Mail/Absentee Voting | CTVotersCount.org

Testimony: Polling Place Posting, Enforcement, Early Voting, and Internet Voting

Yesterday, in the midst of the gun control hearings drawing a couple thousand, we spent an hour in a snowy entrance line to testify on two bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee. We had planned on testifying on H.B. 5600, however, with many testifying on H.J. 16, I offered additional information to the Committee on that bill and on Internet voting, which was also discussed.

Yesterday, in the midst of the gun control hearings drawing a couple thousand, we spent an hour and a half in a snowy entrance line to testify on two bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee. We had planned on testifying on H.B. 5600, however, with many testifying on H.J. 16, I offered additional information to the Committee on that bill and on Internet voting, which was also discussed.

H.B. 5600, generically titled “AN ACT CONCERNING THE REGISTRARS OF VOTERS” dealt with three items:

Requiring towns to provide Internet access for all Registrars of Voters
Requiring the posting of voter ID requirements at all polling places
Increasing the authority of the Secretary of the State by making procedures and directives enforceable by the State Elections and Enforcement Comission

We testified in favor of all three concepts. <testimony>.

Hard to imagine it, yet some towns do not provide Internet access in this day and age, even with it is available town staff.
Posting voter ID requirements is to provide uniformity such that voters are not illegally turned away or illegally allowed to vote. I suggested that lists of registered write-in candidates should also be posted.
In general we welcome more enforcement, yet the text of the proposed bill is in some areas two broad and in others too narrow. I also needs some further work to assure clarity and transparency. (Read the testimony)

H.J. 16 is the Constitutional Amendment from last year that needs to be approved again by this Legislature and then Connecticut voters in 2014 “RESOLUTION APPROVING AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO GRANT INCREASED AUTHORITY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION.”

The amendment would allow the Legislature to specify early voting such as in-person early voting or no-excuse absentee voting. We assumed, incorrectly, that there would be little discussion and that major debates would occur in 2015 if the amendment passes.

Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, made a brief statement summarizing and supporting the bill which lead to perhaps forty-five minutes of pro and con questioning by the Committee, which also included questions on the largely unrelated topic of Internet voting for the Military. Others added testimony on the bill as well.

Scrapping most of my prepared remarks, I dedicated about half of my allocated three minutes to H.J. 16 and Internet voting. I provided the committee with information on the risks, costs, and value of various early voting methods, Internet voting, and how Connecticut might best serve all Overseas voters, including the Military.

The Committee was very attentive and open to considering my testimony: <testimony>

Especially the sources of the information that all forms of early voting decrease turnout. I promised to followup with links to the references.
I suggested following the example of Minnesota which had the greatest success in serving overseas voters, without risky, expensive, and ineffective Internet voting.
I reaffirmed my support of polling place Election Day Registration (EDR), its potential to increase turnout, while also reaffirming my prediction of disappointing results and concerns for very long lines.

Update: CT-N video, my testimony is about 75% of the way in <watch>

Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

Thanks to Marilyn Marks we have this guide: Steal This Election!–Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election <read>

This guide is for novices to Colorado politics and elections. Colorado has recently gained a reputation as a lawless Wild West state where candidates and parties can rig an election with impunity. Given that most officials appear to have little interest in election reform, it’s only fair to level the playing field for all the would-be players.

Connecticut election administration has also been called the Wild West.

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. For now, we do not have unlimited absentee voting or automatic mail-in voting. However, that might change in the future. Yet we have little reason to take comfort. We do little checking of absentee ballot signatures. We also have a history of fraud by absentee ballot. Similar to many other states, many Connecticut voters would never question the integrity of even one of our registrars (especially those in our own town), and for the most part those registrars share absolute trust in each of their staff members and poll workers. Unfortunately, this is one of the 15 attributes of “Security Theater” from security expert Roger Johnston: “Strong emotion, over confidence, arrogance, ego, and/or pride related to security”.

A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

Grand Theft Absentee

“Of the three methods of voting, the one that has always been the most vulnerable, the one where we know fraud has occurred historically … is in the absentee-ballot process,” Fernández Rundle told The Miami Herald on Thursday, referring also to voting early and on Election Day. Absentee voting, she added, “happens in the shadows. It happens in the dark. It’s the least monitored.”

The Miami Herald: Miami-Dade grand jury: Absentee voting fraud clouds confidence in tight election results <read>

A Miami-Dade voter drops her absentee ballot at the ballot box on Tuesday morning, November 6, 2012, at Miami-Dade Elections Department. Florida and Miami-Dade County should tighten rules for voting by mail and make it easier to vote early in order to prevent fraud and plug “gaping holes” in absentee voting, a Miami-Dade grand jury has concluded. To prove their point, grand jurors made an astounding revelation: A county software vendor discovered that a clandestine, untraceable computer program submitted more than 2,500 fraudulent, “phantom” requests for voters who had not applied for absentee ballots in the August primary. The grand jury issued 23 recommendations, from reinstating a state requirement that someone witness an absentee voter sign a ballot — thereby making it easier for law enforcement to investigate potential fraud…

“Of the three methods of voting, the one that has always been the most vulnerable, the one where we know fraud has occurred historically … is in the absentee-ballot process,” Fernández Rundle told The Miami Herald on Thursday, referring also to voting early and on Election Day. Absentee voting, she added, “happens in the shadows. It happens in the dark. It’s the least monitored.”

We have often discussed the risks of absentee voting and warned of the increased risks of unlimited absentee voting, including all-mail voting. It is refreshing to see a grand jury recognizing the risks. We also note a bit of bad news/good news here – the bad news of vote stealing via “clandestine, untraceable computer program” and the good news, in this case, of its detection by insiders – yet, perhaps less blatant or more clever theft would or has gone unnoticed, or worse actually perpetrated by insiders.

As we have said before, our concerns are mainly with the risks, yet beyond that unlimited absentee voting does not increase turn-out, and disenfranchises voters unbeknownst to them, all the added risks are thus in the name of convenience.

What We Worry? What Could Go Wrong On Election Day?

America’s elections are run entirely on the honor system. What could possibly go wrong?

Detroit News op-ed: BenDor and Stanislevic: What could go wrong on Election Day? <read>

We worry that the nation will end up with no confidence in the election results, regardless of who wins.

That’s because we have no systematic way to detect malfunctions in the voting machines or tabulators on Election Day…

We worry that there could be widespread fraud in the sending of voted military and overseas ballots by fax, email or other vulnerable internet methods…

We fear that close elections will go to the courts without any prospect of credible numbers. This is because of two widespread conditions that preclude complete, meaningful recounts: no paper ballots and no manual counts….In states that do allow a hand recount, like Michigan, the burden is often on the apparent losing candidate, not only to pay for the recount, but also to bear the stigma of “poor loser.” The voting public has no say.

We lose sleep over the prospect of the ultimate disenfranchisement of thousands of voters…

America’s elections are run entirely on the honor system. What could possibly go wrong?

And from the New York Times some “bad news/it could be worse news” if we had the risky National Popular Vote Agreement: Disruption From Storm May Be Felt at the Polls <read>

Some New Jersey voters may find their hurricane-damaged polling sites replaced by military trucks, with — in the words of the state’s lieutenant governor, Kim Guadagno — “a well-situated national guardsman and a big sign saying, ‘Vote Here.’ ” Half of the polling sites in Nassau County on Long Island still lacked power on Friday. And New York City was planning to build temporary polling sites in tents in some of its worst-hit neighborhoods.

Mayor Bill Finch of Bridgeport, Conn., with Secretary of the State Denise Merrill at the Longfellow School, a closed polling place.

The aftermath of Hurricane Sandy is threatening to create Election Day chaos in some storm-racked sections of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut — and some effects may also be felt in other states, including Pennsylvania, where some polling sites still lacked power on Friday morning.

Disrupted postal delivery will probably slow the return of absentee ballots. And with some polling sites likely to be moved, elections officials were bracing for a big influx of provisional paper ballots — which could delay the vote count in places.

Weary local elections officials vowed that the vote would go on. “Come hell or high water — we had both — we’re voting on Tuesday,” William T. Biamonte, the Democratic commissioner at the Nassau County Board of Elections, said in an interview…

With turnout projected to be down in all these states, Mr. Obama could see his share of the national popular vote reduced.

Caltech/MIT: What has changed, what hasn’t, & what needs improvement

The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project has released a thorough, comprehensive, and insightful new report timed to the 2012 election. We find little to quibble with in the report. We agree with all of its recommendations.Several items with which we fully endorse were covered in this report which sometimes are missing from the discussion or often underemphasised.

The report itself is 52 pages, followed by 32 pages of opinions of others, including election officials, advocates, and vendors, some of whom disagree with some aspects of the report. Every page is worth reading. The report is not technical. It covers a wide range of issues, background, and recommendations.

The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project has released a thorough, comprehensive, and insightful new report timed to the 2012 election: VOTING: What has changed, what hasn’t, & what needs improvement <read>

We find little to quibble with in the report. We agree with all of its recommendations although we might place different emphasis in particular areas:

As we have studied the areas where progress has been made since 2001, and where progress has stalled, we have developed the following recommendations. All have been discussed earlier in our report, and we summarize them here. They are not in priority order. First, regarding voting technology, we recommend:

Legislation mandating effective election auditing, which at a minimum would require post-election auditing of all voting technologies used in an election.

Continued strong support for voting systems security research, emphasizing auditing and the verifiability of election outcomes.

A movement toward mandating statistically meaningful post-election audits, rather than setting security standards for election equipment, as the primary way to safeguard the integrity of the vote.

A new business model led by states and localities, with harmonized standards and requirements.

Second, regarding voter registration, we recommend: » Streamlining the provisional balloting process in many states and the creation of common best practices and voluntary standards across states.

The development of voter verification systems in which states bear the cost of stringent voter ID regimes, in those states that desire to increase ID requirements for in-person voting.

Continued standardization of voter registration databases, so that they can be polled across states.

Third, with respect to polling places and pollworkers, we recommend:

Continued improvement of pollworker training and more reliance on network technologies to facilitate pollworker training.

Development of applications deployed on mobile devices that bring more information to pollworkers, and transmit real-time data about Election Day workloads back to the central voting office and the public at large.

Increased functionality of electronic pollbooks and their wider adoption.

Development of applications that gauge how long voters are waiting in line to vote, so that wait times can be better managed and reported to the public.

Fourth, regarding absentee and early voting our first two recommendations repeat those we issued a decade ago; the third is new:

Discourage the continued rise of no-excuse absentee balloting and resist pressures to expand all-mail elections. Similarly, discourage the use of Internet voting until the time when auditability can be ensured and the substantial risks entailed by voting over the Internet can be sufficiently mitigated.

Require that states publish election returns in such a way that allows the calculation of the residual vote rate by voting mode.

Continue research into new methods to get usable ballots to military and overseas civilian voters securely, accurately, and rapidly and to ensure their secure return in time to be counted.

And, finally, regarding the infrastructure and science of elections: » Continued development of the science of elections.

Continued, and expanded, support for the research functions of the Election Assistance Commission.

Development of an Electoral Extension Service, headquartered in each state’s land-grant colleges, to disseminate new ideas about managing elections in the United States.

Several items with which we fully endorse were covered in this report which sometimes are missing from the discussion or often underemphasised:

The Risks of Mail-in and No-Excuse Absentee Voting

The report thoroughly covers the disenfranchisement risks of mail voting which are about double polling place voting. Such voting does not increase turnout significantly, except in local elections. We would have liked to seen more coverage of the organized fraud, vote buying, and coercion frequently occurring via such voting. These are not just theoretical risks. New to us was the surveys showing that the public at some level recognizes the risks and show less confidence in elections with expanded absentee or mail-in voting.

The Emphasis on Election Auditing over Machine Testing and Certification

It is theoretically impossible to develop or test a completely safe voting technology. Extreme testing and slow certification requirements stifle innovation, add costs, delay improvements and are ultimately ineffective. High confidence, efficient statistical audits, paper ballots, combined with a strong chain-of-custody are a necessary solution that eclipse the elusive pursuit of technical perfection.

The Need and Value of Quality Voter Registration Combined with Online Voter Check-in

The report points to the fallacy of votER fraud. Yet there are efficiencies and enhanced enfranchisement available from better, more accurage voter registration databases. There are solutions with online check-in that also provide voter-id without the disenfranchising aspects of the currently proposed voter-id laws.

The Challenges of the Election Technology Industry

My years of experience in the software industry always lead me to the conclusion that the election technology industry is a losing business proposition. While I am not enamored with any of the current voting technology vendors, there is little incentive for them or new players to enter the field. The closest analogy is the defense industry. That industry is not fragmented, has essentially one customer, which designs products and pays for research and development. The voting technology industry is fragmented and has a fragmented customer base, with varying demands, coupled with a very difficult sales environment.

Recognition of One of the Risks of the National Popular Vote Agreement

The proposed National Popular Vote (NPV) may have negative security implications, since the opportunity to perform proper post-election audits appears to be considerably diminished.

CTVotersCount readers know that we would go farther and cover the risks of a national popular vote in our current state-by-state fragmented system, not designed to provide an accurate national popular total. Alleged popular totals cannot be audited, cannot be recounted, and electors must be chosen before an official count is available. The National Popular Vote agreement does nothing to address the existing risk issues with the Electoral College and, in fact, adds to the risks.

Multiple votER fraud, multiple votes, multiple elections, multiple lessons

Individual votER fraud does not happen often, when it does it seldom, if ever, amounts to enough to change a result. But here is a Rhode Island size story from Texas that provides several lessons for those concerned with votER fraud, votING fraud, and the limits of voter ID:

Story in Houston Chronicle: Candidate voted twice in same elections, records show <read>

A Republican precinct chairman running for a seat on the Fort Bend County Commissioner’s Court has cast ballots in both Texas and Pennsylvania in the last three federal elections, official records in both states show.

Bruce J. Fleming, a Sugar Land resident running for Precinct 1 commissioner, voted in person in Sugar Land in 2006, 2008 and 2010 and by mail in each of those years in Yardley, Pa., according to election records in both states.

Fleming, who owns a home in Yardley, voted for Hillary Rodham Clinton in the 2008 presidential primary in Texas. His wife, Nancy Fleming, who is listed as a resident of Yardley, voted by mail in both places in the 2010 general election, records show.

The lessons:

Absentee balloting is the easiest fraud to accomplish. Expanding mail-in and absentee voting leads to increased opportunity for organized and individual fraud.
Voter ID in Texas or Pennsylvania would not have prevented this fraud. They live in Texas, presumably have IDs, while no ID is required for absentee voting.
Preventing this type of fraud would be more possible with better quality voter registration databases, more cross checking, or possibly a national voter registration database or universal registration.
In this case the voters were caught. How many would risk the criminal penalties? How many would risk the embarrassment and career limiting aspects even if not convicted? All for a very slight chance of changing an election result.

Roundup – VotER fraud vs. VotING fraud

Several states continue to argue about voter ID laws allegedly intended to prevent fraud by individual voters, in the face of little evidence of such fraud. Meanwhile the documented fraud which occurs regularly around the country is multiple vote absentee vote fraud. And now evidence of massive voter registration fraud.

Several states continue to argue about voter ID laws allegedly intended to prevent fraud by individual voters, in the face of little evidence of such fraud, with the most noted, Pennsylvania Deadline nears on judge’s Pa. voter ID law ruling <read>

Pennsylvania’s new law is among the toughest in the nation.

It is a signature accomplishment of Republicans in control of Pennsylvania state government who say they fear election fraud. But it is an emotional target for Democrats who call it a Jim Crow-style scheme to make it harder for their party’s traditional voters, including young adults and minorities, who might not carry the right kind of ID or know about the law.

It was already a political lightning rod when a top state Republican lawmaker boasted to a GOP dinner in June that the ID requirement “is going to allow Gov. Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania.”

The high court told Simpson that he should stop the law from taking effect in this year’s election if he finds the state has not met the law’s promise of providing easy access to a photo ID or if he believes it will prevent any registered voter from casting a ballot.

The injunction Simpson was considering revolves around the portion of the law that allows a voter without valid photo ID at the polls to cast a provisional ballot. It would effectively excuse those voters from having to get a valid photo ID and show it to county election officials within six days after the election to ensure their ballot will count. Instead, they might be required to submit a signed declaration to the county.

Last week, Simpson heard testimony about the state’s ongoing efforts to remove bureaucratic barriers for people to get a valid photo ID. He also heard about long lines and ill-informed clerks at driver’s license centers and identification requirements that made it harder for some registered voters to get a state-issued photo ID.

Similar new laws are being more or less contested in several states including Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Tennessee

And in Ohio the issue of disqualifying votes when voters are given the wrong ballot by officials, Slate: Wrong Number – The crucial Ohio voting battle you haven’t heard about <read>

At issue are potentially thousands of Ohio ballots that the state will not count solely because of poll worker error. Here’s the problem: A number of the state’s polling places, especially in cities, cover more than one voting precinct, and in order to cast a valid vote, a voter has to be given the correct precinct ballot. Poll workers, however, often hand voters the wrong precinct ballot mistakenly. In earlier litigation involving a disputed 2010 juvenile judge race in Hamilton County, Ohio, a poll worker testified to sending a voter whose address started with the numbers “798” to vote in the precinct for voters with odd-numbered addresses because the poll worker believed “798” was an odd number. This “right church, wrong pew” problem with precinct ballots was a big problem in 2008, when over 14,000 such ballots were cast.

Meanwhile the documented fraud which occurs regularly around the country is multiple vote absentee vote fraud. Here is a recent case from N.J. <read>

The Mercer County jury found that Fernandez, who works for the Essex County Department of Economic Development, fraudulently tampered with documentation for absentee ballots in Ruiz’s Nov. 6, 2007 general election, submitting ballots on behalf of voters who never received the ballots or had an opportunity to cast their votes.

Fernandez was charged in 2009 along with several other defendants, including Ruiz’s husband, Essex County Freeholder Samuel Gonzalez. As a result, Gonzalez agreed to forfeit his seat on the freeholder board and his job as an aide to a Newark city councilman, and he was admitted into the Pre-Trial Intervention Program. Four other defendants previously pleaded guilty

And now, more and more evidence of actual voter registration fraud, of the type ACORN was alleged to do in 2008 Nationwide GOP Voter Registration Fraud Scandal Widens, Becomes Criminal Matter in Florida <read>

A major element of the Republican National Committee’s overall attempt to game the 2012 elections by trying to affect who gets to vote and who does not, has just been stopped dead in its tracks.

Along with it, a criminal election fraud complaint has now reportedly been filed with law enforcement in the state of Florida against a Republican firm, owned by a paid Mitt Romney consultant, which was hired by the GOP to carry out partisan voter registration operations in at least five battleground states.

Millions of dollars were spent on the aborted effort by the GOP over the last two months — their largest single expenditure in several of the states where the scheme was in full tilt — to seek out Romney supporters only, and sign them up to vote.

The strategy resulted in (or included) fraudulent registration forms collected by the firm and then submitted in Florida by the state GOP with voter addresses, signatures and party affiliations changed. Election officials in the state have told The BRAD BLOG that they fear the scheme could result in the disenfranchisement of a still-unknown number of otherwise legal voters, and they are taking extraordinary measures to try and contain the potential damage as they attempt to work through more than 45,000 new and updated registrations submitted by the GOP and verify their legitimacy.

As we were saying, stealing elections the easy way: Insider absentee fraud.

And now to add even more evidence to past experience, a timely story from the Los Angeles Times, to emphasize the existence of voting fraud, via absentee voting, executed by insiders, otherwise known as election officials.

It seems like just early this week that we were saying:

for all intents and purposes voter fraud is very rare, while voting fraud does regularly occur. Common sense tells us that very few voters would risk intentionally voting illegally for the purpose of casting a single fraudulent vote, given the effort, huge risk, miniscule value. Common sense also tells us that there is likely several times the instances of voter fraud and voting fraud than are successfully uncovered and successfully prosecuted. Yet, voter fraud would still be rare and generally ineffective. Not so with voting fraud, especially that committed by insiders.

And only a couple of days ago that we were saying:

Vote absentee, only if you have to! The risk of fraud is primarily a risk of campaigners, insiders, or others working to fraudulently vote for others or to trash votes somewhere between the voter, in the mail, or in town hall.

And now to add even more evidence to past experience, a timely story from the Los Angeles Times to emphasize the existence of voting fraud, via absentee voting, executed by insiders, otherwise known as election officials.: Feds: Cudahy officials threw away ballots, manipulated two elections <read>

Cudahy officials at the city’s highest levels tampered with and manipulated the results of at least two city elections, according to federal documents released Thursday.

The documents were part of the plea agreements of two Cudahy city officials who agreed to plead guilty Thursday to bribery and extortion.

But the documents also shed light on a culture of corruption within City Hall, with examples of widespread bribery and developer payoffs to voter fraud…

The documents show that a city official identified only as G.P. asked Perales and others to make non-residents register to vote in elections. They used an address that belonged to a Cudahy city employee. In exchange, that employee was rewarded with promotions and other favorable treatment, the documents say…

The documents show that a city official identified only as G.P. asked Perales and others to make non-residents register to vote in elections. They used an address that belonged to a Cudahy city employee. In exchange, that employee was rewarded with promotions and other favorable treatment, the documents say.

The fraud went beyond the fake registrants (Do you know where your absentee ballots are kept and how they are handled in city hall?):

In addition, the city officials tossed out ballots that did not favor incumbents.

Perales said that when absentee ballots were delivered to City Hall, he and G.P. determined through “trial and error” the best way to open the sealed envelopes without defacing them. “Routinely and systematically,” they opened the ballots. If they contained votes in favor of incumbents, they were resealed and counted. Ballots for non-incumbents were discarded.

And apparently it changed the result:

It was the first contested council race in nearly a decade, and they lost by a few dozen votes.

We point out that requiring a voter ID at polling places would do nothing to prevent absentee ballot fraud by officials. Perhaps long jail terms for those that are caught and convicted would. Perhaps that will happen here.

Vote absentee, only if you have to!

The already registered voter must request the ballot; the administrator must receive and process the request; the administrator must in a timely manner send the ballot to the voter; the voter must receive the ballot; the voter must vote correctly, on time and provide the proper verifications (such as the voter’s own signature and/or that of a witness); the administrator must receive the ballot on time; and the administrator must count the ballot.

CTVotersCount readers know that we oppose expanded mail-in voting including no-excuse absentee voting. There are two major reasons: the risk of voting fraud and the risk of error or delays resulting in your vote not being counted. The risk of fraud is primarily a risk of campaigners, insiders, or others working to fraudulently vote for others or to trash votes somewhere between the voter, in the mail, or in town hall. The risk to voters is that they will make an innocent mistake or their ballot innocently lost along the way.

The Daily News articulates the risks, compounded by the dramatic increase in vote by mail: Meet the hanging chad of 2012 <read>

the silent, creeping revolution in the timing and method of voting presents bigger opportunities for trouble. In recent years, absentee and mail-in ballots have been steadily rising as a share of total ballots cast. The majority of states now allow “no-excuse absentee” voting, meaning anyone can ask to cast a ballot by mail. You don’t need the political equivalent of a doctor’s note, as was true previously.

According to the Census Bureau, more than 18% of voters in the 2010 election voted by mail. Another 8% voted early but “in person” at a polling place or vote center (a recent innovation that enables out-of-precinct voting). As a result, more than a quarter of voters ended up voting early or absentee — roughly double the rate in the 2000 election.

In general, misfeasance — meaning, plain old mistake-making — is a bigger threat to voting than is corruption or malfeasance, and absentee ballots are no exception. Many interactions between the voter and the election authority must work without a hitch for the voter’s absentee ballot to be cast successfully:

The already registered voter must request the ballot; the administrator must receive and process the request; the administrator must in a timely manner send the ballot to the voter; the voter must receive the ballot; the voter must vote correctly, on time and provide the proper verifications (such as the voter’s own signature and/or that of a witness); the administrator must receive the ballot on time; and the administrator must count the ballot.

So, even though absentee balloting is not brain surgery, the opportunities for error are considerable. Consider that in the recount involving the 2008 Minnesota Senate race, one out of 25 absentee ballots was disqualified for one reason or another. And this in a state where, the saying goes, all of the voters (and election administrators) are above average.

We pretty much agree with everything they have said, yet disagree that fraud is less of a risk. Fraud tends to have value, with a higher incentive, in very close elections, especially local elections, where moving a few dozen votes can often change the result.

EDR – Proponents cannot have it both ways

Proponents tout gains in turnout, but then estimate very few will use Election Day Registration (EDR) when it comes to claiming it won’t cost municipalities much and would not result in lines etc.

John Hartwell interviewed Secretary of the State Denise Merill on Stream on Conscience

John Hartwell interviewed Secretary of the State Denise Merill on Stream on Conscience <view>

Although I am a supporter of EDR in theory. I am against the current Election Day Registration (EDR) bill as it portends chaos in a popular election and denies EDR voters the rights to privacy booths, ballot clerks, their votes being counted publicly by optical scanner, and does not provide a right to register if they are in line at 8:00 pm.

States that have successfully implemented EDR have seen turnout increase 3% to 7% with 10% to 20% EDR registrants to get the increased turnout. (They use a different model than CT, so it is hard to predict if our model will have the same results in turnout and voter appreciation)

Poponents tout those gains in turnout, but then estimate very few will use EDR when it comes to claiming it won’t cost municipalities much and would not result in lines etc. (Underestimating the result here would increase the odds of chaos if other states’ turnout estimates are the correct ones)

In this interview the Secretary claims early on (8:25 in the video) that states recently implementing EDR have a 10% increase in turnout, but then later finds it hard to accept John’s example of 10% of voters in Westport using EDR (21:20) as “assuming a very large number”. Contrary to the Secretary’s contention that “it is all done by computer”, registering someone who is registered elsewhere in Connecticut involves calling a registrars office, that office calling a polling place, and then responding back to make sure the voter had not previously voted.

It is correct that testing in a low turnout election (2013) would be a good time to roll out the system. However, that can also generate a false sense of confidence, with a huge turnout and huge EDR turnout in a later more popular election (2014 or 2016).

Listen to the entire interview. Many other items of interest are discussed. The Secretary is worried about gangs at polls intimidating voters in the past and potential for chaos at the polls this fall (16:30).

More details on our concerns with the current EDR bill <here>