What’s the matter with H.R.1, Part 1

H.R.1: U.S. House Resolution 1, “For the People Act of 2021”. It is a 790 page omnibus election reform bill supported largely by Democrats. There is a companion bill in the U.S. Senate.

It is endorsed by a huge number of good government groups. I wonder how many have read it in detail and understand its ramifications? Like many such bills it has some good provisions and some not so good provisions. I have read only those portions having to do with voting and election administration, about half the bill, pp78-407 – areas where I can claim a level of expertise. I have also spent hours with a team of experts reviewing those provisions in further detail.

Be careful what you endorse! All of this bill is well-intended, yet not all workable. 

In this 1st post I will concentrate on just three concerns that make it especially tough for states like Connecticut. Overall in its voting and election administration sections one could say it seems to be intended to make all states voting more like California and Colorado which encourage voters to vote by mail, while offering extensive early (in-person) voting, along with polling place voting.

First, overall its too much too quickly. Overall we estimate doubling to quadrupling election costs in our cities and towns...

To trust our elections we need evidence, enough evidence

A recent article in Barons by respected scientists: Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust 

Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:

  • Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.

  • Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered…

One more time: Hand Marked Paper Ballots, protected and exploited

Our Longtime Editorial Opinion

We hear a lot about protecting voting equipment and paper ballots. We talk a lot about both as well. They are not equal!…

Today an article in Freedom to Tinker echoing our opinion: ESS voting machine company sends threats

Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust

Commentary in Barron’s this week Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>

Even though there is no compelling evidence the 2020 vote was rigged, U.S. elections are insufficiently equipped to counter such claims because of a flaw in American voting. The way we conduct elections does not routinely produce public evidence that outcomes are correct.

Paper Ballots Integral to Connecticut Election Security – ANNOTATED

A recent article in the Journal Inquirer is at best misleading:  Paper Ballots Integral to Connecticut Election Security <read>

Connecticut has some good election integrity practices, yet there are gaps and vulnerabilities.

Full disclosure, I am a resident of Glastonbury and have been a poll-worker here since 2013 and prior to that from 2008 in Vernon, Connecticut. I take no pleasure in writing this post. Yet, even when people you know and appreciate provide, in your opinion, inaccurate or uninformed information to the public, it is not appropriate to ignore it. There is some good information in this article, yet it is not entirely accurate.

I absolutely agree that Voter Marked Paper Ballots like we have in Connecticut are the widely recognized basis of election security and integrity. Yet they are just a start.

How Far Have We Come Since 2016?

Have not posted much since the Election, there has been plenty of true and false information to read from all sources. Time now for a little perspective.

Recall 2016, when Jill Stein and others demanded recounts and audits in MI, WI, and PA. They were largely thwarted by officials. Little was possible in PA with no paper records of votes to count. Potential Russian hacking of epollbooks across a county in NC which was never credibly investigated. Government conclusions that there was no evidence that election systems were hacked, without checking for any. Those involved in the recounts/audits, such as the were, conclude that the saw not evidence of hacking. Yet the government acknowledged there were 18 states with attempts (often mis-characterized as 21 attempts) at accessing voter lists. To many, including yours truly, Georgia represented the most questionable state with Secretary of State Kemp on the ballot for Governor, vulnerable, critical election data left on a server before the election – destroyed by officials precluding forensic analysis, voter purges, and no paper records of votes.

We have come quite a way since then in the 2020 election…

Yet we have much farther to go:..

November Election 2020 Post-Election Audit Drawing

Yesterday we observed the Post-Election Audit Drawing by the Secretary of the State Denise Merrill. 38 districts in 31 municipalities will be audited by no later than December 4, 2020.
The Secretary’s Office is offering electronic auditing to municipalities, subject to scheduling limitations. Official Press Release <read>

Making Every Voter Equal: Uniformity, especially for ‘curing’ mail-in ballots.

For years we have been complaining that Election Day Registration in Connecticut may well be a civil rights violation. Now we find that we may well have a similar problem contained in the rushed procedures for handling the volume of mail-in voting.

Warning!

No, its not the time for more electronics in Connecticut’s voting

An Op-Ed in the CT Mirror: It’s time to modernize the way Connecticut votes.

The main trust is that we should do more electronic automation of the election process in Connecticut such as electronic transmission of results and electronic pollbooks, and alluding to less pens and paper in voting.

Perhaps we can forgive the author for accepting at face value the claims of vendors and their customers that have sunk unnecessary millions into questionable technology. Sometimes it works well and saves time and effort, sometimes it doesn’t!

  • Lets start with electronic submission of results. That idea has a couple of basic flaws…

Our bottom line: Never change from Voter Marked Paper Ballots unless there is some dramatic technological breakthrough. Avoid connectivity for voting machines. Cautiously consider electronic pollbooks, with mandatory paper backup systems. Keep using our current AccuVoteOS until they really need replacing – perhaps better more economical alternatives will become available, perhaps they will comply with the new Federal standards expected soon.