Reports | CTVotersCount.org

Study Shows Connecticut Municipal Websites Do Not Serve Voters

Most fail to provide information voters need to register and vote
Citizens must be better served and municipalities could save money

From the press release:

April 6, 2016: The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit released a study evaluating election information provided to voters by Connecticut’s 169 municipalities. Information was collected by volunteer evaluators just prior to the 2015 November election.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “Many towns do not provide the information most sought by voters across Connecticut, such as ‘What is on the ballot?’ or ‘Where do I vote?’. Many failed to inform citizens of online registration, which could increase registration and cut municipal expenses.”

Municipal website findings include:

Only 33% answered “What is on the ballot?”
Only 56% answered “Where do I vote?”
Only 58% provided the date of the next election.
Only 28% provided registration deadlines.
5 provided an incorrect election date.
2 provided incorrect registration information.
51% had no link to Online Registration. 28% had no link to Online Registration or to a Mail-In Registration form.
Only 17% posted results of their 2014 election.
Only 15% provided Voter ID information.

Weeks said, “The Secretary of the State’s web has much of this information, yet studies show that voters go first to their local web. Registration information is important for new voters, and all voters want the election date, ‘Who is on the ballot?’, ‘Where do I vote?’ and voter ID requirements.”

The report also includes recommendations to municipalities, the Secretary of the State, and a low-cost sample website for a whimsical town, http://NutmegtonCT.wordpress.com

Most fail to provide information voters need to register and vote
Citizens must be better served and municipalities could save money

From the press release:

Municipal website findings include:

Only 33% answered “What is on the ballot?”
Only 56% answered “Where do I vote?”
Only 58% provided the date of the next election.
Only 28% provided registration deadlines.
5 provided an incorrect election date.
2 provided incorrect registration information.
51% had no link to Online Registration. 28% had no link to Online Registration or to a Mail-In Registration form.
Only 17% posted results of their 2014 election.
Only 15% provided Voter ID information.

The report also includes recommendations to municipalities, the Secretary of the State, and a low-cost sample website for a whimsical town, http://NutmegtonCT.wordpress.com

Citizen Audit Cites Flaws in Official Election Audits

Again accuracy declined and write-in votes handled incorrectly
November 2015 Post-Election Audit Report

From the Press Release:

The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit has released its report on its observation of the November 2015 official post-election audits. The audits, required by state law, are intended to verify the accuracy of elections at the municipal level.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “After 9 years of official audits, voters should expect accuracy. Yet the audits have gone from poor to worse.”

The group’s observers found that official audit results do not inspire confidence because of continued:

Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts of votes reported to the Secretary of the State by municipal registrars of voters.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering investigations.
Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.

The group’s report noted:

28% of official audits cited “Human Error” in counting ballots and votes. Registrars of voters should be expected to take the necessary effort to count accurately.
Significant decreases in audit integrity, and accuracy.
In three towns audits detected districts where officials fed write-in ballots through scanners a second time on election night.
If the group’s recommendations from last year had been mandated and followed, all write-in ballots would have been counted accurately.

“Problems discovered counting write-ins two years in a row shows the value of the official audits. But the report also reveals the decline in official attention to the audits, demonstrating that independent citizen observation and reporting are essential to election integrity.” Weeks emphasized.

Again accuracy declined and write-in votes handled incorrectly
November 2015 Post-Election Audit Report

From the Press Release:

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “After 9 years of official audits, voters should expect accuracy. Yet the audits have gone from poor to worse.”

The group’s observers found that official audit results do not inspire confidence because of continued:

Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts of votes reported to the Secretary of the State by municipal registrars of voters.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering investigations.
Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security.

The group’s report noted:

28% of official audits cited “Human Error” in counting ballots and votes. Registrars of voters should be expected to take the necessary effort to count accurately.
Significant decreases in audit integrity, and accuracy.
In three towns audits detected districts where officials fed write-in ballots through scanners a second time on election night.
If the group’s recommendations from last year had been mandated and followed, all write-in ballots would have been counted accurately.

“Problems discovered counting write-ins two years in a row shows the value of the official audits. But the report also reveals the decline in official attention to the audits, demonstrating that independent citizen observation and reporting are essential to election integrity.” Weeks emphasized.

Brennan Center: Election Integrity: A Pro-Voter Agenda

Whenever we open a report with multiple recommendations we start from a skeptical point of view. We expect to agree with some proposals and disagree with others. A new report from the Brennan Center for Justice is the exception. We agree with every recommendation:
Election Integrity: A Pro-Voter Agenda

It starts with the right criteria, it has a great agenda, strong supporting arguments, and ends with an appropriate call to action

It starts with the right criteria it has a great agenda, strong supporting arguments, and ends with an appropriate call to action:

This history strongly suggests two overarching principles that should guide any further efforts to secure election integrity. Such efforts should have two key elements:

First, they should target abuses that actually threaten election security.

Second, they should curb fraud or impropriety without unduly discouraging or disenfranchising eligible voters.

Efforts that do not include these elements will just result in burdens to voters and little payoff.

One: Modernize Voter Registration to Improve Voter Rolls

Two: Ensure Security and Reliability of Our Voting Machines

Three: Do Not Implement Internet Voting Systems Until Security is Proven

Four: Adopt Only Common-Sense Voter Identification Proposals

Five: Increase Security of Mail-In Ballots

Six: Protect Against Insider Wrongdoing

We do not have to choose between election integrity and election access. Indeed, free and fair access is necessary for an election to have integrity. This report examined genuine risks to the security of elections, highlighting current vulnerabilities as well as those that will be faced in the future. Recommendations have been made about how to reduce each risk. We invite and urge policymakers to tackle these problems.

As examples, we particularly support its call for sufficient post-election audits and attention to detecting, preventing, and punishing insider fraud:

Require Post-Election Audits. Many machines now issue a paper record of a voter’s selection. But these records are of little security value without audits to ensure that vote tallies recorded by a particular machine match any paper records. Despite near universal expert agreement on the need for audits, some vendors have vigorously opposed these paper trails, contending that they increase costs and slow the voting process. Security experts also recommend that states pass laws for effective “risk-limiting audits.” These require examination of a large enough sample of ballots to provide statistically “strong evidence that the reported election outcome was correct — if it was.” Also, the audit process should not rely on any one individual who might be in a position to manipulate either the voting machine or the recount device. According to experts, these insider attacks are the most difficult to stop. Voting technology experts also say machines must be “software independent,” which is technically defined as when “an (undetected) change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome,” but practically speaking means that the election results can be captured independently of the machine’s own software. Auditors should be assigned randomly to further ensure the process is not being gamed. Finally, audits should be as transparent as possible. This not only is essential to garnering public confidence, but can show a defeated candidate that she lost the election in a contest that was free and fair…

It is not surprising that many instances of election fraud, both historically and in the present day, involve the actions of insiders. Recent abuses by insiders have included lawmakers lying about where they live, magistrate judges willfully registering ineligible persons, and legislators running fraudulent absentee ballot schemes. A pollworker in Ohio was famously found guilty of using her authority and training to conduct voter fraud and take certain steps to evade detection. Culprits have even included the chief election officer of Indiana. This is why election officials and workers should receive special attention because their insider status increases their opportunity to both abuse the system and avoid detection. Moreover, when organizational leaders are involved in wrongdoing, it can create a culture for fraud, encouraging others to commit misconduct.

Book Review: Ballot Battles by Edward B. Foley

I have long been a fan of the papers and other writings of Edward B. Foley of the Moritz College of Law. He writes extensively on the issues associated with close elections, how they have been decided since the founding of the United States, and how the process might be improved. Last month his book on the subject, Ballot Battles:The History of Disputed Elections in the United States was released.

To me, it was a highly fascinating read that kept my interest through every page. It should be required reading for anyone interested in Election Integrity

As I would define it, Ballot Battles is focused on one component of election integrity, i.e. How close elections have been decided in the U.S., rather than if the vote counting itself was accurate. Foley’s work is an important component of election integrity. Further along that vein we could say that Fair Elections go beyond Election Integrity to include fair voter eligibility, access to the polls, candidate access to the ballot, access to the press, and campaign financing etc.

Ballot Battles follows close elections and the process for deciding the declared winner from 1781 through 2008. While Presidential races from 1800, 1876, and 2000 are important, many other races for the U.S. Senate, U.S. House, and Governors are just as important to history and the challenges remaining today. Reforms have been attempted after major controversies, yet as Foley shows they have been insufficient, including those after 2000. We remain vulnerable. As summarized at one point in Ballot Battles:

“the 1960 presidential election must be viewed as a failure of American government to operate as a well-functioning democracy. That failure puts 1960 along-side 1876 — and, as we shall later consider, 2000 — in a disturbing series of instances in which the nation has lacked the institutional capacity to identify accurately the winner of the presidency.”

There is no easy solution. It would likely require a Constitutional Amendment. Ultimately, as Foley recommends, following successful models of instances of bodies of equal numbers of partisans, with a single respected non-partisan member. That is unlikely to always work, yet that has worked better than the system we are left with for adjudicating close Federal Elections.

Ballot Battles thoroughly covers the adjudication process and the risks to which we are exposed. Those seeking information on fraud and error in elections will not find the details here. Likewise, those seeking agreement that the Supreme Court erred or acted responsibly in 2000 will find little agreement here, yet much to ponder, much to learn about the law, and the precedents applied to resolve election challenges.

“Who Could Have Imagined” System rigged to make tests look good.

Over the years, we an others have pointed out that voting systems cannot be tested to assure performance before an election. Not the system itself before it is setup/programmed for a particular election. Not a setup and programmed system either. Not even if a system is completely secured and is somehow proven to run approved/certified software.

Here is some proof, not from a voting system – from a crime by an automaker. In this case it only puts the environment and lives in danger, rather than Democracy.

Here is some proof, not from a voting system – from a crime by an automaker. In this case it only puts the environment and lives in danger, rather than Democracy. Jeremy Epstein explains the analogy at Freedom To Tinker: <read>

In particular, computer scientists have noted that clever (that is, malicious) software in a voting machine could behave “correctly” when it detects that L&A testing is occurring, and revert to its improper behavior when L&A testing is complete. Such software could be introduced anywhere along the supply chain – by the vendor of the voting system, by someone in an elections office, or by an intruder who installs malware in voting systems without the knowledge of the vendor or elections office. It really doesn’t matter who installs it – just that the capability is possible.

It’s not all that hard to write software that detects whether a given use is for L&A or a real election. L&A testing frequently follows patterns, such as its use on dates other than the first Tuesday in November, or by patterns such as three Democratic votes, followed by two Republican votes, followed by one write-in vote, followed by closing the election. And the malicious software doesn’t need to decide a priori if a given series of votes is L&A or a real election – it can make the decision when the election is closed down, and erase any evidence of the real votes.

Such concerns have generally been dismissed in the debate about voting system security.

Read the entire post for more of the convincing details.

Of course voting machines are not autos. Unfortunately, voting machines are more vulnerable; Voting machines are not subject independent testing by trained professionals; Voting machines are not under lock and key by those who are hurt in general by pollution. Voting machines are not under lock and key by those likely to be impacted by declining value in their now illegal or poor performing vehicles. Voting machines are certified by those in the employ of the vendors, tested before election days by amateurs, responsible for their safekeeping. Some of those amateurs may actually have the motive and opportunity to fix results and cover up errors.

The solution when it comes to elections is voter verified paper ballots, sufficient ballot security, sufficient independent audits, and recounts (aka Evidence Based Elections).

Consensus Reached on Recommendations Toward the Future of Internet Voting

The U.S. Vote Foundation has released a report on the feasibility and requirements for Internet voting. This is the result of about eighteen months of work by computer scientists, security experts, and election officials. The goal was to answer definitively once and for all if Internet voting was feasible today or in the future.

The short version is the Internet voting is not ready for prime time, not ready for democracy. Yet, it is possible in the future that a system may be developed which could provide safe Internet voting. The paper lays out the requirements and testing criteria for such a system.

(Internet voting includes online voting, email voting, and fax voting).

The U.S. Vote Foundation has released a report on the feasibility and requirements for Internet voting: <press release> <report summary> <full report> This is the result of about eighteen months of work by computer scientists, security experts, and election officials. The goal was to answer definitively once and for all if Internet voting was feasible today or in the future.

(Internet voting includes online voting, email voting, and fax voting).

From the press release:

Developed by a team of the nation’s leading experts in election integrity, election administration, high-assurance systems engineering, and cryptography, the report starts from the premise that public elections in the U.S. are a matter of national security. The authors assert that Internet voting systems must be transparent and designed to run in a manner that embraces the constructs of end-to-end verifiability – a property missing from existing Internet voting systems…

As election technology evolves and more states evaluate Internet voting, caution on compromises to integrity and security is warranted, and according to the report, should be particularly avoided by the premature deployment of Internet voting. The report aims to list the security challenges that exist with Internet voting and emphasizes that research should continue as the threat landscape continues to shift. Existing proprietary systems that meet only a subset of the requirements cannot be considered secure enough for use in the U.S.

Key recommendations in the report to make Internet voting more secure and transparent include:

Any public elections conducted over the Internet must be end-to-end verifiable
End-to-End Verifiable systems must be in-person and supervised first
End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting systems must be high assurance
End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting systems must be usable and accessible to all voters
Maintain aggressive election R&D efforts

I would recommend that anyone supporting Internet voting read the Press Release, Summary, and Full Report and then recruit experts of equal credibility to do the work and make an equally compelling case refuting this report

9 things about voting machines

The National Council of State Legislatures has a released a report on voting machines: Elections Technology: Nine Things Legislators May Want to Know

It makes a strong case for the importance of technology in elections, planning, and understanding the details. We especially an additional borrowed list within the report: Ten Things to Know About Selecting a Voting System

The National Council of State Legislatures has a released a report on voting machines: Elections Technology: Nine Things Legislators May Want to Know <read>

It makes a strong case for the importance of technology in elections, planning, and understanding the details.

“What makes you lose sleep?” That’s what NCSL staff asked members of the National Association of State Election Directors back in September 2012. The answer wasn’t voter ID, or early voting, or turnout, as we expected. Instead, it was this: “Our equipment is aging, and we aren’t sure we’ll have workable equipment for our citizens to vote on beyond 2016.”

That was NCSL’s wake-up call to get busy and learn how elections and technology work together. We’ve spent much of the last two years focusing on that through the Elections Technology Project, funded by the MacArthur Foundation. One thing we learned is that virtually all election policy choices have a technology component. Just two examples: vote centers and all-mail elections. While both can be debated based on such values as their effect on voters, election officials and budgets, neither can be decided without considering technology. Vote centers rely on e-poll books, and all-mail elections depend on optical scan equipment to handle volumes of paper ballots.

It points to the importance of security in voting systems, the risks of Internet voting and pointing out the ‘pressure’ to do Internet voting. We especially an additional borrowed list within the report:

Ten Things to Know About Selecting a Voting System

While NCSL was finalizing its list of “things to know,” Merle King, executive director of the Center for Election Systems at Kennesaw State University in Georgia was working on another brand-new list with a similar goal. His list focuses on what to look for when choosing a voting system. Interestingly, there are no points of disagreement between our list and his and no overlap.

1. A voting system is the core technology that drives and integrates the system—and it is the part the voter touches.

2. Know who does what and why. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, problems will occur.

3. The true cost of ownership is the cost to purchase, operate and maintain a voting system over its life span. It is more than you think.

4. The request for proposal (RFP) is your first, last and best chance to get the system requirements right. Systems are never better than the RFPs used to define the requirements.

5. Changing a voting system is like changing tires on the bus … without stopping. A transition plan may allow the seamless migration from the old system to the new system, with minimum disruption.

6. Training and education may cost more than the purchase price of the system when you factor in voter education, poll workers, election officials, etc.

7. How long will new systems last? What shortens their lives? What needs to be done before purchase to ensure long life?

8. All modern voting systems are “multimodal,” meaning they will have to function for vote-by-mail ballots, in-person voting, online ballot return, etc. That means flexibility in the architecture is required to avoid retrofitting later.

9. Either you manage vendors or they manage you. Pick.

10. Know the “known unknowns,” such as security, accessibility, auditability, usability, voter convenience, transparency of process and testing and certification requirements.

Citizen Audit Study Shows Low-Cost Way to Improve Turnout

Review of 169 municipal election websites shows election
information lacking, yet easily remedied

From the press release:

February 25, 2015. The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit released a study evaluating election information provided to voters in all 169 municipalities across Connecticut. Information was collected by volunteer evaluators in the days just prior to the 2014 November election.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “Many towns do not provide the information most sought by voters across Connecticut, such as ‘What is on the ballot’ or ‘Where do I vote?’. Many also failed to inform citizens of online registration, which could have saved citizens time and municipal expenses.”

Municipal website findings include:

Only 28% answered, “What is on the ballot?”.

Only 56% provided the “Date of the next election”.

Only 64% answered “Where do I vote?”

Only 15% posted results for their 2013 municipal election.

Many with broken links and obviously outdated information

Many with up-to-date event calendars and front page bulletins, listing current events, and Ebola preparations, that did not list election-day.

Review of 169 municipal election websites shows election
information lacking, yet easily remedied

From the press release:

February 25, 2015. The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit released a study evaluating election information provided to voters in all 169 municipalities across Connecticut. Information was collected by volunteer evaluators in the days just prior to the 2014 November election.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “Many towns do not provide the information most sought by voters across Connecticut, such as ‘What is on the ballot’ or ‘Where do I vote?’. Many also failed to inform citizens of online registration, which could have saved citizens time and municipal expenses.”

Municipal website findings include:

Only 28% answered, “What is on the ballot?”.

Only 56% provided the “Date of the next election”.

Only 64% answered “Where do I vote?”

Only 15% posted results for their 2013 municipal election.

Many with broken links and obviously outdated information

Many with up-to-date event calendars and front page bulletins, listing current events, and Ebola preparations, that did not list election-day.

The Perfect Storm meets illegal, disasterous voting

When hurricane Sandy hit the east coast, New Jersey exposed the vote and voters to additional risks.
New report from Rutgers:

The Perfect Storm: Voting In New Jersey In The Wake of Superstorm Sandy

When hurricane Sandy hit the east coast, New Jersey exposed the vote and voters to additional risks.

New report from Rutgers: The Perfect Storm: Voting In New Jersey In The Wake of Superstorm Sandy <read>

CONCLUSION

After Superstorm Sandy, there was no structure in place to make sure that emergency voting directives were followed. There was mass confusion among county officials and voters, alike. Emergency measures such as Internet and fax voting not only violated New Jersey law, but also left votes vulnerable to on-line hacking. Internet voting should never be permitted, especially in emergencies when governmental infrastructure is already compromised.

As the May 2014 National Climate Assessment issued by the U.S. government makes all too clear New Jersey is highly likely to be impacted
negatively by more Superstorm Sandy-like disasters in the near future. This means that it is critical for New Jersey to enact and implement emergency voting procedures that comply with existing election law, and that protect every vote. As such, those emergency measures should
not include Internet and fax voting as an option, under any circumstance.

The report is a quicker read than its size would indicate. It is packed with details that expose the risks of email and fax voting.

Carter Center: Study of Norway’s Internet Voting

A recent post, brought the Carter Center’s report to our attention. Today we highlight Scott M. Fulton’s thoughtful post based on the report.

I look at a chart like this and see a gold mine of potential exploits–handoffs, air-gaps,… How long before such a system is cracked once, someplace in the world?

A recent post, brought the Carter Center’s report to our attention: Expert Study Mission Report The Carter Center Internet Voting Pilot: Norway’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections. <.pdf> The Carter Center report is highly enlightening, covering Norway’s pilot, Internet voting in general, and the challenges of credible observation of elections.

Today we highlight Scott M. Fulton’s thoughtful post based on the report: Scytl e-voting exposes the dangers of automating a democracy <read>

The truth is, any forward progress we make toward better communication with one another, toward social awareness, toward even expanded conscience of the world around us, can only be accomplished by each of us individually. Technology can empower us to do that, or to do the precise opposite. It is neither to credit nor to blame.

But the corollary to that principle is this, and it is a caution I try to repeat as often as possible: Because technology has no inherent polarization toward progress, simply applying it to a problem does not solve it…

The process of voting in Norway, according to that [Carter Center] report, was not at all dissimilar to the way B-52 bombers were told to attack Moscow in the movie Dr. Strangelove:

In order to vote, a voter had to register their mobile phone with a centralized government register (one could do so online while the voting was underway). The voter should have also received a special card… delivered through the postal service, with personalized numeric return codes. These cards provided the voter a list of four-digit numbers corresponding to each party running for election. The four-digit numbers were randomly assigned for every voter so that, for example, any two voters who wanted to cast their vote for Labour would unlikely have the same return codes associated to the Labour party.

The Carter Center charted the conceptual model of the technology involved:

Imagine your local school board election being charted by a process model this complex. Consider the degree to which people who are already disenchanted by the whole concept of contributing their 1/10,000 of a preference, will simply avoid the process altogether. Maybe this fact alone is what makes it so attractive to people in the election business.

As someone who has regularly sat next to security engineers, I look at a chart like this and see a gold mine of potential exploits–handoffs, air-gaps, SMS as the communications medium. Perhaps Scytl’s system is lock-tight today, but the very fact of its complexity, coupled with its wide-ranging impact on the public, makes it an automatic target. How long before such a system is cracked once, someplace in the world? And when that happens, how many other elections’ veracity will be called into question? How many Bush v. Gore cases will this nation withstand?

The Carter Center report goes into further details that add to the understanding of complexity of the system. Thinking about each part it is easy to speculate on the risks of attack, especially attacks by insiders – from public employees, vendor personnel from the system vendor, and various network support contractors. Add that the near impossibility of independent verification of every possible critical point; along with the impossibility of public trust in any such complex and technically sophisticated evaluation.