardware and software, including from China, and a top group of hackers and national security officials says that means they could have been infiltrated last year and into the future…

“From a technological point of view, this is something that is clearly doable,” said Sherri Ramsay, the former director of the federal Central Security Service Threat Operations Center, which handles cyber threats for the military and the National Security Agency. “For us to turn a blind eye to this, I think that would be very irresponsible on our part.”

Often, voting machine companies argue that their supply chain is secure or that the parts are American-made or that the number of different and disconnected officials administering elections would make a widespread hack impossible. The companies also regularly say that since many machines are not connected to the internet, hackers’ ability to get in is limited.

But at the DEFCON event in Las Vegas, hackers took over voting machines, remotely and exposed personal information in voter files and more…

It sounds like science fiction, or at least “Ocean’s 11,” but cybersecurity experts are frantically waving their hands, trying to get Americans to see that in foreign capitals, the American voting system just looks like easy opportunity.

Skepticism now, Skepticism tomorrow, Skepticism forever

Recent events are a reminder that we must be eternally skeptical. We need to be especially skeptical of the mainstream media as well as other sources.

Today we add the most recent flurry about the “21 states hacked by Russia before the 2016 election”, and more.  The story continues to fall apart, bit by bit. Yet, we suspect the truth is far from common knowledge.

And an Intercept story by Kim Zetter reviewing a report by Kaspersky Lab Masquerading Hackers Are Forcing a Rethink of How Attacks Are Traced. The title pretty much says it all.  Attribution is difficult, yet often possible.

Not expecting to paraphrase George Wallace, a person about as far me politically or as a humanist as one can be.  Yet, recent events are a reminder that we must be eternally skeptical. We need to be especially skeptical of the mainstream media as well as other sources. <here> <here>

Today we add the most recent flurry about the “21 states hacked by Russia before the 2016 election”, and more.  The story continues to fall apart, bit by bit. Yet, we suspect the truth is far from common knowledge:

  • There is no solid evidence available to the public and experts to verify
  • Its not necessarily Russia but people who may be Russian
  • Two years ago the context would have been fears of China, so then many hacks were allegedly Chinese
  • At most one state had data changed, at most otherwise it was attempting to find vulnerabilities — that occurs multiple times a day to almost every server from multiple individuals and groups.
  • The latest is that, so far, two of the states were in correctly included. Yet Another Major Russia Story Falls Apart. Is Skepticism Permissible Yet?  <read>  As we commented on the link:

Our skepticism was justified, it would be even if the story proved true.

I am not a fan of the Russian government system, we should be concerned about China, Russia, and our own actions. Yet, I often read and learn from RT articles.  I find them biased toward publishing factual articles supporting their point of view, yet no more so than FOX, CNN, MSNBC or many other players in the U.S. media.  Like Al Jazeera, RT is journalism and largely accurate, often covering important stories not available elsewhere.  RT and Al Jazerra are hardly Radio Free Europe or Tokyo Rose.  The U.S. is far from innocent when it comes to manipulating elections.  Right now I am in the middle of reading “In the Shadows of the 20th Century”  Here is a quote:

According to a compilation at Carnegie Mellon University, between 1946 and 2000 the rival superpowers intervened in 117 elections, or 11 percent of all the competitive national-level contests held worldwide, via campaign cash and media disinformation.  Significantly, the United States was responsible for eighty-one of these attempts (70 percent of the total) – including eight instances in Italy, five in Japan, and several in Chile and Nicaragua stiffened by CIA paramilitary action.

Now an Intercept story by Kim Zetter reviewing a report by Kaspersky Lab (another company recently trashed because it is Russian) Masquerading Hackers Are Forcing a Rethink of How Attacks Are Traced <read>

The title pretty much says it all.  Attribution is difficult, yet often possible.

We add yes, but without trusted, multiple, third-parties reviewing the evidence and, even better, generating the evidence independently there is little basis for blind trust, while strong skepticism is justified – especially if the claims match the bias and agenda of the source.

 

We need recounts for more than fair elections, for more than Russian risks.

CNN:  For fair elections … can we get a recount?

We should not ignore calls for audits, recounts, and paper ballots just because the motivator for those calls may be simplistic.  There are a multitude  of risks beyond Russians, beyond foreigners, beyond skullduggery. Its not just fairness, it is accuracy and democracy.

CNN:  For fair elections … can we get a recount? <read>

We should not ignore calls for audits, recounts, and paper ballots just because the motivator for those calls may be simplistic.  There are a multitude  of risks beyond Russians, beyond foreigners, beyond skullduggery. Its not just fairness, it is accuracy and democracy.

The latest reporting regarding the scope of attempted Russian cyber-interference in the 2016 presidential election suggests election officials made a mistake in ending efforts to recount the contest in key states. Those recounts offered the best opportunity to identify and resolve issues that are now coming to light. We should study our errors to avoid repeating them — and to make sure recounts in the future are better at detecting hacking and other threats.

Post-election efforts to recount the 2016 presidential vote did not get far. For example, the Michigan recount was shut down after just three days; a federal judge rejected a request to recount paper ballots in Pennsylvania; and while Wisconsin did conduct a recount, in many counties, officials neglected to hand-count paper ballots and did not examine vulnerable software in electronic voting machines.

Just as Donald Trump continues to resist the finding that Russia manipulated our democratic process, he furiously contested the need to investigate the vote…

One clear area of vulnerability then and now is our reliance on electronic voting machines and vote tabulating machines without conducting any meaningful post-election audits. Like any other technology, these devices can fail in unexpected ways. They can have bugs that might produce an incorrect result. When irregularities occur in an election — such as the approximately 84,000 ballots in Michigan on which there were reportedly no selections marked for president — we need to see if an error is to blame.

States (and foreign governments) moving half way toward verifiable election results

From Governing:  After 2016 Election Hacks, Some States Return to Paper Ballots

The Independent, via VerifiedVoting: Norway: Votes to be counted manually in fear of election hacking

We applaud these developments. Yet, what is needed beyond paper ballots are effective post-election audits, those that verify result and can lead to changing incorrect initial outcomes.  Audits that also verify the accumulation of results across jurisdictions;  Audits that check other aspects of the process as checkin, checkin to ballots counts, and ballot security.

From Governing:  After 2016 Election Hacks, Some States Return to Paper Ballots<read>

Across the U.S., about a quarter of registered voters live in election districts with electronic ballots, but Virginia’s decision “could suggest that the DRE era in American elections is approaching its end,” wrote Doug Chapin, an elections expert from the Humphrey School of Public Affairs, on his blog.

Five states — Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey and South Carolina — still use only electronic machines. Another handful of states have a mix of electronic and paper-based machines, depending on the local jurisdiction.

“I do hope that they’ll notice what happened in Virginia,” says Barbara Simons, president of Verified Voting, a national group that supports paper ballots and regular audits of election results. “No elected official wants to be accused of using insecure voting technology, especially with all of the questions raised in 2016.”

The threat of cyberhacks, however, is not the only problem facing election agencies.

The Independent, via VerifiedVoting: Norway: Votes to be counted manually in fear of election hacking <read>

Norway is the second country in Europe to change the way it counts votes. The Netherlands decided to count its March 15 parliamentary elections manually after broadcaster RTL interviewed security experts and hackers who said software security was weak. One hacker claimed an average iPad is better protected than the Dutch electoral system.

We applaud these developments. Yet, what is needed beyond paper ballots are effective post-election audits, those that verify result and can lead to changing incorrect initial outcomes.  Audits that also verify the accumulation of results across jurisdictions;  Audits that check other aspects of the process as checkin, checkin to ballots counts, and ballot security.

Beware of the Watchdog that does not bark any details

NYTimes story that justifies our skepticism on NC ePollbook story:  In Election Interference, Its What Reporters Didn’t Find That Matters

Among other things, we learned that intelligence agencies had intentionally worded their conclusions to specifically address “vote tallying,” not the back-end election systems—conclusions that were not even based on any in-depth investigation of the state election systems or the machines themselves, but on the accounts of American spies and digital intercepts of Russian communications, as well as on assessments by the Department of Homeland Security—which were largely superficial and not based on any in-depth investigation of the state electionsystems or machines themselves.

As we said in our earlier post: See No Evil, Find No Monkey Business, ePollbook Edition

the simple case is that we now have no reason to trust the claim that it was all a simple software error, that the Federal and State Governments were actually protecting us.

NYTimes story that justifies our skepticism on NC ePollbook story:  In Election Interference, Its What Reporters Didn’t Find That Matters <read>

I had been on the cyber beat for six years and had grown accustomed to deep, often lengthy digital forensics analyses of cyber attacks against a wide range of targets: Silicon Valley start-ups, multinational conglomerates, government agencies and our own Times breach by Chinese government hackers. In the vast majority of cases, it takes investigators months or years to discover that hackers had indeed been lurking undetected on victims’ machines…

Yet American intelligence officials were adamant in a report in January—just two months after Election Day—that vote tallies had not been hacked. This despite the broad consensus among United States intelligence agencies that Russia interfered in the 2016 election through an extensive disinformation and propaganda campaign, as well as the hacking of electoral databases and websites, the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.

My colleagues Michael Wines, Matthew Rosenberg and I set out to find out how government officials had nixed the possibility of vote hacking so readily. It was especially unclear to us given that officials at the Department of Homeland Security testified last fall that Russian hackers probed election systems in 21 states, with varying degrees of success, and that months later, a National Security Agency report found that Russian hackers had indeed successfully infiltrated VR Systems, an election service provider in eight states, including he battlegrounds North Carolina, Florida and Virginia.

As we dug more into our investigation, the more unresolved incidents we found.

Among other things, we learned that intelligence agencies had intentionally worded their conclusions to specifically address “vote tallying,” not the back-end election systems—conclusions that were not even based on any in-depth investigation of the state election systems or the machines themselves, but on the accounts of American spies and digital intercepts of Russian communications, as well as on assessments by the Department of Homeland Security—which were largely superficial and not based on any in-depth investigation of the state election systems or machines themselves.

In fact, we discovered that precious little research had been conducted, the result of legal limits on the authority of intelligence agencies to address domestic issues and states’ historic reluctance to permit federal oversight of elections.

This is associated with another story in the NYTimes: Russian Election Hacking Efforts, Wider Than Previously Known, Draw Little Scrutiny<read>

 

In Durham, a local firm with limited digital forensics or software engineering expertise produced a confidential report, much of it involving interviews with poll workers, on the county’s election problems. The report was obtained by The Times, and election technology specialists who reviewed it at the Times’ request said the firm had not conducted any malware analysis or checked to see if any of the e-poll book software was altered, adding that the report produced more questions than answers.

Neither VR Systems — which operates in seven states beyond North Carolina — nor local officials were warned before Election Day that Russian hackers could have compromised their software. After problems arose, Durham County rebuffed help from the Department of Homeland Security and Free & Fair, a team of digital election-forensics experts who volunteered to conduct a free autopsy. The same was true elsewhere across the country.

As we said in our earlier post: See No Evil, Find No Monkey Business, ePollbook Edition <read>

the simple case is that we now have no reason to trust the claim that it was all a simple software error, that the Federal and State Governments were actually protecting us.

We will post this under Skullduggery and Errors, since obfuscating and distorting the facts is deliberate skullduggery.

See No Evil, Find No Monkey Business, ePollbook Edition

NPR All Things Considered Russian Cyberattack Targeted Elections Vendor Tied To Voting Day Disruptions

“Voters were going in and being told that they had already voted — and they hadn’t,” recalls Allison Riggs, an attorney with the Southern Coalition for Social Justice.

The electronic systems — known as poll books — also indicated that some voters had to show identification, even though they did not.

Timeline: Foreign Efforts To Hack State Election Systems And How Officials Responded
Investigators later discovered the company that provided those poll books had been the target of a Russian cyberattack…

NPR All Things Considered Russian Cyberattack Targeted Elections Vendor Tied To Voting Day Disruptions  <read>

When people in several North Carolina precincts showed up to vote last November, weird things started to happen with the electronic systems used to check them in.

“Voters were going in and being told that they had already voted — and they hadn’t,” recalls Allison Riggs, an attorney with the Southern Coalition for Social Justice.

The electronic systems — known as poll books — also indicated that some voters had to show identification, even though they did not.

Timeline: Foreign Efforts To Hack State Election Systems And How Officials Responded
Investigators later discovered the company that provided those poll books had been the target of a Russian cyberattack…

“I became really concerned that this might be a cyberattack, some sort of cyber event,” says [Susan] Greenhalgh.

Despite NSA Claim, Elections Vendor Denies System Was Compromised In Hack Attempt
But she had trouble getting anyone’s attention. Greenhalgh says a contact she had at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was concerned but said there was little federal officials could do unless the state requested help…

“States were very adamant about declaring their independence from the federal government with respect to the 2016 election and, of course, we respected that,” says Ferrante. “However, we wanted to make sure we were prepared and assets were available in the event that states did call us for assistance.”

North Carolina didn’t call for aid. Instead, officials assured federal authorities that things were under control and that they had switched to the paper poll books.

The problem was, on Election Day, the state was operating with limited information. It was unaware that Russian hackers had tried to break into VR Systems, which provided the poll books for 21 North Carolina counties.

It appears from the article that officials may finally be giving more scrutiny, yet the simple case is that we now have no reason to trust the claim that it was all a simple software error, that the Federal and State Governments were actually protecting us.  And it is the very type of ePollbooks the Russians may have hacked.  That is not all.

The investigation was triggered by the leak made public by the Intercept, allegedly from Reality Winner:  Report from North Carolina Makes Reality Winner Leak Far More Important  <read>

Because of the publicity surrounding the VR targeting — thanks to the document leaked by Winner — NC has now launched an investigation…

So this may be the first concrete proof that Russian hackers affected the election. But we’ll only find out of that’s true thanks to Winner’s leak.

Except she can’t raise that at trial.

Last week, Magistrate Judge Brian Epps imposed a protection order in her case that prohibits her or her team from raising any information from a document the government deems to be classified, even if that document has been in the public record. That includes the document she leaked.

The protective order is typical for leak cases. Except in this case, it covers information akin to information that appeared in other outlets without eliciting a criminal prosecution. And more importantly, Winner could now point to an important benefit of her leak, if only she could point to the tie between her leak and this investigation in North Carolina.

BradCast DefCon: David Jefferson on hacking of almost every voting machine

As Brad says

Hopefully, what happened in Vegas does not stay in Vegas

We are not so optimistic.  We have a long history of getting excited about voting irregularities and risks, followed by officials and the general public moving on.

As Brad says

Hopefully, what happened in Vegas does not stay in Vegas

We are not so optimistic.  We have a long history of getting excited about voting irregularities and risks, followed by officials and the general public moving on. As Obama said in 2012 “We have got to fix this”. He created a solid commission that made a significant report, yet by then the country had moved on.  This time, starting before the election, we have Secretaries of the State and Homeland Security telling us there is nothing to see here. Misinformed at best, self serving propaganda at worst.  From the BradCast <read>

“That room was just crowded from morning to night,” Jefferson says, describing the room at DefCon. “And the amazing thing is that all of those successful hacks, these were by people who, most of them, had never seen a voting machine before, and certainly not the system sitting in front of them, and they had not met each other before. They didn’t come with a full set of tools that were tailored toward attacking these machines. They just started with a piece of hardware in front of them and their own laptops and ingenuity, attacking the various systems. And it was amazing how quickly they did it!”

Jefferson tells me, after all of these years, he is now seeing a major difference among the public, as well as election and elected officials (a number of whom were also in attendance), regarding the decades-long concerns by experts about electronic voting, tabulation and registration systems.

“I am seeing a kind of sea change here. For the first time, I am sensing that election officials, and the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI, and the intelligence community, and Congress, and the press, are suddenly, after the 2016 election experience, receptive to our message that these systems are extremely vulnerable and it’s a serious national security issue. As you know, in a democracy, the legitimacy of government depends on free and fair and secure elections. And people are beginning to realize that we haven’t had those for a long time.” 

“I am seeing a kind of sea change here. For the first time, I am sensing that election officials, and the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI, and the intelligence community, and Congress, and the press, are suddenly, after the 2016 election experience, receptive to our message that these systems are extremely vulnerable and it’s a serious national security issue. As you know, in a democracy, the legitimacy of government depends on free and fair and secure elections. And people are beginning to realize that we haven’t had those for a long time.”

He explains how hacking methods attributed by many to Russians following the 2016 elections “are the same methods that anyone on Earth could use — insiders, criminal syndicates, nation-states other than Russia, as well, or our own political partisans. The fear, of course, is that these hacking attempts will be totally undetectable. But even if they are detectable, it’s difficult often to determine who did it, whether it’s an insider, or a domestic partisan, or some foreign organization.”

He also confirms what I’ve been trying to point out since the 2016 election, that despite officials continuously claiming that no voting results were changed by anyone, be it Russia or anybody else, “they cannot know that. They simply can’t know. Certainly in those states where there are no paper ballots, such as in Georgia, for example, it’s impossible for them to know. And even in states where there are, if they don’t go back and either recount the paper ballots, or at least recount a random sample of them, no, they can’t know either.”

“Election officials have fooled themselves into believing the claims of their [private voting machine] vendors that the systems are secure from all kinds of attack. And it’s just never been true,” Jefferson argues.

Not much different than what we have all been saying for many years.  Let us hope with Brad that this time many will hear and act!

I highly recommend listening to the podcast which has much more than than Brad’s post.  The election discussion starts about 40% into the podcast.

Common Sense: Limits on Testing From Turing to Self Driving Cars

At first this may not seem like Common Sense. We have the famous Turing Halting Problem which has some very important consequences for voting which may not, at first, make common sense:

Note: This is then thirteenth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous>

At first this may not seem like Common Sense. We have the famous Turing Halting Problem which has some very important consequences for voting which may not, at first, make common sense:

  • We cannot use testing to be sure that the software in a voting machine will provide accurate election results.
  • And any hardware circuits are also part of the machine and come under the limits of the halting problem

It is worse, beyond the halting problem:

  • We really have no way of knowing if the software that actually ran on a machine when the results were created and printed was actually the approved, tested software.
  • We really have no way of determining if the results were somehow changed by some some means external to the software.
  • We have no way of really determining that the components of the hardware were what were tested were actually those running the machine.
  • There could also be permanent or intermittent hardware errors.
  • The hardware errors could include logic circuits, wires, or sensors.

At this point you may be complaining that this is crazy or at least not common sense.

Consider the idea of self-driving cars.  How comfortable are you with them today?  Do you think testing is sufficient?  Maybe. Yet, they could be subject to intermittent errors and hacking – similar to today’s vehicles that rely almost entirely on software to translate the driver’s commands into action. See:  <60 Minutes Shows Threats to Autos and Voting Machines are Real>

The NEW Rob Georgia

While attention was appropriately aimed at FL and OH respectively in 2000 and 2004, Georgia perhaps remains as the most questionable state for voting integrity in the nation.  Many overlooked the questionable elections there highlighted by Bev Harris in Chapter 11 of Black Box Voting: Rob Georgia, Noun or Verb? <read>

Now we have the story on the vulnerabilities in Georgia in 2017 by Kim Zetter.  Here is her 20 minute interview on yesterday’s Fresh Air: <listen>

And her earlier extensive article at Politico:  Will the Georgia Special Election Be Hacked? <read>

“I was like whoa, whoa. … I did not mean to do that. … I was absolutely stunned, just the sheer quantity of files I had acquired,” he tells Politico Magazine in his first interview since discovering the massive security breach.

As Georgia prepares for a special runoff election this month in one of the country’s most closely watched congressional races, and as new reports emerge about Russian attempts to breach American election systems, serious questions are being raised about the state’s ability to safeguard the vote…

Be careful what you ask for. Georgia has gone from risky to even more questionable as the Secretary of State’s office is taking over the programming of the voting systems from Kennesaw State U. as the Secretary is running for Governor.

While attention was appropriately aimed at FL and OH respectively in 2000 and 2004, Georgia perhaps remains as the most questionable state for voting integrity in the nation.  Many overlooked the questionable elections there highlighted by Bev Harris in Chapter 11 of Black Box Voting: Rob Georgia, Noun or Verb? <read>

Now we have the story on the vulnerabilities in Georgia in 2017 by Kim Zetter.  Here is her 20 minute interview on yesterday’s Fresh Air: <listen>

And her earlier extensive article at Politico:  Will the Georgia Special Election Be Hacked? <read>

“I was like whoa, whoa. … I did not mean to do that. … I was absolutely stunned, just the sheer quantity of files I had acquired,” he tells Politico Magazine in his first interview since discovering the massive security breach.

As Georgia prepares for a special runoff election this month in one of the country’s most closely watched congressional races, and as new reports emerge about Russian attempts to breach American election systems, serious questions are being raised about the state’s ability to safeguard the vote…

Be careful what you ask for. Georgia has gone from risky to even more questionable as the Secretary of State’s office is taking over the programming of the voting systems from Kennesaw State U. as the Secretary is running for Governor.

Here is more on calls before the Special Election for Georgia to use a paper ballot  <read>