Skulduggery and Errors | CTVotersCount.org

Welcome to Post-Confidence Elections

Laws and procedures which are not enforced for elections in the name of “trust us” and “it would be too much work”, are no more real than the laws and Constitutional provisions ignored in the name of national security. “It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.”

Monday, Tom Englehardt wrote a post: Welcome to Post-Legal America, subtitled: Dumb Question of the Twenty-first Century: Is It Legal? Post-Legal America and the National Security Complex <read>

Is the Libyan war legal? Was Bin Laden’s killing legal? Is it legal for the president of the United States to target an American citizen for assassination? Were those “enhanced interrogation techniques” legal? These are all questions raised in recent weeks. Each seems to call out for debate, for answers. Or does it?…

My answer is this: they are irrelevant. Think of them as twentieth-century questions that don’t begin to come to grips with twenty-first century American realities. In fact, think of them, and the very idea of a nation based on the rule of law, as a reflection of nostalgia for, or sentimentality about, a long-lost republic. At least in terms of what used to be called “foreign policy,” and more recently “national security,” the United States is now a post-legal society…

It’s easy enough to explain what I mean. If, in a country theoretically organized under the rule of law, wrongdoers are never brought to justice and nobody is held accountable for possibly serious crimes, then you don’t have to be a constitutional law professor to know that its citizens actually exist in a post-legal state. If so, “Is it legal?” is the wrong question to be asking, even if we have yet to discover the right one.

Then today, news that the “apparent” loser in the Wisconsin Supreme Court recount decided concede and not to pursue legal challenges. <Brad Blog overview and details> Sadly we agree with the candidate’s logic. From her statement:

Wis. Stat. §5.01(1) provides that the state election laws “shall be construed so as to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be ascertained, notwithstanding informality or failure to comply with some of its provisions.” It is questionable whether even the statewide extent of noncompliance uncovered by this recount would cross the bar raised by this statutory language. Moreover, Wisconsin courts have held that absent connivance, fraud or undue influence, substantial compliance with the statutory voting procedures is sufficient.

Which brings me to Waukesha and the question of whether– or if — there was manipulation of some ballots, given the fact that so many bags were unsealed to the point of being wide open. Here again, evidence of opportunity to manipulate or alter ballots is not enough. There would have to be compelling proof that the integrity of the ballots has been compromised. The numerous glaring anomalies in Waukesha certainly warrant further, independent investigation. However, the defects or irregularities in the sealing and securing of the ballot bags, as documented in the recount minutes, would not be sufficient to meet the threshold set by law.

As an attorney, as an officer of the court and as someone who understands both the power and the limits of the law, it is my obligation to evaluate and recognize the legal grounds on which I can and cannot act. I have reviewed the record, the evidence and the law. It would serve no purpose to bring a suit with insufficient legal basis. That is not the kind of lawyer I am.

I suppose it depends on what “substantial” means in “substantial compliance”.

Reading the story of the recount and the election itself, leaves us with little reason to have confidence that elections run like this one in Wisconsin, with fallible accounting and the lack of ballot security result in the winner actually chosen by the people. We have no reason to believe this election is atypical for Wisconsin – just that initial numbers were close enough to require a recount, so critical to receive national attention. Like the candidate, JoAnn Kloppenburg, we cannot say that the result is incorrect, only that elections run this way provide no confidence in the system and could be incorrect by error or won by skulduggery.

Wisconsin is not alone. The chain of custody and security of ballots in Connecticut is no more reliable than in Wisconsin. Until election administration and security is fixed in every jurisdiction in the Nation, we are now knowingly in the era of post-confidence elections. Kloppenburg has asked that the system be improved:

We did the right thing in asking for a recount in this very, very close election. The recount shed light on significant and widespread issues with elections in Wisconsin. The magnitude of those issues surprised clerks, election volunteers, and observers from both campaigns. The problems and gaps ought to be addressed as quickly as possible. And they ought to be fixed.

That is why my campaign is submitting a letter to the Government Accountability Board which summarizes the anomalies, irregularities and in some cases the unexplained mysteries uncovered in this recount. I call on the GAB to take action, along with local clerks, to improve the security, accountability and transparency of the election process in Wisconsin, and to ensure that every vote counts and is counted accurately. The GAB must improve compliance with basic election procedures.

We are also doing the right thing by declining to pursue legal action. Based on the record established in this recount and based on Wisconsin law, the will of the electors has been determined. It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.

A good start would be appropriate penalties for officials at all levels responsible for breaking security and the law, followed by sufficient improved election procedures which are enforceable and actually enforced. Penalties should fit the consequences of the loss of public confidence in the system and the consequences of the potential for incorrect or fraudulent election results.

“Wisconsin is no Minnesota” (Psssst: neither is Connecticut)

Many of the problems in Wisconsin are similar to those we are led to “expect” in states like Connecticut. One unique concern in Wisconsin is several coincident actions of one of the candidates.

Brad Friedman covers issues in the Wisconsin recount, so far. <read>

Many of the problems are similar to those we are led to “expect” in states like Connecticut:

Bags not sealed
Seal numbers missing
Seal numbers don’t match
Faith in sealed bags
Extra ballots found outside bags
Batches of ballots not counted or reported on election night
Officials making errors in calculations or submitting results to the state
Homegrown accounting systems
Local and state officials making errors in transcription and addition

We point out that incompetence or mistakes are good cover for skulduggery , especially where they occur regularly and are routinely accepted/ignored. CTVotersCount readers know that Connecticut Post-Election Audits frequently expose similar problems, as the citizen Bridgeport Recount found, usually followed by no action. The recent exception being some useful, but incomplete, steps to reduce the odds of problems occurring similar to those in Bridgeport, but little to cause the system to correct similar counting, calculating, and reporting errors.

One unique concern in Wisconsin is several coincident actions of one of the candidates, issues including misstatements by the candidate, the activities of the candidate after the election, the location of the changes in votes right after the election, and the location of some of the chain of custody problems (See Brad’s Report).

We are pleased that Wisconsin is holding the recount, such as it is, and that citizens are reporting issues and concerns. The best result would be a recount that ultimately provides real integrity and confidence, followed by positive reform in Wisconsin and other states. At this point we remain open but skeptical that this recount will be satisfactory.

Wisconsin: Democracy In The Gap: Between Impatience And Incompetence

The best outcome of a recount would be to determine the correct winner of the election, leading to an improved system in Wisconsin, and serving as an example to other states. Yet, Democrats should not get their hopes up for a change in the result.

Let us hope that something good comes from the election error and concern in Wisconsin.

Most CTVotersCount readers have been reading various stories of the recent Wisconsin election, for example <here> or <here>

Overall the situation points out the weak underbelly of elections in many of our states, including Wisconsin and Connecticut. There is little reason to have confidence in the accuracy of election results reported on election night and marginally little additional reason to trust the certified results which usually conform closely to the original reported results.

The underlying causes are our media fueled goal to get results immediately from tired officials, regardless of their accuracy; followed by officials wish to get it over-with, avoiding any any questions of accuracy or if every vote was in fact counted; playing a role is the lack of public attention and budget necessary for trusted, accurate elections; and the initially apparent winner claiming victory along with the real or imagined risks to the initial looser in being labeled a sore looser. We are aware that many Republicans continue claiming irregularities in the Minnesota 2008 recount while they accuse Democrats of not getting over Florida in 2000.

I agree and caution those that are calling for a complete recount in Wisconsin:

A thorough recount may expose the weak underbelly of the system in Wisconsin. It may show many small errors; uncounted votes; inappropriately adjudicated absentee ballots; slight changes due to machines and people missing voters’ intent; and even uncover some system flaws like those found in Humboldt County and in Ohio in after the 2008 election.
Democrats should not get their hopes up unless they find additional suspicious results in other precincts and counties. Chances are that a recount would uncover many small differences but unlikely that they would add up to enough to overturn an election. Everyone should avoid pushing unfounded or highly speculative theories.
The best outcome of a recount would be to determine the correct winner of the election, leading to an improved system in Wisconsin, and serving as an example to other states. A transparent, credible recount of integrity would serve to provide confidence in this one election to the ultimate looser and the majority of voters in Wisconsin. I expect it would uncover additional problems with the system beyond the “lone wolf” spreadsheet accounting in one county which could lead to an improved system. Admittedly this is an optimistic view, yet there are often at least positive incremental improvements after election vulnerabilities are discovered, with unfortunately the risk of expensive, knee-jerk reactions of questionable impact (see 2000, HAVA, vendor “help”).

Waukesha County, Wisconsin vs. Bridgeport Connecticut

Connecticut has little to offer Wisconsin as an example of accurate accounting. We do have some “lone wolfs” that use spreadsheet accounting, but many others use the old fashioned system of human transcription and accounting. As one Representative characterized our election system, it is a bit of the “Wild West”. In general, by hand or spreadsheet it is a three step process of manual transcription and accounting with a record of errors and omissions.
We have no idea what a recanvass would show in a statewide Connecticut Election. In the recent race for Governor we understand that about eight towns (nobody knows, there was no requirement to report it) ran out of preprinted ballots and produced copied ballots that would be counted by hand. At least two of those ran out of ballots in polling places. The state recounted none of those towns. The Connecticut Post newspaper and citizens recounted one of those towns demonstrating extensive counting and accounting errors along with wide discrepancies in ballot counts vs. check-off lists. Ten percent of districts were subject to post-election audits of district machine counted audits. No official report is yet available, however, the Coalition audit observation report demonstrated the usual level of significant differences that indicate inaccurate counting and the possibility of machine errors. The audits do not check hand counted ballots or centrally counted absentee ballots. As far as we know, five towns have yet to supply official audit report to the Secretary of the State for the audits which would have been completed by November 22nd 2010.
Connecticut has little to offer Wisconsin in the area of recounting. Like Wisconsin, our recanvasses are primarily a modified recount by similar machines and memory cards. Unlike Wisconsin, we have no provision in our recanvasses for our adjusting vote counts if check-off lists counts do not match. In fact, Connecticut recanvass do not check check-off lists. Recounts in Connecticut are possible via a court order. Procedures are not defined in our state law.

We also recommend that citizens of Wisconsin with concerns under take a thorough review of all posted results and confirm election documents to uncover any other potential specific questionable counts. To his credit, the well supported and financed losing candidate in Connecticut in November 2010 did that to satisfy himself that the result was accurate enough to select the actual winner.

We also note that the Connecticut Legislature and Secretary of the State are proposing steps that would reduce the possibility of similar ballot shortages in the future, yet we have much more work to provide election integrity and credibility equal to the promise of democracy.

Let us take no comfort in the election error in Wisconsin. Let us hope that something good comes from the concerns.

Update. More reasons to Investigate:

Worth checking the source of numbers reported and the accounting details. Alleged history of some questionable results in the county: 20,000 more votes than ballots (Waukesha, 2006) <read> <read>

Also Democrat refutes earlier impression that she endorsed/understood revised result <read>

Laws interact – be careful what you legislate

Earlier this month we cautioned the legislature about enacting the UMOVE Act without providing election officials an opportunity to check for conflicts with existing laws. We highlight an example of a similar conflict in existing state and local laws that frustrates officials and disenfranchises voters.

Earlier this month we cautioned the legislature on enacting an unspecified “Uniform” Military and Overseas Voting Act (UMOVE Act). The “Uniform” bill requires forty-five days advanced availability of absentee ballots for optionally specified state and local elections, primaries, and referendums. The proposed law had only the following text available for the public hearing:

That the general statutes be amended to adopt the Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act.

In our testimony (page 13), we warned and recommended, among other things:

The uniform law text has options that each state may or may not include primaries, run-offs, and referendums in the “uniform law”. For any of these included, absentee ballots must be available 45 days in advance, just as they are in Federal elections. Currently under Sec. 9-369c of the statutes, absentee ballots must be made available three weeks in advance of a referendum and in some circumstances, less. This may pose even more difficult timing challenges if run-offs are included…

I caution against passing this bill without public hearings, providing for review and comment on the actual text of a proposed bill – especially, giving election officials an opportuntity to point out implementation challenges and conflicts with current statutory deadlines.

Today we highlight an article which brings our point home. It is a story of election officials trying to cope with conflicting state and local laws for election deadlines and absentee ballot deadlines. In the Monroe Patch: Absentee Ballots Won’t be Mailed Out. Who’s at Fault? <read>

Town Clerk’s Office employees will be busy preparing for the April 5 budget referendum, issuing absentee ballots over the counter to residents who will not be able to vote in person and processing mailed in ballots voters obtain online…

On Friday, Town Clerk Marsha Beno said she wants to avoid another State Elections Enforcement complaint…

The statute requires a town clerk to have the exact language on a ballot at least three weeks before absentee ballots are mailed out to voters. Beno said the town could not meet that timeline for the April 5 referendum…
[Democratic Town Committee Chairwoman Patricia] Ulatowski says Town Attorney Jack Fracassini, Beno and Town Council leadership are to blame, because they were informed of the State Election Enforcement Commission’s decision on her complaint agreeing that the town violated General Statute 9-369c during two referendums in 2009, and could have influenced a speeding up of the budget process to meet the three week deadline to mail out absentee ballots.

Democratic Registrar of Voters Sue Koneff looked at the Town Charter and came up with a schedule that could allow the town to meet the three-week deadline and comply with the state statute, according to Ulatowski.

The result is frustrated officials and disenfranchised voters.

Once again, myth of accurate official vote counting debunked

South Carolina voting system audited by citizens shows votes lost, images of ballots do not support numbers. Like Bridgeport, this is an example of where transparency, FOI, and independent citizen investigation eventually provided the facts. Yet, again where government and the official system failed to certify accurate election results. Machines, hand counting, and communication procedures should be expected to occasionally breakdown, but the official system should be expected to find and correct those errors.

South Carolina voting system audited by citizens shows that votes, images of ballots do not support numbers. Like Bridgeport, this is an example of where transparency, FOI, and independent citizen investigation eventually provided the facts. Yet, again where government and the official system failed to certify accurate election results. Machines, hand counting, and communication procedures should be expected to occasionally breakdown, but the official system should be expected to find and correct those errors.

Charleston City Paper: Voting process must be simple and transparent – Too complicated for its own good <read>

A group of citizens, in association with the S.C. League of Women Voters, has conducted an audit of Richland County voting machine results from last November, and the numbers don’t lie. According to the LWV, more than 1,000 votes from various precincts were missing from the certified totals in November’s General Election. Elsewhere in the county, the detailed vote image file did not provide confirmation for the 1,362 votes that were certified.

The Richland County voting machine data was independently analyzed by Duncan Buell, a computer science professor from the University of South Carolina, and Chip Moore, a Massachusetts programmer and South Carolina native.

“The failure to count votes from some voting machines and the failure to document votes from other voting machines is a human failure, but it’s a human failure that the software should have caught, so the root cause is a software system that isn’t doing what it’s supposed to do,” Moore said in a LWV statement. “What we have done is to run some self-checks that should always have been in the system.”

This is only the latest controversy over the 1,200 iVotronic touchscreen voting machines that the state uses exclusively. A few weeks ago, Colleton County reported 13,045 votes for statewide offices on Nov. 2. But an election audit showed that only 11,656 ballots were cast that day, according to the signature rolls. That means an extra 1,389 votes were reported and certified.

More from the Press Release, Q&A, and Report. Conclusion from the report:

Conclusions
We are not suggesting or making accusations of fraud, conspiracy, or similar
deliberate attempts to corrupt the vote in Richland County. What we feel we
can justifiably say, however, is that the election system (hardware,
software, and procedures) has failed. Software that is not written to perform
obvious checks and balances to anticipate and check for the errors likely to be
made by fallible (and mostly volunteer) poll workers at the end of a long
election day is unacceptable, and it is a software failure that such checks and
balances apparently do not exist in the election system used in South Carolina.

What we have done is really no more sophisticated than totaling a spreadsheet
across rows and down columns and then totaling the row sums and column
sums to get a grand total in the bottom right corner. From the event log we
can get (or should be able to get, if the logs are complete) a list of machines
used and a count of votes cast per machine. From the vote image file we can
get detailed counts by precinct, machine, ballot image, and candidate. If the
problems we have observed in Richland County can be exposed as easily as
this, by citizen observers without access to hardware, software, or procedures
manuals, then we suggest that the system has failed and that post-election
audits such as ours should be mandated. If the software as written and in use
will not find these errors, then software should be written and used that will
find these errors.

WFSB: What It Takes To Be A Registrar – Politics Play Out In Registrar’s Office

Connecticut is the only state where a registrar from each political party is elected into office. Many registrars told the I-Team while this may seem inefficient, it has worked literally for centuries.

The I-Team provides a bit of an introduction to our unique system of 339 local elected Registrars of Voters along with some interesting tidbits <read>

“The secretary of state’s office sets the rules and sets the regulations, but we have very little power over local decision making,” said Secretary of the State Denise Merrill.Registrars’ offices are in each of the state’s 169 cities and towns.

There are at least two in every office, a Republican and Democrat, who are nominated by their parties and most often run unopposed. Responsibilities include running the polls on Election Day, but also maintaining the voter rolls, and making sure voting machines are available and in working order — to name just a few things.

“We want to assure the voters that their elections are clean,” said Karen Doyle Lyons, Republican registrar in Norwalk.The I-Team’s research showed most registrars are part time and do not receive benefits.

The ones from Burlington earned just $1,900 a year, but registrars are full time in the state’s larger cities.In Bridgeport, the two registrars each earn $65,000.

In Hartford, there are three registrars because of a significant third party, and they each receive $80,000 plus benefits, and they often have full-time support staff…

Connecticut is the only state where a registrar from each political party is elected into office. Many registrars told the I-Team while this may seem inefficient, it has worked literally for centuries.

“If you had one person, you’d be paying them twice as much because you’re splitting up the work,” said Will Brinton, Republican registrar in Bethany.

Readers may recall we suggested a pay cut for the Hartford registrars so that three could do the same job at the same rate as two.

Urania Petit is one of three [Hartford registrars] making $80,000 there and she’s with the Working Families Party.”The law says if I got one vote over a major party, and in this case it was the Republican Party, I become a registrar, but the major party stays,” Petit said.

Petit said she tried to take a pay cut and she was instructed not to.

She told the I-Team she tried to share the load in the office, but the Democratic registrar of voters would not let her.”I receive a memo one time that said if a Democrat came into the office,

I could not serve that Democratic voter, yet still the office is nonpartisan,” she said.

Readers may recall how this non-partisan thing goes, when a slate was ruled intelligible to run, just one year ago: Registrar of Voters suit: Alleged to have fudged petitions for herself and relatives

Last week we testified to the Legislature. Also testifying was Judi Beaudreau, Registrar of Voters in Vernon, for whom we have worked on three election days. Judi and I do not agree on everything, but we certainly agreed when Judi testified for consolidation. We should consider doing for elections what we have done for probate in Connecticut. As Judi suggested to the I-team:

Beaudreau, a registrar with almost 30 years experience, said many of her colleagues are underpaid, overworked and unappreciated, but added that’s not always the case.

“Registrars come into the job they don’t even have computer skills,” Beaudreau said. “A lot of them are in fear they are going to lose their job.

Well, maybe some of them should.”Beaudreau explained in a number of towns, the registrars of voters remains a patronage job.

“What happens now in the system is that the political parties will pick a person to run for the office, and it may be a person who has put stamps on envelopes or labels on envelopes. Nobody else has the guts to say it because it would be political suicide to ’em,” she said.

And Beaudreau said many registrars’ offices have become so poisoned by politics they cannot operate effectively.”Politics has got to stay out of the elections,” Beaudreau said…

Beaudreau believes just one registrar, who is not elected but has some kind of training certification and is chosen by the state, could work in Connecticut’s larger communities, and smaller towns could get by without one at all, instead having a regional approach, much the way probate judges have been reorganized.

“Each of these small little towns would be just another polling place, but there would be one major registrar, and if political parties needed to have representation in the office, have deputies, one from each political party,” Beaudreau said.

Absentee Ballot Fraud In Ohio

Another election, followed, as usual, by reports of absentee vote fraud. This time from Ohio. The good news is that under Secretary of State, Jennifer Brunner, it was not the Ohio of 2004. It is an Ohio where problems are detected, investigated, and hopefully corrected, prevented, and prosecuted.

Ironton Tribune: Absentee ballot report sent to Husted <read>

About a month before the November general election Lawrence County Board of Election workers noticed a number of applications for absentee ballots going to one of two post office box numbers. When voters apply for an absentee ballot, they are allowed to have the ballot sent to an address other than their home location.

However when election board workers noticed the same post office boxes appearing repeatedly, they did a random check to see where the voters wanted their ballots sent. On most of the calls, the workers found the phones listed on the applications were disconnected. However, those they did get in touch with said they wanted their ballot sent to their home address.

When Brunner learned of that situation, she ordered a special investigation, sending Columbus attorney Andrew Baker on Oct. 20 to the county courthouse to review those applications.

As we have said before, the risks of mail-in voting including no-excuse absentee voting are to great. Such voting should be limited to cases where it is absolutely necessary, as it is now in Connecticut. It also requires strong laws, procedures, and vigilance.

Coalition Report: Bridgeport Recount and Recommendations

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Each candidate for the governor’s race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor’s race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

Simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Full report, press release, and supporting details at Coalition site: <read>

Bridgeport Registrar offers fix, Secretary responds

[Republican Registrar of Voters] Borges also said that the Bridgeport registrar’s office is stretched too thin.
[Bysiewicz] feels the Bridgeport office is well-staffed — it spends $551,466 annually, most of that in salaries for two registrars

Fairfield Weekly: Notes from a Scandal <read>

[Republican Registrar of Voters] Borges says he’s faced is a dearth of competent personnel to staff polling places. In the past, polls in Bridgeport have closed when workers didn’t show up, he recalls. He suggests urban registrars partner with corporations to help get quality people at the polls, offering to reward the companies in some fashion. (The only requirement to work at a polling station is being registered to vote.)

The secretary of the state’s office offered its own solution to the problem in 2008 by recruiting 125 students at community colleges, including Housatonic Community College. The average age of poll workers is over 70 and they hoped to attract a younger generation. However, “registrars were reluctant to hire these people,” says Deputy Secretary of the State Lesley Mara, a Democrat, because they were perceived to be in Barack Obama’s camp.

Borges also said that the Bridgeport registrar’s office is stretched too thin. The state’s election laws grant complete control over local elections to municipalities and the decentralized system punishes large, cash-strapped cities, he says. Borges thinks registrars should work directly under the secretary of the state.

“That’s probably not going to happen anytime soon,” says outgoing Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, who adds that she feels the Bridgeport office is well-staffed — it spends $551,466 annually, most of that in salaries for two registrars (one for each major party), two deputy registrars, a secretarial assistant and seasonal employees. Santa Ayala, Borges’ Democratic counterpart who ordered too few ballots for Nov. 2, did not return the Weekly’s calls seeking an interview.

Why We Need Audits and Recounts: AccuVote Missed 0.4% of Ballots in Aspen Elections

How do we know that our Dieblod/Premier/Dominion AccuVote-OS voting machines count ballots and votes accurately in each election, in each polling place? Maybe sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t.

The reason we need paper ballots, audits and recounts is to verify that citizens’ votes are counted accurately. How do we know that our Dieblod/Premier/Dominion AccuVote-OS voting machines count ballots and votes accurately in each election, in each polling place? Maybe sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t.

In Aspen, Colorado they did not, missing 11 ballots out of 2544. Premier AccuVote Machines Missed 0.4% of Ballots in Aspen Elections <read>

On May 5th 2009, Aspen (CO) held municipal elections for mayor, two city council seats and a ballot measure. Pitkin County’s Premier (formerly Diebold) AccuVote optical scan voting machines failed to register 11 (0.4%) of 2,544 ballots, which was discovered due to the ballots also being counted on Election Day at a central location with a separate system. Premier is one of the three largest providers of voting equipment in the United State…

To underscore the importance of the missing 11 ballots, it is not uncommon for manual recounts of optical scan elections to find new valid votes that were discounted by the optical scan voting machine, either because the machine detected a stray pen mark as an over-vote (voting for more candidates than allowed), or because a voter marked a choice too lightly or outside the designated spot on the ballot, such that the machine detected an under-vote, or skipped race. Such “found” votes are common in manual recounts where humans can recognize a voter’s intent that the optical scan machine could not. In the recent Aspen election, the independent scanning of ballots did indeed allow election officials to find at least one such valid vote missed by the AccuVote voting machines.

However, this problem is unrelated to the discovery that nearly a half percent of ballots – 11 ballot cards in all – went entirely unrecorded by the AccuVote machines. According to Aspen City Clerk Kathryn Koch, both the poll book record of the number of voters who voted and the TrueBallot record of ballots processed agree that there were 2,544 ballots. The AccuVote machines, however only recorded 2,533 ballots

Unfortunately, differences in counts between humans and AccuVote-OS optical scanners in Connecticut audit reports are routinely dismissed as human error rather than potential scanner errors to be investigated. See the Coalition Audit Reports.

This is also why CTVotersCount stands for stronger audits and actual recounts in very close elections in Connecticut. We also are strongly support auditing by machine in Connecticut, with systems like the one used in Aspen by TrueBallot, and others by ClearBallot, and TEVSystems – provided Connecticut implements such systems in ways that are transparent, provide for public verification, and confidence.

Sadly these same ballots are being withheld from public scrutiny to verify this result.