Category: National

To trust our elections we need evidence, enough evidence

A recent article in Barons by respected scientists: Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust 

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

  • Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.

  • Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered…

A recent article in Barons by respected scientists: Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust  <read>

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

  • Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.
  • Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered. This requires stringent physical security protocols and ballot accounting, among other things.
  • Election officials count the votes, using technology if they choose. If the technology altered the outcome, that will (with high confidence) be corrected by the steps below.
  • Election officials reconcile and verify the number of ballots and the number of voters, with a complete canvass to ensure that every validly cast ballot is included in the count.
  • Election officials check whether the paper trail is trustworthy using a transparent “compliance audit,” reviewing chain-of-custody logs and security video, verifying voter eligibility, reconciling numbers of ballots of each style against poll book signatures and other records, and accounting for every ballot that was issued.
  • Election officials check the results with an audit that has a known, large probability of catching and correcting wrong reported outcomes—and no chance of altering correct outcomes. The inventory of paper ballots used in the audit must be complete and the audit must inspect the original hand-marked ballots, not images or copies.

None of these steps stands alone. An unexamined set of paper ballots, no matter how trustworthy, provides no evidence. Conversely, no matter how rigorous, audits and recounts of an untrustworthy paper trail provide no evidence that the reported winners won. Auditing or recounting machine-marked ballots or hand-marked ballots that have not been kept secure can check whether the reported outcome reflects that paper trail, but cannot provide evidence that the reported winners won.

We completely and enthusiastically agree.

One more time: Hand Marked Paper Ballots, protected and exploited

Our Longtime Editorial Opinion

We hear a lot about protecting voting equipment and paper ballots. We talk a lot about both as well. They are not equal!…

Today an article in Freedom to Tinker echoing our opinion: ESS voting machine company sends threats

Our Longtime Editorial Opinion

We hear a lot about protecting voting equipment and paper ballots. We talk a lot about both as well. They are not equal!

It is good to protect machines from tampering; good to test machines; and good to preserve them for post-election forensic analysis; yet, ultimately they cannot be fully protected and error free. They cannot be preserved for extended periods, they are needed for the next election.

Paper ballots are also ‘hackable’ by good old fashioned replacement, destruction, or alteration; yet they can be well protected by strong security measures and audits of security compliance. They must be exploited by sufficient, transparent, publicly verifiable audits and recounts.

Today an article in Freedom to Tinker echoing our opinion: ESS voting machine company sends threats  <read>

The ExpressVote XL, if hacked, can add, delete, or change votes on individual ballots — and no voting machine is immune from hacking. That’s why optical-scan voting machines are the way to go, because they can’t change what’s printed on the ballot. And let me explain some more: The ExpressVote XL, if adopted, will deteriorate our security and our ability to have confidence in our elections, and indeed it is a bad voting machine. And expensive, too!

The main point of the article is that ES&S is using false claims made against Dominion to intimidate others, making accurate, indisputable, scientific claims:

Apparently, ES&S must think that amongst all that confusion, the time is right to send threatening Cease & Desist letters to the legitimate critics of their ExpressVote XL voting machine. Their lawyers sent this letter to the leaders of SMART Elections, a journalism+advocacy organization in New York State who have been communicating to the New York State Board of Elections, explaining to the Board why it’s a bad idea to use the ExpressVote XL in New York (or in any state).

ES&S  machines, as far as we know, are no more or less vulnerable than other brands, however, the company exposes its lack of integrity by its unfounded intimidation.

Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust

Commentary in Barron’s this week Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>

Even though there is no compelling evidence the 2020 vote was rigged, U.S. elections are insufficiently equipped to counter such claims because of a flaw in American voting. The way we conduct elections does not routinely produce public evidence that outcomes are correct.

Commentary in Barron’s this week Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>

Even though there is no compelling evidence the 2020 vote was rigged, U.S. elections are insufficiently equipped to counter such claims because of a flaw in American voting. The way we conduct elections does not routinely produce public evidence that outcomes are correct.

Furthermore, despite large investments since 2016, voting technology remains vulnerable to hacking, bugs, and human error. A report by the National Academies into the 2016 election process concluded that “there is no realistic mechanism to fully secure vote casting and tabulation computer systems from cyber threats.” The existence of vulnerabilities is not evidence that any particular election outcome is wrong, but the big-picture lesson from 2020 is that ensuring an accurate result is not enough. Elections also have to be able to prove to a skeptical public that the result really was accurate.

We need evidence-based elections: processes that create strong public evidence that the reported winners really won and the reported losers really lost, despite any problems that might have occurred. Every step in election administration—from technology choices to voter eligibility checks, physical security, the canvass, and audits—should flow from that requirement…

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

  •  Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.
  • Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered. This requires stringent physical security protocols and ballot accounting, among other things.
  • Election officials count the votes, using technology if they choose. If the technology altered the outcome, that will (with high confidence) be corrected by the steps below.
  • Election officials reconcile and verify the number of ballots and the number of voters, with a complete canvass to ensure that every validly cast ballot is included in the count.
  • Election officials check whether the paper trail is trustworthy using a transparent “compliance audit,” reviewing chain-of-custody logs and security video, verifying voter eligibility, reconciling numbers of ballots of each style against poll book signatures and other records, and accounting for every ballot that was issued.
  • Election officials check the results with an audit that has a known, large probability of catching and correcting wrong reported outcomes—and no chance of altering correct outcomes. The inventory of paper ballots used in the audit must be complete and the audit must inspect the original hand-marked ballots, not images or copies.

None of these steps stands alone. An unexamined set of paper ballots, no matter how trustworthy, provides no evidence. Conversely, no matter how rigorous, audits and recounts of an untrustworthy paper trail provide no evidence that the reported winners won. Auditing or recounting machine-marked ballots or hand-marked ballots that have not been kept secure can check whether the reported outcome reflects that paper trail, but cannot provide evidence that the reported winners won…

outsourcing audits, as Georgia did after the November vote, may prevent such process improvements. It is the responsibility of election officials (and not a third party) to ensure and demonstrate that the paper trail includes no more and no less than every validly cast ballot, and that the reported result is what those ballots show.

We note that, to us, ‘Outsourcing’ audits is a distinct concept from ‘Independent’ audits. Outsourcing implies turning all responsibly over to a hired vendor or entity dependent on election officials for funding. Independent auditing means assigning responsibility for the audit, or at least assessment and oversight of the audit to an entity independent of election officials.

How Far Have We Come Since 2016?

Have not posted much since the Election, there has been plenty of true and false information to read from all sources. Time now for a little perspective.

Recall 2016, when Jill Stein and others demanded recounts and audits in MI, WI, and PA. They were largely thwarted by officials. Little was possible in PA with no paper records of votes to count. Potential Russian hacking of epollbooks across a county in NC which was never credibly investigated. Government conclusions that there was no evidence that election systems were hacked, without checking for any. Those involved in the recounts/audits, such as the were, conclude that the saw not evidence of hacking. Yet the government acknowledged there were 18 states with attempts (often mis-characterized as 21 attempts) at accessing voter lists. To many, including yours truly, Georgia represented the most questionable state with Secretary of State Kemp on the ballot for Governor, vulnerable, critical election data left on a server before the election – destroyed by officials precluding forensic analysis, voter purges, and no paper records of votes.

We have come quite a way since then in the 2020 election…

Yet we have much farther to go:..

Have not posted much since the Election, there has been plenty of true and false information to read from all sources. Time now for a little perspective.

Recall 2016, when Jill Stein and others demanded recounts and audits in MI, WI, and PA. They were largely thwarted by officials. Little was possible in PA with no paper records of votes to count. Potential Russian hacking of epollbooks across a county in NC which was never credibly investigated. Government conclusions that there was no evidence that election systems were hacked, without checking for any. Those involved in the recounts/audits, such as the were, conclude that the saw not evidence of hacking. Yet the government acknowledged there were 18 states with attempts (often mis-characterized as 21 attempts) at accessing voter lists. To many, including yours truly, Georgia represented the most questionable state with Secretary of State Kemp on the ballot for Governor, vulnerable, critical election data left on a server before the election – destroyed by officials precluding forensic analysis, voter purges, and no paper records of votes.

We have come quite a way since then in the 2020 election:

  • Georgia and Philadelphia now have new Ballot Marking Devices providing paper records for recounts.
  • Georgia has a Risk Limiting (tabulation) Audit (RLA).
  • Georgia by RLA and Philadelphia by recount, counted their paper ballots by hand.
  • Georgia also by recount used machines to recount them all.
  • Georgia officials, mostly Republican, defended the claim that Biden won. Even Governor Kemp.
  • Other mostly Republican states defended Biden’s win.
  • The Government beefed up cyber defenses and monitoring.
  • Online media improved their monitoring and response to false information.

Yet we have much farther to go:

  • We need Voter-Marked Paper Ballots everywhere. Despite claims to the contrary, Ballot Marking Devices do not provide voter-verified ballots. Tests and observations clearly demonstrate that about 90% of voters make no effort to check their ballots, that many who try fail to check well, and most officials would understandably not believe them if they complain.
  • Many RLA laws, like Georgia’s, are inadequate and poorly written. They like many audit laws fail to come close to the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits. They don’t specify enough details/requirements for RLAs. They mis-state RLAs. They allow election officials to pick races for audit after the fact, all but encouraging picking races with large margins, rather than close races.
  • Georgia’s RLA was really a complete hand recount. Much more valuable than a RLA.
  • Georgia’s hand recount did not count. That is why the official recount was machine recount, an extra waste of time. An adequate RLA law could eliminate the need for machine recounts and result in a full hand recount only when necessary – like it was in Georgia this year.
  • Georgia’s hand recount was not well planned, and not transparent. We can applaud the recount and the hard work involved, yet next time there should be detailed procedures published in advanced, oversight to be sure those procedures are followed, and transparency – observers were unable to see and verify results sheets, compare results to original batch totals, and see that the correct numbers were entered into the results accumulation system, designed for an RLA and not a full recount.
  • The audits and recounts only covered vote Tabulation. Full audits should include transparent audits of the chain-of-custody, eligibility, and other aspects of election administration.
  • Many of these same issues apply to other close states this year and to many other states as well.

Once again, we applaud officials who did exemplary work in trying conditions, especially those defending results they would have had otherwise.

In a future post we will go over some of these issues in more details, comparing to the standards in the Principles and Best Practices.

 

 

New Paper: Evidence Based Elections

A new paper by Andrew Appel and Philip Stark: EVIDENCE-BASED ELECTIONS:CREATE A MEANINGFUL PAPER TRAIL,THEN AUDIT  Provides a thorough description of how the public can be assured of election outcomes, in spite of hack-able voting equipment.

The bottom line: The only reliable method available is Voter-Marked Paper Ballots, with strong security for the ballots, followed by sufficient post-election audits. Other technologies, including Ballot Marking Devices and Internet voting are insufficient.

Anyone interested in trustworthy elections should read this paper – especially those who think that expensive Ballot Marking Devices should be trusted. And those who think it is impossible to use technology to count votes accurately.

A new paper by Andrew Appel and Philip Stark: EVIDENCE-BASED ELECTIONS:CREATE A MEANINGFUL PAPER TRAIL,THEN AUDIT  <read> Provides a thorough description of how the public can be assured of election outcomes, in spite of hack-able voting equipment.

The bottom line: The only reliable method available is Voter-Marked Paper Ballots, with strong security for the ballots, followed by sufficient post-election audits. Other technologies, including Ballot Marking Devices and Internet voting are insufficient.

Anyone interested in trustworthy elections should read this paper – especially those who think that expensive Ballot Marking Devices should be trusted.

The vulnerability of computers to hacking is well understood. Modern computer systems, including voting machines, have many layers of software, comprising millions of lines of computer code; there are thousands of bugs in that code. Some of those bugs are security vulnerabilities that permit attackers to modify or replace the software in the upper layers,so we can never be sure that the legitimate vote-counting software or the vote-marking user interface is actually the software running on election day. One might think, “our voting machines are never connected to the Internet, so hackers cannot get to them.” But all voting machines need to be programmed for each new election: They need a “ballot-definition file” with the contests and candidate names for each election, and lists of the contests different voters are eligible to vote in. This programming is typically done via removable media such as a USB thumb drive or a memory card. Vote-stealing malware can piggyback on removable media and infect voting machines—even machines with no network connection. There is a way to count votes by computer and still achieve trustworthy election outcomes. A trustworthy paper trail of voter selections can be used to check, or correct, the electoral outcomes of the contest in an election…

If a BMD is hacked and systematically steals 5% of the votes in one contest and only 7% of voters inspect their ballots carefully enough to notice, then the effective rate of vote-theft is5% ?93% ,or 4.65%;this is enough to change the outcome of a moderately close election. The same analysis applies to a DRE+VVPATsystem.One might think:“not everyone needs to carefully verify their ballots;” if only 7% of voters carefully inspect their ballots, they can serve as a kind of “random audit” of the BMDs. But this sentiment fails to hold up under careful analysis…

in our hypothetical scenario in which a hacked BMD steals 5% of the votes, and 7% of voters carefully inspect their ballots (and know what to do when they see a mistake), then7% ?5% ofvoters will alert a pollworker; that is, 1 in every 285 voters will claim their paper ballot was mismarked—if the voters do not assume it was their own error. The BMD would successfully steal “only” 4.65% of the votes.One might think:“but some voters caught the BMD cheating, red-handed.” But nothing can be done. It is a rare election official who would invalidate an entire election because 1 out of 285 voters complained.

“Delay” is a dirty word

WhoWhatWhy podcasd interview with Professor Ned Foley  <listen>

Ned is the leading legal expert on our presidential election system and how our country reacts to close elections.

In the second half of the interview he makes the point that counting votes after election day and waiting for certified results is a part of the process. He makes the point that the media and everyone else should avoid using the word ‘delay’ to describe results that are not complete on election night – they never are.

WhoWhatWhy podcasd interview with Professor Ned Foley  <listen>

Ned is the leading legal expert on our presidential election system and how our country reacts to close elections.

In the second half of the interview he makes the point that counting votes after election day and waiting for certified results is a part of the process. He makes the point that the media and everyone else should avoid using the word ‘delay’ to describe results that are not complete on election night – they never are.

4th of July Suggestion

As we often do, a suggested reading for the 4th of July weekend.  Today it seems the Constitution is under assault from all sides, with an administration assaulting the rule of law and civil rights advocates identifying its fundamental flaws. Lets refresh ourselves on our purer, more basic rights.

This weekend is a great time to [re-]read the Declaration of Independence. We find it very inspiring to read it sometime around the 4th of July each year.  As we have discussed before, some believe that the right to vote is more fundamental than the Constitution. Here is a link to a copy for your reading <Declaration of Independence>

The Declaration of Independence asserts our rights to determine and change our form of government – without voting integrity we lose that most fundamental of rights.

“The right to vote… is the primary right by which other rights are protected” – Thomas Paine

As we often do, a suggested reading for the 4th of July weekend.  Today it seems the Constitution is under assault from all sides, with an administration assaulting the rule of law and civil rights advocates identifying its fundamental flaws. Lets refresh ourselves on our purer, more basic rights.

This weekend is a great time to [re-]read the Declaration of Independence. We find it very inspiring to read it sometime around the 4th of July each year.  As we have discussed before, some believe that the right to vote is more fundamental than the Constitution. Here is a link to a copy for your reading <Declaration of Independence>

The Declaration of Independence asserts our rights to determine and change our form of government – without voting integrity we lose that most fundamental of rights.

“The right to vote… is the primary right by which other rights are protected” – Thomas Paine

Comments on new Federal Voting Systems Guidelines

Last week I submitted comments for the State Audit Working Group on the proposed (Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines) VVSG 2.0 standards which will define future voting system standards. Looking over all the submissions, ours were likely the most extensive detailed comments submitted. In total our submission was about three hundred and fifty pages!

By far the largest number of comments were from disability rights groups and individuals supporting their positions, many redundant. Access for the disabled is one of the most controversial and critical issues.

There are other issues with the proposed guidelines. The proposal is a far from a finished product, with wide-ranging comments. It will be a huge task to complete them, far more challenging to complete well.

Last week I submitted comments for the State Audit Working Group on the proposed (Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines) VVSG 2.0 standards which will define future voting system standards. Looking over all the submissions, ours were likely the most extensive detailed comments submitted. In total our submission was about three hundred and fifty pages!  You might consider reading the cover letter and then the Glossary Comments which have their own cover letter. In all, we spent over 200 hours developing and agreeing upon our comments. We were pleased to have thirteen signers and endorsements in comments from others groups : <SAWG Comments>

In all there were seventy-seven comments from various voting integrity, vendor, disability rights groups, and individuals <All Comments>

By far the largest number of comments were from disability rights groups and individuals supporting their positions, many redundant. Access for the disabled is one of the most controversial and critical issues. Many argue that everyone should vote on exactly the same voting machines so that all have equal access. There are several problems with this argument which would have us all vote on BMDs (Ballot Marking Devices): BMDs are not fully developed to meet the needs of the disabled, they need lots of work; Despite voting on identical machines, BMDs provide multiple interfaces for those with various disabilities , leaving voters not actually voting the same way anyway; BMDs cost about four times what a combination of a single BMD per polling place with VMPB (Voter Marked Paper Ballots) for most voters; BMDs do not serve some voters with disabilities  who cannot use them but can use paper ballots; BMDs are often the cause of the long lines we see in Georgia, Pennsylvania and elsewhere – almost non-existent in CT which has the single BMD and VMPB model; those long lines hurt the vast majority of those with disabilities who have issues with walking and standing in line for hours. I would favor investing the savings in BMD research and preparing to replace that one BMD per polling place as better solutions are developed. For some interesting comments on the challenges of the disabled that do not take the standard advocacy line, read the comments from <Marybeth Kuznik>, <Noel Runyan>, and <Harvie Branscomb>.

There are other issues with the proposed guidelines: They spend too little on vote-by-mail equipment; fail to fully recognize early voting; are too detailed in some areas and sketchy in others; provide for unsafe Recallable Ballots; and as vendors point out are often too prescriptive and expensive to implement. The proposal is a far from a finished product, with wide-ranging comments. It will be a huge task to complete them, far more challenging to complete well.

Editorial: Update on Expanded Mail-In for CT and Proposals in D.C.

I am normally opposed to expanded mail-in voting in CT because of proven continuous and recent votING fraud by campaigns and insiders in CT (Which is distinct from votER fraud which for all practical purposes does not exist). Yet in this virus situation, I am in favor of no-excuse mail in voting.

Bottom line: If the state can legally do anything it would be best to leave all current systems in place and hire lots of people to do absentee processing and hope each of the 169 clerks and 338 registrars are up to the jobs of hiring, planning, training, organizing and executing (questionable at best given the years of experience with, never cured, Electoin Day Registration lines in some towns).

I am normally opposed to expanded mail-in voting in CT because of proven continuous and recent votING fraud by campaigns and insiders in CT (Which is distinct from votER fraud, which for all practical purposes does not exist).

Yet in this virus situation, I am in favor of no-excuse mail-in voting.

Recent examples of votING fraud in Connecticut: <Stamford> <Hartford> <Bridgeport>
Some other examples <East Longmeadow, MA> <Dade County, FL>

The Secretary of the State has asked Gov Lamont to sign an executive order to permit it.  However, reading between the lines: Since the Gov cannot by executive order override the Constitution, the fix proposed by Sec Merrill would likely be interpreted as an attempt to do that and an expected court challenge would likely succeed.

If they do come up with a fix that passes Constitutional muster about the only reasonable additional change could be relaxing the 48 hour deadline for the initial counting of votes. That poses risks too because recanvasses must be completed by day 8 and the Constitution requires that the results be certified by day 10.

If that is all that is done then local officials would have to plan and execute well a possible 10-15 fold increase in absentee ballots with a similar expansion in what all town clerks must  do prior to the election and registrars before and after. Counting ballots and meeting integrity requirements also involves special (slower) procedures in the age of COVID-19. Of course, we can give up on integrity requirements like two people checking each envelope inside and outside, and two people examining each ballot (I would not recommend against skipping integrity).

In D.C. there have been independent and stimulus bill sections mandating mail-in and early voting in all states. These would be devastating requirements for CT to implement and execute in such a short time-frame by August or November. All but impossible in a normal year, but much tougher in the age of COVID-19. Mail processing vendors, all but required by such proposed laws, are already saying they are all but booked  for November and have no spare capacity. Meeting those same requirements would also require massive changes, equipment and people in Connecticut, with little time for testing, planning and training. In person early voting would also be a similar huge change. All costly and risky to implement in a hurry.

Everyone points to CA, OR, and CO as shining examples. Not necessarily true. CA comes close to meeting all the requirements in these bills. To meet them CA allows 30 days for counting absentees. In the recent primary (much smaller than the general election) they extended the counting an additional 21 days. If that happens in Nov, its likely the CA electors would not be counted in the Presidential election. Hopefully they will do better.

Bottom line: If the state can legally do anything it would be best to leave all current systems in place and hire lots of people to do absentee processing and hope each of the 169 clerks and 338 registrars are up to the jobs of hiring, planning, training, organizing and executing (questionable at best given the years of experience with and never cured, disenfranchising Election Day Registration lines in some towns).