Mail/Absentee Voting | CTVotersCount.org

Supreme Court to Bridgeport: Those sort of things just aren’t done in CT

In a 3am decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a third primary in Bridgeport. CTPost: Supreme Court orders 3rd primary for Bridgeport

“Citizens can expect and are entitled to integrity in the process and a fundamentally fair and honest election, and this, I regret to say, they did not get,” the judge stated in overturning the results of the primary and ordering a new one.

In a 3am decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a third primary in Bridgeport. CTPost: Supreme Court orders 3rd primary for Bridgeport <read>

The state’s highest court agreed that Superior Court Judge Barbara Bellis was within her right to throw out the results of two previous primaries after she ruled they were skewed by political corruption.

“Citizens can expect and are entitled to integrity in the process and a fundamentally fair and honest election, and this, I regret to say, they did not get,” the judge stated in overturning the results of the primary and ordering a new one…

During a hearing Dec. 21, lawyers for the city of Bridgeport had asked the justices to answer four questions regarding the legality of Judge Bellis’ decision: if state law prohibits any person other than the elector from arranging for a designee to return an absentee ballot to the town clerk; did the judge err in rejecting the unpostmarked ballots; did the judge err in her Northbridge ruling and did the judge wrongfully apply the law in ruling there were substantial violations of law that left the reliability of the election in doubt.

In its one-page decision released shortly after 3 a.m. on Friday, the Supreme Court simply ruled “Yes,” to the first question, “No,” to the second, “Yes,” to the third and “No,” to the fourth question.

Once again, we oppose no-excuse or all mail-in voting for two reasons. 1) Its where the fraud actually occurs, ongoingly. 2) Despite common sense, increased mail-in voting does not increase turnout. (See: Grand Theft Absentee)

Just a step in the right direction: Merrill meets with Homeland Security

“Yesterday, along with representatives from the state’s information technology and public safety departments, I met with regional officials from the United States Department of Homeland Security to discuss how we can work together to ensure that Connecticut elections are safe from outside interference or manipulation. We had a productive meeting and I look forward to working together in the months and years to come to protect our elections, the bedrock of our democracy.” – Denise Merrill, Connecticut Secretary of the State

We applaud this step in the right direction. Last year as leader of the National Association of Secretaries of State, Merrill opposed the designation of elections as critical infrastructure, leading in expressing the concern for a Federal take-over of elections. We were critical of that stand then and remain so.

Secretary Merrill met with Homeland Security on Thursday:

Merrill Statement on Meeting with DHS Officials Regarding Election Cybersecurity

“Rosenberg, Gabe” <Gabe.Rosenberg@ct.gov>: Oct 27 04:57PM

“Yesterday, along with representatives from the state’s information technology and public safety departments, I met with regional officials from the United States Department of Homeland Security to discuss how we can work together to ensure that Connecticut elections are safe from outside interference or manipulation. We had a productive meeting and I look forward to working together in the months and years to come to protect our elections, the bedrock of our democracy.” – Denise Merrill, Connecticut Secretary of the State

Gabe Rosenberg
Communications Director
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill

In our opinion this is just a step. There are several aspects to election security/integrity that should be addressed,. This step may assist in those that are under direct control of the of the the State, yet less so those under local control. It’s not an issue of a State take-over of local elections, but the impossibility of every town in the State doing what even the NSA has failed at – protecting their most sensitive systems from attack. Yet, like the NSA, the State is capable of doing ever better.

We need to protect our Centralized Voter Registration System (CVRS) from corruption and denial of service attacks on election day.
We need to protect the CVRS from incremental loss or corruption of data over time. That means independently logging of every add, change, and delete of the file, balancing, and auditing those changes against the database regularly, and especially in the days and weeks before an election.
Making sure that if we use electronic pollbooks that there is a usable paper pollbook in every polling place and a copy of that in the Registrars’ Offices during every election. We want to avoid the disaster that occurred in a NC county in the last election

Cybersecurity from “outside interference or manipulation” is insufficient. We must prevent insider attacks. We must be able to recover from “interference and manipulation”, since complete prevention is not possible.. As we have said before, database and election integrity depends on Prevention, Detection, and Recovery.

We have paper ballots everywhere in Connecticut. Yet, they need to be protected better. In the majority of Connecticut municipalities they can be accessed by either Registrar for hours, undetected. In many, they can be accessed by any official in the Registrars’ Offices, sometimes by other officials. Without paper that we can trust there can be no detection or recovery from insider attack.
We need to have sufficient audits of results we can trust, from the accurate counting/adjudication of paper ballots to the totals reported by the State. Where necessary those audits ending in full recounts to determine and certify the correct winners.
We also need process audits to verify various aspects of the election process: Comparing checkoffs to ballots counted; verifying ballot security; verifying the integrity of checkoffs to actual legal voters; the integrity of the absentee ballot process, from application integrity, mail delivery. signature verification, counting etc.

Testimony on Early Voting and Registrar’s Bills

Yesterday, we submitted testimony on a number of early voting bills and a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.

The primary reason to avoid expanded mail-in or no-excuse absentee voting is the opportunity for and documented record of absentee voting fraud. There are other reasons:

Contrary to a touted benefit – early voting DECREASES turnout…

And a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.

As an election official, I am sympathetic to the wish of Registrars to make their jobs simpler. Yet, my sympathy ends when it results in barriers to participation in democracy for candidates and citizens.

Yesterday, we submitted testimony on a number of early voting bills and a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.

Our testimony of a variety of early voting bills <read>

We oppose expanded mail-in voting in any form, including no-excuse absentee voting. As I testified several times in the past, we have no objection to a Constitutional Amendment authorizing the General Assembly to legislate early voting, provided, that voters are clearly informed of the amendment’s intent for the form(s) of early voting to be authorized.

The primary reason to avoid expanded mail-in or no-excuse absentee voting is the opportunity for and documented record of absentee voting fraud. There are other reasons:

Contrary to a touted benefit – early voting DECREASES turnout – An academic report concluded that early voting, including mail-in voting, decreases turnout by 3%. An earlier report showed a reduction of 2.6% to 2.9%.

It disenfranchises voters, not providing the opportunity to revote when they mistakenly overvote.

It disenfranchises voters, when applications or ballots are lost or delayed in the mail.

…We could support a version of in-person early voting as suggested by S.J.27.

However, any such approach should have sufficient provisions to provide:

Assurance that voters can receive impartial voting instructions and the opportunity for spoiling ballots and trying again.

Sufficient provisions for security of ballots, check-in lists, and voting machines in periods when voting does not occur.

Absentee ballots should be included in all post-election audits. This becomes more and more important as the number of absentee votes increases.

Our testimony on the Registrars bill <read>

The Citizen Audit supports one provision:

Lines 86-90 requiring the permanent posting of declaratory rulings, opinions, and regulations by the Secretary of the State on the web.

The Citizen Audit opposes one provisions as currently written:

Lines 131-132 require that random audit drawings be held within 72 hours of the election. We agree that a deadline should be set for the random drawing which has often occurred very late in the process, causing problems for election officials and the public. However, vote counting does not complete until 48 hours after the election. The drawing should be held sometime after all results are reported to the Secretary of the State and available for public review on the Secretary’s election reporting system. Also, the random drawing should have a required advanced notification. See our testimony on S.B. 540. We suggest the following substitute language:

“and take place not later than the 8^th day after any election or primary and be noticed to the public by press release at least three business days in advance.”

The Citizen Audit completely opposes one provision:

Lines 149-156 would remove the requirement that the Secretary of the State consult with the University of Connecticut for the approval of electronic pollbooks. Was this proposed be because Prof. Shvartsman of UConn has tested several available electronic pollbooks and found them all lacking? (Ref: Video of NH Forum on Electronic Pollbooks, on May 10, 2016 at 30min: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtYJkVNIGMA or as covered by the Manchester Union Leader: https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/16/05/UnionLeader20160511.pdf)

I personally oppose one other provision:

Sections 8 and 9 preclude voters who register after petitions become available from being counted for the petition. This would reduce ballot access for petitioning primary candidates. It would reduce participation and preclude a standard practice that results in more eligible voters registering.

It is normal and vital to success for petitioning candidates and their supporters to approach citizens that are unaffiliated and ask them to sign the petition by simultaneously reregistering in the candidate’s party – this change would preclude that. They also approach eligible citizens to encourage them to sign the petition and simultaneously register for the first time – this change would preclude that.

As an election official, I am sympathetic to the wish of Registrars to make their jobs simpler. Yet, my sympathy ends when it results in barriers to participation in democracy for candidates and citizens.

Better Access To Voting Within Reach In CT (Annotated)

Courant Editorial, Sunday November 20th: Better Access To Voting Within Reach In CT

We have long had concerns with extending mail-in voting, aka no excuse absentee voting. We also support in-person early voting, if we are willing to pay for it. We have a new Courant Editorial joining Denise Merrill in a renewed push for early voting, defeated two years ago by the voters of Connecticut, consistent with our warnings but not our prediction.

Connecticut is one of only a handful of states that does not allow in-person voting before Election Day and requires those casting absentee ballots to provide an excuse — two unnecessary and antiquated barriers to participation in the political process. [Unnecessary only for those who lack concern for election integrity, turnout, and costs]

Courant Editorial, Sunday November 20th: Better Access To Voting Within Reach In CT <read>

Connecticut is one of only a handful of states that does not allow in-person voting before Election Day and requires those casting absentee ballots to provide an excuse — two unnecessary and antiquated barriers to participation in the political process. [Unnecessary only for those who lack concern for election integrity, turnout, and costs]

But Secretary of the State Denise Merrill has a smart, two-pronged plan that would make it easier to cast a ballot and give more people access to the workings of democracy.

A record number of Connecticut residents were registered to vote in this year’s presidential election, but only about three-quarters of them actually cast a ballot. Procrastination, apathy and disgust certainly kept many people at home. For others, though, there can be no doubt that the inconvenience of voting was the primary factor. [Note that we also enhanced our motor-voter system and thus registered many with no intention to vote, so that could also account for some of the difference, as we predicted.]

Consider a person who commutes to work in New York City every day. She had to get on the train in West Haven at 6:47 a.m. and wouldn’t get back until after 8 p.m. Perhaps she tried to vote at 6 a.m. when the polls opened, but the line was long, and she had a train to catch. So she didn’t vote. [Checking the Metro-North schedule, she is actually eligible to vote absentee if she left town on the 5:51am or could arrive at her polling place to vote at 6:00am, then she would likely still make the 6:47am or catch the next trains at 6:53am or 7:13am, actually the 6:53am would get her in to Grand Central 10 minutes earlier than the 6:47am! In any case, she could vote with just a little effort.]

If Connecticut allowed early voting, she would have had more days to vote and lines would have been shorter [Not necessarily, since early voting might itself have very long lines, or to pay for early voting towns could scrimp on both staffing election day and early voting. Some states with early voting have long lines.], or she could have rearranged her schedule [Yes, she could rearrange her schedule with no change in CT law]. Or she could have cast an absentee ballot, if Connecticut didn’t have such strict laws regarding who can take advantage of that simple solution. [Or as we said left on an earlier or later train.]

Ms. Merrill’s plan addresses both situations by recommending a simple change to the absentee ballot law and a constitutional amendment to allow early voting. [Depending on if the “simple” change allows regional voting. See the Courant’s version of early voting below.]

The legislature should make both of those options happen in the coming session. [Which they cannot because the voters must approve Constitutional Amendments.]

Ms. Merrill proposes amending the state constitution to explicitly allow in-person early voting for two to five days within two weeks before the election and to allow anyone to vote absentee without having to meet specific conditions. [That might pass. Last time, the Constitutional Amendment gave the General Assembly a blank check to do anything with early voting.] To get on the ballot, it would have to be approved by 75 percent of the legislature during the coming session. Those simple changes would clear away the most onerous legal barriers. [75% would be an almost impossible hurdle. The previous amendment took the path of a majority of two General Assembly’s to pass. So, by our understanding the next time such an amendment could be on the ballot is 2020.]

The second prong is to simply amend the law that describes who is eligible to vote absentee. Under current law, one of the acceptable “excuses” for voting absentee is that the voter is out of town all day. Ms. Merrill’s proposal would remove seven words — “during all of the hours of voting” — from the law, thereby making the hypothetical commuter eligible to vote absentee. Another smart, and simple, change. [Hard to justify given the debate on the previous amendment that a Constitutional change was necessary for unlimited absentee voting.]

The drawbacks are few. There could be increased costs to towns to keep polls open and staffed for those extra days, but ensuring everyone can exercise their most fundamental American right must be the top priority, if not the basic responsibility, of every municipality. The few dollars it might cost are not worth quibbling over. [Maybe not, yet there are not that many polling places with long lines in Connecticut. That problem can be solved with one or two additional individuals manning check-in lines at polling places that had lines this year. Adding the equivalent one-half person for each polling place would cost about $80,000. Staffing a polling place with only one line in 169 municipalities for one day would cost about $270,000, just for the polling place staff. Lines and the requirement for more checkers would occur once every four years, while early voting would presumably be required for every election, primary, and referendum.]

Ms. Merrill’s proposed constitutional amendment also would allow early voting to be done regionally — for example, the city of Hartford could allow early voting only at city hall instead of staffing all of the individual polling places across the city for five days. It might be more difficult for someone in the city to make it to city hall than to their own polling location, but given enough time to vote, along with easy no-excuse absentee voting, residents will have more opportunity to cast a ballot. [The Constitutional Amendment gets longer here, and voting in a region, not just one city gets complex, unless the entire election function is regionalized (which we do support).]

Some politicians might be inclined to consider whether early voting would benefit one party over the other by expanding access to specific demographic groups, such as commuters or urban residents. But there isn’t strong evidence that early voting has any such effect, and in any event, it’s far better for politicians to try to convince voters that their platform is the right one than to try to win an election by excluding, or including, certain demographic groups. [And turnout could be increased by better and more candidates. We could enhance turnout and interest by leveling the playing field for third-party and petitioning candidates – a move unlikely to please either major party.]

There is one, and only one, good reason to allow people to vote before Elenntion Day: because it allows, and encourages, more people to vote. [Actually it does not. Studies have shown that Early Voting actually decreases turnout.]

Reminder: We would support in-person Early Voting, if we are willing to pay for it. i.e. provide for a complete voting experience along with integrity of the process, especially providing effective protection from ballot skullduggery.

**********Update:
An example of the problem of long lines. It will not be fixed by early voting. It will be fixed by competence: New Haven Independent: Probe Sought of [New Haven] Election Mess <read>

Is our election hackable or not?

We hear from Richard Clarke, President Obama, Pam Smith, and Secretary of the State Denise Merrill. We annotate Denise Merrill’s recent press conference.

Richard Clark, former White House senior cybersecurity policy adviser via ABC News: Yes, It’s Possible to Hack the Election <read>

Those experiences confirm my belief that if sophisticated hackers want to get into any computer or electronic device, even one that is not connected to the internet, they can do so. The U.S., according to media reports, hacked in to the Iranian nuclear centrifuge control system even though the entire system was air-gapped from the internet. The Russians, according to authoritative accounts, hacked into the Pentagon’s SIPRNet, a secret-level system separate from the internet. North Koreans, computer forensics experts have told me, penetrated SWIFT, the international banking exchange system. Iranians allegedly wiped clean all software on over 30,000 devices in the Aramco oil company. The White House, the State Department and your local fast food joint have all been hacked. Need I go on?…

Some systems produce a paper ballot of record, but that paper is kept only for a recount; votes are recorded by a machine such as an optical scanner and then stored as electronic digits. The counting of the paper ballots of record — when there are such things — is exceedingly rare and is almost never done for verification in the absence of a recount demand.

President Obama via NPR: President Obama: The Election Will Not Be ‘Rigged’ <read>

“Of course the election will not be rigged! What does that mean?” Obama said at a news conference at the Pentagon. “That’s ridiculous. That doesn’t make any sense.”

The president added Americans should not take Trump’s musings on this seriously. “We do take seriously, as we always do,” the president said, “our responsibilities to monitor and preserve the integrity of the voting process.”

Pam Smith, Verified Voting via NPR: Hacking An Election: Why It’s Not As Far-Fetched As You Might Think <read>

“Wherever there’s a fully electronic voting system, there’s potential for tampering of some kind,” said Pamela Smith, president of Verified Voting. She says her nonprofit group has been warning about such tampering for years.

Smith says the Democratic Party hacks are another red flag that someone might try to interfere with election results, and that there are many ways to do that.

“If you can get at an election management system, you could potentially alter results, or muddy up the results, or you could even just shed doubt on the outcome because you make it clear that there’s been tampering,” she says.

Denise Merrill, Connecticut Secretary of the State and President of the National Association of Secretaries of State, press conference as reported by CTNewsJunkie: Merrill Defends Integrity of Connecticut’s Voting System <read> With our annotations in [brackets]

I think it’s highly improbable at best that a national system of elections could be hacked. First of all there is no national system of elections,” Merrill, who is president of the National Association of Secretaries of State said Wednesday. “Our election system is extremely decentralized.” [This is a strawman. It does not take a national hack. In a close election hacking just one or two swing states could do the job. In fact, just a couple of polling places the winner of the Electoral College could have been changed either way in Florida alone. A single state could have made the difference in 2004 and 1960. ]

She said there is no credible cyber security threat. [This is just plain false in the light of all the know hacks of government, election, and corporate hacks. Perhaps it is taken out of context.]

In Connecticut there is no county government, so there are 169 towns who are all in charge of running the election and none of them are connected to the Internet. [All of them are connected to the Internet. Especially to the Central Voter Registration System, critical on election day for 5% to 10% of the vote. Also for the new end of day Election Night Reporting System. I applaud the Secretary for continuing to follow the recommendations of UConn implemented by the Bysiewicz administration to keep the voting machines from the Internet. Unfortunately that does not guarantee security. a) See the Stuxnet attack, it attacked Iran’s nuclear centrifuges which were isolated from the Internet. b) It is easy for single insider to hack the voting machines in a single town. Sadly, officials in each of 169 towns cannot approach the levels of security of Military, Government, or Corporate installations, all of which have been hacked by insiders and outsiders.]

“The idea that somehow there could be some national system hack is very unlikely,” Merrill said. [I agree, yet it is a strawman argument]

She said different states are using different kinds of election equipment, but Connecticut is using optical scan machines, which are not connected to the Internet.

Alexander Schwarzmann, head of the University of Connecticut’s Voter Technology Research Center, said there is no possible way to connect the optical scan voting machines to the Internet.

He said Connecticut’s optical scan machines also rely on a paper ballot so those can be counted independently of technology. [As we have said many times, it depends on who wants to look. Go to your town hall and ask to see and count the ballots.]

Merrill said there’s been a lot of pressure on the state to go to some type of Internet voting, but she has resisted. The state purchased the optical scan machines about 10 years ago and have developed an auditing process for the memory cards that are inserted into the machines…[As we have told the Secretary and others several times, defending against Internet voting has been her finest hour!]

Peggy Reeves, director of elections, said most of the mistakes made in elections can be attributed to “human error.” [Unfortunately, too often the SOTS Office and registrars assume that any differences in a post-election audit, without investigation, actually are human error in machine counts. Sometimes the scanners have counted incorrectly in Connecticut, sometimes local official pursue the problem and determine it was not human error in the hand count, but human error in the election process that lead to an incorrect count being certified for the election. Hacking, fraud, machine error, or errors in the process all must be investigated, resolved, and prevented in the future. ]

Merrill said she wanted to sit down with the media Wednesday to “reassure the voters” that Connecticut’s voting system is secure. [Overconfidence is a standard concern of security professionals as an indicator of security risk.]

As far as fraud is concerned, Merrill said the concern in Connecticut is whether people are appropriately filing absentee ballots. She said the law says a person must be absent from the state or unable to get to the polls from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. [We agree absentee voting fraud should be a concern. That is why we warn against all -mail voting, and no-excuse absentee voting.]

Also a Courant article covering the same press conference: <read>

…during a demonstration in Merrill’s office, Peggy Reeves, the state director of elections, showed how the machine is locked with a tamper-proof seal. The UConn Center for Voting Technology Research tests the memory cards the machines use before and after each election.

As we said in our comment on the article:

To be clear CT does not use “Tamper Proof” anything tape or seals. They are called “Tamper Evident”. What that means is that if officials follow good seal protocols and the seals are actually “tamper evident” as applied then officials should be able to detect if they have been tampered with.

Connecticut does not have, as far as I know, any such protocols. Many apply the seals in ways that could easily be compromised. NJ tried six times to create effective seal protocols and failed each time. Finally, seals are designed to prevent outsiders from tampering without detection by insiders. It would be much more difficult for seals to protect against insider access.

Also the Secretary of the State on Where We Live: <Listen>

We called in and discussed the Election Performance Index, areas it does not cover, and the cyber risks to our Election Day Registration System. The Secretary stated that we “Audit all voting machines”. That is incorrect. We audit 5% of polling place voting machines (until July 1st we audited 10%), never audit central count absentee ballot systems, and the audit, as conducted, is insufficient to provide the credibility Connecticut voters deserve. <See the observation reports at the Citizen Audit>

Brennan Center: Election Integrity: A Pro-Voter Agenda

Whenever we open a report with multiple recommendations we start from a skeptical point of view. We expect to agree with some proposals and disagree with others. A new report from the Brennan Center for Justice is the exception. We agree with every recommendation:
Election Integrity: A Pro-Voter Agenda

It starts with the right criteria, it has a great agenda, strong supporting arguments, and ends with an appropriate call to action

It starts with the right criteria it has a great agenda, strong supporting arguments, and ends with an appropriate call to action:

This history strongly suggests two overarching principles that should guide any further efforts to secure election integrity. Such efforts should have two key elements:

First, they should target abuses that actually threaten election security.

Second, they should curb fraud or impropriety without unduly discouraging or disenfranchising eligible voters.

Efforts that do not include these elements will just result in burdens to voters and little payoff.

One: Modernize Voter Registration to Improve Voter Rolls

Two: Ensure Security and Reliability of Our Voting Machines

Three: Do Not Implement Internet Voting Systems Until Security is Proven

Four: Adopt Only Common-Sense Voter Identification Proposals

Five: Increase Security of Mail-In Ballots

Six: Protect Against Insider Wrongdoing

We do not have to choose between election integrity and election access. Indeed, free and fair access is necessary for an election to have integrity. This report examined genuine risks to the security of elections, highlighting current vulnerabilities as well as those that will be faced in the future. Recommendations have been made about how to reduce each risk. We invite and urge policymakers to tackle these problems.

As examples, we particularly support its call for sufficient post-election audits and attention to detecting, preventing, and punishing insider fraud:

Require Post-Election Audits. Many machines now issue a paper record of a voter’s selection. But these records are of little security value without audits to ensure that vote tallies recorded by a particular machine match any paper records. Despite near universal expert agreement on the need for audits, some vendors have vigorously opposed these paper trails, contending that they increase costs and slow the voting process. Security experts also recommend that states pass laws for effective “risk-limiting audits.” These require examination of a large enough sample of ballots to provide statistically “strong evidence that the reported election outcome was correct — if it was.” Also, the audit process should not rely on any one individual who might be in a position to manipulate either the voting machine or the recount device. According to experts, these insider attacks are the most difficult to stop. Voting technology experts also say machines must be “software independent,” which is technically defined as when “an (undetected) change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome,” but practically speaking means that the election results can be captured independently of the machine’s own software. Auditors should be assigned randomly to further ensure the process is not being gamed. Finally, audits should be as transparent as possible. This not only is essential to garnering public confidence, but can show a defeated candidate that she lost the election in a contest that was free and fair…

It is not surprising that many instances of election fraud, both historically and in the present day, involve the actions of insiders. Recent abuses by insiders have included lawmakers lying about where they live, magistrate judges willfully registering ineligible persons, and legislators running fraudulent absentee ballot schemes. A pollworker in Ohio was famously found guilty of using her authority and training to conduct voter fraud and take certain steps to evade detection. Culprits have even included the chief election officer of Indiana. This is why election officials and workers should receive special attention because their insider status increases their opportunity to both abuse the system and avoid detection. Moreover, when organizational leaders are involved in wrongdoing, it can create a culture for fraud, encouraging others to commit misconduct.

Does All Mail Voting Increase Turnout?

In the long run, apparently Not or Not Much.

Article from the Washington Post, from researcher Elizabeth Bergman: Voting only by mail can decrease turnout. Or increase it. Wait, what?

My research found that when you can only vote by mail, voter turnout actually drops by about 13 percent. I examined what happens to turnout if voting by mail is compulsory. I studied more than 90,000 voters who could vote only by mail across four elections from 2006 through 2008 in five of the most populous urban counties in California. (In that state, if a precinct has fewer than 250 voters, elections officials are allowed to forego a polling place and accept ballots only by mail.)

That decline may seem counterintuitive. Presumably voting by mail is easier and more convenient than going to the polls. So why doesn’t turnout go up?

In the long run, apparently Not or Not Much.

Article from the Washington Post, from researcher Elizabeth Bergman: Voting only by mail can decrease turnout. Or increase it. Wait, what? <read>

Note that we here are talking about all mail elections, not no-excuse absentee voting, which tends also to decrease turnout.

Supporters hope that voting by mail means more citizens will vote. Is it so?

Generally, the answer is both “no” and “yes,” but with important qualifications…

Some early research in Oregon claimed that voting by mail increased turnout by 10 percentage points. However, since then, scholars have been unable to reproduce those results. Apparently that boost to Oregon’s turnout grew from a “novelty effect” and recurred only in special elections.

In Washington, researchers found that switching to all-mail elections increased overall participation by about three percentage points in presidential and midterm elections. In the California pilot, after the Nov. 3 elections, the San Mateo County elections office received 105,325 ballots out of the approximately 353,000 that were mailed. That’s 29.5 percent voter turnout, or 4.1 percent more than a similar off-year polling place election in 2013, when 25.4 percent of registered voters cast their ballots…

The media was quick to attribute the “eye-popping” increase in voter turnout to simply switching to vote-by-mail. But it’s not that simple.

Mail-only balloting actually decreases voting

My research found that when you can only vote by mail, voter turnout actually drops by about 13 percent. I examined what happens to turnout if voting by mail is compulsory. I studied more than 90,000 voters who could vote only by mail across four elections from 2006 through 2008 in five of the most populous urban counties in California. (In that state, if a precinct has fewer than 250 voters, elections officials are allowed to forego a polling place and accept ballots only by mail.)

That decline may seem counterintuitive. Presumably voting by mail is easier and more convenient than going to the polls. So why doesn’t turnout go up?

According to a 50-state study that examined elections over a 30-year period, voter turnout is less about convenience than academics once thought. Most voting reforms, like all-mail balloting, do not attract new voters.

What’s more, alternative voting methods are most likely to be launched in states that already have high voter turnout.

Why does voting by mail decrease turnout? Because mail voters have a longer voting “window,” they receive less stimulus to vote. Scholars have found that reductions in stimulation to vote are greater than the modest positive benefits of additional convenience from mail voting…

But reminders make a difference

Reminders are critical. My research found that when the elections office communicates more often with voters, more of them vote. In particular, four official communications can wipe out the 13 percent decrease in turnout that I found. ‘‘Official communications’’ include such documents as a Sample Ballot, a Voter Guide, letters on county letterhead and postcards from the Registrar of Voters. Each additional communication improved the odds of voting by 4 percent. And a voter who received five communications was 4 percent more likely to vote than a voter who received no mailings.

That leaves us with another question. What effect would those same reminders have on election day voting? Could we wipe out the 13% deficit by avoiding all mail voting, and add those same five reminders to increase turnout altogether, say by 10% or so?

Voter or Voting Fraud? via AB, immune to Voter Id

Many believe that stronger Voter Id would prevent voter fraud. Actually who would risk going to the polls with the risk of strong penalties if they are caught when there is an easier alternative, absentee voting? This case from Wisconsin shows how easy can be, yet also that sometimes you can get caught. In this case only because there were two votes from one person.

A Shorewood man has been charged with more than a dozen counts of illegal voting, accused of casting multiple ballots in four elections in 2011 and 2012, including five in the 2012 gubernatorial recall.

A Shorewood man has been charged with more than a dozen counts of illegal voting, accused of casting multiple ballots in four elections in 2011 and 2012, including five in the 2012 gubernatorial recall.

Robert D. Monroe, 50, used addresses in Shorewood, Milwaukee and Indiana, according to the complaint, and cast some votes in the names of his son and his girlfriend’s son.

According to the complaint:

Monroe cast two ballots in the April 2011 Supreme Court election, two in the August 2011 Alberta Darling recall election, five in the Scott Walker-Tom Barrett recall, one illegal ballot in an August 2012 primary, and two ballots in the November 2012 presidential election.

In the presidential election, Monroe cast an in-person absentee ballot in Shorewood on Nov. 1 and drove a rental car to Lebanon, Ind., where he showed his Indiana driver’s license to vote in person on election day, Nov. 6, the complaint charges. Monroe owns a house there, according to the complaint…

The complaint indicates the investigation started in Waukesha County as an inquiry into possible double voting by Monroe’s son, who lives in Waukesha. But the son denied any knowledge of requesting an absentee ballot from his father’s Shorewood address, and the investigation shifted back to Milwaukee County…

The complaint refers to Monroe as an executive within the health care industry who earned a master’s degree in business administration at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 2013.

“He has expressed an interest in attending law school,” the complaint reads.

Monroe faces various counts of election fraud, including registering in more than one place, providing false information to an election official, voting more than once and voting as a disqualified person, for a total 13 felony charges. Each charge carries a maximum penalty of up to 18 months in prison, two years of extended supervision and a $10,000 fine.

It’s a Conspiracy Theory, until it is not a Theory – Voting Party Edition

Now from Seattle, this video of a “Ballot Box” with a “tamper resistant contraption“, in the hands of practically anyone: King County acknowledges using cardboard boxes to collect ballots

If you have voted Absentee, for the election tomorrow, we ask “Do you know where your ballot is, and where it has been?

Bob Fitrakis of the FreePress reminds us how “Conspiracy Theories” are used and abused:
Bob Bites Back: A history of computer voting “conspiracies” <read>

When you are lazy, ignorant and not willing to do research – accuse your more-informed opponents of being “conspiracy theorists.” A recent Columbus Dispatch editorial utilized this technique in its defense of Ohio’s antiquated and easily hacked voting apparatus.

The Dispatch, with few facts or statistics, stated that, “Secretary of State Jon Husted claims ‘…Ohio’s current voting equipment should be in fine shape through the 2016 election.’” In a subhead, the Big D also claimed “Transparent bipartisan approach should head off conspiracy theorists.”…

We live in a world where hackers can get into the Pentagon, CIA and major corporations, but we’re to believe they are stymied by antiquated, vulnerable computer voting machines programmed with secret proprietary software. If I’m a conspiracy theorist saying our voting machines are hackable and democracy is at risk – then I’m in good company with most of the major academic computer scientists in the country.

If course, that is Ohio. We on the other hand, are worried about other crazy theories, like parties after Church, at work, and the Union hall or at military installations where “We will get some candidate and issue information and then all vote our absentee votes together”. Like the concerns in Colorado from 2010.

Many Coloradans fear union hall voting brunches as much as church congregations` voting breakfasts during the two-week run-up to Election Day. The potential for voter intimidation is much greater with mailed ballots than at the polls. And while voting at the kitchen table is convenient, the secrecy of the ballot can be compromised in ways that do not exist at the polls.

I have to agree with officials that this ballot box and method does make me more interested in elections.

If you have voted Absentee, for the election tomorrow, we ask “Do you know where your ballot is, and where it has been?

Marks questions marks: Colorado democracy black and blue

“Where their is smoke there is fire”. We say, “Where there is black and blue there is a victim” and “When it quacks like a cover up, suspicion is justified”. In this case we have ballots filled-in in black and blue with cross-outs. We suspect Colorado democracy is the victim.

Once again, a blow to those who claim there is no voting fraud. A further justification of counting votes by scanner in public in polling places, limiting mail-in voting, and limiting central scanning, while arguing for requiring adversarial election officials in every operation.

Colorado elections watchers who have been following the zig-zagging, on-again, off-again case of the 2012 Republican Primary Chaffee County ballots completed half in blue and half in black ink may get an answer soon whether or not state officials believe the ballots are evidence of election fraud.

Or they may get no answer at all…

According to the secretary of state’s office, 3,235 ballots were cast in the county election. Of those, 140 were marked partly in blue and partly in black ink, and another 43 were marked in varying ways — fully blackened squares side by side with dashed-off Xs, or neatly filled-in boxes alongside boxes scribbled over with messy scrawls — the kind of markings that show inconsistency and can raise suspicion that more than one person filled out a ballot.

In the fall of 2012 Marilyn Marks, a high-profile election integrity activist and proud thorn-in-the-side to election administrators, filed an open records request for ballots from several counties. She was concerned with the rules giving the public access to voted ballots and whether ballots could be traced to individual voters, in effect undermining the right to cast a secret ballot.

Chaffee County delivered color images of its ballots to Marks. And the images shocked her.

“They were so weird,” she said. “Here was one that was completed half in blue and then half in black. Well that’s odd, I think and move on. Then there’s another one. Then another one. What is going on here? I’m sure I said it out loud to myself.”

Marks showed the images to her lawyer and to fellow election activists, who agreed they were weird, and then she filed a complaint with the secretary of state

I agree that this is highly suspicious. I’ll go beyond that, based on my experience, this seems to be almost guaranteed fraud, likely by insiders after the fact.

I have personally reviewed thousands of ballots, perhaps 30,000, and been in the room while perhaps 100,000 have been reviewed by others in exactly 100 post-election audit counting sessions, about 10 recanvasses, as central-count Absentee Moderator, and leading the recount of 25,000 ballots in Bridgeport. I have seen a number of strange marks on ballots – they are usually brought to the attention of others in the room as they are so interesting and need adjudication to determine voters intent. I have no statistics on strange marks, yet 43/3,235 seems possible, yet high. Yet, I do not recall a single ballot in two colors or pen and pencil. So, 140/3,235 all in blue and black is way out of line with experience.

It seems there is some official agreement that this is more than suspicious:

A few weeks later, in the middle of October, secretary of state’s office investigator Michael Hagihara found himself visiting the Chaffee County clerk’s office, where he conducted a two-day investigation. He talked to the elections staff, studied voted ballots, sealed up elections office ballpoints with the ballots and reviewed video of the elections staffers tallying the votes.

In an October 24, 2012, memo, Hagihara reported on the investigation for Secretary of State Scott Gessler, Deputy Secretary of State Suzanne Staiert and Director of Elections Judd Choate. Hagihara did not believe the county elections administration staff was to blame for any irregularities — but he did find irregularities. He determined that 140 ballots out of roughly 3,235 were filled out partly with blue and partly with black ink. He said those ballots “created serious questions as to the legitimacy of the votes cast.”

Read the entire article. The questions now are if anything is being investigated and if anything will be officially resolved.