Category: Skulduggery and Errors

The Day: New London has problem with math

Actually it is more a problem of complexity and communications

New London has problem with math <read>  Actually it is more a problem of complexity and communications:

The decision to consolidate seven districts into three was made late last spring as a cost-cutting move. Like every other city and town in the state, money is tight and New London is looking to trim wherever it can find savings.

The state’s statutory requirement for municipal polling places is that there be at least one for each House district. And since New London is split between the 39th and 40th districts, the city’s minimum is two, but in consolidating, it opted for three for convenience.

The savings amount to about $12,000 for each election, including costs for setting up ballots, programming voting machines, adding telephone lines, and paying poll workers. Rather than the usual 16 machines in operation in New London on Election Day, now there will be eight. And the typical contingent of about 60 poll workers will be halved to 3…

The only two districts that are physically moving are the 3rd and 4th, which previously voted at Bennie Dover Jackson Middle School. The problem is, they’re moving to different places. The old 3rd is going to the new 1st, which casts ballots at New London High School. (In the past, the high school was the place to vote for the old 1st, 2nd, and 3rd districts.) And the 4th is going to the new 2nd, which used to be home to the 4th, 5th and 7th districts. So if used to vote at Bennie Dover, you need to figure out where you’re going on Nov. 3rd…

The registrar’s map delineating the new districts is virtually impossible to read, and the problem is compounded because in some neighborhoods, the odd-numbered side of a street votes in one district while the even-numbered households vote in another.

TIME: Galbraith: How the Afghan Election Was Rigged

“Once fraud occurs on the scale of what took place in Afghanistan, it is impossible to untangle.”

We are lucky to hear from Mr. Gailbrath. Had he not been fired, he might have continued to keep quiet

Time article, How the Afghan Election Was Rigged <read> by Peter W. Galbraith, formerly deputy special representative of the Secretary-General of the U.N. in Afghanistan

No one will ever know how Afghans voted in their country’s presidential elections on Aug. 20, 2009. Seven weeks after the polling, the U.N.-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is still trying to separate fraudulent tallies from ballots. In some provinces, many more votes were counted than were cast. E.U. election monitors characterize 1.5 million votes as suspect, which would include up to one-third of the votes cast for incumbent President Hamid Karzai. Once fraud occurs on the scale of what took place in Afghanistan, it is impossible to untangle.

Afghanistan’s fraudulent elections complicate President Obama’s job as he weighs a recommendation from General Stanley McChrystal, his top commander there, to send as many as 40,000 additional troops to support a beefed-up counterinsurgency strategy. But for that strategy to work, the U.S. needs a credible Afghan partner, which Afghanistan’s elections now seem unlikely to produce…

We are lucky to hear from Mr. Gailbrath.  Had he not been fired, he might have continued to keep quiet:

Unfortunately, I am unable to provide reassuring answers. Over the past four months, I served as the deputy head of the U.N. mission in Kabul and had a firsthand view of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan’s presidential vote. Each time I proposed actions to deal with it, Kai Eide, the head of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan, overruled me. Like any good subordinate, I respected my boss’s decision, but in private, I told him I thought he was making a mistake in downplaying the fraud. When the press learned of our disagreement (through no fault of ours), U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon removed me from my post.

I recommend reading the entire article, it is not that long.  This so called  ‘election’ shows an unbelievable disregard for integrity, a very thinly disguised fraud, and a superficial image of democracy.

We can have high degree of certainty that the Afghan elections were not credible.  How much worse is this than the uncertainty we often have in our own elections?  We need effective monitoring and reporting of all elections. Without effective monitoring and auditing we cannot have confidence in the leaders of our own democracy.

Siegleman Election Fraud Claims Another Victim

Once again, justice delayed in justice denied. Elections stolen, but not immediately redressed even worse.

This is the case of election fraud in the reelection bid of Alabama Governor Don Seigelman. <previous coverage> Lets recap:

  • The 1st victims were the people of Alabama.  Governor Seigelman was not reelected due to fraud in the election.
  • The next victim was Don Seigelman who, instead of being reinstated as Governor, was prosecuted, convicted, and jailed, based on trumped up charges and prosecutorial misconduct.
  • The Governor was released from jail but may face a new trial.
  • It seems the American People and the rule of law are also victims.  So far no body has been punished for misconduct.
  • Most recently a whistle blower, Tamarah Grimes, sent Attorney General Eric Holder a letter detailing more misconduct in the case.  Three days later Ms. Grimes was fired, becoming the latest victim: <read>

Leura Canary, U.S. attorney for the Middle District of Alabama, wrote press releases about the Don Siegelman case that were distributed under the signature of assistant prosecutor Louis Franklin. Also, Canary regularly had two assistants communicate her suggestions about the Siegelman case to Franklin.

All of this took place after Canary had announced her recusal from the Siegelman case. And they are two of many stark examples of prosecutorial misconduct outlined in a letter dated June 1, 2009, from whistleblower Tamarah Grimes to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder.

Eight days after writing the letter, Grimes was fired from her position as a paralegal for the Department of Justice in Montgomery, Alabama. So far, there is no indication that Holder has taken any action in the matter.

Once again, justice delayed in justice denied.  Elections stolen, but not immediately redressed even worse.

Afghan Results Raise Suspicions

Numbers from several polling places raises suspicions, with all votes going to one candidate, lots of round numbers of votes, and more votes than voters. And fake polling sites.

McClatchy Story. Numbers from several polling places raises suspicions, with all votes going to one candidate, lots of round numbers of votes, and more votes than voters. <read>

In Kandahar Province in southern Afghanistan, the results from 66 polling sites have been released. In nine of them, 100 percent of the votes went to Karzai…

At one point, he read the voting tallies at six polling sites where Karzai received almost all the votes and where all the totals were rounded numbers ranging between 250 and 350. “They should have set these aside,” Abdullah said…

The polling place called Zherai Awal Camp, for example, has an estimated 2,100 voters who were eligible to cast ballots for president. On election day, the polling place reported nearly 2,300 voters showed up, and every one who voted cast ballots for Karzai.

At three polling sites at the Shorabak District of Kandahar, 11,210 votes were tallied, and 99 percent went to Karzai.

According to an article in the New York Times, there were fake polling sites <read>

The fake sites, as many as 800, existed only on paper, said a senior Western diplomat in Afghanistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the political delicacy of the vote. Local workers reported that hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of votes for Mr. Karzai in the election last month came from each of those places. That pattern was confirmed by another Western official based in Afghanistan.

“We think that about 15 percent of the polling sites never opened on Election Day,” the senior Western diplomat said. “But they still managed to report thousands of ballots for Karzai.”

Why Vote On Paper? Tales from Georgia and Massachusetts

No paper, no problem! Yet, also less integrity and no credibility!

In Geogia they are claiming that all electronic voting is unconstitutional <read>

We will have to wait for the court to rule on the constitutionality issue.  But we don’t have to wait for paper ballots and stronger election integrity nationwide, Congress can pass the “Holt” bill.

A case brought by election integrity advocates in Georgia claiming that unverifiable electronic voting, or E-voting, is unconstitutional could spell trouble for the controversial practice, as it heads to the Georgia Supreme Court for a ruling.

E-voting first started in Georgia. In 2002, the state became the first to use the Diebold AccuVote TS-R6 machines statewide after then-Secretary of State Cathy Cox entered into a 54-million-dollar agreement with Diebold…

Of the 13 counts listed by VoterGA in their lawsuit, two argue that E-voting is in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment, which states that “No State shall… deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process.”

Count 12 also claims that E-voting violates the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law because Georgians who choose to vote with an absentee ballot are able to do so on paper, while those who vote on Election Day must use the E-voting machines.

“The electronic-only voting cannot provide equal protection in terms of voter verification…” Favorito said.

Questions will always remain about the 2002 election in Georgia when Max Cleland was defeated for the Senate and Sunny Perdue was elected Governor.  Especially questions raised by Bev Harris in her book Black Box Voting.

Contrast this to Massachusetts where Recounts of ballots can occur.  Mistakes happen but they don’t have to result in the voters’ intent being bypassed.  Clerk does not know why votes weren’t counted <read>

Two months after the recount on the library override, Town Clerk Ron Fucile said the town might never know why nine ballots were not counted in the June 6 election.

A total of 5,726 ballots were documented as cast in the June 6 election, when Walpole voters barely approved a Proposition 2 1/2 override to partially finance the construction of a new library…

The town clerk said he has been poring over records from election day and he hasn’t been able to figure out what happened to the nine ballots – six of which were from Precinct 1.

“I don’t know if I’ll ever get to the bottom of it,” said Fucile.

The Massachusetts story hints at the emotions behind resistance of election officials to paper ballots.  With lever machines or paperless touch screens there can never be an actual recount or audit, there is little reason or basis to question the equipment or lapeses in the process.

No paper, no problem!  Yet, also less integrity and no credibility!

Aspen Ballots, An Issue For Us All

We side completely with the activists, they are on the side of democracy, integrity, and transparency of government. Beyond a CD ballots should be made available to the public, the actual ballots should be made available to the public.

05/17/2013 [Most] ballots [finally] made available: Ballot images from 2009 election online for public inspection <read>

Marks, who on Thursday said she has not spent much time examining the images posted online, wondered why the city withheld 129 ballots and if officials plan to attempt to make contact with voters who cast them since it’s illegal to make distinguishing marks on a ballot.

“How did they get counted in the first place?” Marks asked. “The idea of a secret ballot is that no one — no one — should have an identifiable marking.”

One of the city’s main arguments against releasing the ballots is that it could encourage the practice of voters leaving marks on their ballots in a corrupt cash-for-votes system.

The city had previously fought disclosure of the ballot images all the way to the Colorado Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. Marks won a judgment from the Colorado Court of Appeals in September 2011, which found that the ballot images qualified as public records.

The Court of Appeals directed the City Clerk to withhold ballots that contained markings that could identify a voter, including all write-in votes.

12/28/2009: Letter to the editor: One dozen excuses <read>

Mayor Ireland just sent an intriguing e-mail to the “voting rights community” titled “Why we don’t need your help in running our elections and why a recount is not needed.” It probably wasn’t written to amuse, given the personal attacks in it, but recipients surely chuckled…

4. Election-integrity advocates are destructive nitpickers! Although the pre-election software test tabulated the candidate with the fewest votes as the winner, 15 hours was plenty of time to reconfigure the software before the polls opened…

10. The early voting ballot box at City Hall, accumulating 32 percent of the votes, was sometimes unlocked. Why audit these ballots now? Any possible mischief already happened. An audit now would be meaningless.

12/19/2009: Bev Harris makes the case for public access to ballot images <read>

Concealed vote counting systems have been deemed unconstitutional by the German high court, which ruled in March 2009 that no public election can conceal any essential step in the election from the public. The German Constitution was formed according to requirements provided by the U.S. after WW II. Principles of public sovereignty over government are embedded into our Declaration of Independence (the document which provided much of the argumentation for women’s suffrage), and are also recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…

a precedent will be set which can alleviate some frustrations with computerized voting processes.

9/17/2009: Good news ballots will not be destroyed just yet <read>

9/1/2009 Aspen heats up.  From the RedAnt <read>

Aspen citizen Millard Zimet  filed the formal complaint  with Aspen’s Election Commission questioning whether Aspen conducted a secret ballot election in May 2009.

Reading the complaint, it seems that Mr. Zimet has a strong argument that it was not a secret election.

The post also points to a series of emails between Aspen Mayor Mick and Kathy Dopp who has articulated the inadequacies of Instant Runoff Voting as used in Aspen.

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Aspen Colorado held an IRV (Instant Runoff Voting) election.  A CD was made of all the ballots.  Activists would like access to the CD to perform a post-election audit, but the city objects.  An editorial by activitst leading the charge <read>

If there is a law that actually says we the people cannot see our anonymous ballots, and if it says the permanent record of this groundbreaking and unique election in Colorado history should be destroyed, then such a law should be changed. If somehow the laws to which the City has alluded apply, we are confident that election integrity advocates will lobby to change them. The public will and we hope the City Council will understand the need to view a disk of the ballots, at any time for any reason…

The City of Aspen is trying to translate the requirement for destruction as a message about how dangerous the ballots are. These ballots are only dangerous to a small group- anyone who might fear the revelation of fraud or non-accidental error. After the write-in handwriting and any stray marks are removed or redacted, reviewing ballot images can only safeguard, not endanger voter privacy and confidence. .

Aspen wrote in its election press release: “By making the rankings and all other election data public, everyone had the opportunity to double-check the IRV tallies themselves.” We like the sound of that. Will Aspen now look for ways to hide that data from the public instead of enthusiastically joining the general trend towards more transparency in government?

Another article from the Aspen city public relations director <read>

After thorough and significant review, the city attorney has concluded that the release of the ballots, or their images, would violate state law. Colorado, along with every other state in the country, began to guarantee the secret ballot to its citizens at the end of the 19th century. Every state and almost all jurisdictions have adopted laws and rules to ensure that ballots are cast in absolute privacy and remain secret even after the election is completed.

The editorial refutes this position:

You alone might be able to recognize your own ballot from the way you have voted, if you remember the many rankings on your ballot. The protection of the anonymity of the ballot is demanded by the Colorado Constitution as the city has pointed out. If the city has counted any ballots containing identifying marks in any election, it has violated the law. Should the voters be able to learn whether this has happened? The city says you are not allowed to find out- by law. The city says trust: but don’t verify.

Our opinion:

We side completely with the activists, they are on the side of democracy, integrity, and transparency of government.  Beyond a CD ballots should be made available to the public, the actual ballots should be made available to  the public.

  • The ballots are the actual public record of the vote.  The public needs assurance that the CD matches the actual votes.
  • We believe activists are correct in their interpretation of ballot secrecy – if it is identifiable then its not a legal vote.
  • We have the same issue in Connecticut and many other states.  Here ballots must be kept under seal by law for 14 days after the election, then stored for twenty-two months (federal elections) or six months (other elections), and then destroyed.  There is no explicit opportunity in the law for the public to access the ballots.
  • Meanwhile there are indications that the ballots in Connecticut may show that the reported election results for third parties were incorrect.  That Working Families Party cross-endorsed candidates were short changed.  That the Green Party candidate for President was also short changed.  Only the ballots can say and provide satisfaction that the election was correctly reported.
  • Where laws don’t allow public review of ballots, they should be changed.

Some states provide access.  Here our hats are off to Ohio law.  It made possible the investigation by citizens of questionable results.

Update: 02/25/2010:  <read>

What can we say but “Good Grief, Aspen!”

The memorandum by the Defendant appears to seek to impair the discovery of facts in the course of the litigation.  The Defendant is arguing that the Plaintiff is attempting to contest the election outside of legal time constraints and making suggestions about that motive.  Defendant is also appears to be making the argument that benefit to the public interest is not among the possible  reasons to inspect ballot images, and that testimony by TrueBallot may show “errors and irregularities” which may be of interest, but not relevant to the case at bar. On the other hand, the possibility of learning about “errors and irregularities” does seem to me to be a reason to inspect the ballot images.

Update: 3/11/2010 – Case Dismissed – Public Cannot See the Ballots. Harvey Branscomb’s Comments <read>

Civilized society normally keeps ample records of how it makes decisions–much more so now with inexpensive digital record-keeping–allowing historians as well as the general public to help policy makers with productive improvements. Election policy too would benefit from guidance by similarly complete historical records. Instead, hundred year old laws are being interpreted to require consistent destruction of all records…

The court appears to have decided that Marilyn Marks, the plaintiff, has no viable argument, yet the court has not yet heard that argument. The judge acted only two days before a vital deposition was to be taken. This blocked a long-fought-for opportunity to obtain valuable information from the election contractor TrueBallot. That deposition would have informed the court and the public on the relationship of ballot images to the paper originals. It would have given a good indication of how beneficial to the public those images could be.

Update: 4/18/2010: Criticism of Caleb Kleppner Guest Editorial in Aspen Times Sept. 17, 2009: Aspen Election Transparency <read>

Two views of election transparency:  An OpEd, Annotated:

[Caleb Kleppner]Whether you like IRV or hate IRV, Aspen’s election was a model of transparency and verifiability, and American elections would be improved if they incorporated elements of Aspen’s election.

HB[Branscomb]>; I do not agree that Aspen was a “model” but I do agree that American elections would benefit from  more transparency and verifiability such as what Mr. Kleppner’s company provides.  For Aspen to become a model for a superior election, it is necessary to look at the details and come clean about the defects of this innovative election and to avoid making these mistakes again, whether you like or hate IRV.

Caleb Kleppner is a vice president at TrueBallot Inc., which has run elections for municipalities, labor unions, associations, state Democratic and Republican parties, and others over the past 15 years.

HB>; Harvie Branscomb is a Board Member of Coloradans for Voting Integrity, a Trustee of the Colorado Voter Group, and appointed by the Democratic Party to be Eagle County Canvass Board member.

Update 10/25/2010: Aspen Daily News: Do Away With IRV <read>

Connecticut: Land of Steady [and Slow] Habits

Connecticut takes criticism from Brad Friedman for the slow and unpredictable speed of election enforcement. As those of us who have submitted complaints know, they can take a long time to be completed. But as Brad points out, some are resolved much quicker than others.

Update 10/16/2013: Inconsistent Justice.  Now a State Representative is accused in case dismissed against Ann Coulter: CTNewsJunkie:  Elections Enforcement Hands Evidence Over To Criminal Prosecutors In Ayala Investigation  <read>

An SEEC investigation revealed evidence that Ayala “falsely registered to vote at the address in Bridgeport in July 2009 and remained registered at this address until January 2013.”

There is evidence she used the address to vote in nine primaries and elections, according to Attorney Kevin Ahern of the SEEC who investigated the matter. There also is evidence she ran for elected office twice using the address and applied for funds from the Citizens’ Election Program using the false address, he wrote in a statement.

Rep. Ayala’s mother Santa Ayala is the Democratic Registrar of Voters in Bridgeport and “may have conspired with Representative Ayala to commit fraud,” Ahern wrote in his statement to the commission.

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Original Post:

Connecticut takes criticism from Brad Friedman for the slow and unpredictable speed of election enforcement.  As those of us who have submitted complaints know, they can take a long time to be completed.  But as Brad points out, some are resolved much quicker than others <read>

It’s been nearly five months since the official complaint about Ann Coulter’s alleged voter fraud in 2002 and 2004 was filed in Connecticut, yet state election officials continue to refuse comment on the status of the case beyond acknowledging that it’s “still pending,” as recently confirmed by The BRAD BLOG.

Several charges of absentee voter fraud were alleged in the complaint against Coulter in Connecticut, where evidence shows she cast absentee ballots illegally while living in her then permanent New York City residence…

“The delay in this case is inexplicable given they need to prove two things: where she registered to vote/voted and where she lived when she registered to vote/voted,” the complainant in the case, Daniel Borchers, a Christian conservative who has long opposed Coulter’s behavior…

But sometimes things are resolved quickly:

In a case which almost identically mirrors the allegations against Coulter, New York resident Daniel Jarvis Brown, who had been registered to vote at his parents’ home in CT, voted in the November 2008 election illegally by absentee ballot. Coulter also used her parents home address, claiming it as her own, when she is alleged to have voted while a permanent resident of NYC in 2002 and 2004…

But the timing of Brown’s violation and subsequent settlement of the case is notable as well. While Brown’s violation [PDF] occurred in November of last year, he signed his agreement with the State Elections Enforcement Commission less than three months later, on February 23, 2009, and the Commission formally adopted the agreement on March 5th, just four months after the original violation.

In another more recent case [PDF], a CT voter was alleged to have voted improperly during a referendum in the Town of New Hartford on February 12, 2009. After an investigation by the Commission finding no impropriety, the complaint was officially adopted as “dismissed” on May 27th, less than two months after the election.

Connecticut has several nicknames in addition to  “The Land Of Steady Habits”, including “The Provisions State”,  the “Nutmeg State”, and perhaps most pleasing, “The Constitution State”.

Update: 10/6/2010 – some progress via BradBlog: Ann Coulter to Face Vote on Voter Fraud Charges in CT by State Elections Enforcement Commission <read>

Will Ann Coulter finally be held accountable for having committed voter fraud? We may find out on October 14th when the matter will come up at a public hearing by Connecticut’s State Elections Commission after an extraordinarily long two-year delay since the complaints about her allegedly illegal absentee votes in 2002 and 2004 were filed.

Update: Brad Friedman discusses Ann Coulter’s case <about 9 min in 1st hour>

Update: 10/14/2010 Charges Dismissed <read>

Iran: Who Won? Who Lost? Was It Stolen? Was It Credible?

For now, we can say that Ahmadinejad seems to have won, one way or another. But winning in a questionable way with the opposition protesting is not a complete win, it may come back and bite sooner or later. Credibility is missing. Without credibility, democracy loses — no matter the intent of the voters — no matter the accuracy of the election.

Several articles on the Iranian election:  The Guardian Brad Blog Daily Voting News. Right now we have no way verifying or refuting the official result.

For now, we can say that Ahmadinejad seems to have won, one way or another.  But winning in a questionable way with the opposition protesting is not a complete win, it may come back and bite sooner or later. It has been said that election credibility is for the losers so that they can accept the result.  We say it is for the voters so that they actually determine their government and have confidence that their collective intent is realized.  Credibility is missing.  Without credibility, democracy loses — no matter the intent of the voters —  no matter the accuracy of the election.

From The Guardian: Iranians can’t believe it:

I don’t mean that Ahmadinejad did not have any supporters at all. He had many supporters actually – some of his rallies were as huge as Mousavi’s and the competition between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi looked pretty close, but winning twice as many votes as Mousavi is incredible. That’s why Iranians are now demonstrating on streets. They can’t believe it.

As Brad Friedman makes the same point, and how it applies to us: Iran’s 2009 Election Results Suggest Massive Fraud

Just Like Ohio’s in 2004 Without citizen oversight and transparency, ‘faith-based’ elections threaten democracy no matter where they are held…

It sounds a lot like Ohio 2004. A less than popular old-line incumbent facing massive public demonstrations against him and in favor of his main progressive challenger promising reform; polls that suggest a swell of support for the challenger…

The most substantive difference from Ohio 2004, however: the declared winner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is said to have defeated his main opponent Mir Hossein Mousavi by a 63% to 34% “landslide,” instead of the razor-thin margin seen in Ohio…

The other main differences between Iran ’09 and Ohio ’04: New York Times is already asking “Landslide or Fraud?” this morning; in Iran, supporters of the challenger are taking to the streets; and the challenger himself has already called the election results a “fraud”…

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 1 – Bad Cards, Procedural Lapses Continue

This week the University of Connecticut VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report.  In Part 2 we will highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Summary

From the press release:

My office entered into this historic partnership with the University of
Connecticut VoTeR Center so that we could receive an independent, unbiased accounting of Connecticut’s optical scan voting machines,” said Bysiewicz.  “The results of these two studies confirm that numbers tallied by the optical scanners were remarkably accurate on Election Day November 4, 2008.  Voters should feel confident that their votes were secure and accurately counted.

From the Post-Election Memory Card Audit Report:

In summary. (1) all cards used in the election were properly programmed, (2) cards with junk data continues to be a problem, and additional analysis is in progress to determine the cause, (3) a number of cards show that the pre-election procedures are not followed uniformly and that cards continue to be duplicated; we recommend a stronger policy statement is needed on handling the cards before and during the election an disallowing memory card duplication.

The Secretary of the State, her Office, and UConn are rightfully proud of initiating the audit in 2008 and instituting the unique memory card testing program. We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn.   We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified:

From the Press Release:

“Overall, I’m pleased that our first pre- and post-testing procedures with UConn demonstrate the security of our office’s chain of custody practices with election officials,” said Bysiewicz. “However, the percentage of unreadable cards is still too high and we await UConn’s forthcoming investigation into possible causes and recommended solutions for guidance on this issue. In the interim we will provide additional training to local election officials to make sure regulations concerning the handling and security of memory cards used by the optical scanners are uniformly followed throughout the State of Connecticut.”

From the Secretary of the State’s May 14th Newsletter:

Moving forward, my office will continue to improve the training we give to Registrars of Voters and local election officials to reduce any further errors in counting. We will also start new training within weeks to improve the security of memory cards used by the optical scanners to record votes on Election Day.

Our comments and concerns:

  • This is not a random audit of memory cards. We continue to applaud this unique memory card testing program, yet it is a registrar selected set of memory cards, not exhaustive, not a random sample. 297 cards used in the election were tested out of 833 districts. This opens a huge hole for covering up errors and fraud – just don’t send in your card. It also biases any statistics one way or another based on which cards tend to be sent to UConn.
  • 9% error memory card failure rate is bad enough, but is it the actual rate? 9% of all cards sent to UConn had memory problems. These are all classified as cards not used in the election, if so, the rate would be 41/142 or 29%. We wonder if many bad cards are found in the process of testing and not used in the election thus not counted in the audit. Or could some of these cards have worked in the election and failed subsequently? Bottom line we don’t know the actual failure rate % since we don’t have a random sample. The 9% is within the range of previous UConn pre and post election tests <all UConn Reports> <Our Past Commentary>
  • There is a serious failure of officials to follow procedures. A rate of 34% or 144 failures to follow procedures on 421 non-junk-data cards is a serious pervasive problem. (52-Not Set for Election, 20 Results Print Aborted, 2-Set for Election, Zero Counters, 41-Duplication Events, 29-Zero Totals Printed Before Date of Election)  In some cases multiple problems may have occurred on the same card so the number of districts detected as failing to follow procedures is likely a bit less that the 34%. (This  paragraph has corrected numbers, in an earlier version we had double counted some of the errors)Once again, this is not a random sample yet it’s a totally unacceptable level of not following procedures. The report correctly suggests these should be changed through better training and instruction to municipalities. If procedures are necessary, then when they are not followed it means there is an opportunity for problems to occur. This should cause everyone to wonder to what extent other unaudited election procedures are regularly not followed. Most procedures are in place because they are intended to prevent election day problems, errors, and fraud.  In fact, this memory card finding is very consistent with the Audit Coaltion Reports which have consistently shown a significant level of failures to follow procedures, for instance the chain-of-custody failures described in the most recent Coalition report <read>

Our bottom line:

  • A non-random partial post-election audit of memory cards is useful, but it is insufficient. A more rigorous sampling process would yield more accurate information and, just as importantly, it would eliminate the existing opportunity for errors or fraud to be covered up by not sending the cards for testing.  Last year we proposed and the GAE Committee passed 100% pre-election independent testing of memory cards.  We stand by that recommendation to protect the cards from front-end insider fraud and to make it less likely that election officials have to deal with junk data cards.  Post-election random testing or 100% testing of memory cards is also advisable.
  • How many more tests, reports, and elections will it take before the junk data problem is significantly reduced? Ridiculous, Unacceptable, Unconscionable come to mind to describe the junk data problem.  5%, 9%, 20% or even 1% is way out of line for electronic equipment.  Why do we stand for it?  What about all the other states that use this exact same technology, why are they putting up with it?
  • Almost every failure to follow procedures is an opportunity to cause problems, cover up errors, or cover up fraud. Perhaps it is easier to understand human failure to follow procedures exactly, every time.  Once again no mater if failure to follow procedures is 5%, 10%, 20% or 40% in handling memory cards it points to a likely much higher rate of failure to follow all procedures.  How can we have confidence in elections with such a lack of ability or attention to following procedures, many of which are performed outside of public view, outside of audits purview to discover.    We can only hope that the Registrars of Voters will join in the commitment to meet a much  higher standard.

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Related story 5/28:  Diebold memory card problems in Florida — a different model, this time it is high speed wireless cards <read>