Is A Democracy Index In Our Future?

The American Democracy Index Act (H.R.4033) seeks to improve election administration throughout the United States by ranking states on election performance and comparing best and worst practices.

Representative Steve Isreal announces bill to create a state by state Democracy Index <read>

The American Democracy Index Act (H.R.4033) seeks to improve election administration throughout the United States by ranking states on election performance and comparing best and worst practices…

The American Democracy Index Act requires that the Election Assistance Commission contract with an entity to collect voter data and publish the American Democracy Index for the federal election cycle of 2012. The American Democracy Index (ADI) will present voter and election administration data on a state-by-state basis in a manner designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of election administration practices. States will be ranked according to criteria established by an independent advisory board of election administration experts in consultation with the Election Assistance Commission. The legislation also establishes a pilot program for the 2010 federal election cycle to create an index that ranks localities within five states to measure the effectiveness of their election administration.

The concept is based on a proposal that Yale Law School Professor Heather Gerken wrote about in her book, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is Failing and How to Fix It. She argues that a “Democracy Index” – a public ranking of election performances around the country – would encourage states to take real steps to make voting easier.

This sounds like a good idea, yet it depends – it depends on what data is collected and who gets to charcterize it.  Our concern would be that the data might be too superficial to judge the quality of actual compliance with a standard.

Here is a like  to Heather K. Gerken’s book, we need to add it to our reading list. <link>

A Day As Absentee Ballot Moderator

This election day was spent as moderator for central counting of absentee ballots, once again, in Vernon, CT. I tend to learn by reading and doing. In 2008, I became a Certified Moderator and served my 1st time as an election official. As I said at the time:

I hear and I forget.
I see and I remember.
I do and I understand. – Confucius

(Draft subject to improvement)

This election day was spent as moderator for central counting of absentee ballots, once again, in Vernon, CT.  In Connecticut absentee ballots can be delivered to the district (precinct) and counted there or counted centrally for each town.  Most towns with more than a very few polling places count them centrally, with a separate counting team and an Absentee Ballot Moderator.

I tend to learn by reading and doing.  In 2008, I became a Certified Moderator and served my 1st time as an election official.  As I said at the time:

I hear and I forget.
I see and I remember.
I do and I understand. – Confucius

One of my goals this year was to obtain more hands-on experience in the election process by serving as an election official. In August I attended moderator training. I became a certified moderator which, in no way qualified me to actually be a moderator (I would describe a moderator as the czar of a polling place). Reading the manual and taking the training would never be enough for me to grasp such a job, without perhaps several years experience as a poll worker. Thanks to Judi Beaudreau, Moderator Trainer, and Registrar of Voters, Vernon, CT, I worked one of the polls in Vernon this year. I spent about half my time as a ballot clerk and about half as machine tender.

And as I concluded last year:

PS: Tired, but interested in election results, I went to my local party headquarters to follow the election results. One race had a margin of 300 votes and everyone wanted to wait for 2800 absentee ballots to be counted to be sure of the result. The absentee results were predicted to be available at the earliest 3:00am. Few present knew we scanned absentee ballots centrally, they assumed officials were counting 2800 ballots by hand. I wondered: “How can it take that long? Especially when counting and sorting starts at noon? Even if its done by hand, how can it possibly take that long?” I heard some possible issues that I had not considered, but nothing that would convince me it should take that long unless its a very very small counting team. An area for me to study and observe further. Perhaps in the next election some town in Connecticut would let me participate as an official in their central count absentee operation on election day. I know I would learn something.

Be careful what you ask for.  Emailing Judi a couple of reminders that I was interested in working on absentee ballots, so that I could really understand the process, she sent back the “Procedure Manual For Counting Absentee Ballots” and said they were considering hiring me as absentee ballot moderator.  The immediate thought: “Decline, I’m not ready. This time I want to be a counter and maybe next time be a moderator”, but then “I can probably do it, who knows if I would get another chance.  It is not the 18 hour day of a polling place moderator, we start later.  Its not the same as a polling place with real time decisions as voters arrive”.  And not knowing the rates in Vernon, I might make a small fortune.

In the 10 days before the election I read the manual completely, twice.  Judi says it needs revisions and updating, it was written in 2007 just as Connecticut was changing from levers to optical scanners.  It is quite detailed, yet it gives little guidance on the actual hand counting of ballots – but then I realize that almost all absentee ballots are counted by scanner so we are likely to only have a very few ballots to count by hand.

I arrive 15 minutes early.  I note that the office is staffed by young officials, presumably some experienced graduates of the special program allowing 16 and 17 year old’s participate as election officials – Vernon takes full advantage of the program.  Two phone lines are ringing constantly.  The officials answer the calls and perhaps 1/3rd of time consult the registrars.  I recall the many calls I saw last year, from the moderator of my polling place to headquarters.  Many of the calls are checking voter registration, some of which are required by our election system.  It is busy, yet calm.

At 1:00 pm,  Judi swears me in, goes over the procedures and the paper work, and the pre-printed forms with me.  Instead of a single central count optical scanner and memory card, they use one memory card per district starting and closing two optical scanners a total of six times, once for each district.  I will be very familiar with the opening and closing procedures by the end of today.  Judi explains the advantages of this scheme being lower cost for memory card programming, keeping the ballots per district segregated, and that an incorrectly issued ballot would not be  incorrectly counted.  (An incorrectly issued ballot occurs when a ballot for the wrong district is sent to the voter – a separate memory card would detect it, but a combined one would count it for the wrong district, including votes for candidates the voter was not eligible to vote for.  Yet, in Vernon, in this election, there is one ballot for all six districts so the clerk could not mix them up, on the other hand, the machine could not count them by district either.  So the towns using a central count, single card arrangement must have different ballots even if they all have the same contests across the board?)  We will be counting in the town council chambers on the third floor.

The Registrars, Judi and Patricia Noblet, officially deliver the ballots to me, which I count and accept for each of the six districts.  282 ballots in double envelops – easy to count and separate, they do not stick together.  But if there were a much larger number I would need some counters to help.

I distribute the ballots, pre-printed forms, ballot envelopes, and memory cards (sealed in see-through pouches) in six locations around the town council tables.

At 2:15 pm the four election officials arrive who will be the counters, process the envelopes and ballots.  I swear them in.  Judi does the training and provides a one-page list of steps for the processing and counting.  I suggest and decide that we will do the process by performing the steps that logically go together for all districts and then the next set of steps for all districts etc. so that we can concentrate on one part of the process at a time. Judi says to call her when we are ready to start scanning.

The old hand-count system counted absentee ballots in batches for each district as they come in from the post office  – the manual still expects this process.  We will process the envelopes, review each ballot to determine if it should be hand-counted, hand-count those that need to be, but leave final counts open and report everything at the end as one batch.  Because we are using separate memory cards, we won’t scan any ballots until we are sure we have almost all the absentee ballots.  If any come in after we scan a district, then they would have to be manually counted.

Judi explains that we should hand-count all ballots where we think there is any question that the machine would read it correctly or incorrectly.   They have chosen to not override on the scanner to count ballots with overvotes, so we should hand count any ballots with overvotes.  If the machine kicks out any overvotes that we mis then those would be hand counted.

If there are any questions about votes or envelopes etc., the counters bring it to my attention.  As moderator I make the “final” decision and write it on the envolope or ballot.  (I realize that accepting an envelope is final, since once the ballot is separated from the envolope, it cannot be changed.  If I make a decision on a ballot, it could be changed or challenged in a recount or recanvass).

We check each outer envelope against the list of voters – they must have been marked as voting absentee on the list – they all match.

In Connecticut we don’t validate signatures on envelopes, but they must be signed.  But because the law is very specific that we must check to see that the name of the voter on the inner and outer envelopes must be for the correct voter, we need to do what we can to see if the name is different.  (e.g. if a husband and wife somehow put their votes in the wrong envelopes, then the votes do not count.  If both their votes are in one outer envelope, only the one that matches the outer envelope counts).

The counters count the inner and outer envelopes.  When the count does not match what I counted on the delivery from the registrars, I don’t tell them the original count – I just tell them it does not match and they have to count again – it all balance after no more than two counts for each pile.

Over the course of processing, I reject perhaps 6-8 ballots.  Most are straight-forward decisions because the ballot was in the outside envelope but not in the internal envelope. (A little surprising, the frequency of this particular error).  Three interesting decisions.  One ballot has a different first and last name on the inside envelope and the hand written return address, than the official voter name printed on the outside envelope – rejected.  One inside envelope says that it needs to be hand counted as there are corrections – I rule it has to be mixed with other ballots and we need to make an independent decision on how to count it – otherwise we could know which ballot corresponded to a particular voter.  The counters show me a ballot with some votes crossed out with a ‘NO’ and others substituted – it would have not have been problem, but the voter initialed the ‘NO’ – I ruled it could not be counted because it had identifying marks. (Connecticut is a “Voter Intent State”). There were a couple of other rather unique ballots, but since all the marks had to do with canceling some votes, according to my interpretation of the law, they should be counted.

We could have easily missed an overvote and left it to be machine counted.  The counters went back and reviewed some ballots again and found some overvotes they missed.  In the end we hand counted a dozen or so votes by hand and none of those to be scanned were rejected by the scanners.

At about 5:45 pm, the registrars  arrive with four more absentee ballots.  They say that that is it!  We can now go full speed ahead to finish the job.  We process the envelopes and then the ballots.  The counters hand count all the ballots that we have identified as needing hand counting, by hashmarking on a pre-printed sheet for each district.  The counters ask me to make some decisions on the hand counting of individual votes on the ballot.  I call Judi to say we are ready to scan.

Judi arrives and talks me through setting up and opening the first district on each scanner and their closing.  I was going to go through the steps in the manual, but instead followed Judi’s direction – having done it once for real, I can do all the rest without problems or checking the manual.  I find it much simpler actually doing the steps than it seems when reading about them.  Judi says to call her once we are ready to complete all of the paperwork.

We bring all the ballots to be read by the machine and the memory card pouch to each machine, deal with it and them move the district back to the tables.  Before each district is scanned we print three zero tapes.  After all ballots are scanned we print three totals tapes and empty the ballot bins.  On the second district counted, at first we see no ballots.   We pull out the scanner and open the top and find they are all stopped by a small ridge – but, because it is about 50 ballots, there is no jam.  We check that ridge from below for every subsequent district.

The smallest part of the process is the scanning which is accomplished by two officials at each scanner.  The critical factor is my time – the moderator must setup the machine, unseal and reseal memory cards, print and sign six tapes for each district (the printers are slow, especially considering the three copies).  I find myself going back and forth frequently half-way across the room between the two machines and the waiting officials.  Next time I would put the machines closer, but not too close to risk districts being mixed up. (Here is where my personality comes into play – I tend to rush to keep the counters busy – Here is where I need to be especially sure that I am deliberate).

Why three copies of the tapes?  One is the copy for the moderator’s report – the last zero tape copy is is connected to the first closing copy with the vote counts.  Another copy is posted on the wall.  Another copy goes into the bag with the memory card.

At one point in the process one team points out that I printed four copies not three for one district.  I crunch that one up.  Later in looking at the wall that same team asks me why there are three zero tapes for their districts but only one count tape.   One has yet to be printed out – the other is the crumpled tape which we unravel and sign.  The final tapes are posted on the wall after 8:00, for public observers who are allowed to observe the counting, but not close enough to determine any results before the polls close.  Since we are counting with scanners and so few votes are counted by hand, it would be easy to prevent anyone from knowing the results.  Nobody from the public comes to watch.  As far as I can tell nobody comes to see the tapes to report results to the party.

I find the memory card bags very interesting.  They are tough clear plastic, perhaps 7″x9″.  They have a slot for a paper card for recording seal numbers, my name, date etc.  They have a very interesting zipper and plastic seal arrangement that seems a bit better than the usual plastic seal – just a bit of a challenge to remove two little plastic parts left after breaking the seal that must be removed before applying the new seal.  In addition to the memory card, they contain the pre-election test tape.  I add one copy of the zero tape and one copy of the count tape.  I pick a new seal, write its number on the paper card, place the paper card in the slot inside the bag – visible outside but sealed in.  I close the zipper and apply the seal.

Oooooooooops.  We close the last district scammer.  I pack the scanners in their bags.  Opening the top of one of the machines, it has four ballots stuck in a ridge atop the write-in bin.  We processed write-ins through the machine as there were no valid write-in candidates (votes double votes for a candidate by the usual bubble and/or write-in were hand counted).  But on that one machine, apparently the 1st write-in ballot hung up and the others ended up on top of it.  (Next time I will open the top of the ballot box every time, after each district).

Here is where being logical and surfacing, not hiding problems is important.  Since all ballots are the same in every district it is questionable which district the ballots belong with. Reviewing the four write-in ballots, I see that two ballots only have write-ins for the town council and the other two only for the board of education.  The tapes show the town council write-ins are all in one district so those two ballots can be filed with that district.  Unfortunately, the write-ins for board of education are split between two other districts and the vote counts on the rest of the two ballots are different, so we cannot classify them into a district. We keep them separate and I write a note explaining the problem.  If there is a recanvass or a recount then the totals will need to be combined for the two districts for the purpose of comparison.  Later, Judi will have us rubber band all the ballot envelopes for each district, and rubber band the two districts together with the two write-in ballots between.

The next morning I learn that there will be a racanvass based on a close margin between the lowest winning town council seat and the highest losing seat.  I rest peacefully believing that I handled this correctly.  (But I learn the newspaper reports were wrong – Judi emails me that the candidates are farther apart than initially reported in the paper – there will be no recanvass) .  Yet, part of me knows its easy to make a logical error in handling a situation like this, especially for others with less focus on the details of vote counting or with less of a logical bent – and its always possible that there is some mistake that one of us made that we have yet, if ever, to realize or be discoverd.  There is a lot to get right and a lot to coordinate for the moderator – with the toughest, most detailed part at the end of the night.  Starting at 1:00pm rather than 5:00 am, I am more rested than any polling place moderator.

I call Judi on her offer to help with the paperwork.  For each district I read the hand counts and the tape, while she fills in the form and adds the two numbers.  She reminds me to let the counters do the rest of the work, sealing  and signing envelopes and bring us one district at a time.  In the process there are some envelopes mixed up by district and we have to straighten that out.  I also do the paper work by district reconciling the absentee ballot envelopes delivered with the ballot count by hand, plus machine count, plus rejected – I am a little surprised and greatly relieved that for each of the six districts, everything balances perfectly the 1st time.  After some of districts are complete Judi calls in one of the young officials to replace her, to help me complete the rest of the districts.

I also do the paper work reconciling the envelopes delivered with the ballot count by hand, plus machine count, plus rejected ballots by district – I am a little surprised that for each of the six districts, everything balances perfectly the 1st time.  This is where every step done correctly, every bit of organizing by district and keeping things straight paysoff.  If anything is out of whack then it is a lot of recounting by hand, just when everyone is tired and anxous to go home – the last thing you want to do is have to recount and reconcile when you are tired and think you are done.  This is where experience is a great, yet very expensive teacher – I am lucky to have Judi available for my 1st time – this would be unusual for a polling place moderator except in an a single district town.

We pack everyting up and head downstairs to the registrars’ office.  Judi reads the counts and a young official types them into a spreadsheet.  He prints the page.  I read the totals from the paper work again and another young official checks the printed sheet.  We find one error of one vote which is quickly corrected in the spreadsheet.

What would I do differently next time?  I would pull the scanner and check the bins from the top after each district was scanned.  I would make up the envelopes for each district ahead of time (Judi gave me pre-printed sheets to attach to the envelopes).  I would keep all the totals for each envelope on stickies on the labels until we were sure we had the final counts, so that I would not have to replace the labels.  I would have a talk with my team at the beginning and explain two things:  1) The importance of keeping each district completely separate and maintaining that separation without fail – we had a couple of close calls;  2) The potential for boredom, especially at the end – there are many critical steps for the moderator that require concentration and the rest of the team may have nothing to do.  Next time I would consider having the counters do the forms and totaling while I supervised and later re-checked their work. Having done the process once, with help from Judi, it would be much easier for me next time.

My official role was complete. As I left, I believe, I overheard that the first polling place moderator was arriving with results, ballots and paperwork  for checking.

PS: My next stop was party headquarters in my own town about twenty minutes away.  When I arrived they had all the results available, except the absentee results.  They likely got the results from each polling place before the moderator packed up and left for town hall.  But where were the absentee ballot results?  A couple of the races were close.  The results came in at about 10:30 pm.  Soon, one of the counters from the absentee ballot team arrived.  I asked her what happened? Why did it take so long?  She said they did not get the final absentee ballots until very close to 8:00 pm and did not start scanning until shortly after 8:00 pm.  That pretty much explained it all to me – why it took until 10:30 pm.  They did nine districts in perhaps 1/2 hour less than we did in Vernon.  Now, I am left wondering where the process is differnent in the two towns between the post offices, town clerks, and registrars in the timing of the availablity of the final set of absentee ballots?  In the grand scheme of things, 10:30 pm is not that long to wait for final results.  Especially knowing the team is one mixup or transcription error away from quite a bit of delay and extra work at the end of the day.

Secretary of the State’s Letter To Senator Schumer RE: Premier, ES&S

“We are concerned that this transaction will unduly stifle competition across the country and for Connecticut in a number of significant ways.”

Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz and Deputy Secretary Lesley Mara have sent the following letter to Senator Schumer relative to the Premier acquisition by ES&S.

October 26, 2009

The Honorable Charles Schumer
Chairman
Committee on Rules and Administration
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

RE:  Sale of Diebold’s voting machine business, Premier Election Solutions, Inc. to Election Systems & Software Inc.

Dear Senator Schumer:

Thank you for the opportunity to share our concerns with you and the Committee regarding the sale of Premier Election Solutions, Inc. (“Premier”) to Election Systems and Software, Inc. (“ES&S”).  We greatly appreciate your leadership in this important area and your recognition that this country’s election systems must be rigorously safeguarded.

We are concerned that this transaction will unduly stifle competition across the country and for Connecticut in a number of significant ways.  First, for those states looking for new machines, there will be fewer vendors from which to choose, potentially driving up the cost of purchasing new machines and giving the states less leverage in demanding high standards of quality, especially with respect to transparency and security issues.

Second, once machines are purchased, this transaction can negatively affect the quality of ongoing service contracts with the states, contracts that include ongoing preventive maintenance of the machines and other services.  Since ES&S offers a product that competes with the Premier product purchased by Connecticut, it seems unlikely that ES&S will dedicate sufficient resources and development energies to the extent necessary to support two distinct products.  It seems much more likely that ES&S will devote the majority of its resources to its own present product line to the detriment of those customer states across the country that currently use the Premier product.

Finally, as ES&S positions itself to dominate the voting machine sales and service industry, it also assumes unfair control of the pace and quality of innovation down the road.  In short, if ES&S is “the only game in town,” then the lack of outside competition  may also impact future product innovation in this industry.

By way of background, the State of Connecticut entered into a contract with Diebold (now Premier) in June, 2006 for the acquisition of optical scan voting machines to replace the state’s lever voting machines.  That contract included the purchase of equipment and accessories, training, on-site support during the first use of the equipment, programming of memory cards and ongoing maintenance.  Our contract expires on December 31, 2026.

We conducted our first statewide use of the new equipment in November, 2007 and completed the largest single use of the new voting machines during the historic Presidential election last November.  While that portion of the contract relating to the purchase and delivery of the equipment has been implemented, we have a strong interest in maintaining quality, ongoing service and maintenance of the product we have purchased for the seventeen (17) years that remain on our contract.

One provision in Connecticut’s contract with Premier requires Premier: (1) to address security vulnerabilities identified in a report by the University of California at Berkeley specifically entitled: “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter,”and (2) to provide Connecticut with any upgrade(s) addressing those vulnerabilities at no additional cost.  Those upgrades were supposed to have been provided within one year and that deadline has now passed.  Although Premier has received EAC certification for a new version of its product that it may claim addresses the issues contained in the subject report, the upgrades have not been offered to Connecticut for review.  Now that ES&S has acquired Premier, we are concerned that ES&S may not dedicate the technical and other resources necessary to fulfill this provision in a timely way.

At the same time we chose optical scan voting machines in 2006, we also entered into a contract with IVS, LLC to provide one accessible voting machine at each polling place in the state.  The “Vote-By-Phone” system uses a special telephone at each polling place to allow voters to cast their ballots.  We specifically entered into a year-to-year arrangement for this product because it was, and remains, our goal to find a more permanent solution.  Ultimately, we want a ballot that can be fed into the optical scan voting machine – the vote-by-phone ballots look different and must be hand counted separately.  While the vote-by-phone system is especially helpful for persons who are sight-impaired or blind, we hope that a future technology can accommodate even more disabilities, including providing sip-and-puff options, foot pedals and other features to expand the usefulness and accessibility of the machines.

In anticipating a future Request for Proposal for accessible voting machines, both ES&S and Premier have traditionally offered ballot marking devices that might meet the state’s business requirements.  It was also our understanding that Premier was conducting its own research and technical development to offer a new product that might be even more attractive to customers.  With the acquisition of Premier by ES&S, one vendor is lost to this process and it seems likely that Premier’s innovation and research into any new product will be lost as well.  This transaction will result in fewer vendors participating in the RFP process in Connecticut, with the attendant consequence that the state will have less leverage in negotiating for the best possible price.  Further, as previously mentioned, this dynamic may stifle the innovation that could lead to more efficient machines.

Thank you again for conducting a thorough review of this transaction and its impact on election systems across the country.  It is imperative that competition be maintained to provide optimal opportunities for states to purchase voting machines that are cost-effective and machines that ensure transparency, auditability, security and accuracy.  A more concentrated voting machine industry jeopardizes such competition and places states at a disadvantage in fulfilling their responsibilities to the voters they serve.

Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Susan Bysiewicz
Secretary of the State

Lesley D. Mara
Deputy Secretary of the State

Earlier coverage of the acquisition <here> <here>

Statisticians, Political Scientists, Election Officials, and Advocates Recommendations to NIST

“We strongly recommend that the next version of the VVSG support auditing election outcomes by facilitating small-batch reporting in standardized electronic reporting formats, and usable voter-verifiable cast vote records.”

Last weekend I participated in a working meeting in Alexandria, VA to design pragmatic post-election audits.   One result was a letter to the National Institute of Standards and Testing (NIST) making suggestions for the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines which they are in the process of updating.   I am one of two participants and endorsers from Connecticut <Letter>

Overview

Two key goals of vote tabulation audits are

-To verify that the election outcomes implied by the reported vote totals are correct, and
-To provide data for process improvement: specifically, to identify and quantify various causes of discrepancies between voter intentions and the originally reported vote totals.

Difficulty in obtaining subtotals of the machine tallies to compare with manually-derived totals from small batches of ballots is a major problem. Efficient vote tabulation audits require – in addition to software-independent audit trails – timely, comprehensive, detailed, standardized, machine-readable subtotals of the votes as recorded by the vote tabulation systems. For greatest efficiency, individual ballot interpretations should be available to support emerging methods that audit at the ballot level (that is, batches of size 1) without breaching confidentiality.

Future VVSGs should contain audit-related requirements for all voting systems, designed in consultation with experts in election auditing, to ensure that the next generation of voting systems facilitate election audits.

Key areas for standards include:

-Usability of the paper record
-Comprehensive reporting of all important data elements
-Small-batch or individual ballot reporting capability
-Machine-readable, standard election result reporting formats, with support for standardized identification of contests and candidates, –that facilitate aggregation for electoral contests spanning multiple jurisdictions
-Machine-readable, standard audit result reporting formats, including audit units selected and discrepancies found

…

Voting systems should make it easy to create detailed reports with subtotals by contest, by ballot batch, by precinct, or by scanner or tabulation machine.

One common, standardized data format is needed for reporting audit results, as well as initial election results. Implementation details are outside the scope of this letter; election auditing experts should participate in specifying these requirements.

In summary, we strongly recommend that the next version of the VVSG support auditing election outcomes by facilitating small-batch reporting in standardized electronic reporting formats, and usable voter-verifiable cast vote records.

One a personal note, it was great to meet in person several political scientists, officials and advocates whom I’ve know only from frequent email and conference call presentations; see again, those I have met previously; and meet several additional scientists, advocates, and officials dedicated to election integrity.

Another Candidate for Secretary of the State?

Opponent charges that Mary Glassman might run for Secretary of the State and resign in a year if she is reelected First Selectman, this fall.

Courant: Rough Tactics In Simsbury First Selectman Race <read>

Opponent charges that Mary Glassman might run for Secretary of the State and resign in a year  if she is reelected First Selectman, this fall:

Darren Cunningham, the Republican challenger of incumbent First Selectman Mary Glassman, issued a news release Friday calling on Glassman to pledge that, if re-elected on Tuesday, she will serve out her two-year term and not run for higher statewide office.

Cunningham is calling for Glassman to make such a pledge because of an article Thursday in the online newspaper New Haven Independent. In that article, New Haven Mayor John DeStefano said that he is not endorsing a local candidate for Connecticut secretary of the state because he is waiting to hear whether Glassman will be a candidate for that office.

In 2006, while much attention was paid to the Ned Lamont/Joe Lieberman Primary and U.S. Senate election, there was also a hard fought Democratic Primary for Governor and Lieutenant Governor.  John DeStefano prevailed over Dan Malloy for Governor, yet Malloy’s choice for Lieutenant Governor, Mary Glassman, prevailed and became DeStafano’s runningmate in the general election.  Although they lost, Mary Glassman gained recognition statewide.

Glassman responded during an interview Friday by saying that she was “disappointed” with Cunningham’s news release.

“I’ve worked hard for Simsbury these past two years, and I am looking forward to serving the town over the next two years,” Glassman said. “I have no plans to run for secretary of the state.”

Timely Reminders from Secretary Bysiewicz and CTVotersCount

Referendums and questions are exempt from the Connecticut post-election audit law. However, they are not exempt from the risks of error and fraud.

In a press release, Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz reminds voters of the importance of questions on the November municipal ballots:

“Towns throughout Connecticut are facing some crucial decisions on
schools, local budgets, road repair and other issues, so it is
imperative that voters make their voices heard next Tuesday,” said
Secretary Bysiewicz.  “Local elections are enormously important for
determining the future direction of all of our communities.”

CTVotersCount reminds voters and the legislature that:

Referendums and questions are exempt from the Connecticut post-election audit law.  However, they are not exempt from the risks of error and fraud. The post-election audit law needs to be strengthened is several ways; including subjecting all critical ballots and contests to be subject to selection for audit; and all ballots and contests are critical.

For more information: FAQ: Why Would Anyone Steal A Referendum?

Another Candidate for Secretary Of The State

Gerry Garcia, a financial adviser, who was 9th Ward alderman from 1996 to 2001, promised to be “a new voice to speak on behalf of Connecticut voters and small businesses.”

New Haven Register: Ex-alderman eyes Bysiewicz’s post <read>

A former Democratic alderman is the first person in Connecticut to declare his candidacy for secretary of the state.

Contrary to the story, he is not “the first person”.  Looking at the SEEC site we see two others who have declared their candidacy and have been listed there for several months.  Republicans Richard Abbate and Corey Brinson.  Also on the list is Rep James Spallone’s exploratory committee which we understand is for Secretary of the State (see Update below for another exploratory candidate, Rep Kevin Roldan).

Gerry Garcia, a financial adviser, who was 9th Ward alderman from 1996 to 2001, promised to be “a new voice to speak on behalf of Connecticut voters and small businesses.”…

Garcia has promised to work to make Connecticut an early voting state, which would allow citizens to send in a paper ballot during a limited period leading up to Election Day. Ballots are now available only to those who will be out of town on Election Day.

Garcia, 38, who attended city public schools and earned his undergraduate and master’s in business from Yale University, said he would try to make voting more accessible in the state and would build on reforms instituted by Bysiewicz.

Garcia, who is of Puerto Rican and Jewish descent, headed a Puerto Rican social service organization while at Yale, as well its largest Jewish fraternity.

He worked as an assistant project director at the Anti-Defamation League in 1994. After getting his master’s degree, he moved to New York, where he was an investment banker before returning to Connecticut in 2006…

For all our coverage of the 2010 Secretary of the State race see 2010

*****

Update: New Haven Independent Article <read>  The Independent points out an additional exploratory campaign: <Rep. Kevin Roldan of Hartford>  So now we count three Democrats and two Republicans.

Here is Garcia’s web site: <GarciaForConnecticut.com>

Hartford Advocate: A New Day? [For Elections Enforcement]

Views of elections enforcement from Representative Chris Caruso and SEEC Director Al Lenge.

Hartford Advocate article on State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC) and criticism of its history of enforcement:  A New Day? Critics hope a new head of the state’s Elections Enforcement Commission will be tougher on corrupt politicians <read>

Jeffrey B. Garfield just retired as head of Connecticut’s Elections Enforcement Commission, ending more than 30 years as the official watchdog of our campaign laws.

In theory, Garfield was an ever-vigilant guardian ready to rip the entrails out of any scum-sucking politician who violated our sacred election system.

In reality, Garfield and the EEC more often played the role of flaccid, placid lapdog than ass-chewing election Rottweiler, particularly when it came to incumbent state elected officials.

Garfield’s departure has triggered gushing praise for his long service as well as questions about how effective his enforcement efforts were in the past and whether recent reforms will be able to prevent abuses in the future…

Garfield’s replacement, Albert P. Lenge, insists recent reforms have already made the EEC a tougher, more effective agency. “It’s a brand new day,” Lenge said this week. Let’s hope so…

The EEC seemed more eager to go after challengers and municipal officials than to take on the people who controlled the commission’s budget. The commission almost never launched an investigation on its own, preferring to wait for formal complaints. Garfield said the commission didn’t have the resources to go out looking for violators.

Proof of how weak the enforcement was came in an eruption of federally prosecuted corruption cases that included convictions of ex-Gov. John G. Rowland, Silvester, ex-Bridgeport Mayor Joe Ganim and ex-state Sen. Ernest Newton III. Those scandals finally led in 2005 to passage of public campaign financing and reforms intended to insulate the commission’s enforcement arm from political pressure.

“Had they [Garfield and the EEC] been stronger, had the whistle been blown sooner, you probably wouldn’t have seen the level of corruption that came about,” said state Rep. Chris Caruso, a Bridgeport Democrat who formerly served as co-chairman of the legislature’s Government Administration and Elections Committee…

Lenge, who served as the commission’s deputy director and general counsel since 1995, doesn’t agree with many criticisms of the EEC’s past performance and also argues recent reforms have made the agency even stronger…

“Those were strong enforcement actions,” said Lenge. Caruso thinks the penalties should have been much heavier.

“There’s been a tradition within the EEC to level fines of a few thousand dollars on sitting state officials,” said Caruso. “In public opinion, really those are slaps on the wrist.”

Lenge says the emphasis on bigger fines ignores the effect an EEC reprimand can have on an incumbent’s reelection. “Just a finding [of wrongdoing] or a reprimand sometimes sends a strong message,” Lenge said.

He also disputes there was ever an EEC tactic of going after easy targets like local or challenge candidates.

Lenge said creation of an enforcement unit that is insulated from the director and the rest of the EEC staff has made the agency more independent and more likely to take on powerful incumbents. He also argues the commission has lots more resources now, with a staff that’s grown from seven in 1995 to 52 today. The EEC is now auditing every single 2008 legislative campaign and will initiate investigations if need be.

In the past we have criticized the speed of the SEEC and the Legislature because election regulations and procedures are not enforceable by the SEEC, leaving little room for holding election officials to account for lapses in the conduct of elections and audits.

Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on Citizens United v. FEC

the Court would have to ignore several time-honored principles that have served for the past two centuries to preserve the public’s respect for and acceptance of its decisions…At the oral argument last month, one justice seemed to suggest that it is perfectly acceptable for a tobacco company to try to defeat a candidate who wants to regulate tobacco, and to use its shareholders’ money to do so.

Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on Citizens United v. FEC <read>

The principles involved and the consequences of the case:

while I have disagreed with many Supreme Court decisions, I have great respect for that institution and for the men and women who serve on the Court. But this step would be so damaging to our democracy and is so unwarranted and unnecessary that I must speak out. That is why Senator McCain and I have come to the floor today.

To overrule the Austin decision in this case, the Court would have to ignore several time-honored principles that have served for the past two centuries to preserve the public’s respect for and acceptance of its decisions. First, it is a basic tenet of constitutional law that the Court will not decide a case on constitutional grounds unless absolutely necessary, and that it if there is no choice but to reach a constitutional issue, the Court will decide the case as narrowly as possible…

The second principle is known as stare decisis, meaning that the Court respects its precedents and overrules them only in the most unusual of cases.  Chief Justice John Roberts, whom many believe to be the swing justice in this case, made grand promises of what he called “judicial modesty,” when he came before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2005. Respect for precedent was a key component of the approach that he asked us to believe he possessed…

Talk about a jolt to the legal system. It’s hard to imagine a bigger jolt than to strike down laws in over 20 states and a federal law that has been the cornerstone of the nation’s campaign finance system for 100 years.  The settled expectations that would be upset by this decision are enormous. And subsequent developments surely have not shown that the Austin decision is unworkable. Indeed, the Court relied on it as recently as 2003 in the McConnell case and even cited it in the Wisconsin Right to Life decision just two years ago, written by none other than Chief Justice Roberts. To be sure, there are justices on the Court who dissented from the Austin decision when it came down and continue to do so today. But if stare decisis means anything, a precedent on which so many state legislatures and the American people have relied should not be cast aside simply because a few new justices have arrived on the Court.

Third, the courts decide cases only on a full evidentiary record so that all sides have a chance to put forward their best arguments and the court can be confident that it is making a decision based on the best information available. In this case, precisely because the Supreme Court reached out to pose a broad constitutional question that had not been raised below, there is no record whatsoever to which the Court can turn. None. And the question here demands a complete record because the legal standard under prevailing First Amendment law is whether the statute is designed to address a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that result…

Does the Supreme Court really believe that the First Amendment requires the American people to accept a system where banks and investment firms, having just taken our country into its worst economic collapse since the Great Depression, can spend millions upon millions of dollars of ads directly advocating the defeat of those candidates who didn’t vote to bail them out or want to prevent future economic disaster by imposing strict new financial services regulations?…

At the oral argument last month, one justice seemed to suggest that it is perfectly acceptable for a tobacco company to try to defeat a candidate who wants to regulate tobacco, and to use its shareholders’ money to do so. This is the system that the Supreme Court may bequeath to this country if it doesn’t turn back. Some will say that corporate interests already have too much power

Low Tech, Computer Hack

Just a little reminder that we can have all the physical security, encryption, open source, and source disclosure in the world. Yet, there are still low tech ways to hack systems available to high school “D students”.

Update: Nationwide: Computers Increase Students’ Temptation To Cheat

Just a little reminder that we can have all the physical security, encryption, open source, and source disclosure in the world. Yet, there are still low tech ways to hack systems available to high school “D students”.  Courant story from Manchester. Connecticut <read>

Two Manchester High School students breached the school district’s computer system and altered grades and attendance records, police said Tuesday.

The incident remains under investigation.

Police said the students learned the user name and password to the system from watching a school administrator log in.

They changed grades and attendance records multiple times over the past two weeks, police said. One of the students changed a grade from a D to a C, police said. Another student discovered what they were doing and told a school official about it.

Update: 10/30/2009 Courant: Nationwide: Computers Increase Students’ Temptation To Cheat <read>

More evidenced that it does not take researcg at Princeton or UConn to cheat with computers.  Are registrars any more savvy than school administrators in preventing and detecting fraud?

Much of it is using computers for cheating, but some is hacking:

There’s nothing new about cheating, said Lt. James Wardwell, a computer forensics expert with the New Britain Police Department, “and the computer is just another tool to help someone accomplish a bad deed.”

What is new is that cheating in America’s high schools has become “rampant, and it’s getting worse,” according to a 2008 nationwide survey by the Josephson Institute, the California-based nonprofit organization that runs the Character Counts! youth ethics program in schools in Connecticut and throughout the country.

The survey of 30,000 high school students found that 64 percent said they had cheated on a test during the past year, up from 60 percent in 2006. The survey did not address school computer hacking, but 36 percent of respondents said they had used the Internet to plagiarize an assignment, an increase from 33 percent in 2006.

Some students have been lured into cyber-cheating by the apparent cloak that computers and personal communication devices provide, Michael Josephson, president of the ethics institute, said. Armed with stolen information, kids can enter school record systems from their bedrooms, or they can photograph copies of tests with their cellphones and send them to others who have to take the same test…

Newspaper reports from throughout the country show that the methods students use to crack school computer programs range from simply watching a school staff member entering a password — the method used in Manchester, according to police — to sneaking spyware onto school computers. “Key-logger” programs, for instance, record all strokes on a computer keyboard and send a record to another computer.

In some cases, cyber-cheating students have lifted user names and passwords from hard copy lists left in school offices. Some school staff members use their own names, or slightly altered variations, as passwords, enabling a student to enter a grading or attendance site after a few guesses.

That was the case in Naples, Fla., recently, where police say a 16-year-old boy slipped into school district computers by guessing an employee’s password. The boy was then able to change the grades of five or six students, according to Florida news reports.

Nationwide: Computers Increase Students’ Temptation To Cheat