September 2021 Audit Drawing

This year’s drawing was different. Based on the law passed this year it finally included centrally counted absentee ballots, an item we have been requesting since 2008. We thank Secretary Merrill for initiating the change this year. Better late than never!

This year’s drawing was different. Based on the law passed this year it finally included centrally counted absentee ballots, an item we have been requesting since 2008. We thank Secretary Merrill for initiating the change this year. Better late than never!

The Arizona “Republican Audit”, no so fast

There are many reviews of the Arizona “Republican Audit” <read> and critiques, like this one <read>. I have to admit that I did not attend or watch the audit and have not read the report in detail, yet I have heard from those who have read the report and some who observed parts of it. Democrats and others are celebrating. Don’t rush to any conclusions, consider:

  • There are many distorted claims in the audit report, yet a few point to weaknesses in our election process, not just in Arizona…

There are many reviews of the Arizona “Republican Audit” <read> and critiques, like this one <read>. I have to admit that I did not attend or watch the audit and have not read the report in detail, yet I have heard from those who have read the report and some who observed parts of it. Democrats and others are celebrating. Don’t rush to any conclusions, consider:

  • There are many distorted claims in the audit report, yet a few point to weaknesses in our election process, not just in Arizona. For instance we need to be concerned with ballot security, largely from when they leave the polling place until they are destroyed 22  months later – how secure is the storage? Who can access the storage and ballots undetected? How can we be sure?
  • There are huge questions about the quality of signature comparison, is it even a reliable way to check for fraud? Does it really serve to inappropriately reject legitimate ballots?
  • Democrats and others celebrate that the audit “proved” that Biden won by a slightly larger margin than the official results.  Given the non-transparency of the audit, there is no reason to believe its results are more accurate that the official results; no reason to believe they are accurate at all. Perhaps Biden won by a little more or a little less than the official results, yet this audit provides no reliable evidence.

RLA Working Group holds its first meeting.

This spring there was a bill to initiate a Risk Limit Auditing Working Group. I testified in favor of the concept and suggested several changes to the bill. A similar bill was passed near the end of the session. Last week the group began its work. Here is a video of the meeting:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UhH4JVYcaso

Here is the bill passed by the General Assembly: https://cga.ct.gov/2021/ACT/PA/PDF/2021PA-00002-R00SB-01202SS1-PA.PDF (The RLA section is on page 156.)

The meeting lasted about an hour, primarily consisting of an introduction to RLAs by Alexander Russell from UConn.  Assisted by Ben Fuller also from UConn.  Also in the group was Brian Macdonald, a statistician from Yale.

I am only familiar with the Chair Gabe Rosenburg, Alex Russel, and one of the registrars of voters in the group. There was no published agenda or list of members. The members were listed by the Chair at the beginning of the meeting. I could be wrong, yet as far as I know none of the members of the group have any experience observing or participating in RLAs. A far cry from RIs plan which included experienced experts from around the country and took much more time and effort that seems to be possible here…

This spring there was a bill to initiate a Risk Limit Auditing Working Group. I testified in favor of the concept and suggested several changes to the bill. A similar bill was passed near the end of the session. Last week the group began its work. Here is a video of the meeting:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UhH4JVYcaso

Here is the bill passed by the General Assembly: https://cga.ct.gov/2021/ACT/PA/PDF/2021PA-00002-R00SB-01202SS1-PA.PDF (The RLA section is on page 156.)

The meeting lasted about an hour, primarily consisting of an introduction to RLAs by Alexander Russell from UConn.  Assisted by Ben Fuller also from UConn.  Also in the group was Brian Macdonald, a statistician from Yale.

I am only familiar with the Chair Gabe Rosenburg, Alex Russel, and one of the registrars of voters in the group. There was no published agenda or list of members. The members were listed by the Chair at the beginning of the meeting. I could be wrong, yet as far as I know none of the members of the group have any experience observing or participating in RLAs. A far cry from RIs plan which included experienced experts from around the country and took much more time and effort that seems to be possible for this Connecticut team (RI Study Report)

Russell’s slides were a reasonable introduction to RLAs. I found three things curious:

  • He listed three types of RLAs. One was full hand counts usually not listed and omitted from the list was the usually included Batch Comparison Audit.
  • He indicated that creating a ballot manifest requires a complete hand count of the number of ballots. That is usually not required, although very accurate it would be quite a task to hand could all the ballots in every town for a state-wide RLA.
  • His plan seems to be to rescan each ballot with the UConn Audit Station would additionally involve stickering each ballot with a QR Code. Once again usually not required, although very accurate quite a task stickering all the ballots in every town for a state-wide RLA.

With their next meeting to be scheduled for early October, they have a lot to accomplish.

Here is my testimony from last year, my concerns and suggestions still stand: (My Testimony)

Summary Recommendations:

  • Consider doing what CO, VA, RI and perhaps what every other state that has
    prototyped or implemented RLAs have done: Convene a team of election officials, and
    volunteer national experts to help plan a prototype, bring tested software (typically available
    at no cost) to the table to provide tested statistical calculations and public verifiability. And
    then report on the results and recommend methods and changes necessary in the law.
    Such a group could report to the Task Force such as the Rhode Island RLA Group reported
    to the RI Board of Elections.
  • Do not limit the prototype to 5 to 10 largely redundant municipal RLAs
  • Move the prototype(s) to the 1st half of 2022. That will give sufficient time to plan the
    prototype(s). It will provide more access to statistical experts and those with experience with
    RLAs to participate.
  •  Move the reporting deadline to Jan 2023 to provide more time to absorb the lessons of the
    prototype, to consider all the issues necessary to implement actual RLAs, and to detail the
    changes necessary in the law.

See my detailed testimony for reasoning behind these recommendations.

What’s the matter with BMDs?

Free Speech for People recently held a forum on Ballot Marking Devices (BMD)’s: An Examination of the Use and Security of Ballot Marking Devices

I recommend watching at least the 1st panel and;
If you are considering purchasing BMDs for all voters then you owe it to your jurisdiction to watch the whole forum;
If you are a voter and your jurisdiction is considering such a purchase of BMDs, you should also watch the whole thing and let your legislators and election officials know what you think.

Our Editorial:

…How much better to purchase the minimum number of BMDs today, fund research, and replace them every five years or so with improved designs.

Free Speech for People recently held a forum on Ballot Marking Devices (BMD)’s: An Examination of the Use and Security of Ballot Marking Devices <view>

There are several panels, you can see the topics and panelists <here>

I recommend watching at least the 1st panel and;
If you are considering purchasing BMDs for all voters then you owe it to your jurisdiction to watch the whole forum;
If you are a voter and your jurisdiction is considering such a purchase of BMDs, you should also watch the whole thing and let your legislators and election officials know what you think.

Our Editorial:

BMDs for all voters is a very bad idea. They will cost at least double paper ballots filled out by most voters followed by scanning. As the videos show they cannot be trusted, they will not be verified by enough voters, they will not be accurately verified by voters, and for good reason officials will not trust voters who claim the machines did not accurately record their votes.

BMDs for only a few voters with disabilities is a reasonable idea. A better idea. Many voters with disabilities are better served with voter completed paper ballots. Today’s BMDs do not serve or serve well the remaining voters with disabilities. More research and development is needed to produce better methods and equipment so that voters with disabilities can vote independently, privately, and securely.

How much better to purchase the minimum number of BMDs today, fund research, and replace them every five years or so with improved designs.

Why doesn’t anyone know what a voting machine costs?

We recently hosted a discussion on the Price of Voting Machines. Now an article in Politico gives the background story.

Politico: One Man’s Quest to Break Open the Secretive World of American Voting Machines

It began to dawn on Caulfield, slowly at first, that the amount the public didn’t know about these companies was vast. Quarterly profits, regional market share, R&D budgets, even the number of employees—often, there was simply nothing. “Basic, basic data—the basic layout of the industry—was just not out there,” Caulfield recalls. “Eventually, we realized that it didn’t exist.”…

Caulfield’s work points toward something more radical than perhaps even its author intended: a new reason to question the marriage of election administration and private industry. “What kinds of machines would we make if we declared this a public good, and had it produced in public laboratories?” Bollinger asked …

We recently hosted a discussion on the Price of Voting Machines. Now an article in Politico gives the background story.

Politico: One Man’s Quest to Break Open the Secretive World of American Voting Machines <read>

It began to dawn on Caulfield, slowly at first, that the amount the public didn’t know about these companies was vast. Quarterly profits, regional market share, R&D budgets, even the number of employees—often, there was simply nothing. “Basic, basic data—the basic layout of the industry—was just not out there,” Caulfield recalls. “Eventually, we realized that it didn’t exist.”…

But by far, Caulfield’s most significant discovery was to put a figure on the total size of the industry. He estimated the entire revenue footprint of all the companies in the United States was $350 million. That meant the entire elections industry in the world’s richest democracy was about the peak size of the R&D department of the camera company GoPro. The private voting sector wasn’t like a secretive and well-heeled defense contractor. It was more like the manufacturers of arcade machines or jukeboxes, grasping for market share with a product they could sell at best once a decade.

Mark Lindeman, a longtime voting expert who leads Verified Voting, explained the difficulty this poses for election clerks whenever they attempt to buy a new fleet of voting machines. “Election officials have no way of knowing what a fair market price could possibly be,” Lindeman said. He compared it to a recent experience he had buying his car, a Chevy Volt. At the dealership, “My wife and I got run in circles, while we waited for the dealer to give a price that was sensible,” he said. “How did we know it was sensible? Well, we went to the Consumer Reports website and got an idea of what a fair market value would be.” He added, “Election officials have no way to do that.”…

In the data, Caulfield discovered clerks who were buying the same voting machines from the same company, but seeing significantly different discounts than their peers—sometimes in the same state. In California, Mono County and Placer County both purchased orders of Dominion equipment, including the ImageCast Evolution, a voting machine priced at $7,200. But Mono received a 5 percent discount off of its bottom-line order, while Placer, 128 miles away, saw a mark-off of nearly 25 percent. Volume didn’t necessarily matter, either: Dodge County, Wis. purchased the same ES&S machines that Polk County, Fla. did. Even though Polk County bought substantially more machines and equipment, Dodge got a discount seven times larger than Polk’s—a mismatch Caulfield spotted in other states, including Texas and Virginia…

A business model in which repair and maintenance costs are the most stable source of revenue might not, to put it delicately, create optimal incentives for designing hassle-free technology. In fact, as Caulfield and Coopersmith suggested, it might not be financially wise to regularly roll out new models at all…

Caulfield’s work points toward something more radical than perhaps even its author intended: a new reason to question the marriage of election administration and private industry. “What kinds of machines would we make if we declared this a public good, and had it produced in public laboratories?” Bollinger asked when I called him this spring, just before Caulfield’s report went public. He drew an analogy to the life sciences and human biology, sectors where the U.S. government has made hundreds of billions of dollars in public research investment. “We have public funding for all kinds of development of things. But we leave this—.” Bollinger cut himself off and laughed. “We leave this essential object and thing, which is so critical, to the free market?”…

Risk Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use

A recent report, Risk Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use is about the most comprehensive and balanced introduction to Risk Limiting Audits that I have seen. Its 38 pages will take an hour or two to read in detail, and well worth it.

I am a fan of Risk Limiting Audits, yet I am concerned that they are misunderstood in several dimensions:

  • RLAs are not a panacea:…

A recent report, Risk Limiting Audits: A Guide for Global Use <read> is about the most comprehensive and balanced introduction to Risk Limiting Audits that I have seen. Its 38 pages will take an hour or two to read in detail, and well worth it.

I am a fan of Risk Limiting Audits, yet I am concerned that they are misunderstood in several dimensions:

  • RLAs are not a panacea: They are one type of audit among that others that need to be performed among several. Complementary audits are needed as a prerequisite to trusted RLAs, such as auditing the security of ballots presented for the RLA. RLAs done well, only assure that ballots were counted and tabulated correctly enough. There are other audits needed to determine the legitimacy of the election, such as the accuracy of voting lists and the integrity of the check-in lists and processes.
  • RLAs are not easy or simple: Some tout RLA benefits claiming that they are easy and simple. They are not. They are complicated and require attention to detail. They require scientific expertise to organize, execute, and understand, and for the most part trust on the part of the public in that science. They may be efficient, yet not simple to implement and understand.
  • RLAs have not been uniformly done well and backed by sufficient laws and procedures: Most state laws and procedures are insufficient and, at best, add confidence to the very few contests actually subject to such audits.
  • The larger the contest audited, the more efficient a RLA can be: Statewide contests and Congressional races can be reasonably to highly efficient. Auditing local contests, especially all local races can be expensive and time consuming, approaching the cost of recounting those contests by hand.

While optimistic, the Guide, points to all the details at a high-level, while avoiding all the statistical details. That makes it readable It does not avoid pointing out all other audits and their necessity.  It also emphasizes the need for transparency and public verifiability – often neglected in RLAs and other audits.

 

Study: The Price of Voting (Machines) – Valuable, Timely, and Facinating

Last week, I moderated a discussion featuring the authors of The Price of Voting, a study of what jurisdictions actually pay for voting machines.

The study is a great contribution to jurisdictions, including states like Connecticut, that are considering evaluating voting machines.

Five quick conclusions that I find relevant to Connecticut:

  1. If you are not getting about a 20% discount, you are paying too much…

Last week, I moderated a discussion featuring the authors of The Price of Voting, a study of what jurisdictions actually pay for voting machines.

Five quick conclusions that I find relevant to Connecticut:

  1. If you are not getting about a 20% discount, you are paying too much.
  2. Most voting machines cost about the same, so you might be able to pick the most suited if all bids are actually competitive.
  3. Connecticut should plan on about $12,000,000 for the initial purchase and about 10% of that per year for maintenance.
  4. There are also costs beyond the initial purchase and subsequent maintenance.
  5. Plus Connecticut may spend an additional $5,000,000 for initial purchase of a machines intended for those with disabilities, and perhaps $3,000,000 for initial purchases of ePollbooks.

Valuable, timely, and fascinating.

It seems that most jurisdiction pay about 20% off. What about those that paid more, far more? Did officials get too enamored of one solution? Did vendor sales staff get too close to the officials making the decisions? Were too many officials former vendor employees?

Beyond equipment maintenance the ongoing costs are: payments to vendors for expensive proprietary ballot paper based on claims that other papers will not do; ballot printing; ballot programming; and other services provided by the vendor(s) in managing the election which are outsourced from officials.

S1 Tempers “For the People Act” Impact on Connecticut

As we pointed out earlier, H1, the House version of the “For The  People Act” would have a large impact on Connecticut’s elections.

Recently there was a new Managers’ Amendment in the Senate, S1 https://www.rules. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Klobuchar%20Substitute%20S1.pdf

We have reviewed the new version and are pleased to report that there are many improvements that would ease its impact on Connecticut election officials, yet the impact remains significant.

Among the changes:

As we pointed out earlier, H1, the House version of the “For The  People Act” would have a large impact on Connecticut’s elections.

Recently there was a new Managers’ Amendment in the Senate, S1 https://www.rules. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Klobuchar%20Substitute%20S1.pdf

We have reviewed the new version and are pleased to report that there are many improvements that would ease its impact on Connecticut election officials, yet the impact remains significant.

Among the changes:

  • It now leaves a single day between early voting and election day and does not require early voting on election day. Still just a single day to print updated voting lists and load ePollbooks is very short – especially if there is a natural disaster or internet outage – just when you need those printed voter lists the most.
  • It now reduces the requirement for 20 days delay in results for accepting and curing absentee ballots to 10 days. Yet, that is not enough to save Connecticut from two elections, with two deadlines each even year, until we pass a Constitutional Amendment to conform state elections to federal election deadlines. Its complicated. Unfortunately the Elections Committee apparently did not get the urgency in my testimony.
  • It also removed the requirement for absentee balloting signature checking.
  • For smaller jurisdictions it eased some of the requirements for Election Day Registration and early voting – it seems that these will help large-area, small-voter rural areas more that Connecticut small towns.
  • It postponed many of the deadlines and provided an option for a state to apply for exemptions for a few years in some cases.
  • It also eased impossible requirements for support of those with disabilities. Some are good, but removing grants for research are disappointing.
  • It also removed grants for Risk Limiting Audits, that is not bad since it made Risk Limiting Audits mandatory.
  • Overall it included many of the changes recommended by the State Audit Working Group, which I moderate. We held sessions with staffers of four Senators on the Rules and Administration committees: Senators Klobuchar, Merkley, Feinstein, and Padilla Embarrassingly, to me, Sen Blumenthal on the Administration Committee did not respond to calls to meet with his staff.

It would remain a huge scramble for the State to meet all the deadlines and for local registrars to double to quadruple (depending on size) their work and budgets for each election.

Testimony on two more election bills: RLAs and Internet Voting

H.B.6325 was a second bill similar to an earlier on that proposed a task force for Risk limiting Audits (RLAs). My detailed testimony only changed a little bit. For the previous bill, I only testified on paper. For this bill I spoke, especially giving my answer to a legislators question of another on another bill. I’m glad I had a few days contemplate an answer: “How would you explain RLAs to forth graders?”

That is a good question: Risk Limiting Audits are intended to confirm that elections are correctly counted and totaled or to correct incorrect results…

  H.B.6325 was a second bill similar to an earlier on that proposed a task force for Risk limiting Audits (RLAs). My detailed testimony only changed a little bit. For the previous bill, I only testified on paper. For this bill I spoke, especially giving my answer to a legislators question of another on another bill. I’m glad I had a few days contemplate an answer: “How would you explain RLAs to forth graders?”

That is a good question: Risk Limiting Audits are intended to confirm that elections are correctly counted and totaled or to correct incorrect results. Over a 10-year period, Connecticut has about 20,000 election contests. For instance, if 20 of those contests were incorrectly decided due to error or fraud, rigorous Risk Limiting Audits which examine all 20,000 contests would correct at least 19 of the 20.

After several hiatus an Internet voting bill is being proposed, one of 28 sections. It also included a flawed proposal for curing absentee ballots rejected for signature issues etc. S.B.5 was patterned after systems that have failed independent security studies, spectacularly.

Testimony on two Elections Bills

 

Earlier this week we testified on two elections bills.

First a bill for a Task Force to provide a prototype and recommend state laws for Risk Limiting post-election Audits (RLAs). See our testimony and that of the inventor of RLAs, Philip Stark, and John Marion of RI. Phil and I disagree just a bit on our recommendations. I find November is just not the best time to do a prototype and then providing less that two months to make recommendations to the General Assembly is not enough time. Here is all thee testimony <read>

Then on a long bill with several election changes recommended by the Secretary of the State. We had comments on two sections: We asked that two officials empty drop boxes and sign logs listing their content. Also a reform we have been requesting for a long time – including central count absentee ballots and Election Day Registration ballots in post-election audits <testimony>

 

Earlier this week we testified on two elections bills.

First a bill for a Task Force to provide a prototype and recommend state laws for Risk Limiting post-election Audits (RLAs).  See our testimony and that of the inventor of RLAs, Philip Stark, and John Marion of RI. Phil and I disagree just a bit on our recommendations. I find November is just not the best time to do a prototype and then providing less that two months to make recommendations to the General Assembly is not enough time. Here is all thee testimony <read>

Then on a long bill with several election changes recommended by the Secretary of the State. We had comments on two sections: We asked that two officials empty drop boxes and sign logs listing their content. Also a reform we have been requesting for a long time – including central count absentee ballots and Election Day Registration ballots in post-election audits <testimony>