Differing levels of trust in the technology are apparent in statements from TrueVoteCT, the Secretary of The State’s Office, and a Uconn Scientist:
“How do we know the card was programmed correctly in the first place?†[Dr. Michael Fischer, computer science professor at Yale University and president of True Vote Connecticut] asked. “Up until that point (when the cards reach Connecticut), they’re vulnerable, beginning with LHS Associates and all the hands they pass through at the company to the shipping clerk. It’s real convenient to say that once the cards have reached Connecticut they can’t be changed. Any time you have a private company that has the power to control the outcome of an election, it’s a big threat. The only way I would trust the memory cards would be if there was a publicly available way to verify the cards afterward.â€
Michael Kozik, managing attorney of the Elections Division of the Secretary of the State’s office, said this isn’t a large concern.
LHS performs the same service for five New England states and has been in business 20 years, Kozik said. “It’s their livelihood,†he said. “In terms of security after it leaves their facility, it is shipped to the registrar in tamper-evident packaging. If something has been done to the card, it will be obvious once it has reached the town.â€
Dr. Alec Schvartsman, professor of computer science and engineering at the University of Connecticut and head of the university’s voting technology research center, which is working closely with the Secretary of the State to safeguard elections, agrees with Fisher that there is a possible vulnerability at LHS.“
That’s a valid concern, and the issue of how well we trust the people who program the memory cards for the election is important, be they a state employee or not,†he said. “The concerns are very valid and very real.â€
I recommend reading the full Record Journal story click here.
Review some CTVotersCount recent posts on LHS and Diebold here and here.
