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Reporting Error In Westport News Story

This report from Westport deserves attention because it is actual reporting by a reporter at the audit, it makes one significant error, and it has been linked from some national voting news sites.

Story in Westport News: Audit ensures election accuracy <read>

In the last couple of weeks there have been perhaps a dozen local news stories covering the post-election audits around the state. For the most part we have not posted or commented on them here as they are usually reports prior to the audits and authored by the local Registrars covering the basic facts of the audit and the town’s selection. Yet this report from Westport deserves attention because it is actual reporting by a reporter at the audit, it makes one significant error, and it has been linked from some national voting news sites. (As some readers may not be aware, CTVotersCount is a member of the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition where I also serve as Executive Director.)

From the Westport News:

There were 12 people who had a hand in the audit, including the town’s Democratic and Republican registrars of voters, Nita Cohen and Judy Raines. Some people had the task of counting the ballots. Others had to watch them count. Two monitors hired by the state had to watch people count and also watch the people watching them count.

In fact:

Rather than state officials, the two observers present were unpaid volunteer observers from the Coalition, which itself is entirely an unpaid volunteer operation.
Checking with our observers and the Westport Registrars’ Office, we understand that accurate information was given to the reporter and that the registrar was misquoted in the story.
With perhaps 130 audit observations to date, our observers have never reported the presence of an observer from the State. The State, as far as we know, does not observe the local audits and bases all of its reports on data supplied from the registrars and investigations not open to the public:

The next step will be to forward the report to the University of Connecticut for analysis of the accuracy of the tabulators. After their analysis is written, it’s then sent back to the Secretary of State. Finally, it’s passed along to the State Elections Enforcement Commission.

Our observers also report precious few sightings of the media at audits, for that we appreciate the Westport News for sending a reporter.

Based on past observations, Westport election officials deserve applause for their consistent performance in the organization of their audits. Past observation reports show that many towns fall short in conducting audits in a way that provides data sufficient to judge the accuracy of election results.

Registrars in Westport, like those in many towns are concerned with the costs of the audit:

All of this was required by the state. Most of it was paid for by the town. The total cost came to $1,388…In an interview with the Westport News, Cohen noted just how important everyone’s role is in an audit and other aspects of elections, despite the tediousness and “labor intensive” nature of the process.

We believe the audits are a small. critical, incremental investment. The statewide cost of audits represents less than 10% of the costs of printing the paper ballots. We estimate $72,000 in Nov 2008 for local audit activities vs. more than $750,000 for ballots in that election. Both of these costs are small when compared to the total costs of conducing elections, not to mention the risk to democracy if the voters intentions are not consistently realized in the official election results. In Federal elections billions of dollars and thousands of lives are at stake. In local elections millions of dollars, eminent domain issues, education, and quality of life are at stake

Secretary Bysiewicz, Senator Dodd, and Representative Courtney Support MOVE Act

We point out that our troops are dedicated to defending democracy. When their votes can be changed or coerced because they are neither secure nor secret, it goes beyond their ballots, it threatens the election results, and the very democracy that they and their predecessors sacrifice to preserve. Here we see not a conspiracy, but a “domino theory” where prototypes not fully evaluated, lead to acceptance for the military and overseas voter, and then justified for all voting because it “seems to work, the voters like it, and election officials like it”. In other words, faith-based voting integrity.

In a press conference today, Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, Senator Chris Dodd, and Representative Joe Courtney expressed strong support for the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act <Press Release>

While we support our troops and their commitment to democracy, we do not support the MOVE Act in its current form. We object to one provision of the Act passed by the Senate, passed by the House, and signed by the President. Like the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the MOVE Act is well intended, aimed a solving a real problem, yet has unintended consequences.

The problem of military and overseas voting has several good solutions that have been used in some states and localities and have been effective. The MOVE Act incorporates many of those good solutions. Yet, it also authorizes pilots of electronic submission of actual votes electronically. As of this time there is no known proven method for the security and secrecy of electronic submission of ballots, no proven method of auding such votes, and the bill contains no mandate for the evaluation of pilots for security and secrecy.

We have written about this issue several times, followed the technical issues with other advocates, security experts, and computer scientists. Most disappointing is that so many members of Congress supported the bill so quickly, without technical scrutiny. Most surprising is Secretary Bysiewicz support after her office spent so much time this spring working to remove electronic voting provisions from a military voting bill before the Connecticut Legislature (The bill was eventually changed to eliminate the electronic voting, but never considered by either house).

References:

Our coverage of the MOVE Act and reaction of advocates in MA to a similar bill.

Technologists Statement on Internet Voting

The Internet and Voting: Worth Doing Right, by Barbara Simons

Secretary Bysiewicz endorsement of a bill that specifically prohibited electronic submission of ballots

Secretary Bysiewicz testimony against the electronic voting provisons of the bill in CT this year

The latest from Verified Voting on the MOVE Act: <Newsletter>

Modified language from the MOVE Act was included in the National Defense Authorization Act (HR 2647, now Public Law No: 111-84) signed by President Obama on October 28. The new law includes, as Section 589, a provision for Technology Pilot Projects, which could include the electronic submission of voted ballots. The new language in the engrossed bill does call on the National Institute of Standards and Technology to work together with the Election Assistance Commission to develop “best practices or standards” within 180 days of the bill’s signing. While the law does not establish any requirement to adhere to such standards or best practices, nor is there a process for determining such adherence in proposed projects. EAC and NIST have announced their intention to produce best practices for Military and Overseas voters by the end of the calendar year. Verified Voting advocates a more thorough security review of any proposed use of the internet for the transmission of voted ballots.

Bills In CT, MD, WA, Risk Security Despite DoD Concerns

Documented threats to the internet and military networks

Update: 12/22/2009 Sec. Bysiewwicz Ob-Ed <read>

Some may say that these changes should have been made a long time ago. I agree. This is a change I and many of my fellow Secretaries of State have sought at the federal level for years, and is similar to a bill I proposed in the Connecticut General Assembly this past legislative session.

I also recognize, however, that we must step gingerly when allowing the electronic transfer of ballot materials to any voters, so as not to compromise the integrity and security of our elections. Still, the MOVE Act is a giant step forward that will guarantee that our brave Military men and women serving their country overseas will have the opportunity to use the right they are putting their lives on the line to defend. I look forward to implementing it in 2010.

Courant: Ballot Access Should Require Two People Of Opposing Parties

“The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

We believe that ballots cannot be trusted unless there is a strong chain of custody, one critical part of that is that all access should be by at least two people and of opposing parties, and opposing interests in primaries. The Courant is right on in their editorial covering the Haddam situation <read>

when town offices were closed for Veterans Day, head election moderator Marge DeBold, a Democrat, found a clerical error in the absentee vote count that added an additional vote to Ms. Houlton’s total. That extra vote would throw the results into a tie, which would require a runoff election. The following day, Democratic Registrar Pat Hess authorized Ms. DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and amend the recount.

But there were no Republicans present. That was wrong…

Mr. Harris, the initial winner of the recount, summed it up well: “The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

The Courant’s earlier coverage and our comments <read> Coaliton reports documenting breaches in the chain of custody <read> The issue goes beyond a documented instance of two people from the same party accessing the ballots. The issue includes the risks of single individuals having access to a single key needed to access the ballots – leaving them vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Yes New York, There Is No Virus In NY-23

A couple of days ago a news story about a virus in the election equipment used in New York’s 23rd Congressional District Special Eection. We should not rely on the assessment of frustrated election officials to understand the risks of technology or the assessment of the cause of problems with voting and voting technology. Bo Lopari sets the record straight in his blog. But it is not all good news.

Update: A Richard Hayes Phillips: Impossible Numbers Certified in NY-23 <read>

Richard is the author of Witness To A Crime proving several beyond doubt several forms of skulduggery in Ohio-2004. We hosted Richard for a book signing in Connecticut last year. I had forgotten that he is a resident of Canton, NY, within NY-23. His report may not prove fraud or that the incorrect candidate was certified, yet it certainly demonstrates incompetence and holes in the computer-human system.

For six election districts in St. Lawrence County (the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 7th districts in Canton, the 14th district in Massena, and the 2nd district in Oswegatchie) negative numbers appear in the column for “blank” ballots, known in other states as “undervotes.” …

In Canton’s 7th district, the certified results show a total of 148 ballots cast. The results of those votes were counted as 88 votes for Owens, 11 votes for Scozzafava, and 80 votes for Hoffman. The problem is that these numbers add up to 179 votes counted for the candidates, and there were only 148 ballots cast; St. Lawrence County certified these numbers to the state as accurate with the number of ‘blank’ ballots reported as -31.

Update: A second opinion from Howard Stanislevic <read>

An article quoting an election official who claimed there was a “virus” in the voting system has been criticized for the misuse of this term. While technically, the critics may be correct — a bug discovered in the software is not necessarily a virus — critics also seem unaware of the history of the machines in question.

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Original Post:

A couple of days ago a news story about a virus in the election equipment used in New York’s 23rd Congressional District Special Election. We should not rely on the assessment of frustrated election officials to understand the risks of technology or the assessment of the cause of problems with voting and voting technology. Bo Lopari sets the record straight in his blog <read>

How do I know? Well, in the first place, the Dominion ImageCast scanners in question run the Linux operating system, which is nearly immune to viruses due to its inherent ability to lock out programs that lack explicit permission to run, unlike the highly vulnerable Windows operating system. Second, the State Board of Elections gave an account of the problem at their public meeting on November 10, and which I confirmed in a phone conversation with staff earlier this week. Here’s what really happened:

But it is not all good news:

Let’s be clear. While no votes were lost due to the ability to independently count the paper ballots, a problem did occur that affected certain machines around the state. The issue was a bug in the Dominion source code that caused the machine to hang while creating ballot images for certain vote combinations in multiple candidate elections (the ImageCast, like the other scanner used in New York, the ES&S DS200, creates digital images of each ballot which can be reviewed after the election). So if, for example, a “vote for three candidates out of five” race was voted in a certain way, the scanner would hang. This is one reason why the defect affected some, but not all machines with ballots containing this type of race, because only certain combinations of votes caused the memory problem. But here’s the thing – the problem was discovered before the election.

Chain-Of-Custody Education In Haddam

A tight Board of Education race in Haddam provides an example four understanding chain-of-custody and recounts vs. recanvasses.
* The chain-of-custody is important and its enforcement is important
* Every vote is important, counting every vote accurately, transparently, and credibly is critical to democracy
* Recounts and recount laws are important

A tight Board of Education race in Haddam provides an example four understanding chain-of-custody and recounts vs. recanvasses. Courant story: Dispute Over Recount In Haddam Board Of Education Race <read>

Republicans said they plan to call the secretary of the state’s office today to ask officials to investigate confusion about the vote for a seat on the board of eduction. Democrats, who say there is no confusion, called a meeting Tuesday evening to sort out the issue. A dozen Democrats and Republicans met, but left without reaching a consensus.

Democrats say the following occurred:

The unofficial vote count after the Nov. 3 election showed Republican Chester Harris beating Democratic incumbent Sabrina Houlton by one vote. Because of the slim margin, the town held a recount Nov. 10, which showed the same result.

The next day, when town offices were closed for Veterans Day, election head moderator Marge DeBold, a former Democratic first selectman, was reviewing the election information and found a clerical error. She noticed that next to Houlton’s name on the absentee vote count were four tally marks and the number “3.” DeBold said she realized that someone had miscounted the marks as three instead of four.

The next day, DeBold told Democratic Registrar Pat Hess what she had found. Hess authorized DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and to amend the recount.

Hess said Tuesday that she knew representatives from both parties needed to be present during all vote-counting procedures, but the GOP registrar could not attend that morning and they wanted to get the new tallies quickly to file the proper paperwork with the secretary of the state’s office. She said there was no intentional wrongdoing.

The additional vote for Houlton meant the race was a tie. State law mandates that the town must hold a runoff election between tied candidates. The election will be Tuesday.

Earlier Tuesday, GOP Town Chairman Kenneth Gronbach alleged that the three Democrats — DeBold, Hess and Huffstetler — had tampered with votes.

“This isn’t Afghanistan. This is the United States of America,” Gronbach said. “It’s a conspiracy. The vote was changed; sealed documents were opened and altered.”

By Tuesday evening, he said he wasn’t accusing anyone of fraud, but would file a complaint with the State Elections Enforcement Commission and would file an injunction to prevent Tuesday’s election. He said that the last legal step in the process was the initial recount, and that its result is the one that should count.

Houlton argued that the mistake needed to be fixed, adding, “If that’s what the voters really want, then the runoff will speak to that.”

Harris said the issue “is that the process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

We also viewed a news report on WFSB-TV last night covering a meeting of Haddam officials and the actual hashmark sheet involved.

What can we learn from this?

The chain-of-custody is important and its enforcement is important
Every vote is important, counting every vote accurately, transparently, and credibly is critical to democracy
Recounts and recount laws are important

The chain-of-custody is important and its enforcement is important

The credibility of the election process is dependent on a strong chain-of-custody to protect the ballots and associated election materials so that recanvasses, recounts, and post-election audits will be accurate and trusted. In Haddam we have a classic situation where the evidence of the election has been called into question. There are two additional problems here. First, even if there was no tampering with votes or hashmark sheets candidates and the public cannot trust the process, lose faith in their government, and have to settle for a new election.

A new election is a fine solution for an actual election tie, and would be a necessary remedy for a compromised election. But it is not as good for a compromised election as performing the original election as intended. A new election is costly to candidates and taxpayers. Also it brings out a different group of voters and may or may not produce the same result as ab original election with integrity would have.

Unfortunately, in Connecticut, election laws, regulations, procedures and common sense are often not followed. The Coaltion Post-Election Audit Reports have documented many lapses in procedures, including the chain-of-custody. It is quite possible that in this case there was a violation of state law subject to enforcement, as the registrar points out “Hess said Tuesday that she knew representatives from both parties needed to be present during all vote-counting procedures”. In our experience most violations of the chain-of-custody are not discovered, not enforced, and not enforceable. Part of the problem is that, in Connecticut, only laws are enforceable, leaving regulations and procedures unenforceable – our ballots are only protected by law for fouteen days after the election, such that violations of procedures and common sense observed during the post-election audits are not enforceable.

The actual problem goes much deeper than this incident and the law. Common sense would imply that access to ballots should require at a minimum: access by two individuals with opposing interests, logging of all access, and systems to assure that violations of such access were prevented. In many states counties run elections and hold ballots in vaults, covered by 24×7 survelence and guards etc. In Connecticut, in most towns (according to Coalition surveys) either registrar has access to a key to ballot storage; in many towns any employee in the registrars’ office has such access; in others additional town employees including school janitors. The seals used for ballots in Connecticut can be compromised in a matter of minutes or seconds – they are useful but do not protect the ballots sufficiently when they can be accessed by individuals for extended periods.

Two years ago, I asked a security expert if I was being too hard in expecting Connecticut to follow stronger chain-of-custody procedures. He pointed out that officials should not want such open access as it would open them to potential questions of tampering – that they would be unable to refute. Case in point Haddam, even though many will trust the word of the officials, there will always be a lingering doubt.

Every vote is important, counting every vote accurately, transparently, and credibly is critical to democracy.

Time to reiterate the importance of every vote, the accuracy of every registration, the work to make sure every voter has a full opportunity within the law to vote, counting every absentee vote, every qualified provisional ballot, military and overseas ballot.

Also making sure that every effort is expended to properly reject ballots and unqualified voters and votes. To take reasonable steps to prevent fraud, such as avoiding internet voting, and penalizing fraud.

To voters: Make sure you vote. Carefully consider the risks of absentee voting or mail-in voting before you subject your vote to the added risk of fraud or error in such votes.

Recounts and recount laws are important.

I did not attend and can find no specific news reports of the Haddam ‘recount’, but unless it was unusual it likely conformed to the Connecticut close vote ‘recanvass’ law and procedures. As we have pointed out in the past there is a huge difference between a recount as conducted in some other states and the ‘recanvass’ conducted in Connecticut. <Our Comparison w/Minnesota>

Recanvasses may sufice to uncover significant transcription and arithmetic errors and a poorly tuned scanner. But when it comes down to one or two ballots in a district or perhaps a handfull in a town recanvass procedures may not be accurate enough. Here we have a one or zero ballot margin. In the Haddam race, just like a recent recanvass we attended that was judged a tie, one ballot can make a difference. One hashmark made under the wrong candidate. One vote misspoken or misunderstood. One apparent undervote that was actually a vote for a candidate. One ballot with identifying markings, but missed – such ballots should not be counted in Connecticut. One overvote not detected when counting ballots in multi-vote races. Every part of the process should be verified by two people to avoid simple errors like an incorrect count of hasmarks, transcription, or addition errors. The only reliable way we know is for mutiple officials to check every ballot on both sides, with candididate representatives watching; multiple officials checking every aspect including tallying. It is not a matter of official integrity or misconduct, it is to count with a level of precision equal to the closeness of the election.

Retail Fraud – A Stitch In Time Could Save Democracy

So, in Hartford, it seems that nothing is wrong with a little tax evasion a “lot of people” do it. It seems that voting fraud is regarded as almost in that same category except we don’t really know if a “lot of people” and officials do it or not. Maybe it is treated casually elsewhere in Connecticut and around the country. This is one of the two reasonse we are against expanded mail-in voting which includes no-excuse absentee voting – at a minimum it will mean more retail fraud and more voters unknowingly disenfranchised.

Update: Looks like the changes will be difficult to confirm and maybe there is nothing behind them <read>

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There is no agreement on the demarcation between retail vote fraud and wholesale vote fraud. In general retail fraud represents fraud that involves individual voters and individual votes, while wholesale fraud would represent fraud an a large scale by insiders or hackers. Everyone would agree that forging a handful of ballots would be retail fraud and that misprogramming voting machines would be wholesale fraud. The middle ground comes when in a statewide election an official in a single town substitutes or votes a few dozen ballots, or in a Presidential election one hacker changes the results on a single polling place machine.

Sometimes the existence of retail fraud is denied, ignored, or almost dismissed. We tend to think it dosen’t happen, accept it as part of the system, or believe that it does not matter. Two stories in Connecticut this week seem to conform to these views:

New Haven Register: Alderman alleges voter fraud <read>

In a complaint filed this week with the state Elections Enforcement Commission, Alderman Greg Morehead, D-22 accuses write-in opponent Lisa Hopkins of applying for and filling out absentee ballots against the wishes of voters, allegations Hopkins says are not true.

Hopkins lost to Morehead by eight votes in a hotly contested Democratic primary in September. She returned in the general election as a write-in candidate, securing 194 votes to Morehead’s 237. More than half of Hopkins’ votes, 107, came from absentee ballots. Morehead received 24 absentee ballot votes, records show.

In his complaint, Morehead alleges Hopkins told an elderly voter to hand Hopkins a signed absentee ballot before selecting a candidate. Morehead claims Hopkins told the voter she would complete the form.

In a close race with a margin of eight votes two alleged cases of fraud. If true, that could cut the margin to four. And this would be just the fraud discovered by this one candidate – if true, what are the odds there was more fraud?

To vote by absentee ballot, voters must show they are unable to make it to the polls on Election Day. “We don’t have ‘no excuse’ absentee ballot voting,” said Av Harris, spokesman for the Office of the Secretary of the State.

To be eligible, voters must show they will be out of state on Election Day, have an illness or physical disability that prevents them from getting to a polling place, or have a religious reason why they cannot vote on Election Day.

Voters must swear in an affidavit that they personally filled out the ballot. There may be rare circumstances in which a voter’s disability requires that someone fill out their ballot for them, but “it has to be a pretty compelling reason,” Harris said.

Absentee ballot fraud is not common, he said.

We agree that you need to have an excuse or lie to vote absentee ballot in Connecticut. We are not so sure that absentee ballot fraud is uncommon – maybe, maybe not – here is a recent story on three instances of absentee very retail voting fraud <read> And another from a while back <read page 1>

Here is another story this week showing how little we regard the seriousness of absentee ballot fraud. The Hartford Courant: Tax Troubles At City Hall <read>

Four years ago, Hartford Democratic operative Prenzina Holloway was fined $10,000 for absentee ballot fraud. But state officials allowed her to pay only $2,000 of the fine because she demonstrated financial hardship.

Yet a year and a half later, the apparently financially strapped Ms. Holloway bought a used Hummer for $31,727, state motor vehicle records show. According to city records, she never paid city taxes on the Hummer. She owes Hartford $3,500.

But she did draw a city paycheck recently for a one-week stint in the registrar of voters’ office — a temporary job she shouldn’t have been given because of her unsavory ballot-fraud past.

And the delinquent taxes? That seems to present no problem to Ms. Holloway’s daughter, rJo Winch, who just happens to be Democratic majority leader of the Hartford city council. “A lot of people in city hall owe the city money,” sniffed Ms. Winch.

How To NOT Instill Confidence In Election Integrity

one of the voting machines had broken down Tuesday evening, forcing poll workers to switch to a separate machine to count the remaining ballots. Some of the ballots had been photocopied because election officials believed they had run out of the official ballots. It was later revealed that officials had more than 1,000 unused ballots locked in the registrar of voters’ office.

Waterbury Republican: Ex-first selectman has lawyer probe Middlebury voting <read>

MIDDLEBURY — Former First Selectman Edward B. St. John has hired an attorney to investigate ballot irregularities in the Nov. 3 election.

Dennis M. Buckley, a Waterbury-based attorney, is reviewing documents filed by poll workers and election officials for St. John.

St. John, who ran as a write-in candidate, raised concerns immediately following the election after he learned one of the voting machines had broken down Tuesday evening, forcing poll workers to switch to a separate machine to count the remaining ballots. Some of the ballots had been photocopied because election officials believed they had run out of the official ballots. It was later revealed that officials had more than 1,000 unused ballots locked in the registrar of voters’ office.

“He wants to know what they should have done and what they did do,” Buckley said Wednesday. “Obviously, the only thing Mr. St. John has been able to do up until this point is listen to hearsay.”

Buckley said he plans to contact the Secretary of the State’s Office about the photocopied ballots, which were single-sided and did not have instructions on how to fill in the ballots for write-in candidates, something St. John has said could have hurt his candidacy.

MA: Talk – A Poor Substitute For Integrity?

Don’t Count Your Ballots Up in Massachusetts. That Sort Of Thing Just Isn’t Done.

Jammed voting machine misses six ballots in close race. We say “Maybe, maybe not”.

Don’t Count Your Ballots Up in Massachusetts. That Sort Of Thing Just Isn’t Done.

Story in the Eagle-Tribune about Methuen, MA: Jammed voting machine misses six ballots in close race <read> We say “Maybe, maybe not”.

Here is the summary from the City Clerk Christine Touma-Conway:

“The integrity of the process is being proven by the fact that we’ve discovered this and are talking about it,” Touma-Conway said. “That’s why we have all these checks and double checks and triple checks.”

What exactly did they discover?

the number of voters checked in and out was six higher than the number of ballots counted by the AccuVote voting machine. That leads Touma-Conway to believe six votes weren’t counted.

That could be true, however, its also possible that 6 voters walked out without voting. Or perhaps an error was made in the check-in process. Did the machine jam and lose votes? We use the same machines in Connecticut and have instructions for election officials to handle jams such that votes are counted once and only once – it would be quite an exception if the same human error were made six times in the same polling place — yet it could happen. Here is what is reported:

The machine read 762 ballots, but 768 voters checked in and out at Precinct 7. The box containing the ballots is sealed, so officials don’t know for certain whether there are in fact 768 ballots in there, but Touma-Conway expects there is.

Voting machines regularly become jammed temporarily, resulting in one or two votes not being counted, but that usually doesn’t affect an election because the votes usually aren’t as close as the result between Kazanjian and Henrick. Plus, it’s rare for as many as six votes to go uncounted, Touma-Conway said.

Hum, perhaps they lose votes from jamming. MA has more experience with these machines, yet how do they know? Massachusetts does not have a post-election audit. But what does it matter if we lose six votes in an election? Should every voters vote really count?

This adds a new twist to the School Committee election saga, where incumbent Kenneth Henrick placed just five votes ahead of his friend and fellow incumbent George Kazanjian.

We often criticize Connecticut for having an inadequate recanvass law that falls short of a true recount, but at least we do an automatic recanvass when the election is close. Despite our criticism of the weaknesses and inefficiencies in our post-election audit law, we do have one. When questions arise situations similar to this one, the Secretary of the State’s office often refers the situations to the UConn VoTeR Center for research and actual factual answers.

Post-Election Audit Random Drawing

Today, three members of CTVotersCount drew 10% (60 districts) of 600 districts in the November election for the post-election audits.
Many towns ask why the are chosen so often?

Today, three members of CTVotersCount drew 10% (60 districts) of 600 districts in the November election for the post-election audits. There were thirty-five towns comprising well over 100 districts that were therefor exempted from the audit. We chose the 60 from the remaining districts.

Many towns ask why the are chosen so often? In Connecticut we audit 10% of the districts after each election and primary — a town with around 10 districts should expect to be chosen frequently to participate in the audit — if a town has 20+ districts it should expect to have a district chosen almost every time and ususally more than one of its districts. In other states such as, Minnesota, each county must audit some of its districts each time. Some of those counties are smaller than many Connecticut towns.

Here is the Secretary of the State’s Press Release with the list of towns and a photo from the drawing: <Press Release>

“We had a very smooth Municipal Election Day last Tuesday, but as I have said many times, we in Connecticut don’t just take the machines’ word for it — we audit the results of every election,” said Secretary Bysiewicz. “We want to make sure that as voters come to the polls and cast ballots in Connecticut they have continued confidence that their votes were recorded accurately. hat is why the independent audits are so vital”…

“Auditing election results isn’t just a good idea, it’s absolutely essential in order to guarantee the integrity of our elections,” said Secretary Bysiewicz.

Reminders from CTVotersCount, Secretary Bysiewicz and the Waterbury Republican

Close races prove votes matter.
Voters matter
Election Integrity Matters
Recanvasses are not what we would call recounts.

Article in the Waterbury Republican <read>

Close races prove votes matter

In New Hartford, just one vote separated Phyllis Webb and Bruce Gresczyk for a seat on the Board of Selectmen. With just 16 votes separating three selectman candidates in Oxford, a recount is expected to determine which two will serve the next two years. Democrat Elizabeth T. Falzone and Republican William L. Fredericks battled to a tie for a Region 16 Board of Education seat…

if just two Webb supporters in New Hartford had hopped into their cars and driven to the polls rather than staying home, she’d have a seat waiting for her on the Board of Selectmen, pending a recount…

Ms. Bysiewicz reported recounts will be necessary in at least 35 communities, or about 20 percent of the towns and cities in Connecticut.

Reminders from CTVotersCount:

Votes matter. Voters Matter
Election Integrity Matters – just one machine programming error or manual transcription error can cause differences of hundreds or thousands of votes.
Connecticut has “Close Vote Recanvasses” – these are not really recounts as they are usually understood – they are machine recanvasses performed by reading most of the votes back through machines with memory cards programmed by those same out of state contractors, LHS Associates.