EVEREST Reports Devistating

Earlier I had promised more on the USENIX/ACCURATE Conference in San Jose. In addition to the panels, the presentations on the Ohio EVEREST studies provided information that we have not covered here at CTVotersCount.org. Released in mid December, following the California Top-To-Bottom review the Ohio reports have gotten less attention by many, including me. Two presentations on EVEREST at the conference grabbed my attention – they not only confirmed the CA reports but added additional vulnerabilities and devastating conclusions.

Links:
Ohio One Page EVEREST Summary
Ohio Secretary of the State’s Executive Report
USENIX Hart and Premier [Diebold] Paper
USENIX ES&S Paper
HOPE Conf ES&S Video Presentation

From the Ohio Secretary of State’s summary:

Ohio’s electronic voting systems have “critical security failures” which could impact the integrity of elections in the Buckeye State, according to a review of the systems commissioned by Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner.

“The results underscore the need for a fundamental change in the structure of Ohio’s election system to ensure ballot and voting system security while still making voting convenient and accessible to all Ohio voters, “ Secretary Brunner said Friday in unveiling the report…

“To put it in every-day terms, the tools needed to compromise an accurate vote count could be as simple as tampering with the paper audit trail connector or using a magnet and a personal digital assistant,” Brunner said.

(Note: Since Connecticut uses Premier [Diebold] equipment that report’s findings are most relevant. Note, however, that all the findings do not apply to Premier and that Connecticut uses a subset of their products – yet all the findings indicate the state of the industry, our vendor, and the general qualities and security of our electronic election equipment.)

From the Hart/Premier report:

As in previous studies, we found the election systems to be critically flawed in ways that are practically and easily exploitable. Such exploits could effect election results, prevent legitimate votes from being cast, or simply cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election itself. In this

effort we identified new areas of concern including novel exploitable failures of software and election data integrity protection and the discovery of dangerous hidden software features…

there were several important failures detailed by this study that were not known prior to the release of this study. Several important discoveries include:
Continue reading “EVEREST Reports Devistating”

Election Fraud In Bridgeport?

Update 6 /17/2009: Head of CA GOP Voter Registration Firm Pleads Guilty to Voter Registration Fraud
Update: 10/07/2008: Election Enforcement Commission investigation opened
Update: Secretary Bysiewicz Responds

(Without editorial comment, see Editor’s Note)

Update 6 /17/2009: Head of CA GOP Voter Registration Firm Pleads Guilty to Voter Registration Fraud <read>

Update: 10/07/2008: Election Enforcement Commission investigation opened <read>

Update: Secretary Bysiewicz Responds: <read>

“Voter fraud is an allegation that my office takes very seriously. The only state agency that can investigate potential voter fraud, however, is the State Elections Enforcement Commission. In fact, the Office of the Secretary of the State has consistently instructed local Registrars of Voters that if they see any voter registration cards that raise red flags or do not look correct, they should make photocopies for their own records and send the problematic cards to the State Elections Enforcement Commission for investigation. If anyone feels there is enough evidence to warrant an investigation, I would urge them to file a Complaint with the State Elections Enforcement Commission. ACORN has informed our office that there were indeed problems with voter registration cards being filled out improperly or incorrectly in Bridgeport and in fact those cards were not counted. This case proves the system works. Locally elected Registrars of Voters are trained statewide to detect discrepancies or inconsistencies in information provided on voter registration cards.?

As CTVotersCount.org readers know there are a lot of questionable practices and issues with the conduct of elections and post-election audits in Bridgeport which are the responsibility of the city’s Registrars and their election officials. <read> <read>.

Now issues of external fraud are being to be raised by one of the Bridgeport Registrars and the Republican Party Chair is calling for an investigation. We suggest watching the video. and reading the article

HARTFORD In the wake of a recent interview posted on the website ElectionJournal.org (www.electionjournal.org) with Bridgeport Republican Registrar of Voters Joe Borges, Chairman Chris Healy is calling for Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz to launch a full investigation into the activities of the Association of Community Organizers for Reform Now (ACORN). “There should be no room for playing games with elections in Connecticut,” said Healy, the Chairman of the Connecticut Republican Party. “The allegations of voter registration fraud by ACORN should be fully investigated, and if any crimes are uncovered, they should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.?

According to the interview, which is now posted on the CTGOP blog The Everyday Republican, Bridgeport Republican Registrar of Voters Joseph Borges indicated that “at least 20%” of the voter registration cards ACORN had submitted were duplicative or falsified. Mr. Borges even told of one instance where an ACORN employee had solicited voter registration cards under the guise of “job employment applications”.

Election Costs $ – Democracy? Priceless!

We have said that conducting elections cost from $5.00 to $20.00 per ballot cast and that our estimate of $0.20 to $0.50 for an audit is a small price to pay to assure that the votes are counted as the voters intended. But the news from Norwalk indicates we may need to revise the high-end cost of running an election upwards from that $20.00. <read>

“Everybody has their right to have a primary, but they should consider the costs and if they really statistically have a chance to win,” said Betty Bondi, Democratic registrar of voters in Norwalk, where 6.3 percent of registered Democrats voted.

Bondi said the primary will cost Norwalk taxpayers about $50,000 by the time the bills get sorted – all that for a contest in which Himes got 899 votes and Whitnum got 70

The calculation is $50,000 / (899 + 70) = $51.59 per ballot cast to run the election, totally dwarfing the cost of a strong, effective post-election audit.

A story earlier this week highlighted complaints of high barriers by third-party candidates. Today’s article features complaints from election officials of barriers being too low for primary challengers.

We cannot help but agree with one comment from Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz:

Lopsided results and low turnouts must be put in perspective, Bysiewicz said.

“Sometimes democracy costs money,” she said

We would add that the costs of the peoples’ intention not being followed can be trillions of dollars and thousands of lives, no matter how you look at it, Red, Blue or Green. The value of Democracy? Priceless!

New York – Test/Think Before You Buy

New York has an extensive testing and review program to test voting machines before they purchase them. Of course that means, given the information we have from various reports in California, Ohio, and Connecticut, its quite predictable that none will pass reasonable tests and review <read>


New York State’s new voting systems are failing certification testing. The two systems undergoing testing for use in 2009 are showing large numbers of defects against New York requirements, have as yet unresolved design and manufacturing issues, and during the initial stages of my source code review I found a software back door that would allow a rogue program to load from an inserted memory card. What’s not to like?

Now, you may be thinking that these all sound like bad things. And of course, on one level they absolutely are. As I’ve written about in earlier posts, what gall vendors have providing New York’s voters with such flawed equipment, sold at astronomical prices, and which have apparently not undergone basic quality assurance testing before being shipped. So what’s the good news? The good news is that we’re identifying problems prior to use in an election – the machines are failing New York’s tests.

Unlike the situation in so many other states, where inadequately tested machines are approved by private companies working for system vendors with no independent review, New York State has changed the rules of the game. Here, we require rigorous testing to the highest standards. Here, we have independent review of not only the machine vendors, but of the vendor performing the testing. Here, we have a Citizens Advisory Committee which has access to the systems and provides advice and analysis to the State Board. Because of this, New York State will not use these machines until such time as they meet the standards required by law and regulation. In other words, the process is working.

Read the full report for more details.

Too High A Barrier?

(Without editorial comment, see Editor’s Note)

Hartford Advocate article on the petitioning effort required to get on the presidential ballot: <read>

In a rare show of third party unity, the campaigns of Nader, Libertarian Bob Barr and the Green Party’s Cynthia McKinney, the last two former Congress members, are joining forces across state lines to overcome ballot access rules designed to keep minor party candidates out. The camps are sharing workers, swapping petitions and urging voters to sign up for another third party candidate along with their own. They’ve joined forces in Maine, West Virginia, Hawaii, Pennsylvania and now Connecticut, where Barr submitted 13,000 signatures and McKinney turned in “close to the necessary number,” a Green Party boss says…

Sidewalk petitioning can be thankless work: Campaigns pay workers $1 to $1.50 per signature to stand on baking asphalt, asking irritated grocery shoppers to sign in support of a candidate they’ve often never heard of, or might consider a “spoiler.” Nader’s national ballot coordinator, Christina Tobin of Illinois, arrived in Hartford last week to turn in the fruits of their labor…

…petitioners must carry a form for every town—Andover to Woodstock—which the state then mails to those towns. Another law says petitioners must be state residents, which poses a problem because the most reliable workers are the few paid national staffers who travel from state to state, not local volunteers. Beyond that, requiring 7,500 valid signatures when other New England states require a fraction as many (1,000 in Rhode Island, 3,000 in New Hampshire) disadvantages small-dollar grassroots campaigns, Tobin says.

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, the state’s top election official, is unsympathetic. She says town officials must validate petition signatures because only they have the original signed voter cards. If something looks suspicious—say, several signatures in the same handwriting—officials need to check the source documents.

Read the entire article for more details and opinion.

CT Irony #3: Passed in 2005: Tougher Audits and Custody for Equipment/Paper We Don’t Use

In 2005 the Legislature passed the Voter Verified Paper Trail Bill. They also passed post-election audits along with a minimum one hundred and eighty day seal on the paper. Unfortunately, they had not anticipated optical scan, limiting the audit to DRE (Touch Screen) equipment. We actually have tougher post-election audits and custody laws on the books that would have applied to DRE than apply to the optical scanners we do have. We are not advocating DRE machines, Connecticut voters have a much safer, auditable, economical voting system with optical scan.

We have pointed out many weaknesses in the optical scan audit law passed in 2007 which applies to optical scan. Among the inadequacies of the law are that we don’t audit enough of the votes, we don’t do it soon enough after the election, and we have a questionable chain-of-custody provision which many believe only lasts fourteen days – with the audits starting on day fifteen. But on the books is a much tougher audit law for DRE’s which does not apply to optical scanners. This law has a much bigger audit, started sooner, audits all races and questions, and with a much longer and clearer chain-of-custody This would be an expensive audit as DRE paper tapes are much more time consuming to audit than paper ballots: Sec. 9-242b. Procedures for use of direct recording electronic voting machines

(5) Not later than five business days after each election in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least (A) two direct recording electronic voting machines used in each assembly district, or (B) a number of direct recording electronic voting machines equal to fifty per cent of the number of voting districts in the municipality, whichever is less. Not later than five business days after a primary in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrar of voters of the party holding the primary shall conduct such a manual audit by designating two or more individuals, one of whom may be the registrar, representing at least two candidates in the primary. The machines audited under this subdivision shall be selected in a random drawing that is announced in advance to the public and is open to the public. All direct recording electronic voting machines used within an assembly district shall have an equal chance of being selected for the audit. The Secretary of the State shall determine and publicly announce the method of conducting the random drawing, before the election. The manual audit shall consist of a manual tabulation of the contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records produced by each voting machine subject to the audit and a comparison of such count, with respect to all candidates and any questions or proposals appearing on the ballot, with the electronic vote tabulation reported for such voting machine on the day of the election or primary…

(6) The individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records contemporaneously produced by any direct recording electronic voting machine in use at an election or primary held on or after July 1, 2005, shall be carefully preserved and returned in their designated receptacle in accordance with the requirements of section 9-266, 9-302 or 9-310, whichever is applicable, and may not be opened or destroyed, except during recanvass or manual audit as set forth in this section, for one hundred eighty days following an election or primary that does not include a federal office, pursuant to section 9-310, or for twenty-two months following an election or primary involving a federal office, pursuant to 42 USC 1974, as amended from time to time.

What we need in Connecticut is a stronger, independent, more comprehensive, more timely post-election audit of all types of ballots cast with a stronger chain-of-custody.

Editor’s Note

CTVotersCount.org concentrates on issues related to computerized voting and issues related to the voters’ intent being realized. There are many other issues related to voting such as voter fraud, voter suppression, voter registration, campaign finance, candidate qualification etc. for which we have not taken positions. However, occasionally we present news items associated with those issues.

WaPo: Fear Mongers (Scare Voters From Registering)

(Without editorial comment, see Editor’s Note)

WaPo Editorial, Fear Mongers, Virginia’s GOP tries to scare new voters away from the polls: <read>

Republicans are increasingly anxious about retaining their hold on a state that GOP presidential candidates have carried since 1968. What is surprising is their utterly baseless charge of “coordinated and widespread voter fraud . . . throughout Virginia.”

That rhetorical hand grenade, lobbed the other day by the state Republican Party chairman, Del. Jeffrey M. Frederick of Prince William County, bears little relationship to the facts. Nor do Mr. Frederick’s attempts to frighten prospective voters by warning that they could be victims of identity theft if they sign up to vote in registration drives by “a whole lot of groups out there that nobody has ever heard of.” In fact, there is not even a whiff of evidence that identity theft is taking place in Virginia under the guise of registration campaigns. Mr. Frederick’s message amounts to a classic attempt to suppress votes.

EVT ’08 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop

Last week I attended EVT ’08, 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workship, in San Jose. <program and papers>

It was pleasing to see a UConn paper on memory card testing accepted and presented. Their work has been previously covered here. Over the next few days I will cover a couple of the other papers presented.

This year the program expanded from one day to almost two days, complementing the papers with a keynote and panels including computer scientists, election officials, and federal election officials. Missing from the panels, for the most part were activists although they did include some computer scientists and election officials that could be considered activists.

Today the panels: Continue reading “EVT ’08 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop”

Times: Feinstein Bill is Bad – First, do no harm!

Update: Senator Feinstein replies to The Times with letter to the editor – that is, with excuses to counter the substance of objections to the bill <read>

Another right on editorial from the New York Times, A Bad Electronic Voting Bill <read>

Some have faith in the “‘hearings” held last week, that were packed with those who may well have written the bill. At least one paper agrees with us and VerifiedVoting.org. From the Times:

Congress has stood idly by while states have done the hard work of trying to make electronic voting more reliable. Now the Senate is taking up a dangerous bill introduced by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, and Robert Bennett, Republican of Utah, that would make things worse in the name of reform. If Congress will not pass a strong bill, it should apply the medical maxim: first, do no harm.

Voters cannot trust the totals reported by electronic voting machines; they are too prone to glitches and too easy to hack. In the last few years, concerned citizens have persuaded states to pass bills requiring electronic voting machines to use paper ballots or produce voter-verifiable paper records of every vote. More than half of the states now have such laws.

There is still a need for a federal law, so voting is reliable in every state. A good law would require that every vote in a federal election produce a voter-verifiable paper record, and it would mandate that the paper records be the official ballots. It would impose careful standards for how these paper ballots must be “audited,” to verify that the tallies on the electronic machines are correct.

The Feinstein-Bennett bill does none of these. It would permit states to verify electronic voting machines’ results using electronic records rather than paper. Verifying by electronic records — having one piece of software attest that another piece of software is honest — is not verifying at all. The bill is also vague about rules for audits, leaving considerable room for mischief. The timeline also is unacceptable. States might be able to use unreliable machines through 2014 or longer.

This bill goes out of its way to placate voting machine manufacturers and local election officials, two groups that have consistently been on the wrong side of electronic voting integrity. Reform groups like Verified Voting, which have done critical work in the states, say they were not allowed to provide input.

The bill would do some good things, including reducing the conflicts of interest that plague the process for certifying voting machines. But the damage it would do is much greater.

Ms. Feinstein introduced a better bill last year, which would have required a paper record of every vote, but she could not get enough support to pass it. If Congress cannot pass a good bill, it should let the states continue to do the hard work — and be prepared to explain to voters why it cannot muster the will to protect the integrity of American elections.

There is still time to call and e-mail our senators. Remember Dodd is on the Committee <e-mail action>