A provision of the Freedom to Vote Act reduces credibility, defying common sense

There is a lot that needs to be improved in our elections. The current bill before Senate and House, the Freedom to Vote Act, is well intended yet in at least one provision it actually makes elections less secure, less likely to provide public confidence. This is a change from previous bills H.R.1 and all version of S.1.

This new provision would prevent observers from within eight feet of ballots until after certification. That would make it impossible for observers to actually see that votes were counted and totaled accurately in audits and recounts (recanvasses in CT).

There is a lot that needs to be improved in our elections. The current bill before Senate and House, the Freedom to Vote Act, is well intended yet in at least one provision it actually makes elections less secure, less likely to provide public confidence. This is a change from previous bills H.R.1 and all version of S.1.

This new provision would prevent observers from within eight feet of ballots until after certification. That would make it impossible for observers to actually see that votes were counted and totaled accurately in audits and recounts (recanvasses in CT).

From page 298:

‘‘(1) I N GENERAL.—A person who is serving as a poll observer with respect to an election for Federal office may not come within 8 feet of
‘‘(A) a voter or ballot at a polling location
during any period of voting (including any period of early voting) in such election; or
‘‘(B) a ballot at any time during which the processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, or certifying voting results is occurring.

Like other provisions it is well intended but has unintended consequences. Observers need to be closer to observe ballots being adjudicated, votes determined and counted. Without public verifiability, justified confidence in elections is not possible.  We have covered the details of this before in our editorial series: Common Sense, specifically Justified Confidence and Public Transparency and Verifiability.

January 6 was practice. They are much better positioned to subvert the next election.

Bart Gellman article in the Atlantic: Trump’s Next Coup Has Already Begun
January 6 was practice. Donald Trump’s GOP is much better positioned to subvert the next election 

Its a long article, yet, unfortunately the most chilling projection yet of what is awaiting in 2024 and perhaps in 2022. I would emphasize Trump less that Gellman.  It can be as bad if he is not the candidate. Its not just the presidency at stake, its all levels of democracy and our democracy itself.

Bart Gellman article in the Atlantic: Trump’s Next Coup Has Already Begun
January 6 was practice. Donald Trump’s GOP is much better positioned to subvert the next election <read>

Its a long article, yet, unfortunately the most chilling projection yet of what is awaiting in 2024 and perhaps in 2022. I would emphasize Trump less that Gellman. It can be as bad if he is not the candidate. Its not just the presidency at stake, its all levels of democracy and our democracy itself.

In 2022 much of the same playbook could be used to change a handful or less House districts, or a couple of Senate seats and suddenly the House and Senate change to the control of the Republican Party, thwarting the President’s agenda and further harming voting rights and integrity.  Fine if the Republicans win one or both houses legitimately, by not illegitimately.  In 2024 even more is at stake, even more erosion can be anticipated if nothing changes the current trajectory.

Its unlikely to happen in Connecticut, with our current voting laws and little chance for them to change, yet even in 2021 we have seen several baseless claims by losers (and a couple legitimate claims which will likely be appropriately investigated).

Read and understand. Consider what you might do to support appropriate laws, serve in polling places, and perhaps open some minds.

 

 

The Arizona “Republican Audit”, no so fast

There are many reviews of the Arizona “Republican Audit” <read> and critiques, like this one <read>. I have to admit that I did not attend or watch the audit and have not read the report in detail, yet I have heard from those who have read the report and some who observed parts of it. Democrats and others are celebrating. Don’t rush to any conclusions, consider:

  • There are many distorted claims in the audit report, yet a few point to weaknesses in our election process, not just in Arizona…

There are many reviews of the Arizona “Republican Audit” <read> and critiques, like this one <read>. I have to admit that I did not attend or watch the audit and have not read the report in detail, yet I have heard from those who have read the report and some who observed parts of it. Democrats and others are celebrating. Don’t rush to any conclusions, consider:

  • There are many distorted claims in the audit report, yet a few point to weaknesses in our election process, not just in Arizona. For instance we need to be concerned with ballot security, largely from when they leave the polling place until they are destroyed 22  months later – how secure is the storage? Who can access the storage and ballots undetected? How can we be sure?
  • There are huge questions about the quality of signature comparison, is it even a reliable way to check for fraud? Does it really serve to inappropriately reject legitimate ballots?
  • Democrats and others celebrate that the audit “proved” that Biden won by a slightly larger margin than the official results.  Given the non-transparency of the audit, there is no reason to believe its results are more accurate that the official results; no reason to believe they are accurate at all. Perhaps Biden won by a little more or a little less than the official results, yet this audit provides no reliable evidence.

What’s the matter with BMDs?

Free Speech for People recently held a forum on Ballot Marking Devices (BMD)’s: An Examination of the Use and Security of Ballot Marking Devices

I recommend watching at least the 1st panel and;
If you are considering purchasing BMDs for all voters then you owe it to your jurisdiction to watch the whole forum;
If you are a voter and your jurisdiction is considering such a purchase of BMDs, you should also watch the whole thing and let your legislators and election officials know what you think.

Our Editorial:

…How much better to purchase the minimum number of BMDs today, fund research, and replace them every five years or so with improved designs.

Free Speech for People recently held a forum on Ballot Marking Devices (BMD)’s: An Examination of the Use and Security of Ballot Marking Devices <view>

There are several panels, you can see the topics and panelists <here>

I recommend watching at least the 1st panel and;
If you are considering purchasing BMDs for all voters then you owe it to your jurisdiction to watch the whole forum;
If you are a voter and your jurisdiction is considering such a purchase of BMDs, you should also watch the whole thing and let your legislators and election officials know what you think.

Our Editorial:

BMDs for all voters is a very bad idea. They will cost at least double paper ballots filled out by most voters followed by scanning. As the videos show they cannot be trusted, they will not be verified by enough voters, they will not be accurately verified by voters, and for good reason officials will not trust voters who claim the machines did not accurately record their votes.

BMDs for only a few voters with disabilities is a reasonable idea. A better idea. Many voters with disabilities are better served with voter completed paper ballots. Today’s BMDs do not serve or serve well the remaining voters with disabilities. More research and development is needed to produce better methods and equipment so that voters with disabilities can vote independently, privately, and securely.

How much better to purchase the minimum number of BMDs today, fund research, and replace them every five years or so with improved designs.

Why doesn’t anyone know what a voting machine costs?

We recently hosted a discussion on the Price of Voting Machines. Now an article in Politico gives the background story.

Politico: One Man’s Quest to Break Open the Secretive World of American Voting Machines

It began to dawn on Caulfield, slowly at first, that the amount the public didn’t know about these companies was vast. Quarterly profits, regional market share, R&D budgets, even the number of employees—often, there was simply nothing. “Basic, basic data—the basic layout of the industry—was just not out there,” Caulfield recalls. “Eventually, we realized that it didn’t exist.”…

Caulfield’s work points toward something more radical than perhaps even its author intended: a new reason to question the marriage of election administration and private industry. “What kinds of machines would we make if we declared this a public good, and had it produced in public laboratories?” Bollinger asked …

We recently hosted a discussion on the Price of Voting Machines. Now an article in Politico gives the background story.

Politico: One Man’s Quest to Break Open the Secretive World of American Voting Machines <read>

It began to dawn on Caulfield, slowly at first, that the amount the public didn’t know about these companies was vast. Quarterly profits, regional market share, R&D budgets, even the number of employees—often, there was simply nothing. “Basic, basic data—the basic layout of the industry—was just not out there,” Caulfield recalls. “Eventually, we realized that it didn’t exist.”…

But by far, Caulfield’s most significant discovery was to put a figure on the total size of the industry. He estimated the entire revenue footprint of all the companies in the United States was $350 million. That meant the entire elections industry in the world’s richest democracy was about the peak size of the R&D department of the camera company GoPro. The private voting sector wasn’t like a secretive and well-heeled defense contractor. It was more like the manufacturers of arcade machines or jukeboxes, grasping for market share with a product they could sell at best once a decade.

Mark Lindeman, a longtime voting expert who leads Verified Voting, explained the difficulty this poses for election clerks whenever they attempt to buy a new fleet of voting machines. “Election officials have no way of knowing what a fair market price could possibly be,” Lindeman said. He compared it to a recent experience he had buying his car, a Chevy Volt. At the dealership, “My wife and I got run in circles, while we waited for the dealer to give a price that was sensible,” he said. “How did we know it was sensible? Well, we went to the Consumer Reports website and got an idea of what a fair market value would be.” He added, “Election officials have no way to do that.”…

In the data, Caulfield discovered clerks who were buying the same voting machines from the same company, but seeing significantly different discounts than their peers—sometimes in the same state. In California, Mono County and Placer County both purchased orders of Dominion equipment, including the ImageCast Evolution, a voting machine priced at $7,200. But Mono received a 5 percent discount off of its bottom-line order, while Placer, 128 miles away, saw a mark-off of nearly 25 percent. Volume didn’t necessarily matter, either: Dodge County, Wis. purchased the same ES&S machines that Polk County, Fla. did. Even though Polk County bought substantially more machines and equipment, Dodge got a discount seven times larger than Polk’s—a mismatch Caulfield spotted in other states, including Texas and Virginia…

A business model in which repair and maintenance costs are the most stable source of revenue might not, to put it delicately, create optimal incentives for designing hassle-free technology. In fact, as Caulfield and Coopersmith suggested, it might not be financially wise to regularly roll out new models at all…

Caulfield’s work points toward something more radical than perhaps even its author intended: a new reason to question the marriage of election administration and private industry. “What kinds of machines would we make if we declared this a public good, and had it produced in public laboratories?” Bollinger asked when I called him this spring, just before Caulfield’s report went public. He drew an analogy to the life sciences and human biology, sectors where the U.S. government has made hundreds of billions of dollars in public research investment. “We have public funding for all kinds of development of things. But we leave this—.” Bollinger cut himself off and laughed. “We leave this essential object and thing, which is so critical, to the free market?”…

Risk Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use

A recent report, Risk Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use is about the most comprehensive and balanced introduction to Risk Limiting Audits that I have seen. Its 38 pages will take an hour or two to read in detail, and well worth it.

I am a fan of Risk Limiting Audits, yet I am concerned that they are misunderstood in several dimensions:

  • RLAs are not a panacea:…

A recent report, Risk Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use <read> is about the most comprehensive and balanced introduction to Risk Limiting Audits that I have seen. Its 38 pages will take an hour or two to read in detail, and well worth it.

I am a fan of Risk Limiting Audits, yet I am concerned that they are misunderstood in several dimensions:

  • RLAs are not a panacea: They are one type of audit among that others that need to be performed among several. Complementary audits are needed as a prerequisite to trusted RLAs, such as auditing the security of ballots presented for the RLA. RLAs done well, only assure that ballots were counted and tabulated correctly enough. There are other audits needed to determine the legitimacy of the election, such as the accuracy of voting lists and the integrity of the check-in lists and processes.
  • RLAs are not easy or simple: Some tout RLA benefits claiming that they are easy and simple. They are not. They are complicated and require attention to detail. They require scientific expertise to organize, execute, and understand, and for the most part trust on the part of the public in that science. They may be efficient, yet not simple to implement and understand.
  • RLAs have not been uniformly done well and backed by sufficient laws and procedures: Most state laws and procedures are insufficient and, at best, add confidence to the very few contests actually subject to such audits.
  • The larger the contest audited, the more efficient a RLA can be: Statewide contests and Congressional races can be reasonably to highly efficient. Auditing local contests, especially all local races can be expensive and time consuming, approaching the cost of recounting those contests by hand.

While optimistic, the Guide, points to all the details at a high-level, while avoiding all the statistical details. That makes it readable It does not avoid pointing out all other audits and their necessity.  It also emphasizes the need for transparency and public verifiability – often neglected in RLAs and other audits.

 

Study: The Price of Voting (Machines) – Valuable, Timely, and Facinating

Last week, I moderated a discussion featuring the authors of The Price of Voting, a study of what jurisdictions actually pay for voting machines.

The study is a great contribution to jurisdictions, including states like Connecticut, that are considering evaluating voting machines.

Five quick conclusions that I find relevant to Connecticut:

  1. If you are not getting about a 20% discount, you are paying too much…

Last week, I moderated a discussion featuring the authors of The Price of Voting, a study of what jurisdictions actually pay for voting machines.

Five quick conclusions that I find relevant to Connecticut:

  1. If you are not getting about a 20% discount, you are paying too much.
  2. Most voting machines cost about the same, so you might be able to pick the most suited if all bids are actually competitive.
  3. Connecticut should plan on about $12,000,000 for the initial purchase and about 10% of that per year for maintenance.
  4. There are also costs beyond the initial purchase and subsequent maintenance.
  5. Plus Connecticut may spend an additional $5,000,000 for initial purchase of a machines intended for those with disabilities, and perhaps $3,000,000 for initial purchases of ePollbooks.

Valuable, timely, and fascinating.

It seems that most jurisdiction pay about 20% off. What about those that paid more, far more? Did officials get too enamored of one solution? Did vendor sales staff get too close to the officials making the decisions? Were too many officials former vendor employees?

Beyond equipment maintenance the ongoing costs are: payments to vendors for expensive proprietary ballot paper based on claims that other papers will not do; ballot printing; ballot programming; and other services provided by the vendor(s) in managing the election which are outsourced from officials.

S1 Tempers “For the People Act” Impact on Connecticut

As we pointed out earlier, H1, the House version of the “For The  People Act” would have a large impact on Connecticut’s elections.

Recently there was a new Managers’ Amendment in the Senate, S1 https://www.rules. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Klobuchar%20Substitute%20S1.pdf

We have reviewed the new version and are pleased to report that there are many improvements that would ease its impact on Connecticut election officials, yet the impact remains significant.

Among the changes:

As we pointed out earlier, H1, the House version of the “For The  People Act” would have a large impact on Connecticut’s elections.

Recently there was a new Managers’ Amendment in the Senate, S1 https://www.rules. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Klobuchar%20Substitute%20S1.pdf

We have reviewed the new version and are pleased to report that there are many improvements that would ease its impact on Connecticut election officials, yet the impact remains significant.

Among the changes:

  • It now leaves a single day between early voting and election day and does not require early voting on election day. Still just a single day to print updated voting lists and load ePollbooks is very short – especially if there is a natural disaster or internet outage – just when you need those printed voter lists the most.
  • It now reduces the requirement for 20 days delay in results for accepting and curing absentee ballots to 10 days. Yet, that is not enough to save Connecticut from two elections, with two deadlines each even year, until we pass a Constitutional Amendment to conform state elections to federal election deadlines. Its complicated. Unfortunately the Elections Committee apparently did not get the urgency in my testimony.
  • It also removed the requirement for absentee balloting signature checking.
  • For smaller jurisdictions it eased some of the requirements for Election Day Registration and early voting – it seems that these will help large-area, small-voter rural areas more that Connecticut small towns.
  • It postponed many of the deadlines and provided an option for a state to apply for exemptions for a few years in some cases.
  • It also eased impossible requirements for support of those with disabilities. Some are good, but removing grants for research are disappointing.
  • It also removed grants for Risk Limiting Audits, that is not bad since it made Risk Limiting Audits mandatory.
  • Overall it included many of the changes recommended by the State Audit Working Group, which I moderate. We held sessions with staffers of four Senators on the Rules and Administration committees: Senators Klobuchar, Merkley, Feinstein, and Padilla Embarrassingly, to me, Sen Blumenthal on the Administration Committee did not respond to calls to meet with his staff.

It would remain a huge scramble for the State to meet all the deadlines and for local registrars to double to quadruple (depending on size) their work and budgets for each election.

State Audit Working Group comments on H.R.1

This week the State Audit Working Group published a letter sent to Rep Sarbanes regarding the collective concerns with the bill.

Here are the details from the cover letter to Rep Sarbanes:

We write to request critical changes to H.R.1, along with suggested improvements. Without a few key changes, we believe the bill might degrade election integrity and miss opportunities for improvement, rather than meet its well-intended, laudable goals. Our comments are restricted to election administration and integrity issues pp78-407 of the bill.

Attached to this letter is a list of detailed comments. Here we summarize the most critical items:

  • Requirements for grants should be stronger, to help ensure effective Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs)

This week the State Audit Working Group published a letter sent to Rep Sarbanes regarding the collective concerns with the bill <read>

Here are the details from the cover letter to Rep Sarbanes:

We write to request critical changes to H.R.1, along with suggested improvements. Without a few key changes, we believe the bill might degrade election integrity and miss opportunities for improvement, rather than meet its well-intended, laudable goals. Our comments are restricted to election administration and integrity issues pp78-407 of the bill.

Attached to this letter is a list of detailed comments. Here we summarize the most critical items:

  • >Requirements for grants should be stronger, to help ensure effective Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs). We suggest specific improvements to the HR1 grant requirements. Grants should be available to audit compliance and eligibility which are crucial for valid RLAs.
  • Poll books should be part of the Federal certification program, as proposed. So should other systems used to determine the eligibility of voters or ballot packets. They however, should be tested and certified separately from the voting system. Competition will be stifled if pollbooks are only tested as part of an entire voting system. Election officials will end up with fewer and less innovative purchase choices.
  • Ballots cast by an in-person voter by hand marked paper ballots may be rejected later under the current text. When a voter appears in person they must be offered an opportunity to be authenticated and, upon authentication, vote on a hand marked paper ballot  without further eligibility checks.
  • Voter Privacy / Ballot Secrecy. Ballots should never be associated with voters, thus compromising ballot secrecy There should be no unique identification numbers on some ballots for voters with disabilities. Voters should not be able to waive their ballot secrecy, a collective right.
  • Voting over the internet is not secure and does not protect the secrecy of the ballot. For security and integrity, votes should not be transmitted over the internet or by other electronic means such as email or fax.

Last week we posted a three-part series on our concerns with H.R.1. There concerns were largely based on the effects for states like Connecticut.

PS: I am the Moderator of the State Audit Working Group. Members spent hours over a couple of weeks under tight deadlines to publish our concerns.

What’s the matter with H.R.1, Part 2

Yesterday in <Part 1> we covered our three greatest concerns with the election administration in H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021”. Here we will cover the rest of our major concerns, these alone argue that the bill should not be passed without a number of major and minor changes…

In <Part 3> we address what is clearly good in the election administration portions of the bill and what might be changed to meet the well-intended goals without the, likely unintended, unnecessary detailed requirements and consequences.

Yesterday in <Part 1> we covered our three greatest concerns with the election administration portions of H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021” <read H.R.1> Here we will cover the rest of our major concerns, these alone argue that the bill should not be passed without a number of major and minor changes:

  • In states, like Connecticut, with an elected Chief Election Official (in CT Secretary of the State), when they are on the ballot, they are required to step aside and appoint someone else to perform their role for the election – appoint someone who does not report to them. For instance, if Denise Merrill were to run for reelection in 2022, under H.R.1, she would need to do that. Its a complex job to learn and in Connecticut there are few sufficiently knowledgeable or experienced  individuals who could quickly step in – even less individuals willing to stop what they are doing and take over a more than full time job. Worse that would apply to all future Secretaries of the State. Perhaps many future Secretaries would choose for the benefit of election management, limit themselves to a single term. The voters of the State might well suffer from missing the benefits of an experienced Secretary of the State.
  • H.B.1 requires that drop box ballots be counted like early voting ballots. Instead, they are normally counted like absentee ballots, yet this law seems to preclude that. Early voting ballots are normally provided to voters in person, voters who fill them out in the early voting place, have an opportunity to replace them to re-vote, and then the voter feeds them into a scanner. Perhaps this is just an oversight, yet it needs to be corrected or clarified.
  • H.B.1 also requires that drop boxes be accessible to all those with disabilities. It would be straight-forward to make them accessible to those who use wheelchairs, yet presumably there other disabilities where that would be all but impossible and prohibitively expensive, e.g. to provide independent access to a severely limited paraplegic.
  • In a similar vein, H.B.1 requires that all those with disabilities be a able to vote independently and privately. While that is a laudable goal it is all but impossible to serve everyone, with every actual disability, or combination of disabilities. While this is required the bill recognizes the limitations of actually available products when it, laudably, offers grants for researching such solutions.
  • H.B.1 requires Election Day Registration at every early voting site. That is certainly a convenience for voters, yet we point out it is another significant additional amount of work both for early voting place officials and for registrars in Connecticut.
  • The bill requires that voting arrangements should be such that for election day and for early voting that voters must not ever have to wait more than 30 minutes in line. Anyone familiar with queuing theory would know that to achieve that is all but impossible. Election officials have no way of predicting when and how many voters will arrive at a polling place or early voting center, especially when polling places open on election day and the 1st day of early voting. I have served at polling places in Connecticut where the only line over five minutes was at 6:00am. The 1st time I served in Nov 2008 the media hyped up that voting would be difficult with long lines, we had a 6:00am backup that was about 20 min – it could have been much longer, most of the rest of the day. we were mostly idle. In Nov 2020 and the Jan 2021 run-off in Georgia there were many stories of long lines in Georgia and other states on the 1st day of early voting, the stories seemed to go away after that initial crush. I agree that voters should not have to wait in lines for long times and generally less than 30 minutes, yet that is absolutely impossible to guarantee. Worse, there are unpredictable problems that take time to cure that could interrupt or slowdown voting e.g. ePollbook and voting machine breakdowns, sick pollworkers, power and internet failures, broken water pipes etc.
  • Another provision requires IDs on some ballots to identify the voter with their ballot. This is violates the, so called, Secret Ballot, or as the Connecticut Constitution calls the right of secret voting. Any method of linking a voter to a ballot should be illegal, rather than mandatory. Note that a ballot package with such an ID on an outer or inner envelope is fine, as long as the process does not result in an opportunity for the ballot to be read while still linked to such an envelope.
  • Finally, the bill has very strong enforcement provisions that go well beyond what we have in Connecticut. We have Secretary of the State’s Office’s hot lines, Election Enforcement hot lines, Elections Enforcement processes, and the opportunity for redress in the courts. A small error by an official should normally be referred to the processes we have now, yet this law would provide extensive legal recourse for a voter who had to wait in line more than 30 minutes, a single voter with disabilities who could not be served independently and privately, a single voter with disabilities unable to use a drop box unaided, a single voter not receiving an absentee ballot when they applied as late as five days before election day, etc. Who would want to be a pollworker, registrar or clerk under such potential risk?

In <Part 3> we address what is clearly good in the election administration portions of the bill and what might be changed to meet the well-intended goals without the, likely unintended, unnecessary detailed requirements and consequences.