We have said it simply in an op-ed, we have pointed to a statement by technologists and presented lists of cyber attacks, but people still think Internet voting is a good idea and that technologist should be able to figure it out. We are not surprised that many still do not trust us. What is surprising is that some trust their intuition over the testimony of experts. For those who still have faith in the Internet we present a panel earlier this year at the Overseas Vote Foundation, UOCAVA Summit.<view> (the 1st first video is the introduction, which automatically links to the panelists in order)
The moderator Assoc. Prof. Candice Hoke, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, introduces the panel and explains why taking prescription drugs is safer than internet voting.
Joe Jarzombek, Department of Homeland Security, explains the risks of purchased software and what questions elections officials need to ask vendors.
Prof. David Jefferson, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, describes the vulnerabilities of email, fax, and web voting and why its false to assume that since I can bank online, why can’t we vote online?
Asst. Prof. J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan, describes his experiences creating a voting machine virus, testing Indian voting machines, and his recent attack on the Washington D.C. online voting system
Dr. Josh Benaloh, Microsoft Security, demonstrates that the central issues are verifiability and vulnerability, not limited to electronic voting. He outlines advanced methods for verifying elections, which leave most vulnerabilities in place.
Stay tuned for the Q&A at the end. It ended with a question from West Virginia officials incompletely answered. Let me provide my response:
- With online delivery of ballots and absentee ballot applications, the soldier in the example could vote anytime after the ballots were available as long as he had access to an online computer with a printer. This would solve the problem for the soldier without the risk and expense of online voting (which would also require an online computer).
- There is an incorrect assumption in the question. It is true that we could allow a person to accept the risk that their vote would be compromised by online voting, but that is insufficient, since everyone’s vote is at risk if some votes can be compromised.
