Category: National

14 Towns Exempt From Post-Election Audits, So Far

Press Release from Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz <read>

So far, 14 Connecticut towns have reported races close enough for an automatic manual recount.  That is the good news, unfortunately, due to Public Act 07-194 those towns are also exempt from the random post-election audits.  More to come as results come in and races are contested which can also result in exemption or avoiding the recount.

One slight mis-statement in the release: all paper ballots for selected races will not be counted – central count absentee ballots are also exempt by Public Act 07-194 audited.

Once again there is news – 300 memory cards were tested so far, and another 300 expected to be done soon.  At 600 that is a large portion of the districts in the election.

Talk Radio Investigation Into New Voting Technology Reveals Vulnerabilities

Secretary Bysiewicz is taking steps to improve security and procedures with our voting machines. More seals and testing of spare memory cards for most districts by UConn. Yet, the procedures must be clear to election staff and followed unfailingly — a huge challenge when changing so many locations at once, with 169 municipalities with dedicated but predominately very part time election staff. CTVotersCount readers know that the audits remain insufficient to detect errors and deter fraud.
Dori Smith of TalkNationRadio.org covers her investigation of procedures not being followed in 2006, the risks of outsourcing election programming and management, along with potential problems posed by new and conflicting procedures <read>.

Are Connecticut’s new electronic voting machines safe from fraud? A year-long Talk Nation Radio investigation found serious security problems when the machines were first used in some Connecticut towns during the 2006 election. There was chaos at the polls during the 2nd District recount and LHS staff members were refusing to follow the voting machine security protocols drafted by Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz under Chapter 9 of Connecticut law. The 2006 protocols were rushed through, and a year later the state’s new protocols were hastily constructed and are still being updated for the public with the Nov. 6 election right around the corner.

Memory Card Failures 1%? 4%? 9%? – Diebold Won’t Disclose Data

Memory cards have been failing in Florida on AccuVote-OS scanners. Diebold won’t release the actual data claiming it is proprietary. Also attempts to blame the customer for the problem. BradBlog has the story. <read>

The resulting reports, from 17 of the 27 counties, show two counties with over 9 percent memory card failure rate and some counties with zero. The average failure rate is 2.8 percent; nearly three times what Diebold/Premier is admitting publicly.

Datona Beach News-Journal:

Diebold officials said the 4.4 percent error rate in Volusia was unusual, that the average was about 1 percent. The company conducted a survey of 27 Florida counties that use its machines but refused to release the results, calling them “proprietary business information.

The company offered several explanations for the damage, including improper cleaning, foreign objects and improper memory card removal or insertion,

Update: More from Brad Blog <read>

Nonetheless, some very good stuff here. Of particular note, are the points from Diebold’s recommendations which “appear to border on the absurd,” that should voting machine memory cards be lost, “elections must be re-scheduled.” Or if they fail, as our recent story concerning Diebold’s admissions about memory card failures in Florida pointed towards, the company says “all voters will have to be called in to re-vote.”

Update 11/12: Some responses from Diebold/Premier <read>

Unintended Consequences – Bridgeport Lockup

Update:Â Supreme Court to intervene <read>

Bridgeport, Conn., Voting Machines “Held Hostage” Says Secretary of State <read>

Judge Blawie has ruled that the primary election results are valid,” said Bysiewicz. “Rep. Caruso is entitled to appeal but he should not hold the city’s voting machines hostage in the process. The actual paper ballots would be available for review if necessary but the voting machines used in the primary should be released now so election officials can prepare them for next week’s general election. Rep. Caruso has the opportunity to help, and ensure that taxpayers are not forced to shell out thousands of dollars to have substitute machines shipped in from out of state.”

Here are some solutions:

  • Borrow the machines from towns not holding elections this year (Federal HAVA funds paid for them)
  • Have a team of representatives of both candidates observe as the memory cards are removed from the scaners and locked up, then reuse the machines.
  • Use paper ballots and hand count the election
  • Use the backup machines for the election, and use paper where the backup machines fail on election day

What has not been mentioned in any reporting, as far as I know, is that Bridgeport was supposed to conduct random post-election audits of the primary by October 1st, and has not because of the machine lockup.

New Britain – Shortage of Election Officials. Questionable Procedures? Short Fuses?

Update 11/3, more arguments <read>, no wonder they are having problems recruiting.

Between pay increases for poll workers and a candidate’s company moving voting machines, New Britain voting officials have had their share of the news lately. Now Rick Guinness reports on a shortage of poll workers, a shortage of cooperation between registrars, and frustration directed at the Secretary of The State <read>

As of Wednesday afternoon, Democrats need one to fill their quota and Republicans needed 27, according to Democratic Registrar of Voters Edward “Butch” Dzwonkowski…

Tensions have risen among voting officials. Staff members in the registrars’ office said [Republican Registrar of Voters Dorothy] Turnrose stormed out of the City Hall basement vault where she, Dzwonkowski and their staffs had been working to secure and store voting machines for Election Day. Turnrose did not show up for work Wednesday after Tuesday’s argument, and she did not return phone calls….

[Mayor Timothy] Stewart said the state thrust new voting machines and laws on cities and towns on the pretext they were more efficient and secure.

What I learned at the Post Election Audit Summit

Update 10/31: 1) Some grammar improvements courtesy of D. Weeks. 2) The good news: Connecticut is a Voter Intent State. 3) The not so good news: Connecticut does not require that andit or recount observers be able to viably verify that paper ballots are counted correctly. Thanks to Ted Bromley of the Secretary of the State’s Office for answering these questions.

I have just returned from the Post Election Audit Summit. A unique and powerful event which brought together stakeholders in election audits including computer scientists, statisticians, election officials, legislators, and advocates.

One of the main themes was “Better Together” taken from a book of that title. By meeting in an open, respectful atmosphere we could each be open to share concerns, ideas, successes, and failures. I found the entire event extremely stimulating and educational. We will be able to create better proposals which provide greater voter confidence at less cost, while mitigating concerns of other stakeholders and helping them meet their goals and responsibilities. I am left with much more to do, yet with the tools to provide election integrity and confidence at a higher level with more velocity than was possible three days ago.

Stay tuned for new announcements in the next two weeks about a citizen audit observation project for the November Connecticut post-election audits. The greatest value of your volunteering for the project is the opportunity and pride of actually participating in democracy.

Let me list, in no particular order, some of the things I learned and re-learned at the Summit:

Continue reading “What I learned at the Post Election Audit Summit”

The Case Against Voting By Mail

In an effort to increase participation, from time to time, we hear calls for unlimited voting by mail. Oregon provides for vote by mail. While well intended, vote by mail opens up the opportunity for fraud, buying votes, and voter intimidation.

John Foster, makes the case to the Committee on House Administrations, Elections Subcommittee in Expanding and Improving Opportunities to Vote by Mail or Absentee.

Another example of good intentions, questionable benefits, and unintended consequences:

Continue reading “The Case Against Voting By Mail”

Voting Machine Security Enhanced By SOTS Office

The Secretary of the State’s Office has taken action to reduce the chance of tampering with voting machines in Connecticut by requiring three additional tamper evident seals added to the Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scanners. The problem was outlined in a recent FAQ at CTVotersCount.org – the canvass bag and plastic seal are vulnerable, while the memory card seal can be bypassed by four screws on the bottom of the AccuVote-OS. In addition advocates complained that the parallel port had not been disabled as recommend by UConn.

Two seals will be placed over the ports of the AccuVote-OS, while another placed on the side to indicate that the optical-scanner was opened by the screws.

Case SealPort Seal

Hats off to the Office of the Secretary of the State for swift action to address these concerns. While we doubt these seals are a perfect solution or that there is one, they are an added layer of protection, and appear somewhat more difficult to defeat than the canvas and plastic seals.

Ballots More Costly Than A Sufficient Audit

We have been saying that a sufficient audit would cost $0.20 to $0.50 per ballot cast. Now we have an example in Connecticut demonstrating that at least for one town, ballots cost $0.40 each to print. Given that extra ballots must be printed, it is clear that counting the paper is less costly than printing it in the 1st place. Just one more reason to sign the petition and change the law: Democracy is Priceless – Audits are a bargain.

Diebold Source Code – CA Top-To-Bottom Review

In August, the Secretary of the State of California decertified electronic voting equipment from Diebold, ES&S, and Sequoia. Her action was based on the Top-To-Bottom Review, which consisted of four reports on each vendor. Two of those reports, Documentation and Source Code were not released at the time. On October 5th, I highlited the Documentation Review. Today, I highlight the Source Code Review.

A Source Code Review sounds like and is a very techinical topic. However, this report is very educational and easy to read. Read the Executive Summary, read the Introduction, and more. I don’t expect everyone to read it completely, but please start and see  if you agree that it is accessible and articulate. I cannot add to the report, however, I can provide some highlights and encourage you to go farther <the report>

From the executive summary:

Our analysis shows that the technological controls in the Diebold software do not provide sufficient security to guarantee a trustworthy election. The software contains serious design flaws that have led directly to specific vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. These vulnerabilities include:

  • Vulnerability to malicious software…
  • Susceptibility to viruses…
  • Vulnerability to malicious insiders…

Although we present several unpublished vulnerabilities, many of the weaknesses that we describe were first identified in previous studies…

we conclude tht the safest way to repair the Diebold system is to reengineer it so that it is secure by design.
Continue reading “Diebold Source Code – CA Top-To-Bottom Review”