Category: National

Fixing the Transcript for DemocracyNow: “Fixing” the Electoral College

In a segment last week DemocracyNow editorialized on, interviewed New Yorkers, and representatives of FairVote, on the occasion of New York joining the National Popular Vote Compact/Agreement: Fixing the Electoral College: New York Joins Pact to Elect President by Popular Vote

Unfortunately, their transcript needs at least as much fixing as our current election system. As CTVotersCount readers know, we oppose the Compact because it would make a risky system, much riskier, without providing the claimed benefits. We understand the attraction to many, like nuclear power, fracking, GMOs, and Touch Screen Voting, the national popular vote would seem to be beneficial, yet like those other ideas it has largely unrecognized and unappreciated consequences. For details and background, refer to our recent testimony to the Connecticut Legislature or review our index of past NPV posts..

As a service to our readers, we here provide some annotations to the DemocracyNow transcript, showing where we disagree with the interviewees, and some of the biased comments of the reporters.

I am a fan of DemocracyNow. Yet, like all media they are not exempt from their own biases and blinders. In a segment last week they editorialized on, interviewed New Yorkers, and representatives of FairVote, on the occasion of New York joining the National Popular Vote Compact/Agreement: Fixing the Electoral College: New York Joins Pact to Elect President by Popular Vote <read>

Unfortunately, their transcript needs at least as much fixing as our current election system.  As CTVotersCount readers know, we oppose the Compact because it would make a risky system, much riskier, without providing the claimed benefits.  We understand the attraction to many, like nuclear power, fracking, GMOs, and Touch Screen Voting, the national popular vote would seem to be beneficial, yet like those other ideas it has largely unrecognized and unappreciated consequences. For details and background, refer to our recent testimony to the Connecticut Legislature or review our index of past NPV posts..

As a service to our readers, we here provide some annotations to the DemocracyNow transcript, showing where we disagree with the interviewees, and some of the biased comments of the reporters. Our comments are in {maroon, with curly brackets and italics} .

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: New York has become the latest state to join an agreement that would transform the way we elect the president of the United States. Under the compact for a national popular vote, states across the country have pledged to award their electoral votes to the presidential candidate who wins the nationwide popular vote. If enough states sign on, it would guarantee the presidency goes to the candidate who wins the most votes across the country.{Not so. Gamesmanship like FL 2000 could easily cause the system to fail. Also there is no official popular vote number to use to determine the winner under the Compact} It would prevent scenarios like what happened in 2000, when Al Gore won the popular vote but still lost the election to George W. Bush. {Al Gore also apparently won FL by the newspaper recount of all votes in the state, demonstrating under a fair count, Gore would have won FL under the Electoral College in 2000}

AMY GOODMAN: The compact will kick in only when enough states have signed on to reach a threshold of 270 electoral votes. This week, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo brought the campaign a step closer, adding New York’s 29 electoral votes to those already pledged by nine other states, including California, Illinois, Massachusetts and by Washington, D.C. In a statement, Governor Cuomo said, quote, “By aligning the Electoral College with the voice of the nation’s voters, we are ensuring the equality of votes {Yes, votes, if counted accurately would be equal, but that is misleading since citizens would not be equal, since there is not an equal national franchise and different levels of ease of voting and suppression across states} and encouraging candidates to appeal to voters in all states, instead of disproportionately focusing on early contests {sorry Gov, the Compact has nothing to do with primaries} and swing [states].” New York State Senator Joseph Griffo, a Republican, sponsored the bill.

STATE SEN. JOSEPH Gur RIFFO: Potential presidential candidates concentrate more than two-thirds of their advertising budget and two-thirds of their campaign stops in just five states. Almost 100 percent of their message is seen in approximately 16 battleground states. New York has 19.5 million people, but we’re routinely ignored by campaigns. I want to empower people. I want to make New York state relevant in a national campaign again. I want democracy that creates excitement in people, not apathy. Joining the National Popular Vote compact creates that opportunity. It leverages the combined power of the states in a compact to say, “No longer can you take us for granted. No longer can you effectively disenfranchise million of Americans by ignoring us {Do your really feel disenfranchised Gov? Did you vote for President last time? Did you tell New Yorkers not to waste their time?}. No longer can you assume that you have our vote.”
{Readers, think for yourselves:

  1. How many votes would have changed if Obama and Romney had visited Connecticut and spoke to a few thousand voters each, giving the same talking points as they did in other states, and you  watched them on Local news, in addition to National news?
  2. Do voters want more 30sec ads to help them decide who to vote for?
  3. Have you ever visited a swing state or early primary state? The voters there would tell you they do not want more ads and phone calls to help them choose a candidate.

Ask yourself who benefits by this? Most of the money would go to media moguls, not in your state.}

AMY GOODMAN: To talk more about the campaign for a national popular vote, we’re joined now by Hendrik Hertzberg, staff writer for The New Yorker magazine. He has been writing in support of the national popular vote since 2006, serves on the board of the electoral reform organization FairVote. {Another ”journalist” who shows his bias serving on a board advocating for the NPV.}

Rick, welcome to Democracy Now!Talk about the significance of New York joining on, but also what the national popular vote is.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Well, it’s an important step psychologically, because now the threshold, instead of being 50 percent of the way to the threshold, we’re 61 percent of the way. So every little bit—every little bit helps. And, of course, New York is the media capital. Things don’t really happen in the brain of the media until they happen in New York. {Wow quite a statement, for someone advocating for a group that contends that New Yorkers are left out. Maybe that is why so many New York Republicans voted for the bill, considering it is the center of the media businesses which would be the chief beneficiaries, if the Compact’s advocates are correct in their assumptions of how campaigns would change.} So even though California, New Jersey, state of Washington—even though all these other states have already signed on, it’s only now starting to raise to the level of some sort of public attention. And most people don’t even know this is going on, and that includes people who are extremely well informed—don’t even—have never even heard of this, don’t realize that we’re halfway—more than halfway to solving one of the central problems of our Constitution, which is the—this Electoral College setup. {And unfortunately, the public does not understand the unanticipated consequences, with one-sided media coverage in favor of the Compact.} And the problem with the setup is not the Electoral College itself. The problem is the winner-take-all by state. That’s what creates all the anomalies. {Does anyone here see problems with voting rights inequality? Voter suppression? Campaign spending? Citizen’s United? The Media complex? Apparently not today.}

And what the National Popular Vote plan does is, by a whole bunch of states getting together to award their electors to whoever wins in all 50 states, as soon as that happens, well, then it doesn’t matter what state you live in: {Once again there is no equal franchise, state to state}. Your vote is just as much equal to go after, to campaign for. It means that, for instance, in New York, where it’s pointless to do—to do doorbell ringing, to have a coffee collection, invite your neighbors in—what difference does it make? Everybody knows which way New York is going. {Usually so in most states, but their votes count and contribute their fair share in determining the winner} But if every vote, if a vote in New York is worth the same as a vote in Ohio or Pennsylvania, you get a—that really is transformational. Even more than preventing a wrong winner is that you get grassroots politics happening in every corner of the country. {And you then get incentive for suppression and manipulation everywhere too.} And if you’re worried about political corruption, if you’re worried about campaign finance, for example, what this would do is, all those billions raised for campaigns, instead of being funneled into a handful of states, they would have to be spread out across the whole country, so their relative impact would be much less. This is an extraordinary reform. {That is an extraordinary claim, that by providing more opportunity for more money to make more of a difference, you are reducing the influence of that money? How many of the advocates for the Compact agree that Citizens United is bad for Democracy? I suspect the vast majority, yet increased influence of money is twisted to be a benefit when it comes to the Compact.}

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, what allows a group of states to be able to come together and reach a compact like this? Wouldn’t a constitutional amendment be needed for this? Explain the legality of it.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Well, this is based on two things in the Constitution. One is what you just mentioned, interstate compacts. There are hundreds of them. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, maybe not the best example lately, but that is an example of an interstate compact. It’s in the Constitution. The other part is that the only thing in the Constitution about electing the president is basically a one-liner that says each state shall appoint a number of electors in such manner as the Legislature thereof may determine. That’s all it says. Everything else is left to—is left to the states to figure out. And the winner-take-all notion, that’s a—that’s something that came in 20, 30 years after the Constitution was written. And it’s because a party that controls the state Legislature isn’t going to say, if given the choice between keeping all those electors for themselves or giving, you know, some portion of them to the opposition, of course they’re going to do it this way. {I am not a Constitutional lawyer. I am not a lawyer. Yet, I would agree the Compact is likely Constitutional, yet it may well be challenged to the Supreme Court. And based on the precedents of past elections, and the rules of the Electoral College, it is quite likely that the Supreme Court would be “forced” to choose the President under those challenges. See our testimony for a discussion of the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act and the Compact’s likely effects.}

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democratic New York State Senator Michael Gianaris, who is among those who oppose joining the compact for a national popular vote.

STATE SEN. MICHAEL GIANARIS: The current system allots Electoral College votes based on a state’s population, whereas a system such as the National Popular Vote will do so based on voter turnout in a presidential election, which means states that have a high number of unregistered residents would not be counted as much, or states that have low voter turnout would not be counted as much as they are under the current system. There’s also a myriad of other issues related to those that have wealth being able to saturate a big city media market to affect the outcome more than they currently do, which is already too much, as well as the possibility for some states that are unhappy with the results, potentially between Election Day and the Electoral College vote, changing their state laws to pull back out of a compact like this, which would throw the whole system into chaos. {We generally oppose the Compact for other reasons, the increased risks to the system. We do not reject these arguments out of hand. Unfortunately, the strongest arguments against the Compact are not getting a fair hearing}

AMY GOODMAN: That’s Democratic New York State Senator Michael Gianaris. Now, interesting, he’s Democrat, and the person we played for the national popular vote was a Republican. But can you answer his points? {Interesting because, in our opinion in general, Democrats are for it for the wrong reasons, and Republicans are against it for the wrong reasons. Both think their party would benefit from their positions.}

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: He’s wrong on every single one of them. You cannot withdraw from the state—interstate compact for 90 days before an election. That’s part of the deal. That’s part of the contract that you make.

The notion that—as far as turnout is concerned, right now there’s a sort of a five-to-10-point difference in the turnout between battleground states and spectator states. So when you have a nationwide vote, you’re going to see—yes, you’re going to see turnout increase, but don’t say it like it’s a bad thing.

He mentions that the Electoral College is based on—is not based on how many people vote; it’s based on population. And that’s one of—that’s sort of the original sin of the Electoral College, because the reason it’s based on population is so that the three-fifths of the slaves could be counted to give the slave owners more representation. It imports—the Electoral College mechanism imports that right—which is in the Senate and the House, right into this choice of the presidency. Now, that part of it’s gone now, but that is the original sin. {There are a lot of things in our history which are regrettable, but tying the Electoral College to slavery, is close to playing the  Hitler card on other issues. Should opponents bring up disappointing or criminal Senators, Governors, and Mayors that were elected by popular vote?}

And of course it makes more sense for the president to be chosen by voters, one-by-one voters, rather than by states with a fixed number of votes. Even if only three people vote in a state and it’s got 10 electoral votes, they’ll still go to that candidate. All the National Popular Vote plan does, really, is elect the president the way we elect a dog catcher or a governor or a senator or representative. It’s not that complicated. {Unfortunately, it is much more complicated. Study our testimony on the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act, along with the effect of the Compact.}

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: But my question is, given the fact that you would only need the states who equal a number of 270 votes to join the compact, and they would therefore then be decisive in terms of who would get elected if the—who wins the popular vote, but isn’t it possible just as well for the compact to be broken years down the line? In other words, for new legislatures to come in and decide to leave?

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Sure, that would be possible, yeah. And actually, that’s one of the advantages to this maybe over a constitutional amendment. We can try it. We can try it, see if—try electing a president democratically, see if we like it. If we like it, we can keep it. If we don’t like it, we don’t have to keep it. That’s actually a plus, not a minus.

AMY GOODMAN: So, so far, now—

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: And I might add, Juan, that it’s not as if the states that are compacting are then going to decide who’s president. No, the only thing that will decide who’s president is the voters in all the states that are compacting and that are not compacting. It won’t make any difference whether you live in one of them or not. {Unless, they are not counted accurately, there was no national post-election audit, no national recount, and no national popular vote number available in time for states to choose their electors. Oooops we have none of those, so we are stuck with the “trust us” non-verification system.}

AMY GOODMAN: So, now signed on: New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Vermont, California, Rhode Island and Washington.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Mm-hmm.

AMY GOODMAN: What happens next?

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Well, right now there’s a focus on Connecticut, where the bill is being considered. It’s kind of a one-by-one thing, state to state. {Yes, we are the next target.} Now, people may have noticed that the states that you mentioned are all blue states. And, of course, because of what happened in 2000, Republicans tend to have a—you know, they kind of—they kind of have a—react to this and think—or, suspiciously, they think maybe this is Al Gore’s revenge. {And Democrats are apparently, in general, blind to the risks, since they have been led to believe that this would have changed the outcome in FL in 2000. Yet with different voters, more voters, with a different counts, and different campaign strategies, who knows if Gore would actually have won under the NPV in 2000. Can we at least all agree that more and different voters would go to the polls under the Compact and that we have no idea what an accurate count would have been in 2000?}, in fact, there are plenty of Republicans who back this. If you believe in democracy, if you believe that the way to have an election is count the votes, see who wins, then it really doesn’t matter if you’re a Republican or a Democrat. Yes, there are these inbred prejudices. Republicans are—maybe they’re more resistant to change. Maybe they think this is somehow an end run around the Constitution, which it is not, which it definitely is not. They have a—they have more skepticism to overcome. But this isn’t like, you know, taxing the rich, where that’s a matter of principle. It’s a matter of principle the other way: If you’re for democracy, you really ought to be for this. {Yup, anyone against this is charged with being undemocratic. And the other side says proponents are against the Founding Fathers. And then back to the opposition favoring slavery…}

AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you very much for being with us. Hendrik Hertzberg is a staff writer at The New Yorker. He’s been writing in support of the national popular vote since 2006. I think you said in your last piece you had written 51 pieces on this.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Fifty-two as of this morning.

AMY GOODMAN: He serves on the board of the electoral reform organization FairVote. When we come back, we’re going to England and to Norway to talk about drones and who’s running the U.S. drone operation. Stay with us.

As we have said many times, we are not in theory opposed to electing the President by national popular vote. But we need a uniform voting system, a uniform national franchise, enforceable, and enforced to avoid increasing the risks inherent in the current system.

What might Plato say to us about election integrity?

“If we don’t understand our tools, then there is a danger that we will become the tool of our tools.”

Like Plato, we will leave you to contemplate his statement and our questions. Is that a worthwhile exercise?

I am about 80 pages into a fascinating, thought-provoking book, Plato at the Googleplex <view>

One of the 1st fascinating nuggets from the fictional Plato dropping in on our world could easily occupy us for the foreseeable future:

“If we don’t understand our tools, then there is a danger that we will become the tool of our tools.”

What could we endeavor to understand about the “tools” we use for elections:

  • How are our votes counted after we scan them at the polling place?
  • How are absentee votes counted? How do they get from our envelopes to the place that they are counted?
  • How are all those votes accumulated in a municipality and statewide to determine the election results?
  • How accurate are those counts and accumulations? How do we know? Do we know how many of those votes are counted and counted accurately?
  • How accurate or inaccurate is the list of registered voters?
  • How accurate are the lists of voters checked-in as voting in each election?

Some other questions:

  • How safe is the Internet for banking, email, and voting?
  • How safe are foods, drugs, GMOs, fracking, the electric grid, and Connecticut’s nuclear power plants?
  • When and how can we trust Government and the Media?
  • How do we already trust Government, the Media, and our election system?

Like Plato, we will leave you to contemplate his statement and our questions. Is that a worthwhile exercise?

If Internet voting is so safe, why is the power grid so vulnerable?

Of course the answer is that Internet voting is not safe, much more vulnerable than the power grid. But why don’t we know that?

How are grid vulnerabilities different from the vulnerabilities of electronic voting and Internet voting in particular? Lets look at a story from the LA Times highlighting vulnerabilities in the power grid

Of course the answer is that Internet voting is not safe, much more vulnerable than the power grid. But why don’t we know that? Could it be that voting is largely a Government managed function and therefor Government articulation of vulnerabilities, and public expenditures on security would be less welcome?

Today we have a story from the LA Times highlighting vulnerabilities in the power grid: Security holes in power grid have federal officials scrambling <read>

Adam Crain assumed that tapping into the computer networks used by power companies to keep electricity zipping through transmission lines would be nearly impossible in these days of heightened vigilance over cybersecurity.

When he discovered how wrong he was, his work sent Homeland Security Department officials into a scramble.

Crain, the owner of a small tech firm in Raleigh, N.C., along with a research partner, found penetrating transmission systems used by dozens of utilities to be startlingly easy.

How are grid vulnerabilities different from the vulnerabilities of electronic voting and Internet voting in particular? We can start with the article subtitle:

In Congress, the vulnerability of the power grid has emerged as among the most pressing domestic security concerns

Internet voting is hardly a concern in the Connecticut Legislature which unanimously passed Internet voting two years in a row mandating the Secretary of the State and Military Department do what the DoD, experts from Homeland Security, and the National Institute of standards say is impossible.  And even here grid security is a big concern of state government.

Then again maybe they are also the same in some ways:

“There are a lot of people going through various stages of denial” about how easily terrorists could disrupt the power grid, he said. “If I could write a tool that does this, you can be sure a nation state or someone with more resources could.”…

Some members of Congress want to empower regulators to force specific security upgrades at utilities. Others are attacking whistle-blowers and the media, demanding an investigation into disclosures of how easily the country’s power grid could be shut down.

Here is a difference. Who would even attempt insuring the safety of our election system? Let alone Internet voting?

Lloyds’ appraisers have been making a lot of visits lately to power companies seeking protection against the risk of cyberattack. Their takeaway: Security at about half the companies they visit is too weak for Lloyds to offer a policy.

Power companies are actual monopolies, but so are local election departments. Some of the same issues apply:

The problem, said Scott White, a security technology scholar at Drexel University in Philadelphia, is that “you are basically dealing with these monopolies that are determining for themselves which expenditures are a priority. Security has not generally been one.”

Utilities deny they’ve ignored the problem, pointing to the billions of dollars they say they’ve spent to upgrade outdated computer systems and close security holes.

Here is a difference, something seldom seen when Internet voting is adopted and declared successful:

They are signing contracts with security firms like Booz Allen Hamilton to investigate such things as to how to keep potentially mischievous devices out of the equipment they buy, often from foreign suppliers. The security firms help clients sift through reams of confidential intelligence provided by federal agencies. They simulate cyberattacks.

“It is the equivalent of war gaming, like the military does,” said Steve Senterfit, vice president of commercial energy at Booz Allen Hamilton.

Here in Connecticut we pride ourselves in the safety of 169 autonomous elected election departments. But that also has its downsides. Like the power grid, electronic voting involves users’ computers or distributed military computers:

But critics, including many in Congress, say more needs to be done to shore up a grid increasingly exposed to attacks. They note that so-called smart grid technology, which allows operators to calibrate the flow of energy from an increasingly diverse pool of sources, has opened new security risks.

The technology relies on devices in remote locations that constantly send signals to substations to help control when juice needs to be brought on and offline. The smarter the grid becomes, though, the more entry points an attacker can exploit.

“The whole idea of a smart grid is to push equipment further and further away from the substations,” Crain said. “Some of it is even in people’s homes. It’s physically impossible to secure it all.”

Here is a difference: The grid is apparently not on the Internet, so it is actually just a little harder to compromise:

The vulnerabilities Crain exposed, for example, had been overlooked because taking advantage of them requires an attacker to have access to closed, local networks. Now, a cyberterrorist with a little knowledge and the right laptop can gain that access and cause chaos in a regional power system merely by linking up with the control panel at a secluded electric vehicle charging station.

 

 

Legally Questionable Solution Proposed for Bickering Registrars

The the West Hartford registrars do not get along, resulting in trading complaints, long lines at polls, and an inability to solve that without intervention by the Secretary of the State. The latest is an attempt by the town to fix the problem, despite the fact that the registrars are publicly elected officials charged with running the elections. In our opinion, best that the Town Council members can do is to work with their Town Committees to find candidates who, if elected would work together, or to find satisfactory candidates to win in primaries.

Courant report: West Hartford To Hire Administrator For Registrars’ Office <read>

As was reported last year, the West Hartford registrars do not get along, resulting in trading complaints, long lines at polls, and an inability to solve that without intervention by the Secretary of the State.

The latest is an attempt by the town to fix the problem, despite the fact that the registrars are publicly elected officials charged with running the elections:

The town will hire an office manager to take over the administrative functions of the embattled registrars of voters office, where town officials said long – standing problems between the registrars contributed to long lines and frustration among voters in the 2012 elections.

The plan will leave more time for the elected registrars to perform their statutory duties, such as running elections.

In a memorandum dated Feb. 6, Deputy Corporation Counsel Patrick Alair laid out a plan for a “complete overhaul” of the office. The memo was discussed at Monday’s meeting of the committee to review operations of the registrars o f voters, formed by Mayor Scott Slifka shortly after the 2012 election…

Under the plan, the registrars would serve as more of a governing body, while a paid staff member performs administrative tasks. The staff member will be an assistant town clerk, though the title may change as the job description is finalized, the memo stated. Town clerks and assistant town clerks are legally able to register voters…

“How the registrars execute all of their duties is largely left to them to work out between themselves with whatever support and advice their municipalities may provide. This system provides ample opportunity for error even in the best – managed situations,” Alair wrote. “When the registrars are unable to work together to sort out those details, however, the system collapses.”

Leading up to the problems on Election Day 2012, the office had been embroiled in conflict for nearly a decade since a failed attempt to revamp it.

Unfortunately, we do not see this as a solution as long as the registrars do not agree, since they are legally responsible for critical decisions.

Brazell continues to object to the idea of an assistant and says “she would not work willingly with a new administrator if one was appointed,” Alair wrote.

On Tuesday, Brazell said she was “not happy” about the new plan “because I think it’s running fine just the way it is.” When asked if she would cooperate with a staff member since one is going to be hired, she said, “of course…

Thornberry agrees with the new plan, officials said. She could not be reached for comment Tuesday.

Town council members on both sides of the aisle are supportive of the new plan

In our opinion,  best that the Town Council members can do is to work with their Town Committees to find candidates who, if elected would work together, or to find satisfactory candidates to win in primaries.

Experts demonstrate how to hack email voting

Security researchers say they have developed an interesting trick to take over Gmail and Outlook.com email accounts – by shooting down victims’ logout requests even over a supposedly encrypted connection.
And their classic man-in-the-middle attack could be used to compromise electronic ballot boxes to rig elections, we’re told.

Thanks to a friend for passing on this link to a ‘how to’ demonstration from last summer’s Black Hat 2013:  Gmail, Outlook.com and e-voting ‘pwned’ on stage in crypto-dodge hack – Once you enter, you can never leave logout <read>

Security researchers say they have developed an interesting trick to take over Gmail and Outlook.com email accounts – by shooting down victims’ logout requests even over a supposedly encrypted connection.

And their classic man-in-the-middle attack could be used to compromise electronic ballot boxes to rig elections, we’re told.

Ben Smyth and Alfredo Pironti of the French National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control (INRIA) announced they found a way to exploit flaws in Google and Microsoft’s web email services using an issue in the TLS (Transport Layer Security) technology, which encrypts and secures website connections.

Full details of the attack are yet to be widely disseminated – but it was outlined for the first time in a demonstration at this year’s Black Hat hacking convention in Las Vegas on Wednesday.

In short, we’re told, it uses a TLS truncation attack on a shared computer to block victims’ account logout requests so that they unknowingly remain logged in: when the request to sign out is sent, the attacker injects an unencrypted TCP FIN message to close the connection. The server-side therefore doesn’t get the request and is unaware of the abnormal termination….

The attack does not rely on installing malware or similar shenanigans: the miscreant pulling off the trick must simply put herself between the victim and the network. That could be achieved, for example, by setting up a naughty wireless hotspot, or plugging a hacker-controlled router or other little box between the PC and the network.

The researchers warned that shared machines – even un-compromised computers – cannot guarantee secure access to systems operated by Helios (an electronic voting system), Microsoft (including Account, Hotmail, and MSN), nor Google (including Gmail, YouTube, and Search).

Maybe you use some other email system. But maybe that is a system that has yet to be hacked, publicly. If you send in a vote, what system does your recipient use?

American Voting Experience: A Laudable Report

It seems we have several surprisingly refreshing Government reports in recent weeks, two on reigning in NSA spying, and now an excellent report on improving election administration, the election experience, and a contribution to realizing the ideals of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
Many will find a lot to like in the report. Some parts might be taken out of context as it often points out the benefits, costs, and risks of various solutions. Some will use the report to justify doing anything, such as their favored solution, to a problem. That said, we will likely be referencing many areas in the report going forward

It seems we have several surprisingly refreshing  Government reports in recent weeks, two on reigning in NSA spying, and now an excellent report on improving election administration, the election experience, and a contribution to realizing the ideals of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution. The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration <read>

Its long, yet refreshingly readable for the average citizen. The .pdf is 112 pages, yet the introduction and main body constitute a bit less at 84 pages. I have read it all, and so have many others.  Let me start with overall impressions:

  • It is readable tutorial covering several areas to a moderate level of depth and detail: Causes and cures for lines; The variety in voting methods, laws, and practices; The synergy between problems and solutions, especially improving registration systems; The need to soon replace aging systems and hardware; the systemic problems in making better systems available; The value, costs, challenges, and security tradeoffs expanding early voting; Serving Military and Overseas Voters responsively and responsibly.
  • The report remains true to its promise of staying within issues and solutions that can be agreed upon by members of both major parties.
  • Given its size, I find very very little to disagree with in the report. Two or three minor quibbles, too minor to mention.
  • There is a lot to be done in many many areas covered in the report, many details to be filled in. There in, will lie many issues to debate, potential for making things better, worse, or wasting huge sums with little actual change.
  • It is most detailed and potentially effective recommendation is in better online voter registration systems and cross checking between states for duplicate/out-of-date registrations and the benefits throughout the system.
  • Its best articulation of problems and opportunities are in the areas of reducing lines, pollworker training, pollworker recruiting and improving ballot design. Its all very common sense, but somehow the system got to be the way it is, and by-and-large not moving to solve the problems.
  • The toughest details to be determined are how to create, pay for, and determine the best way forward to truly better software, hardware, and manual systems.

Many will find a lot to like in the report. Some parts might be taken out of context as it often points out the benefits, costs, and risks of various solutions. Some will use the report to justify doing anything, such as their favored solution, to a problem. That said, we will likely be referencing many areas in the report going forward:

  • We completely agree with its take on Military and Overseas Voting, that recommends against online/Internet voting, yet effective online registration, ballot tracking, and ballot distribution systems.
  • We applaud its recognition that unlimited absentee voting or mail-in voting represents a significant risk for fraud, while early voting, voting centers, and in-person absentee voting can be safe.
  • We agree with its overview of the software/hardware challenges going forward. The problem may not be quite as imminent, yet the  challenges to get going and find good solutions will require a transformation, years of work in regulation, cooperation, and not so common sense between industry, computer scientists, other experts, officials, and government.

How can the NSA, Microsoft, Google etc. vote?

A post got us thinking: Every Scary, Weird Thing We Know the NSA Can Do. Lets add some corollaries relevant to voting and elections:

A post got us thinking: Every Scary, Weird Thing We Know the NSA Can Do.  <read>

It seems they missed that the NSA and others with access can vote!

This post originally appeared on the website of The Brian Lehrer Show.

The trove of documents leaked by Edward Snowden has revealed the elaborate tricks the NSA can use to monitor communications and data around the world. Here, a running list of things we now know the NSA can do, based on media reports and other publicly available documents—so far. If we missed any, let us know in the comments page or by tweeting @brianlehrer.

  • It can track the numbers of both parties on a phone call, as well location, time and duration. (More)
  • It can hack Chinese phones and text messages. (More)
  • It can set up fake Internet cafes. (More)
  • It can spy on foreign leaders’ cellphones. (More)
  • It can tap underwater fiber-optic cables. (More)
  • It can track communication within media organizations like Al-Jazeera. (More)
  • It can hack into the U.N. video conferencing system. (More)
  • It can track bank transactions. (More)
  • It can monitor text messages. (More)
  • It can access your email, chat, and Web browsing history. (More)
  • It can map your social networks. (More)
  • It can access your smartphone app data. (More)
  • It is trying to get into secret networks like Tor, diverting users to less secure channels. (More)
  • It can go undercover within embassies to have closer access to foreign networks. (More)
  • It can set up listening posts on the roofs of buildings to monitor communications in a city. (More)
  • It can set up a fake LinkedIn. (More)
  • It can track the reservations at upscale hotels. (More)
  • It can intercept the talking points for Ban Ki-moon’s meeting with Obama. (More)
  • It can crack cellphone encryption codes. (More)
  • It can hack computers that aren’t connected to the internet using radio waves. (More)
  • It can intercept phone calls by setting up fake base stations. (More)
  • It can remotely access a computer by setting up a fake wireless connection. (More)
  • It can install fake SIM cards to then control a cell phone. (More)
  • It can fake a USB thumb drive that’s actually a monitoring device. (More)
  • It can crack all types of sophisticated computer encryption. (Update: It is trying to build this capability.) (More)
  • It can go into online games and monitor communication. (More)
  • It can intercept communications between aircraft and airports. (More)
  • (Update) It can physically intercept deliveries, open packages, and make changes to devices. (More) (h/t)

Did we miss any? Mischaracterize any capabilities? Let us know in the comments, or tweet @brianlehrer.

Lets add some corollaries relevant to voting and elections:

  • It can set up fake Internet cafes
    • They can use those to monitor, identify, change and drop votes submitted over the Internet or by email. And change ballots presented to voters.
  • It can tap underwater fiber-optic cables
    • And monitor, identify, change and drop votes submitted over the Internet, by email or fax. And change ballots presented to voters.
  • It can monitor text messages.
  • It can access your email, chat, and Web browsing history
  • It can map your social network
  • It can access your smartphone app data
    • They could determine your politics and intercept your electronic or absentee vote and eliminate it before it is counted.
      Because—>
  • It can physically intercept deliveries, open packages, and make changes to devices

They could use these facilities in a variety of ways to disrupt elections:

  • Change electronic results as they are transmitted or posted, confusing or changing the initially reported winner.
  • Discover embarrassing past statements or activities of candidates and caused these to be published.
  • Discover embarrassing past statements or activities of candidates and use them to intimidate candidates once elected.
  • Plant rumors about candidates.

Why do we ignore science and facts?

We have often been perplexed when the public and the Legislature ignore science and simple facts. No more so than when it comes to Internet voting where there is overwhelming recognition of the risks by scientists AND overwhelming evidence that individual, business, and government computers have been repeatedly compromised.

New research provides some clues why.

We have often been perplexed when the public and the Legislature ignore science and simple facts.  No more so than when it comes to Internet voting where there is overwhelming recognition of the risks by scientists AND overwhelming evidence that individual, business, and government computers have been repeatedly compromised.

A recent article and a recent book hint that it might be human nature.

The Hartford Courant’s Science Columnist, Robert Thorson, looking at climate change and a new Yale study says: When Politicians Fight, Facts Take Beating <read>

The study attributes the problem to political conflict:

Psychologist Dan M. Kahan and his colleagues proved that political fighting diminishes our ability to think about evidence-based science.

Think climate change, which was well understood 20 years ago, yet conflict persists. Ditto for gun control, for which the data are compelling. Think nuclear power, genetically modified foods, national health care, commercial drones or any politically contentious topic that could be easily solved with evidence-based reasoning.

Congress is not alone. All of us are vulnerable to bias, prejudice, narrow-mindedness and tunnel vision. In short, seeing what we want to see, rather than what actually is.

This study’s technical name for this phenomenon is the “Identity-Protective Cognition Thesis” or ICT. It says cultural conflict disables the faculties we use to make sense of science that would better inform decisions. The key word here is “disabling.” When there’s no conflict, we’re fine. When there is, we’re disabled.

The ICT thesis is true. We maintain our allegiances by skewing our thinking. Kahan’s clever experiment yielded results so robust that no political partisan could explain them away…

The results are compelling. Both conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats did far worse on tests of evidence-based thinking when the scenario was politically contentious than when it was not. The more political things became, the more the subject’s mental biases kicked in to disable their reasoning skills. And the more scientifically inclined an issue was, the worse they did, perhaps because they were more facile at manipulating the numbers to match their versions of reality. Importantly, self-identified liberals were no more open-minded than conservatives, even though that’s how they’re defined.

Scientists like me have long tried to explain bad policy decisions on a dearth of scientific data or the lack of voter science, technology, engineering and mathematics education. Others fault an excess of highly paid lobbyists. Kahan’s study tags the ICT as a major culprit, advocating that governments must “adopt measures that effectively shield decision-relevant science from the influences that generate this reason-disabling state.”

That might explain some of the problems we see in some election integrity issues. Democrats and Republicans are generally on opposite sides for:

  • Voter Id where Republicans ignore the facts of very very little votER fraud.
  • Absentee voting or mail-in voting, where Democrats ignore the facts of frequent cases of organized votING fraud, and the obvious opportunities.
  • National Popular Vote where both sides ignore the technical risks.

Internet voting seems different in character, where the parties are aligned, not  divided, and in many cases, like Connecticut, the entire Legislature ignores all the risks and unanimously passes Internet voting two years in a row. Even the Governor, knowing the risks and unconstitutionality as articulated in his veto message, signs the bill the second time it hits his desk. By and large, the public goes along with favoring Internet voting, especially for the Military, saying “If we can bank online, why can’t we vote online?”, completely ignoring science, the frequently documented hacks, and NSA disclosures.

A perfect storm: a harder to verify application than banking, a less technically competent/financed election function expected to provide security, and high apparent motivations for insider manipulation of election results. Yet, in the face of all this legislative and public support for Military Internet Voting. Why?

One clue may come from the the Trolley Problem as covered in the book Moral Tribes recently reviewed here.  As we said in the review:

How do we make moral decisions and cooperate or not? It is the result of two systems, thinking fast and slow – a fast intuitive system and a slower logical system. Much of the book and the interesting aspects center around how these systems work, studying the brain, often by experiments in ‘trolleyology‘ – we can save five people who will be killed a trolley by sacrificing one, either by throwing a switch, throwing a fat man onto the tracks, or by other variations. Why do we make different choices based on the method of sacrifice? Research reviewed in the book provides an answer, and demonstrates the two modes of moral choice, their flaws, and their limits – limits we are challenged to transcend.

From the book:

(p. 111) Turning the trolley away from five and onto one…makes utilitarian sense and doesn’t trigger much of an opposing emotional response, causing most people to approve. Pushing the man off the footbridge…likewise makes utilitarian sense, but it also it also triggers a significant negative emotional response, causing most people to disapprove.

(p. 129)Thus, we see dual-process brain design not just in moral judgement but in the choices we make about food, money, and the attitudes we’d like to change. For most things that we do, our brains have automatic settings that tell us how to proceed. But we can also override those automatic settings, provided we are aware of the opportunity to do so and motivated to take it.

I speculate:

  • Providing for online voting by the military evokes a strong emotional response along the lines of “Solders in remote battlefields and other isolated locations obviously have challenges in voting. They are voluntarily sacrificing for us. My experience tells me that online voting would be a convenient way for them to vote. We must to do anything and everything for them to make up for our lack of sacrifice…”.
  • The risks of online voting are a secondary, rational risk, no matter how great or small, our emotional brain does not see that risk. It only sees the sacrificing soldiers.
  • The alternative facts are only available to the rational brain:
    • That all forms of Internet voting, online, email, and fax, face documented obvious, yet not intuitive threats;
    • That online voting is more risky than online banking; That online banking has proven vulnerable to the tune of several billion dollars in losses each year, yet those losses are not seen by individuals;
    • That other states have had great success with providing blank ballot download, effective help, and effective web information following the MOVE Act;
    • That states such as RI, touted as successful with Internet voting have on a small percentage of votes returned by fax, and the similarly “successful” WV pilot did not convince their legislature to move forward.
  • Legislators are additionally at risk of being emotionally persuaded that voters will interpret any vote against soldiers and being weak on the military, security, and defense.

So, we have quite a challenge in personally and collectively making the rational decision. Not just for online vetoing, but for other issues that get highly emotional, either from political polarization for emotional blockage

Grand Theft Education – A Possiblity

Electronic testing is similar to electronic voting. The form of electronic testing is only as safe as the systems chosen and the administration and controls surrounding the system itself. What we know from electronic voting is that we need voter verified paper ballots (paper test forms), a good chain of custody on that paper, before and after the votes (tests) are electronically counted, along with scientifically rigorous audits.

Reading a Jon Pelto post we learned that the Core Curriculum, at least in Connecticut, requires computer testing. Apparently to make this possible the State is “investing” $22 million in loans to buy those computers. I have not had the time to study the Core Curriculum, but from what I understand it is being pushed by education “reformers” that have little educational experience or credentials. It is so popular in Connecticut that the state is spending $1 million on a publicity campaign to convince us of its benefits.

So, what does that have to do with voting?

Nothing directly. But indirectly, two things:

  • First if education is destroyed, we lose citizens required for the functioning of democracy. We can all agree that education needs improvement as a prerequisite for our democracy to thrive and to survive. Maybe the Core Curriculum is a good way forward, maybe not. In any case any way forward that depends on testing, depends on the integrity of that testing.
  • Second, electronic testing is similar to electronic voting. The form of electronic testing is only as safe as the systems chosen and the administration and controls surrounding the system itself. What we know from electronic voting is that we need voter verified paper ballots (paper test forms), a good chain of custody on that paper, before and after the votes (tests) are electronically counted, along with scientifically rigorous audits. It would be a helpful start, if the systems used were subject to the equivalent of the California Top To Bottom Review of voting equipment.

Motive, Opportunity, and Evidence

  • Motive: It is not called “High Stakes Testing” without good reason. Students can gain from passing grades, admission to better schools, and keeping parents at bay. Teachers can gain by keeping their jobs, better jobs, promotion and bonuses. Administrators can receive gains similar to teachers, plus local and national fame. Perhaps most of all those with a stake in education reform – achieving their favorite reform, or preventing it – have the most to gain or lose.
  • Opportunity: It is always possible for anyone with Internet/Computer skills to hack into a system and compromise it either directly or with the aid of an accomplice with those skills. Yet, it might be quite a challenge for students, teachers, and local administrators depending on how the system is built. Students, teachers, and administrators would have to have access to the questions and the correct answers, in addition to compromising the system (unlike voting, where there are just a few items on a ballot, and the ‘correct’ choice for a fraudster is clear).

    For system insiders, as opposed to outsiders, the opportunity is much much greater. Systems would presumably be more centralized, additional complexity would make testing very challenging. Similar to voting there is no exact expected result for each student or a collection of students, no double entry bookkeeping like electronic banking.

    Here we must mention that education “reformers” with goals of “transforming” education, via privatization and the elimination of unions include leaders in our Federal Government, many state governments, and leaders of companies that make our computers, such as Bill Gates. (He has donated millions in Connecticut and elsewhere to support the efforts of favored reformers). Recent NSA Snowdon revelations have shown, among other things, that the NSA watches bugs in Microsoft Windows and exploits them before they are fixed and that backdoors are added to systems during shipping – similar approaches could be used to compromise testing. There is clearly opportunity for insiders to take control of electronic testing whether it depends on centralized servers, decentralized servers, or the computers used by the individual students.Note:

    One advantage of electronic testing, depending on how it is accomplished, is that it may make cheating in the “old fashioned ways” a bit more difficult. Questions may not be known in advance, so that “teaching to the test” might preclude providing teaching to the exact questions and answers just prior to the test. With no paper tests, then the opportunity to compromise the paper before grading would be eliminated.  All of these would tend to make it more difficult for students and teachers to cheat, yet do nothing to mitigate the greater opportunities for insiders, especially those with the most to gain.

  • Evidence: There have been several recent test cheating scandals by teachers and administrators. None more instructive than the recent one in Hartford. A school achieving national fame (Newshour Report) for almost magical transformation of reading progress, was exposed as simple test cheating. What can we learn from this?
    • Cheating is real, and if undetected can provide fame and fortune. (At the expense of students and the reputations of all involved, guilty and innocent)
    • Here it was detected by statistical analysis showing questionable patterns.
    • And proven ONLY by the existence of student completed paper tests, even though they were held under lax security.

With electronic testing, we would not have that same paper record available to audit, nor necessarily the same statistics to review – and an opportunity for more sophisticated fraud that would more easily avoid statistical detection (For instance, with access to student data from the past, gains and test results could be correlated to students past results, while randomly selected easier incorrect answers corrected).

Secrecy/Privacy

One more issue is security of test data and the scope of its disclosure.  In voting we are concerned with the “secret vote”, so that votes cannot be bought, sold, or coerced. When it comes to student data, there are other privacy issues, similar to those with medical data. Any automated collection and retention of test data or other student data should be of concern.  What could be done with such data? What or would our Government do with such data?

Unfortunately, for many students we have an answer in an example. The U.S. Military currently, in violation of international children’s rights deviously collects extensive data on high school students and uses the data to help recruit for the military. Here is a current review based on FOI requests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Career Exploration Program <read> To make a long story short, the test is administered to high school students in school, often under false pretenses that it is mandatory, and then the data used in ways that violate U.S. Law, Military Regulations, and the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child.

This is an issue with any type of automated testing, even paper testing than is recorded permanently. It goes beyond the Military, to any Government agency such as the NSA, and to any private company that may accumulate that data, the data’s protection, sale, and potential use for all sorts of illegitimate purposes.

Book Review: Moral Tribes

Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and The Gap Between Us and Them, by Joshua Green, is a book about science, morals, psychology, how we make decisions, how the brain works, and how we “should” make decisions. Brain science would seem to have little to do with election integrity, yet when it focus on a discussion of how we make decisions and make moral choices, then it is relevant.

Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and The Gap Between Us and Them, by Joshua Green, is a book about science, morals, philosophy, psychology, how we make decisions, how the brain works, and how we “should” make decisions. I have always been interested in brain science since my senior year in college with my first seminar on the subject, with newly minted Ph.D., Robert Baron. Brain science would seem to have little to do with election integrity, yet when it focus on a discussion of how we make decisions and make moral choices, then it is relevant. We will leave the election integrity discussion for future post(s).

There is a lot in the book that will hold the interest of many readers. It does not require a background in brain science, philosophy, or psychology. The main theme centers around why we tend to cooperate with our own group (tribe), yet fight with other groups, or as the book says “The Tragedy of the Commons” – why can’t we work things out between different groups, between pro-live, and pro-cho ice or between religions or races?

How do we make moral decisions and cooperate or not? It is the result of two systems, thinking fast and slow – a fast intuitive system and a slower logical system. Much of the book and the interesting aspects center around how these systems work, studying the brain, often by experiments in ‘trolleyology‘ – we can save five people who will be killed a trolley by sacrificing one, either by throwing a switch, throwing a fat man onto the tracks, or by other variations. Why do we make different choices based on the method of sacrifice? Research reviewed in the book provides an answer, and demonstrates the two modes of moral choice, their flaws, and their limits – limits we are challenged to transcend.

The book makes a case for ‘utilitarianism’, blaming disrespect for the term on an unfortunate name and misunderstandings of its implications, calling for using the name ‘deep pragmatism’. As we often say “a rose by any other name would be just as thorny”.  The case is strong, yet in our agreement we remain uncomfortable. We are left adrift wondering, beyond hope that their might be an alternative or a better formula to apply deep pragmatism.

The author attempts to reconcile pro-choice and pro-life morals, yet is unable to provide a fully convincing argument. That should not be taken as a reason to discredit the book or its contributions. We are human creatures with brains shaped by evolution, imperfect, with some tough dilemmas, limitations, and imperfect, perhaps irreconcilable morals.

Finally, the book ends with six moral rules we may well all agree on.

Despite the limitations of the science, so far, we highly recommend this book. The science is powerful, and fresh. Joshua Green’s heart is in Moral Tribes, making it all accessible and engaging.