CTVotersCount.org

CT Attorney General’s opinion on Ranked Choice Voting

https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/AG/Opinions/2024/2024_1_AGO_Formal_Opinion_on_Ranked_Choice_Voting.pdf

AG William Tong concludes that for State Offices (General Assembly, Judge of Probate, Governor, LT Governor etc.) would require a Constitutional Amendment.

I would go one step further that the Constitutional requirement that such offices be counted and certified within 10 days of the election would be all but impossible to coordinate across the entire State if they required multiple hand recanvasses (recounts) , as the order of elimination can be critical and more than one can be very close.

https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/AG/Opinions/2024/2024_1_AGO_Formal_Opinion_on_Ranked_Choice_Voting.pdf

AG William Tong concludes that for State Offices (General Assembly, Judge of Probate, Governor, LT Governor etc.) would require a Constitutional Amendment.

Random Audit Drawing – First to use 10-sided die, rather than barrel

After several years of our asking, Secretary Thomas uses 10-sided die for drawing. This is much more fair, transparent, and random than drawing slips from a barrel. The Secretary gets our applause for this change.

Here are the districts chosen, from the Press Release:

…

This time there were a number of medium and large cities with recanvasses, exempt from the audit. So a higher percentage were chosen from the remaining towns. Also we believe Fairfield is exempt based on a highly publicized recanvass, so at least Suffield will be added from the alternates: <read>

Here are the districts chosen, from the Press Release:

List of polling places to be audited:

Killingly—District 5 – Board of Education Central Office Cafeteria
Norwalk – District 1-3 – Kendall School
Fairfield – District 133-5 – Fairfield Warde High School
Thompson—District 1 – Thompson Library, Louis P Faucher Comm. Ctr
East Haven – District 4 – Overbrook School
Goshen – District 1 – Camp Cochipianee
Trumbull – District 5 – Frenchtown School
Greenwich – District 10 – Glenville School
Waterbury – District 4-1 – Chase School Gym
Wallingford – District 9 – Park and Recreation Department
Norwich – Precinct 6 – AHEPA – 110 Community Room
Norwalk – District 2-1 – S. Norwalk School/Columbus School
New Fairfield – District 2 – New Fairfield Senior Center
Southington – District 4 – Kennedy School
Stamford – District 915 – Dolan Middle School
Bridgeport – Absentee Ballot Counting – Margaret Morton Government Center
Bristol – Absentee Ballot Counting – Bristol City Hall, Room G-1
Wolcott – Absentee Ballot Counting – Wolcott Town Hall
Wallingford – District 4 – Dag Hammarskjold Middle School
Torrington – District 2 – Coe Park
Waterbury – District 3-5 – Carrington School Gym
Waterbury— Absentee Ballot Counting – Waterbury City Hall, Cass Gilbert Conference Room
Putnam – District 2 – Town Hall Municipal Complex
Waterbury – District 1-1 – Kennedy High School Gym
Wallingford – District 1 – Pond Hill School
Pomfret – District 1 – Pomfret Community School
North Canaan – District 1 – Town Hall McCarthy Room
Stratford – District 1 – Lordship School
Wallingford – District 8 – Wallingford Senior Center
Darien – District 1-1 – Municipal Building
New Britain – District 7 – School Apartments
Wallingford – Absentee Ballot Counting — Town Hall, Room 315
Windsor – District 4 – Windsor Town Hall
Washington – District 1 – Town Hall, Main Hall
Bridgeport – District 132-2 – Bassick High School
New Canaan – Absentee Ballot Counting – Town Hall, Second Floor, Meeting Room
Newtown – District 3-6 — Reed Intermediate School Cafetorium
West Hartford – District 3 – West Hartford Town Hall Auditorium
East Haven – Absentee Ballot Counting – East Haven Town Hall

Alternates:

Suffield – District 1 – Suffield Middle School
Coventry – Absentee Ballot Counting- Coventry Town Hall Conference Room
Beacon Falls – District 1 – Laurel Ledge School
Guilford – District 2 – Abraham Baldwin School
Trumbull – District 6 – Middlebrook School
Westport – District 2 – Saugatuck Elementary School
Danbury – District 5 – War Memorial
Bethel- District 1 – Bethel Municipal Center
Griswold – District 1 – Griswold High School
Coventry – District 2 – Coventry High School
Bridgeport – District 134-2- Blackham School
West Hartford – District 4-2 – Charter Oak International Academy – Gym
Plainville- District 2 – Our Lady of Mercy Parish
Cornwall – District 1 – Town Hall
Manchester – AB Counting- Manchester Town Hall

Don’t be deceived: Drop Boxes are more of a solution than a problem

Since the absentee ballot cheating in Bridgeport we have heard more and more calls for banning drop boxes. That is illogical.

This evidence was only possible because of video surveilled drop boxes. Without drop boxes and surveillance ballots could have been mailed through many post office boxes, from individual mail boxes, or just added to the system in city hall, somewhere between the mail room and the municipal clerk’s office.

The alternative would be unsurveilled mail boxes, sent through the mail, to the mail room, and then through some unknown system to the clerk’s office. Even if U.S. mail boxes were surveilled (which might be illegal for those in post offices or at homes) there would be no way of identifying what was mailed by particular individuals…

You can legitimately be concerned with the greater risks of mail balloting. Yet we all should recognize that drop boxes are a part of the solution, not a part of the problem.

Since the absentee ballot cheating in Bridgeport we have heard more and more calls for banning drop boxes. That is illogical.

The culprit(s) were conclusively caught on video tape of a drop box outside of city hall, making multiple trips by the same person dropping in multiple envelopes into the same drop box. There was also much paper and statistical evidence pointing to likely a much larger number of fraudulent ballots, plenty to make it likely that the wrong winner was declared. The additonal evidence was partially related to the logging of daily drop box retrievals and reviewing the numbers of ballots unstamped, stamped, and cancelled.

The mail system is also more of a risk than drop boxes because of all the postal workers and contractors involved in collecting and delivering each piece of mail. Also because of all the city employees involved in distributing the mail from the mail room to the clerk’s office. Take Bridgeport, the city employee and campaign supporter caught using the drop boxes could have presumably put them in the system from postal boxes or somehow from the mail room and gotten away with it. Presumably the culprit(s) wanted to avoid paying for stamps.

Some have suggested that drop boxes be inside town halls and only available during business hours. That would be a solution to prevent people blowing up or stealing whole boxes (even though that has not proven to be a problem and at most would result in the theft of one day’s ballots – not the addition of many forged/fake ballots). It would also greatly inconvenience voters who want to submit ballots on the way to work, on the way home, or on the weekend. And still those drop boxes would need to be surveilled.

You can legitimately be concerned with the greater risks of mail balloting. Yet we all should recognize that drop boxes are a part of the solution, not a part of the problem.

Betting on the SEEC to get to the bottom of Bridgeport AB issues

From the CTNewsJunkie: State Commission Probes Bridgeport Primary Amid Ballot Concerns

I’m betting on the SEEC to get to the bottom of Bridgeport AB issues This might be a bit of work, but straight-forward. We have long advocated against signature checking during AB counting as that is a very sophisticated process requiring experts and a lot more than one signature given years ago or electronically at the DMV. However the value of signatures on AB applications and AB envelopes is just for these cases of suspected mass insider AB fraud…

Republicans focus on eliminating drop-boxes is exactly what not to do. The drop-boxes are not the problem, they are part of the solution…

From the CTNewsJunkie: State Commission Probes Bridgeport Primary Amid Ballot Concerns <read>

The tedious job is going through the applications and envelopes probing for those that have been filled out by the same individual(s). Not looking just at signatures but first those that have been filled out by the same pens and then all the writing to see if it was done by the same person. 1st line up all the ballot envelopes by the date and time received by the Clerk, stamped as required by law. The same to the extent possible with when applications were received and the ballots logged as sent. I would start with those received on the day when the video shows an individual submitting several. Its a big job because all those ballots may not have been submitted on the same day and only by one individual. Once similar items are identified, the experts can get to work to assess and prove they were filled out by the same individual(s) and perhaps identify them.

The great thing here is the video. It is very likely the individual can be identified and charged. It is also unlikely that a single individual was involved. That one individual can be used to identify others who were likely part of a conspiracy, leading to convictions. The bigger job is showing the likelihood that enough illegal ballots were cast to have changed the result. It is also possible that a campaign did legal things to get a large AB turn-out to win an election, even if there were some illegal votes.

Republicans focus on eliminating drop-boxes is exactly what not to do. The drop-boxes are not the problem, they are part of the solution. The video’s of the drop-boxes is what is raising suspicion. For $0.66 per ballot they could be mailed in any post-office or mailbox (1000 for $666, a drop in the bucket for a Bridgeport mayoral campaign.) ABs are risky, yet at this shows it is possible to catch and punish large scale fraud (If indeed it occurred in this case.) Drop-boxes, well secured eliminates all the risks of regular mail from the mail box, through postal employees, postal contractors, and from the mail room in town hall to the Clerk’s Office, where the risks from drop-boxes are concentrated in the Clerk’s office which is only a part of the process with regular mail.

Activists for hand-counting ballots don’t acknowledge drawbacks: More mistakes, time, and money

We have said it before, we will say it again: The best protection is machine counting in polling places on election night followed by sufficient post-election audits and recounts. <for example>

A recent article in Votebeat: Activists for hand-counting ballots don’t acknowledge drawbacks: More mistakes, time, and money

Years ago a minority of liberals wanted only hand-counts now its election-denying conservatives.

It seems that those who have never tried have opinions that are not informed by sufficient facts.

We have said it before, we will say it again: The best protection is machine counting in polling places on election night followed by sufficient post-election audits and recounts. <for example>

A recent article in Votebeat: Activists for hand-counting ballots don’t acknowledge drawbacks: More mistakes, time, and money <read>

Years ago a minority of liberals wanted only hand-counts now its election-denying conservatives. From the article:

Despite widespread coverage of the follies of hand-counting ballots, the quest to expand use of the method continues. This year alone, there have been 16 bills in 8 states that would ban the use of tabulators. It’s a really bad idea. And so, Votebeat has decided to compile a list of our favorite cold-hard evidence.

I’m sure many of you already understand the broad strokes of this: years of evidence and basic common sense shows that hand-counting is less accurate, more time consuming, and significantly more expensive than using tabulators. Still, the same arguments continue to motivate local officials and activists to attempt to upend elections systems. Let’s go through them here, point by point.

Contrary to the article, I assert that hand-counting can be quite accurate, yet it takes a lot to do that. A good plan with lots of double checking, high quality people, and high quality supervision. That is why when I led teams in the 25,000 ballot Citizen Recount of Bridgeport, I used teams of four supervised by a fifth person. Yet, even then for many of the counts we could compare to original machine counts of ballots and votes to further check everything and pursue any differences.

It seems that those who have never tried have opinions that are not informed by sufficient facts.

Editor’s Note: I have been publishing less lately. Mostly because, it seems, there is less novel to discuss.

Report: Security Analysis of the Dominion ImageCast X

Report released this week on vulnerabilities of the Dominion ImageCast, used for the vast majority of the votes in Georgia <Report>

The report was actually submitted to a court on July 1, 2021 – the court considered the information so dangerous to elections that is has largely been suppressed until now!

However in two years, Dominion has made several fixes, yet Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger is in no hurry to update Georgia machines at least until after the 2024 election.

Note: After planning for a couple of months, I launched CTVoters Count in late 2007, Little did I know that the California Top To Bottom Review would be release at that time! Many are claiming that this report may rival the impact of that California report.

Report released this week on vulnerabilities of the Dominion ImageCast, used for the vast majority of the votes in Georgia <Report>

The report was actually submitted to a court on July 1, 2021 – the court considered the information so dangerous to elections that is has largely been suppressed until now!

However in two years, Dominion has made several fixes, yet Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger is in no hurry to update Georgia machines at least until after the 2024 election.

You do not need to read the whole report. Better to start with a summary from the author, Prof. Alex Halderman. <Summary Report>

…we discovered vulnerabilities in nearly every part of the system that is exposed to potential attackers. The most critical problem we found is an arbitrary-code-execution vulnerability that can be exploited to spread malware from a county’s central election management system (EMS) to every BMD in the jurisdiction. This makes it possible to attack the BMDs at scale, over a wide area, without needing physical access to any of them…

The report was filed under seal on July 1, 2021 and remained confidential until today, but last year the Court allowed us to share it with CISA—the arm of DHS responsible for election infrastructure—through the agency’s coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) program. CISA released a security advisory in June 2022 confirming the vulnerabilities, and Dominion subsequently created updated software in response to the problems. Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger has been aware of our findings for nearly two years, but—astonishingly—he recently announced that the state will not install Dominion’s security update until after the 2024 Presidential election, giving would-be adversaries another 18 months to develop and execute attacks that exploit the known-vulnerable machines…

The right solution is Voter-Verified-Paper-Ballots and sufficient post-election audits, recounts, and sufficient ballot security. Then even with election systems subject to errors and fraud, election results can be verified and corrected.

Testimony on two small, instructive bills

Last week I submitted testimony on two bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee.) (Read my testimony here)

This is likely the last time I will testify this year. Both of the bills seem minor, yet offered and opportunity to highlight errors and inconsistencies in the law that are overlooked and not addressed.

The first about collecting envelopes from drop boxes. There is no requirement for more than one person to collect the envelopes. There is no requirement that the collection and materials be logged. Who supports that ballots and other materials should be collected and transported by only one person, at any time?

The other making minor changes to the recanvass law, including requiring a training video from the Secretary of the State. I suggested several other changes, such as notifying all candidates, sending the video link along (so that everyone involved know the rules, and that one observer should be allowed per counting team.

When submitting testimony one can specify Support, Oppose, or General Comments. When signing up to speak the choices are Support or Oppose. I often wrestle with this. I know that some look just at how many support or oppose a bill. Here there is much missing, so I choose oppose.

Last week I submitted testimony on two bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee.) (Read my testimony here)

Testimony opposed to six bills on RCV and RLAs

On Monday I testified against five bills on Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and one on Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs),

As I said,

I am not opposed to the concepts of Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs) or Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) but I am opposed to all six of these bills as they are insufficiently detailed. They also provide no guarantees of transparency..

Both of these concepts involve detailed technical and computational issues. Neither are as simple as looking at marks on ballots and simply counting votes. Officials, candidates, the public, and the SEEC need to know exactly what is expected of officials, so they can perform as expected and such that all can determine if they are doing what is required, uniformly across the state…

On Monday I testified against five bills on Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and one on Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs),

As I said,

Both of these concepts involve detailed technical and computational issues. Neither are as simple as looking at marks on ballots and simply counting votes. Officials, candidates, the public, and the SEEC need to know exactly what is expected of officials, so they can perform as expected and such that all can determine if they are doing what is required, uniformly across the state.

Just like we need paper ballots to avoid trusting voting machines and software, we need transparency to judge all the counting and calculating required for RCV and RLAs.

In both RCV and RLAs the counting rules details are critical. Especially, in close contests, where the result is dependent on the nuances in the rules.

Here is a link to my complete testimony, also including a link to extensive comments on the RLA bill <read>

Testimony on Early Voting and Absentee Voting Bills

Yesterday I submitted testimony on four bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee.) (Read my testimony here)

I was pleased to learn that Secretary of the State, Stephanie Thomas generally agreed with me and that she called out my testimony in hers!

It was clear before I spoke that the Committee understood my main points, so I asked them to read the testimony and spent my three minutes discussing additional thoughts:

Yesterday I submitted testimony on four bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee.) (Read my testimony here)

I was pleased to learn that Secretary of the State, Stephanie Thomas generally agreed with me and that she called out my testimony in hers!

It was clear before I spoke that the Committee understood my main points, so I asked them to read the testimony and spent my three minutes discussing additional thoughts:

That if Absentee Ballots are made FOIable (I thought they were), we should post them to the Internet to save citizens from filing FOI requests and officials from processing them.
That my surveys show that our voting machines are NOT failing at an increased rate, and that this might be the worst time in history to replace them. (Because newer VVSG 2.0 machines will be available soon, making anything we buy today obsoleted soon as well.
Emphasizing that if they General Assembly had listened to me in 2013 then we could have avoided many of the problems, some that still remain with Election Day Registration – and that many of the same issues can occur with Early Voting and Same Day Registration, if they ignore similar suggestions in today’s testimony

Nov 2022 Post-Election Audit Report

From the Press Release:

Watchdog Group: 24 Audits Since 2007 with Little Improvement

Independent Observation and Analysis of Connecticut’s Nov 2022 Post-Election Audit

HARTFORD: We conclude, based on citizen observations and analysis of official municipal post-election vote audit of the November 2022 election, that it failed to meet basic audit standards

After 16 years with disappointing, locally performed, hand-count audits, we recommend replacement of all local hand-count audits with sufficient and efficient electronically assisted manual audits utilizing the UConn Audit Station.

The non-partisan Connecticut Citizen Election Audit has provided volunteer observation and post-election audit reports since the adoption of optical scanners statewide in 2007. Without the hours and mileage incurred by these volunteers after every election nobody but a few election officials would know the actual quality of the audits performed, while officials would have less motivation toward credible audits.

From the Press Release:

Watchdog Group: 24 Audits Since 2007 with Little Improvement

Independent Observation and Analysis of Connecticut’s Nov 2022 Post-Election Audit

HARTFORD: We conclude, based on citizen observations and analysis of official municipal post-election vote audit of the November 2022 election, that it failed to meet basic audit standards

The audits were not conducted and reported as required by law. The Secretary of the State’s Office continues to fail to take responsibility for that failure by local officials.
Human error was still considered an acceptable explanation of differences between machine and manual counts. This defeats the purpose of the audits.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security procedures necessary for confidence that ballots were not tampered with between the election and the municipal audit counting sessions.
The short schedule for audits and dates for electronic audits not announced sufficiently in advance cause both registrars and the Citizen Audit to scramble to conduct and observe audits – they should be added to the annual election calendar months in advance.
There were at least three municipalities with new registrars, neither of which had previously performed audits. This resulted in various failures to follow procedures and in one case failure to allow transparency required by the procedures.

The public, candidates, and the Secretary of the State should expect local election officials to be able to organize audits and produce accurate, complete audit reports. The public should expect the Secretary of the State’s Office to take the lead in ensuring that the audit is scheduled in advance, complete, and publicly verifiable.

We are pleased with the following developments:

Electronic audits again included random manual verification comparing some paper ballots to Cast Vote Records produced by the audit station.
There was a significant reduction in incomplete forms.

We emphasize that this report does not question any election official’s integrity.

All reports and backup data are available online at: https://www.CTElectionAudit.org.