Category: National

Results also indicate continuing extensive problems with procedures not being followed by election officials.

The UConn VoTeR Center recently released two more reports in its series of memory card audits <Aug Primary Post-Election> <November Pre-Election>

We applaud UConn for carrying out these tests and the Secretary of the State’s Office for commissioning these tests. We appreciate the valuable addition of analysis of the Audit Logs.

From the Presidential Pre-Election Report:

The UConn VoTeR Center performed a pre-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that are to be used in the November 2008 Elections in Connecticut. The cards are programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. For the pre-election audit the VoTeR Center received and examined 620 memory cards as of November 3, 2008. These cards correspond to 620 distinct districts in Connecticut. About 2/3 of these memory cards were randomly chosen by the VoTeR Center personnel during the visits to LHS and before the cards were packed and shipped to the towns. Another 1/3 of the memory cards came from the towns directly, where the cards were randomly chosen for pre- election audit (this procedure applied to the town for which the cards were not selected at LHS). The towns that shipped the cards to be audited were not asked to perform the local pre-election testing before shipping, thus the majority of the cards received from the towns did not contain the pre-election testing events in their audit logs.

This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit. Among the 620 cards received and tested as of this writing, 564 cards (91%) were found to have been properly programmed for election. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code.

One of the ongoing areas of concern is the quality of memory cards and the quality control of our vendor LHS Associates, which supplies the Diebold memory cards and programs them for each election. Past tests at UConn, in other states, and surveys by the audit Coalition indicate significant problems.

The source of the problems remain in question: Are the cards bad from the beginning? Do they leave LHS working correctly, to be harmed by transport or by testing by election officials? These latest reports may get us closer to some of the answers. Looking at the results and the reports conclusions, we conclude:

1. The quality control is getting worse: The pre-election test showed 3.8% of the cards were programmed correctly but contained additional random data, apparently a new issue.
2. Election officials continue to violate procedures: 16 of 297 post-election cards sent by registrars were from the wrong election. 23 cards were duplicated which is prohibited by the Secretary of the State’s procedures.
3. The cards are bad when they leave LHS: 8.9% of the cards tested post-election contained “Junk” data, when 2/3 of the cards tested were directly from LHS. UConn noted no significant difference in card failure rates between those collected at LHS and those shipped by Election Officials

We might conclude, perhaps erroneously that:

• The problems are getting worse: The August Post-Election report showed 15.4% of cards with “Junk Data”, while previous post-election reports have shown 5% and 8% junk data.

However, the memory cards shipped by election officials are not selected at random and do not represent all the districts in the election. The results may reflect a tendency for election officials to send in the “Junk” data cards or for districts with problems not to send cards – we have no way of knowing.

The results show serious problems with the hardware and the election system: Memory cards should not fail at these rates. In the unlikely event the memory card problems are shipping and handling, then LHS should specify exactly how the shipping and handling should be improved. Election officials should be expected to follow procedures. How can the public have confidence in our elections when procedures are not followed?

We note from the pre-election report:

The current SOTS procedure is not to duplicate cards, but this is now being reconsidered, with one possibility being to allow duplication at the districts and to document and report all such occurrences.

We have reservations about making this change and question the added vulnerability associated with the duplication of cards. We have concerns that election officials will follow any such procedure given that they have clearly failed to follow the current procedure for memory cards and a similar procedure associated with the post-election audit requiring them to call the Secretary of the State’s Office when incorrectly sealed ballots are discovered. Procedures are insufficient when they are difficult to follow, they are regularly violated, they cannot be effectively monitored, are not enforced, and are not enforceable.

Update: Photo of Secretary Bysiewicz and caption indicating she will look into early voting <view>
*****

Westport News: A Concept Worth Exploring <read>

Many viewed the long lines as a success for democracy. Well, the record turnout — most notably among younger Americans — sure was. But the lines, no way. In our fast-paced society, where time is money, some voters may have been discouraged by the lines and decided it was not worth the wait. We certainly hope this wasn’t the case and would like to extend our support to a concept that could be the remedy in Connecticut — early voting.

Fortunately, we believe, Connecticut was spared those long lines, as were most states with optical scan voting. If we did have long lines anywhere they could easily be cured by more space and more election officials at those polling places – a much simpler solution than early voting.

We do recognize the value of encouraging more citizens to vote by making it more convenient.

There are two ways early voting can take place: opening polls for a specified period prior to an election and permitting no-excuse absentee ballots.

Without a detailed analysis we can say that we are conditionally against early voting for Connecticut at this time(*). In simpler terms, we would want to see a very detailed plan and have an opportunity for it to be reviewed by nationally respected voting experts, computer scientists, and security experts. Until we see a detailed proposal and it is positively reviewed by experts our position would be against.

“No-excuse absentee ballots” is another name and form of mail-in voting. Like touch-screen voting it is attractive to the public and some election officials and, unfortunately, that ease may be accompanied by an unwarranted confidence that votes will be counted.  For more on concerns with mail-in voting, see <novbm>

“The secretary of the state is open to any and all suggestions that improve access to voters so it’s easier to cast a ballot,” said Adam Joseph, deputy communications director for the Office of the Secretary of the State.

In regard to early voting, Joseph said, “It is definitely going to be on our agenda for consideration in the upcoming legislative session.”

Continue reading “CT: Secretary Of The State, Town Clerks Open To Explore Early Voting”

Christine Stuart, CTNewsJunkie <read>

Republican Party Chairman Chris Healy sent this letter to Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz Friday afternoon asking her to delay the certification of Tuesday’s vote because he fears the results in some close races may not be accurate.

Especially in races where candidates were cross-endorsed by other party’s like the Working Families party.

Using an example from the 62nd District were 18 year incumbent Rep. Richard Ferrari, R-East Granby, was ousted by political newcomer Annie Hornish, Healy said he is concerned about “how easy it is to incorrectly double count votes for cross-endorsed candidates.”

Hornish ran as a Democrat but was also endorsed by the Working Families Party, so her name appeared twice on the ballot. In East Granby the moderator mistakenly counted the votes from the working Families Party twice. “Fortunately, this error was caught in time for the moderator to amend his return,” Healy said.

As Healy said in his letter:

The instructions on the moderator’s return state in relevant part: “1. Enter total votes in the boxes directly below each candidate’s name.” Initially in East Granby, the moderator entered the total votes received by the Democrat candidate in the box under the Democrat candidate’s name. The Working Party votes were included in this total, but the Working Party votes were also entered in the box under the Working Party candidate’s name.

Since the candidate was cross-endorsed, this error had the effect of double counting the
Working Party votes.

We agree that it is very easy to make this error and several others in accounting for votes. There are several problems and contributing factors:

• Misunderstanding the instructions.
• Transcription errors – polling place officials transcribe numbers from machine tapes and hand-count totals to the Moderator’s Return – the Head Moderator in each municipality transcribes results to combine totals for the town – the Secretary of the State’s Office transcribes totals to be added to determine results for races that cross municipal boundaries.
• Moderators do their work late at night after a seventeen or eighteen hour day.

A component of a solution we recommend would be that copies of all polling place Moderator’s Returns and tabulator tapes be faxed to the Secretary of the State’s office with their images posted on the Secretary of the State’s web. This would provide the opportunity for Mr. Healy, candidates, and concerned citizens to review results free of most transcription.

Another component of a solution we recommend would be stronger, more comprehensive post-election audits – including auditing all votes no matter how cast, no matter how counted: Machine counted, hand-counted, including absentee, military, provisional ballots etc.

We share another concern expressed by Mr. Healy in his letter:

My second concern has to do with how the “unknown” votes are assigned to a party (as opposed to a candidate). “Unknown” votes are votes that the tabulator assigns to a cross-endorsed candidate when the voter voted both for the candidate as a Democrat and, as in this case, for the candidate as a Working Families candidate. There is no direction or guidance regarding how these votes are assigned, so the moderator has the discretion to assign them to either the Democrat candidate, or the Working Families candidate. I understand that in most – if not all – cases, these votes are being assigned to the Working Families candidate. This of course has the effect of inflating the vote for the Working Families party and may mean the difference between the party being included or not included on future ballots.

While this practice has no effect on the outcome of these races, it has profound implications for future ballots. It is a practice that is simply unacceptable.

We add these concerns:

• Assignment of such votes should be decided by the legislature, not the Secretary of the State, and not by local election officials.
• If credit for votes is effectively taken away from a candidate’s party, the effect of a cross-endorsement could hurt the candidate’s party and serve as an incentive for candidates to not accept cross endorsements.
• Similarly what if a popular third party candidate was cross endorsed by a major party, would the votes then go to the major party at the expense of the third party?
• What happens if a candidate is cross endorsed by more than two parties?
• What happens if a candidate is cross endorsed by two major parties? Could this be a strategy to take credit from the other party?